Skip to main content

Full text of "Hold high the torch; a history of the 4th Marines"

See other formats







QUANTICOVA 22134-diG? 

"Take up our quarrel with the foe: 
To you from failing hands we throw 

The torch; be yours to hold it high. 

If ye break faith with us who die 
We shall not sleep, though poppies grow 

In Flanders fields" 


"]y(,5, hl^/A/e, Corps / 

» t ft 


A History of the 4th Marines 


Historical Branch, G-3 Division 
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps 
Washington, D.C., i960 


Library of Congress 
Catalog Card No. 60-60001 

MAY 24 1961 


The 4th Marine Regiment, in its near half century of service, 
has acquired a sense of tradition and esprit de corps distinctive 
even in a Corps noted for these qualities. My first acquaintance 
with the 4th Marines was in 1924, when, as a young second 
lieutenant, I joined the regiment in Santo Domingo. In 1927, 
I rejoined to sail with it to China on another tour of expedi- 
tionary duty. 

Both these expeditions were typical of Marine Corps missions 
in those days. Though less spectacular than the regiment's 
World War II operations in the Philippines, Guam, and Oki- 
nawa, they were nevertheless essential to the carrying out of our 
national policy. Such military operations as did take place were 
of the "small war" variety, which have long been a Marine Corps 
specialty, but much of the duty was more diplomatic than mili- 
tary, calling for achieving results through friendly cooperation 
with foreign peoples and governments. 

In its performance of duty, the 4th Marines has always been 
a "second-to-none" outfit. Today, as a vital part of the Marine 
Corps as the nation's force in readiness, the regiment is prepared 
to embark at a moment's notice for duty anywhere in the world. 
Whatever the mission, the 4th Marines will live up to its highest 
traditions for service. ^ 

R. McC. Pate 

General, U.S. Marine Corps 
Commandant of the Marine Corps 



Hold High the Torch, the first of a series of regimental and 
squadron histories in preparation by the Historical Branch, G-3 
Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, is designed primarily 
to acquaint the members of the 4th Marines, past and present, 
with the history of their regiment. In addition, it is hoped this 
volume will enlarge public understanding of the Marine Corps' 
worth both in limited war and as a force in readiness. During 
most of its existence the 4th Marines was not engaged in active 
military operations, but service of the regiment in China, the 
Dominican Republic, and off the west coast of Mexico, was 
typical of the Marine Corps' support of national policy. 

In many of its combat operations, the 4th Marines was only 
one element of a much larger force. In other instances, as in 
the Dominican Republic and China, the regiment was a subordi- 
nate unit in situations which were essentially political and diplo- 
matic. Only so much of these higher echelon activities as are 
essential to an understanding of the 4th Marines story have been 
told. Admittedly, some loss of perspective results, but this is a 
regimental history and the focus is therefore on the 4th Marines. 

Colonel Charles W. Harrison, Head of the Historical Branch, 
conceived the regimental history program and edited the final 
manuscript. Many veterans of the 4th Marines contributed to 
this book by commenting on preliminary drafts or through inter- 
views with the Historical Branch. To them grateful acknowl- 
edgment is made. Mr. John Marley and Mr. Stephen Podlusky, 
the Historical Branch archivists, Mrs. Nickey McLain the li- 
brarian, and Mrs. Laura Delahanty of the Central Files of Marine 
Corps Headquarters were most helpful to the authors in locating 



source material. Captain D'Wayne Gray and Miss Kay P. Sue, 
his assistant in the Administrative and Production Section of the 
Historical Branch, processed the volume from first drafts through 
final printed form. Mrs. Miriam Smallwood typed the many 
preliminary versions and the final manuscript. The maps were 
prepared by the Training Aids Group, Marine Corps Educa- 
tional Center, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia. Act- 
ing Sergeant Henry K. Phillips did most of the actual drawing. 

W. J. Van Ryzin 
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps 
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 



Foreword v 
Preface vii 


Force in Readiness — Early 20th Century Model 1 
chapter 11 

Intervention in the Dominican Republic 29 


Occupation Duty in the Dominican Republic 69 


Force in Readiness — Austerity Model 1 01 


China Marines 1 1 9 


Japan Goes To Town 1 49 


Defense of the Philippines 195 


Emirau and Guam 241 




Okinawa 279 


Occupation of Japan and China 33 1 


Force in Readiness — Mid-Century Model 361 


Glossary of Abbreviations and Technical Terms 389 


Chronology 394 


Regimental Honors 4 02 


Regimental Citations and Commendations 405 


Medal of Honor Citations 4 1 1 


Command List 4 J 3 


Regimental Strength 420 


Regimental Casualties 4 22 

Bibliography 423 

Index 43 1 

List of Maps 


1. Mexico, 1914-1916 15 

2. Panama Canal Strategic Area, 1916 32 

3. Hispaniola Island 38 

4. Northwest Dominican Republic 40 

5. Las Trencheras 48 

6. Guayacanas 55 

7. Eastern Santo Domingo, 191 6-1 91 8 73 

8. China 122 

9. Shanghai, 1927 132 

10. Shanghai, 1932-1941 155 

11. 4th Marines Defense Sector, 1932 158 

12. 4th Marines Defense Sector, 1937 170 

13. The Shanghai Area 177 

14. Manila Bay 197 

15. Bataan 211 

16. Longoskaway an Point 213 

17. Corregidor 223 

18. The Japanese Landing 235 

19. The Western Pacific 246 

20. Emirau — 4th Marines Landing, 20 March 1943 249 

21. Guam 255 

22. 4th Marines Beachhead, 21-23 July 1944 261 

23. The Capture of Orote Peninsula 267 

24. The Final Drive, 7-10 August 275 

25. Okinawa 286 

26. Landing and Advance, 1-4 April 290 

27. Capture of Mt. Yaetake 301 




28. Shuri Line and Naha, 19-27 May 312 

29. Seizure of Oroku Peninsula 319 

30. Last Action in Okinawa 329 

3 1 . 4th Marines Land on Japanese Soil, 30 August 1 945 336 

32. Japan 372 

33. Oahu Island 381 


Force in Readiness- 
Early 20th Century Model 


The 4th Marine regiment dates its history from 1 o March 1 9 1 1 . 
The occasion for activation of the regiment was the outbreak of 
revolution in Mexico, and, while President Taft had no desire 
for war with the republic below the Rio Grande, he felt the need 
for a military force in being with which to exert pressure in 
protection of the interests of the United States. Much is currently 
being written concerning such applications of limited military 
force to achieve limited national goals. But even in 1 9 1 1 , this 
was not a new concept. As early as 1798, ships of the nation's 
infant Navy had fought to preserve the freedom of the seas for 
American commerce in the quasi-war with France. In following 
years, limited operations had been conducted in many parts of 
the globe in support of the national interest. By 1 9 1 1 , the Marine 
Corps, alone, had conducted more than 100 landings, exclusive 
of major wars. 

In March 1 9 1 1 the United States acted to support the existing 
regime in Mexico. Porfirio Diaz, after 43 years of absolute rule, 
was in danger of overthrow by Francisco Madero. President Taft 
feared that Madero might succeed in ousting Diaz, who had al- 



ways been friendly to the United States and to American citizens 
investing in Mexican railroads and other industries. 1 

"I am glad to aid him," the President had written in 1909, 
". . . for the reason that we have two billion American dollars 
in Mexico that will be endangered if Diaz were to die and his 
government go to pieces." 2 

It was to support Diaz, the friend of American interests, that 
Taft ordered concentrations of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps 
along the Mexican border and off both her coasts. Ostensibly 
maneuvers, they were, as the State Department informed the 
Mexican Ambassador in Washington, intended to aid Diaz by 
discouraging rebel activities near the border. 

Four regiments of Marines participated in this show of force, 
but only one is the concern of this history. It was destined to 
become the 4th Marines, although it did not carry that designation 
at first. Major General Commandant William P. Biddle received 
the Navy Department order for its activation on the afternoon of 
Monday, 6 March 1 9 1 1 . Lights burned late that night in Marine 
Corps Headquarters, and the next morning orders flashed across 
the country by telegraph to posts and stations on the Pacific 
coast. 3 

Colonel Charles A. Doyen, then commanding Marine Barracks, 
Puget Sound Navy Yard, was ordered that morning to report for 
duty at San Francisco as commanding officer of a provisional 
regiment. He was to embark his command for movement by sea 
to San Diego. There he would transfer to cruisers of the Pacific 
Fleet, ready for a dash to the west coast of Mexico. With 4 other 

1 For Mexican affairs and U.S.-Mexican relations, see Dana G. Munro, 
The Latin American Republics (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), 
PP- 383-426; Wilfred H. Calcott, The Caribbean Policy of the United States, 
i8go—igao (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), pp. 258-374; and 
Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: 
F. S. Crofts & Company, 1947), PP- 577-631. 

* Quoted in Calcott, op. cit., p. 294. 

1 "Mobilizing on Texas Frontier," Army and Navy Journal, v. XLVIII, 
no. 28 ( 1 iMari 1 ), p. 830. 


officers and 215 enlisted men slated for the new outfit, Colonel 
Doyen pulled out of Seattle on a special train the following day, 
Wednesday, 8 March. 

Meanwhile, Marine Barracks at Mare Island Navy Yard in 
San Francisco Bay was bustling with activity. Marines coming 
off liberty could tell something was up when they returned to 
barracks to see the squad rooms a jumble of sea bags, combat packs, 
new equipment, and tropical khaki uniforms. Five officers and 
193 enlisted men of the Mare Island detachment were under 
orders to Colonel Doyen's provisional regiment. Later in the day, 
an additional 3 officers and 5 1 men for the regiment were ferried 
across the bay to Mare Island from the Naval Training Station 
on Yerba Buena Island. That evening they all embarked on 
board the naval transport Buffalo. 

Thursday, 9 March, was a busy day for all hands. Working 
parties of Marines and sailors loaded three months' rations and 
a quarter of a million rounds of .30 caliber ammunition on the ship. 
They also stowed on board two of the Marine Corps' latest 
weapons — the now famous Springfield Model 1903 rifles, issued 
to West Coast Marines for the first time, and Colt heavy machine 
guns. By evening all the Marine supplies and gear had been 
loaded below decks, and the Buffalo cast off her moorings from 
the Mare Island wharf to anchor off Vallejo Junction, there to 
wait for the Puget Sound detachment. It arrived on Friday 
afternoon, 10 March, and lost no time in loading on board the 
naval tug Unadilla to be ferried out to the waiting transport. By 
evening all were on board, and the Buffalo weighed her anchor 
and steamed out through the Golden Gate, bound for San Diego. 4 

Only four and half days had elapsed between receipt of the 
original orders at Marine Corps Headquarters and the departure 
of the regiment from San Francisco. True to its tradition for 
readiness, the Marine Corps had prepared and embarked the 

4 San Francisco Chronicle, 8-1 1 Mar 1 1 ; Army and Navy Journal, v. 
XLVIII, no. 29 ( i8Mari 1 ) , pp. 867, 869-870. 


regiment in the minimum time. "There wasn't any fuss about 
their mobilizing," said the widely popular Harper's Weekly. 
"There never is. Just an order issued and . . . one regiment 
after another are on their way to Cuba, or Mexico, or the world's 
end. Where they are going isn't the Marine's concern. Their 
business is to be always ready to go." 5 

From the Secretary of the Navy came a commendation in 
more formal language. "In view of the efficient and rapid 
mobilization of the provisional regiments of Marines recently 
despatched to Guantanamo and San Diego," he said, "all de- 
tachments having been embarked in the transports in a shorter 
time than had been anticipated, the Department takes pleasure 
in congratulating the Marine Corps on having maintained its 
past record for readiness for service." 6 

As the Buffalo steamed into San Diego harbor early Sunday 
morning, 12 March, Marines crowding her rails could see the 
lean gray hulls of five armored cruisers — the California, Mary- 
land, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and West Virginia — swinging 
at anchor. Later in the day the Leathernecks transferred from 
the transport to these fighting ships — ready for a dash southward 
if it became necessary. 

No orders came. After a week of waiting, Colonel Doyen 
and his Marines debarked on 20 March to bivouac on North 
Island. There they would be able to stretch their legs and get 
in some much-needed training and would still be available if 
needed. 7 

North Island is one of two islands which transform San Diego 
Harbor from a broad bay, wide open to the full force of the 
Pacific Ocean, into one of the finest landlocked harbors on the 

6 Charles Noble, "Sitting on the Lid," Harper's Weekly, v. LV, no. 2844 
(24Junn), p. 1912. 

8 SecNav ltr to CMC, dtd i8Marn. Unless otherwise cited, official cor- 
respondence is filed in Case No. 13425, HQMC GenCorrFile, 1904-11, NA. 

7 4th ProvRegt, MRolls, io-3iMam; CinCPac msg to CMC, dtd 
i2Mari 1. 


Pacific Coast. North Island and its neighbor, Coronado, are not 
true islands at all, for they are linked to the mainland by a 
narrow sandspit which runs from the southern headland of the 
harbor north across the broad mouth of the bay, leaving only 
a narrow channel open to the sea at the northern end. A flat 
expanse of sand and scrub growth, North Island presented no 
cheerful sight to the Marines as the boats carrying them ashore 
from the cruiser squadron approached the beach. 

Once ashore the Marines went into bivouac, naming their 
encampment Camp Thomas in honor of Rear Admiral Chauncey 
Thomas, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Citizens of 
San Diego were amazed by the efficiency and order displayed 
by the Leathernecks. 

"If one would search the entire country it would be impossible 
to find a camp which compares with that of the Marines in 
regard to sanitary arrangement and hygienic conditions," re- 
ported the San Diego Union. "Occupying a stretch of the level 
mesa of the island, the camp extends from almost the water's edge 
to a point 500 feet from the blue Pacific. It is much like a sub- 
divided tract," continued the Union. "Of course there are no 
contouring roads, but in their place are streets of immaculate 
cleanliness, kept clean, sanitary, and healthful on account of the 
almost eternal vigilance which is exercised." 8 

Colonel Doyen now organized his command into two battal- 
ions of two rifle companies each. Companies A and B consti- 
tuted the 1 st Battalion under command of Captain John N. 
Wright, while Companies C and E made up the 2d Battalion, 
commanded by Captain William W. Low. Company D, a 
machine gun outfit, came directly under regimental command. 9 

On 20 April, Doyen's command became officially the 4th 
Provisional Regiment, U.S. Marines, a designation assigned by 
the Commandant to distinguish it from the three other provisional 

8 The San Diego Union, 2 7Mari 1. 

9 4th ProvRegt, MRolls, 10-3 1 Man 1. 

519667—60 2 


Marine regiments organized in response to the Mexican crisis. 10 
Each day saw intensive training for all hands. Owing to 
cramped conditions at Mare Island and Puget Sound, West 
Coast Marines seldom got a chance for field exercises. A high 
percentage of recruits with less than three months service in the 
regiment made training particularly urgent, leading one of the 
regimental officers later to remark that "it was some mob we 
started out with." 11 Colonel Doyen was determined to take 
advantage of training opportunities on North Island to turn 
the "mob" into an efficient command. 

From reveille at 0615 until retreat parade at 1730 the Marines 
hustled. Physical exercise, close order drill by companies, bat- 
talions, and regiment, and marches under full pack and equip- 
ment were the order of the day. Rifle marksmanship training 
was carried out on a range constructed by 1st Lieutenant Holland 
M. Smith. 12 The culmination of training ashore came on 27 
April when the Marines joined sailors of the cruiser squadron of 
the Pacific Fleet in a landing exercise on North Island. Landing 
from ships' boats, the Marines and bluejackets waded ashore to 
attack an imaginary enemy entrenched behind the shore line. 
Having defeated the enemy, the landing force lined up for in- 
spection by Admiral Thomas. 13 

That the training program was producing results was attested 
by Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss, USA, Commanding Gen- 
eral, Department of California. After inspecting the regiment 
at North Island he telegraphed Admiral Thomas: "This after- 
noon I inspected Colonel Doyen's regiment of Marines, and con- 
gratulate you and him on having such a fine command." 14 Ad- 

10 CMC ltr to CinCPac, soApri 1. 

n Col Paul A. Capron ltr to CMC, dtd 25N0V57 (Monograph & Comment 
File, HistBr, HQMC). 

12 Holland M. "Howling Mad" Smith gained lasting fame as the dynamic 
leader of the V Amphibious Corps and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, during 
World War II. 

13 Capron, op. cit.; The San Diego Union, 27Mam and 28Aprn. 

14 Gen Tasker H. Bliss, USA msg to CominCh, dtd 2gMarii, quoted in 
CominCh ltr to CMC, dtd 3oMari 1. 


miral Thomas, when he inspected the regiment himself a few 
weeks later, was also impressed, writing to the Commandant 
that "the cleanliness and hygienic conditions of the camp, the 
discipline of the force, and their steadiness and perfection in drill 
merits the highest praise." 15 

These good reports by high-ranking officers failed to take ac- 
count of a serious morale problem in the regiment. By the end 
of May disturbing accounts of absences without leave began to 
trickle into Marine Corps Headquarters in Washington. Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Rufus H. Lane, the Assistant Adjutant and In- 
spector, who was sent out to investigate, learned that the rumors 
were all too true. When he arrived at Camp Thomas on i 
June he found that 90 men were being carried as deserters. 
Most of these men were recruits with less than three months' 
service. Disillusioned by the rigors of life in bivouac, these 
short-service Marines had seized the first opportunity to take 
French leave. 16 

Before any action could be taken to reduce the absentee rate, 
Colonel Doyen was ordered to disband the 4th Provisional Regi- 
ment. Diaz had been overthrown at the end of May. The 
revolution was over — one of the quickest and least bloody in 
Mexican history. Moreover, the speedy Marine mobilization 
had so impressed the Navy Department that it was no longer 
considered necessary to keep Marine forces fully mobilized within 
striking distance of the Rio Grande. On 24 June, the regiment 
was disbanded, and all but 9 officers and 204 enlisted men re- 
turned to their home stations. The officers and men remaining 
at Camp Thomas formed a two-company battalion for expedi- 

15 CinCPac ltr to CMC, dtd sMayi 1. 

"SecNav ltr to LtCol Rufus H. Lane, dtd 2gMayn; LtCol Lane ltr to 
CMC, dtd 3junn. This episode was not without benefit to the Marine 
Corps. It was partly responsible for the establishment, later in the year, of 
the recruit depot system for basic training of all Marines, which is still in 
effect today. CMC, Report . . ., in Annual Reports of the Navy Department 
for the Fiscal Year igu (Washington: Navy Dept, 1912). 


tionary duty with the fleet. On 6 July this battalion, too, was 
disbanded. 17 


The disbanding of the 4th Provisional Regiment and of the 
other regiments mobilized in the Mexican crisis of 1 9 1 1 was in 
keeping with previous Marine Corps policy. 18 Originally con- 
ceived as a military force for service with the Navy afloat and 
ashore, the Marine Corps had consisted at first of only two types 
of permanent operational units. These were the ship's detach- 
ment and the Marine guard for naval shore installations. There 
were no permanent companies, battalions, regiments, or other 
tactical organizations either for landing operations or for fighting 
ashore. When landing forces were required in support of naval 
operations, they were formed by the Marines and sailors of the 
fleet or, in cases where greater numbers were needed, by specially 
organized battalions or regiments drawn from the Marine de- 
tachments at naval installations ashore. 

A secondary mission, written into the 1798 law establishing 
the Marine Corps, was "to do duty in the forts and garrisons of 
the United States, on the sea-coast or any other duty on shore, 
as the President at his discretion, shall direct." 19 Under this 
provision Marines had fought alongside Army troops in the 
Florida Indian campaigns of 1 835-1 842, in the War with Mex- 
ico, the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War. But the 

17 Army and Navy Journal, v. XL VIII, no. 41 (iojunn), p. 1241; 4th 
ProvRegt MRolls, 1 Jun-3 1 Jul 1 1 . 

18 Unless otherwise cited, the material in this section is derived from Clyde 
H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1939), pp. 286-312; and Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, 
The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1 951), pp. 21-24. 

" "An Act for the establishing and organizing a Marine Corps, Approved 
July 11, 1798," I Stat., 594. 


land operations occurred so infrequently that the Marine Corps 
did not feel justified in maintaining permanent tactical organiza- 
tions for the purpose. 

At the end of the 19th century this country entered into its 
new role as an important world power. This brought new 
missions to the Marine Corps and a new tactical structure with 
which to carry them out. Americans in all walks of life came 
to believe that, now the continent had been conquered, it was 
the manifest destiny of the United States to expand beyond its 
continental boundaries. The Spanish-American War ushered 
in a decade of vigorous expansion, and when the tumult and 
shouting had died away the American people awoke to find their 
country was, indeed, a World Power, owning the overseas terri- 
tories of Puerto Rico, Guam, Hawaii, Midway, Wake, American 
Samoa, and the Philippines, and exercising a protectorate over 
Cuba, and virtual protectorate over Panama. 

With American expansion in full swing, the Marine Corps 
became a vital component of the military strength needed to 
police overseas possessions. During the early years of the 20th 
century, Marines served ashore for extended periods in the newly 
acquired possessions and expanded spheres of interest. In the 
Philippines a brigade served continuously until 19 14. Marine 
forces, which fluctuated in size from battalion to brigade, were 
stationed in Panama from 1902 to 19 14, and in Cuba from 1906 
to 1909. This almost continuous demand for Marine expedi- 
tionary forces organized for action ashore naturally created pres- 
sure for a permanent tactical organization. 

Pressure for an organization of this sort came also from another 
source during these same years. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the 
eloquent proponent of sea power, had pointed out the vital 
necessity for advance fleet bases if the modern steam Navy, de- 
pendent on coal, was to operate at remote distances from home 
stations. The Spanish-American War drove home to American 
naval planners the validity of Admiral Mahan's doctrine. Even 


for extended fleet operations in waters as close as the Caribbean 
such bases were a necessity, and the acquisition of possessions in 
the Far East made the need even more acute. 

Marines had been involved in this new undertaking from the 
first. An embryo advance base force had been employed during 
the Spanish-American War, when Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. 
Huntington's Marine battalion had seized and successfully de- 
fended Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. After the war, the General 
Board of the Navy, impressed by these events, determined to set 
up a permanent advance base force. 

The Marine Corps, a military force with naval experience, 
was selected for this new mission. An advance base class for 
Marine officers and men was conducted at Newport, Rhode 
Island in 1901, and a battalion conducted advance base maneu- 
vers on the Caribbean island of Culebra in the winter of 1902-3. 
Involvement in expeditionary duty in Cuba, Panama, and the 
Philippines prevented further advance base work until 19 10, 
when an advance base school was established at New London, 
Connecticut, and the job of training Marines and of evolving 
tactics and organization for advance base defense began in ear- 
nest. As early as 191 1, Marine officers were recommending a 
permanent advance base regiment, and the following year Major 
Dion Williams outlined a proposal for an advance base force 
of two brigades of two regiments each, one brigade to be sta- 
tioned on each coast. 20 

No immediate action was taken on this proposal, but the 
Commandant won approval for a less ambitious scheme for the 
rapid formation of advance base or expeditionary forces. In 
1 9 1 1 , he directed the commanding officers at all major Marine 
barracks to divide their commands into two parts. The first of 
these was to be a barracks detachment charged with routine 
housekeeping functions. The second was to consist of tactically 

20 Dion Williams, The Naval Advance Base (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 19 12), pp. 15-16. 


organized companies that could be assembled to form expedi- 
tionary forces of battalion, regiment, or even brigate size. 21 
Marine expeditionary forces could now be created by assembling 
whole companies rather than individuals. 22 

The Advance Base Force became a reality on 23 December 
19 1 3 when a brigade made up of the 1st and 2d Regiments was 
organized at Philadelphia. General Biddle hoped eventually to 
create a similar force on the West Coast, but Marine manpower 
was spread so thin that only a few companies could then be or- 
ganized at Mare Island and Puget Sound. 23 

Thus by 19 14, the first two permanent regiments in the Marine 
Corps had been created. Unlike the regiments of previous years, 
they were assembled not just for a specific expedition but were 
to exist continuously as a regular part of the Marine Corps estab- 
lishment. Marine Corps plans for further expansion of its per- 
manent tactical organization held out hope for a rebirth of the 
4th Regiment, this time on a permanent basis. 


The turbulent affairs of our neighbor south of the Rio Grande 
furnished the occasion for reactivation of the 4th Regiment on 
16 April 1 9 14. The relatively peaceful transfer of power from 
Diaz to Madero had proven to be just the beginning rather than 
the end of the Mexican revolution. Madero was a weak man 
who had very little comprehension of the social and economic 
forces his revolution had unleashed. Completely lacking in 
political skill, he failed to grant the social reforms so ardently 

21 CMC ltr to OIG Paymaster's Dept, dtd 20J11I11 (Case No. 16237, 
HQMC GenCorrFile, 1904-11, NA). 

23 At first the companies were designated at each barracks by letter, A, B, G, 
etc., but this sometimes resulted in the inclusion of more than one company 
with the same letter in an expeditionary force. To avoid this confusion 
numerical designations assigned by Marine Corps Headquarters were substi- 

23 1st AdvBaseBrig, MRolls, i-3iDeci3. 


desired by the poorer classes. Moreover, he was unable to main- 
tain the strong-handed order so necessary for the continued sup- 
port of the wealthy and conservative elements. 

It was only a matter of time before Madero himself became 
the victim of revolution. In February 19 13, an army revolt led 
by Victoriano Huerta toppled Madero from power. Huerta, 
with the approval of the Mexican Congress, at once assumed the 
presidency and within a few months had gained recognition from 
all the leading European powers. President Wilson, however, 
refused to recognize the "unspeakable Huerta." In November 
19 1 3, he called for the resignation of that "desperate brute" 
Huerta, and in February 19 14 he lifted the U.S. arms embargo 
so as to permit materials of war to reach Huerta's principal op- 
ponents, Venustiano Carranza and Francisco Villa. 

Relations between the two countries took a dramatic turn for 
the worse on 9 April when a ration party from the Dolphin was 
seized at Tampico. The men were soon released, but Huerta 
refused to make the formal apology demanded by the United 
States. Wilson countered by a show of force. On the 14th 
he issued orders for a concentration of ships and Marines on both 
coasts of Mexico. The next day Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, 
Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Puget 
Sound, was handed the following telegram from Marine Corps 
Headquarters : 

Report Commandant Navy Yard Puget Sound for 
special temporary foreign tropical shore service com- 
manding Fourth Regiment. Upon arrival San Fran- 
cisco report to senior officer present and upon joining 
of troops from Mare Island organize regiment one 3- 
inch landing gun battery . . . and two battalions of 
three companies each. 24 

24 CMC msg to Col Joseph H. Pendleton, dtd i5Apri4 (Pendleton, Joseph 
H., 0753-2, Orders File, RecsBr, PersDept, HQMC). 


At both the Puget Sound and Mare Island Navy Yards, the 
scenes of March 1 9 1 1 were re-enacted. It was an easier mobili- 
zation, though, because of the smooth functioning of the perma- 
nent company plan. There was no hasty throwing together of 
companies at the gangplank this time. Instead, orders were 
passed to the company commanders of seven Marine companies 
to prepare for "temporary foreign tropical shore service beyond 
the seas." 

The Marines of the 25th, 26th, and 27th Companies boarded 
the armored cruiser South Dakota at Puget Sound on the 18th, 
bound for San Francisco. At Mare Island the 31st, 32d, 34th, 
and 35th Companies had been alerted two days before and were 
now standing by, waiting for the arrival of the South Dakota. 
Navy authorities were busy readying the collier Jupiter for sea. 
She took on a full load of coal as well as the Marines' artillery 
and small-arms ammunition and supplies. 

At noon on 2 1 April the 34th and 35th Companies, which had 
been given the dubious privilege of riding the Jupiter to Mexico, 
boarded two Navy tugs and were ferried across the bay from 
Mare Island to California City. As the tugs neared the shore 
the Marines on board could hear band music and see crowds 
jamming the ends of the piers. Debarking from the tugs, the 
two companies fell in for final inspection on the dock. Then, 
to the strains of "The Girl I Left Behind Me," they boarded the 

A few minutes before sundown the 31st and 32d Companies 
came over from Mare Island to board the South Dakota which 
had slipped quiedy into San Francisco Bay that morning. 25 As 
the Marines went on board, extras of the San Francisco news- 
papers were proclaiming in banner headlines : 

25 4th Regt, MRolls, i-3oApri4; San Francisco Chronicle, 1 7-18-2 1- 



Since the mobilization order of 14 April, events had moved 
swiftly. Huerta still refused to apologize and, by the 1 9th, Presi- 
dent Wilson was convinced that armed intervention might be 
necessary. He went before Congress on the 20th to ask for and 
receive permission to use American armed forces to obtain the 
fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States. 

The crisis came the next day. W ord reached Washington that 
a German merchantman was about to land a cargo of arms for 
Huerta at Vera Cruz. Wilson gave the order for armed inter- 
vention, and, after a naval bombardment, Marines and blue- 
jackets stormed ashore to capture the city. 27 It was with every 
expectation of a fight that the 4th Regiment sailed from San 
Francisco for the west coast Mexican port of Mazatlan on the 
morning of 22 April. 28 

On the 25th, the fourth day out, new orders were received 
directing the South Dakota to proceed with all possible speed 
to Acapulco, a sleepy little port some 300 miles south of Mazatlan. 
(See Map 1.) The American Consul, Clement S. Edwards, and 
a number of Americans had fled the town a few days before, in 
fear of the followers of the peon chieftain, Emiliano Zapata. In 
the wardroom of the South Dakota the rumor was that the regi- 
ment would push all the way to Mexico City. Colonel Pendle- 
ton and his staff were busy drawing up the landing plan, and 
company officers briefed their men on its details. Boat drills 
were carried out, the men assembling fully equipped at their re- 
spective boat stations. Marines of the 25th Company fired their 
3 -inch landing guns. Machine gun crews, too, had a chance to 
shoot a few rounds. 

28 San Francisco Chronicle, 22Apri4. 

27 Bailey, op. cit., pp. 606-607. 

28 Unless otherwise cited, this section on operations off the west coast of 
Mexico is based on eye witness accounts by Albert J. Porter, special cor- 
respondent of the San Francisco Chronicle on board the cruisers South Dakota 
and California, San Francisco Chronicle, 23Apr-3Juli4. 


One cause for misgivings was that the Jupiter, carrying most 
of the stores and ammunition, remained at Mazatlan. In the 
event of a march overland to Mexico City, some 160 miles inland 
from Acapulco, or even a landing to occupy this port, vital sup- 
plies would be 300 miles away. 

On the morning of 28 April the South Dakota steamed into 
Acapulco harbor. Her guns were trained on the shore, and her 
band played "The Star-Spangled Banner" as she passed through 
the broad passage between the curve of the mainland and an 
island that hangs on the outer reef. Marines and sailors on 
her deck could see the Mexican flag barely fluttering over the 
ancient fortress whose battered brown walls gleamed in the sun- 
light. The adobe huts of the little town nestled about the base 
of the 100-foot promontory on which the fortress was situated. 
As the South Dakota swung around the point into the harbor the 
tiny figures of Mexican soldiers detached themselves from the 
base of the fortress and scurried into the hills which ring the 
town. By the time the cruiser dropped her anchor some 900 
yards off the fortress, every male inhabitant had vanished. Only 
a few women and children scampered over the white sand of 
the beach, and they soon disappeared, too. 

In an effort to induce the local authorities to come out to his 
ship, Captain William W. Gilmer had the yellow quarantine 
flag run up, but without success. After about an hour a small 
boat was seen putting out from the shore. It approached the 
cruiser, and Senor Fernandez, a Spaniard who was representing 
the American and British governments as well as his own, came 
on board. A salute of seven guns was ordered for him, but he 
raised his hand in alarm. "If you fire, all the people will run 
away and never come back," he exclaimed. "They are scared 
to death of the big ship." Gilmer, who had received orders from 
the Navy Department to avoid hostile actions towards the Mexi- 
cans, assured Fernandez that the presence of the South Dakota 
was merely a precautionary measure. 


Although the 4th Regiment rank and file hoped for quick 
action, Colonel Pendleton had no orders to land. The Marines 
and sailors settled down for an uneventful stay. The little town 
continued to drowse as before, and from the ship Mexican sentries 
could be seen in the fort, pacing up and down. A lone 6-inch 
gun was trained on the South Dakota, the tampion removed, and 
occasionally a Mexican could be seen to pat the breech. Ac- 
cording to current shipboard rumors, there was little to fear from 
the Mexican ordnance. The last time they were fired one gun 
exploded, and the others failed to carry across the harbor. 

Senor Fernandez reported that the garrison was more fearful 
of the Zapatistas who infested the country districts beyond the 
town than of the Americans, now that the "gringo" warship had 
shown no hostility toward them. Late in the afternoon the train 
which connected Acapulco with the interior could be seen crawl- 
ing down from the hills, filled with soldiers relieved from outpost 

When the Marines tired of watching the Mexicans, there were 
other diversions organized for them aboard ship. Twice a day 
there were swimming parties over the side, and the officers put 
off in the ship's boats to troll for snapper and Spanish mackerel. 
At night there were movies and band concerts on deck. 

Captain Gilmer and the other officers hoped to vary this routine 
by making a liaison with the shore. If the Marines and sailors 
could not go ashore, the Mexican bumboats carrying fresh fruits 
and vegetables and souvenirs could come out to the ship. Each 
evening after colors the ship's band struck up the Mexican na- 
tional anthem, but the Mexican commandant e refused to be 
tempted by musical flattery. His only response was to round 
up a group of musicians of his own, and to return the compliment 
by serenading the Americans. 

After a little more than two weeks of idleness the Marines left 
Acapulco when the South Dakota weighed anchor early on the 
morning of 14 May and steamed north to Mazatlan, arriving 


two days later. The Marines aboard were the first to visit there 
since the Jupiter with two companies of Leathernecks had put in 
for one day on 27 April. As at Acapulco there was no action 
in store for the Marines at Mazatlan. On shore, however, there 
was plenty of excitement. Forces under General Alvaro Obregon, 
the military commander of Garranza's Constitutionalist Party, 
were besieging Huerta's Federalist garrison within the town. Al- 
though there was much maneuvering, no serious fighting took 
place. Obregon did not choose to assault the town and soon 
shifted most of his troops southward, leaving only a small con- 
taining force encircling Mazatlan. 

In spite of the siege, therefore, the daily routine for the Marines 
was much the same as at Acapulco. There were the same swim- 
ming and fishing parties, and movies and band concerts. One 
difference was that the inhabitants, their desire for profit proving 
more powerful than fear of the "gringo," came out to the ships 
in large numbers. Every day a bumboat fleet swarmed out from 
the shore, loaded with garden produce and souvenirs of dubious 

Reinforcements for the 4th Regiment arrived on 9 May, when 
the 28th and 36th Companies arrived at Mazatlan. Organized 
at Puget Sound and Mare Island respectively, the two companies 
remained until 1 1 May when the West Virginia steamed north 
to take station at Guaymas. 

For the rest of May and most of June the 4th Regiment re- 
mained on board the three naval vessels, each stationed at a 
different Mexican port. The bulk of the regiment, including 
Regimental Headquarters and the 25th, 26th, 27th, 31st, and 
32d Companies, were on board the South Dakota at Mazatlan. 
The 34th and 35th Companies were in the Jupiter which had 
retired to La Paz on 27 April, while the 28th and 36th Companies 
were on board the West Virginia at Guaymas. 

The hopes of 4th Marines for action were finally dashed when 
the regiment withdrew from Mexican waters at the end of June. 


On the 25th, representatives of the United States and Mexico, 
meeting at Niagara Falls with those of Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile, the "ABC powers," agreed to a peaceful settlement of 
differences and the withdrawal of American forces. On the 27th 
the 4th Regiment started homeward, when the West Virginia 
weighed anchor and sailed for La Paz. Two days later the 
South Dakota followed suit. At La Paz the two companies on 
board the collier Jupiter transferred to the cruisers for the trip 
home. On 2 July the South Dakota departed, arriving in San 
Diego on the 5th. Two days later the West Virginia followed, 
and on 1 o July the 4th Regiment went into camp again on North 
Island. 29 


History seemed to be repeating itself for the 4th Regiment 
when it was ordered ashore on North Island. This was the same 
ground occupied by the regiment three years before, but 19 14 
was not to be a repetition of 1 9 1 1 . In the earlier year the regi- 
ment was disbanded as soon as the crisis it was created to meet 
had passed. But in 19 14 the regiment outlived the immediate 
crisis to become a permanent component of the Marine Corps. 

Retention of the 4th Regiment resulted from a decision of the 
Navy Department to establish an advance base force on the West 
Coast. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy, had made an inspection trip in April 1 9 1 4 and had recom- 
mended San Diego as the site for an advance base post. His pro- 
posal met with favor in the Navy Department, and the 4th Regi- 
ment, ordered ashore at San Diego for an indefinite stay, became 
the nucleus of the West Coast advance base force. 30 

Following the precedent of 191 1, Colonel Pendleton named 

28 4th Regt, MRolls, iMay-30juni4; Bailey, op. cit., p. 607. 
30 CMC ltr to SecNav, dtd i8Deci3 (Folder Corr re Preparedness Repts, 
1911-16, HistBr, HQMC). 


the 4th Regiment camp on North Island in honor of the Com- 
mander, Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral Thomas B. Howard. The 
installation of electric lights and running water gave to the tents 
of Camp Howard some of the amenities of garrison life. Wives 
and children from San Francisco and Seattle made the lives of 
officers and men more attractive and added to the air of 
permanence. 31 

The 4th Regiment, as organized at Camp Howard in the 
summer of 19 14, followed the model established for a "mobile 
defense" regiment of an advance base force. This was a bal- 
anced force of infantry and field artillery, intended to repulse any 
enemy landing force that broke through the heavy coast artillery 
and mine defenses of the advance base "fixed defense" regiment. 
The "mobile defense" regiment, because it was a balanced force, 
was well-suited for expeditionary duty in the Caribbean where 
regimental-size units were frequently employed on independent 
missions. 32 

With a strength of only 19 officers and 874 enlisted men the 
4th Regiment on 31 July 19 14 was less than a third as large as 
its present-day descendant. Its organization provided two in- 
fantry battalions, a light field artillery company, and a small 
regimental headquarters. Each of the infantry battalions in- 
cluded three rifle companies. Major John Twiggs Myers' 1st 
Battalion was made up of the 31st, 32d, and 34th Companies, 
while Major William N. McKelvey's 2d Battalion included the 
26th, 27th, and 28th Companies. Myers and McKelvey man- 
aged to run their battalions with the help of two-man staffs — an 
adjutant and a sergeant major. 

Rifle company strength was about 3 officers and 95 enlisted 
men. The eight-man squad, commanded by a corporal, was 

31 The San Diego Union, 7JUI14. 

82 CMC, Report . . ., in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the 
Fiscal Year 1914 (Washington: Navy Dept, 19 15); Col John A. Lejeune, 
"The Mobile Defense of an Advance Base," Marine Corps Gazette, v. I, no. 1 
(Mari6), pp. 1-18. 


the basic unit of the rifle company. Three squads formed a sec- 
tion (the counterpart of the present-day platoon), under com- 
mand of a sergeant, and three sections made a company. 
Company commanders got along with a headquarters group of 
a first sergeant, mess sergeant, police sergeant, and two or three 
field musics (drummers and buglers). 

Following the pattern of company and battalion, Colonel 
Pendleton ran his regiment with a staff that would be con- 
sidered sparse by modern standards. His staff officers were an 
adjutant, quartermaster, and paymaster. The regimental ser- 
geant major and about a dozen other enlisted men, including 
quartermaster sergeants and clerks, completed the regimental 

Attached to Regimental Headquarters was a machine gun 
detachment. Later it was absorbed by the 28th Company which 
was then reorganized as the regimental machine gun company. 
As such it was organized in two platoons, each manning four 
guns. 33 

The fire power of the 4th Regiment in 19 14 was primarily 
that of its rifles, which were the now famous Springfield Model 
1 903. Supplementing the rifles were two types of machine guns : 
the Colt heavy .30 caliber, air-cooled, gas-operated gun; and 
the light Benet-Mercie, of like caliber, air-cooled, and gas- 
operated. Both these weapons were much prone to jam, al- 
though the Benet-Mercie, a modification of the Hotchkiss gun, 
had been adopted as standard by both the British and French 
armies. Eight heavy Colts were the armament of the 28th Com- 
pany, while a number of Benet-Mercies, varying according to 
availability, were carried in the rifle and artillery companies. 34 

33 4th Regt, MRolls, 1-31J11I14; The Landing-Force and Small-Arm In- 
structions, USN, igi2 (Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1912), pp. 8-12; Ros- 
well Winans, "Campaigning in Santo Domingo," Recruiters' Bulletin, v. 3, 
no. 5 (Man 7), pp. 14-15. 

84 Melvin M. Johnson, Jr., and Charles T. Haven, Automatic Weapons of 
the World (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1945), pp. 101-102. 
519667—60 3 


Additional fire support for the regiment came from the four 
3-inch naval landing guns of the 25th Company. Field artillery 
in the Marine Corps was in its infancy in those days and was 
limited pretty much to direct fire, although Marine artillery offi- 
cers were expected to be familiar with indirect fire techniques. 
All the ammunition was shrapnel. The greatest deficiency of the 
artillery company was its almost total lack of prime movers. The 
3 -inch naval landing gun came equipped with two long ropes 
which Marines of the gun crew seized to pull the gun across the 
beach and into firing position. 35 

Being stationed at Camp Howard not only permitted the regi- 
ment to remain assembled within striking distance of possible 
scenes of disturbance in Latin America, but it also gave the people 
of Southern California a good chance to become familiar with 
the Marine Corps. "Uncle Joe" Pendleton, one of the best- 
loved officers ever to wear the Marine uniform, lost few oppor- 
tunities to spread the Marine Corps gospel in San Diego. He 
seldom refused an invitation to attend civic functions and took a 
keen interest in local affairs. He held open house at Camp 
Howard every Tuesday and Thursday, when the regiment was 
paraded. Adding to the martial color of these occasions were 
the regimental band and the drum and bugle corps. These 
parades became so popular with San Diegans that special boat 
service was started to ferry visitors across the harbor. Chief 
Trumpeter George V. Rowbottom, leader of the drum and bugle 
corps, composed a special march entitled, "Hail Sunny Cali- 
fornia." 36 

An even better opportunity for putting the Marine Corps in 
the public eye arose at the beginning of 19 15. The occasion was 

35 Col Thomas E. Thrasher interview by HistBr, HQMG, dtd 23Sep57; 
LtGen Pedro A. Del Valle interview by HistBr, HQMG, dtd 700157 (both 
in Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMC) ; SgtMaj Thomas F. 
Carney, "Famous U.S. Marine Corps Regiment Makes San Diego Home," 
The Marines' Magazine, v. I, no. 5 (May 16), pp. 32-33. 

36 The San Diego Union, 14J11I14 and 8N0V14. 


assignment to duty at the two great international expositions held 
in California during 19 15 to celebrate the opening of the Panama 
Canal. These were the Panama-California Exposition at San 
Diego and the Panama-Pacific Exposition at San Francisco. 

Colonel Pendleton received orders for Exposition duty on 23 
November 19 14. Work began at once on a model camp at 
Balboa Park, and on 12 December the 25th Company moved 
from Camp Howard to its new quarters, to be followed four days 
later by the 26th, 27th, and 28th Companies. Colonel Pendle- 
ton and the Regimental Headquarters moved into the Science 
and Education Building on the Exposition Grounds on 22 De- 
cember, the same day that Major Myers and his 1st Battalion 
sailed aboard the cruiser West Virginia to set up a model camp 
at the Exposition in San Francisco. 37 

The Panama-California Exposition burst upon an expectant 
Southern California at midnight on 1 January 19 15 when, "at the 
touch of President Wilson, 3,000 miles away [there was set off] 
a rainbow of light suspended 1,500 feet in midair, covering an 
area of three miles in the sky and punctuated by the bursting of 
bombs . . ." 38 

Typical of Exposition duty at San Diego, and at San Francisco 
where festivities got under way on 1 6 February, were the sched- 
ules for the Marines at San Diego for 3 and 4 January. Accord- 
ing to The San Diego U nion the following events were included : 

January 3, 7975 

10:30 a.m. — Marine band concert at Spreckels music pavilion 
2:30 p.m. — Baseball game on Marine Barracks parade ground : 
Marine team vs. Spreckels team. 

January 4, 7975 

9:15 a.m. — Troop 

9:30 a.m. — Guard Mount 

37 4th Regt, MRolls, iNov-3iDeci5. 
s *The San Diego Union, 3jani6. 


i o : oo a.m. to noon — Drill 

3:30 p.m. — Review Inspection — the Fourth Regiment Band 
will furnish music. 39 

Introduction of the Marine Corps' first mechanical artillery 
prime movers was an important by-product of duty at the San 
Diego Exposition. One of the industrial exhibitors, the builder 
of a track-laying tractor, loaned some of his machines to Captain 
Ellis B. Miller, commanding the 25th Company. Experiments 
were successfully conducted in towing the Marines' 3-inch naval 
landing guns. Although the primitive tractors were prone to 
throw their tracks, they were superior as prime movers to Marines 
"manning the drag." 40 

The 4th Regiment did not enjoy garrison life for long. After 
six months at the two Expositions, orders came for a force of 
Marines to make ready once more for service on the west coast 
of Mexico. 

MEXICO— 191 5 

The fall of Huerta had not ended the Mexican civil war. Villa, 
one of the most successful of Carranza's generals, soon tired of 
playing a subordinate role. He revolted and joined forces with 
Zapata. These two leaders succeeded in deposing Carranza and 
in assembling a convention of generals to name a successor. The 
generals soon fell to quarreling among themselves, and chaos en- 
sued. Rival factions battled each other across the land, and, as 
Mexican soldiers were not distinguished for their discipline, Amer- 
ican lives and property in Mexico were lost. 41 

In June 19 15, marauding bands of Indians in the Yaqui valley 

39 Ibid., 4 Jani6. 

40 LtGen Henry L. Larsen ltr to CMC, dtd 23Dec57 (Monograph and 
Comment File, HistBr, HQMG). 
41 Munro, op. cit., p. 412. 


threatened the lives and property of Americans in that region, 
and, as the Mexican authorities were either too weak or too 
indifferent to do anything about it, the United States decided to 
intervene. It was to protect these Americans that the armored 
cruiser Colorado, with the 4th Regiment Headquarters and the 
25th, 26th, and 28th Companies aboard, steamed south from 
San Diego on 17 June. The Marines were due for another 
disappointment. Arriving off the Mexican port of Guaymas on 
the 20th, they found the Yaqui bands were no longer enough of 
a threat to justify a landing. The next day the Colorado de- 
parted for San Diego, arriving there on the 30th. The Marines 
remained on board until 9 August when they went ashore and 
rejoined the 27th Company at the Exposition Grounds. 42 

Four months later, Marines of the 4th Regiment were hasten- 
ing southward again toward the Mexican coast, for the third 
time in less than two years. On 16 November, a band of 
Yaqui Indians and Villistas had raided the village of Los Mochis, 
a center of American interests in the sugar-producing valley of 
the same name. The Americans, along with other foreign resi- 
dents, made a stand in the sugar plant. After suffering a num- 
ber of casualties, they fled in automobiles to safety under the guns 
of the gunboat Annapolis at Topolobampo. The Carranza 
government, now recognized by the United States, had stationed 
a 500-man garrison at Los Mochis, but the troops had pulled out 
at the approach of the Villistas. 43 

The American consular agent at Los Mochis reported the raid 
to General Munoz, the military commander of the state of 
Sinaloa, and requested protection for American lives and prop- 
erty. Despite assurances that troops would be sent, nothing 

42 4th Regt, MRolls, 1 Jun— 3 1 Aug 1 5 ; Army and Navy Journal, v. LII, no. 44 
(3Juli5), P- 

"SecNav rept to SecState, dtd 28Deci5, in U.S. Dept. of State, Papers 
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 191 5 (Washington, 
1924), p. 854, hereafter Foreign Relations, 191 5. 


was done, and the Indians returned on the 20th to loot the now 
deserted town. 44 

Realizing that the Mexicans would have to be jolted into 
action, Secretary of State Robert Lansing informed Carranza on 
23 November that, if the Mexican authorities were unable to 
protect American lives and property, there should be no objec- 
tion to the landing of American Marines to do so. 45 To have 
the Marines on the spot if needed, Secretary of the Navy 
Josephus Daniels directed Rear Admiral Cameron McR. Wins- 
low, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to dispatch an 
"expeditionary force . . . with the least possible delay to 
Topolobampo." 46 No landing was to be made without specific 
authorization from the State Department. It was in response 
to this directive that the 4th Regiment was ordered southward. 

At San Francisco, the 1st Battalion left the model camp at 
the Exposition Grounds and made ready for tropical shore 
service. "We are off on a little business trip," 47 said Major 
Myers, as the Marines went on board the cruiser San Diego for 
the trip south. On 25 November the cruiser put to sea, arriv- 
ing at San Diego the next day. Regimental Headquarters, the 
2d Battalion minus the 27th Company, and the 25th Company 
came on board, and the San Diego sailed that evening, arriving 
off Topolobampo on 30 November. 48 

The Marines were in for still another disappointment. As on 
the previous trips to Mexico, they were not ordered to land. The 
government forces had at last begun to move, a garrison of 700 
men had arrived at Los Mochis on the 29th, and a Mexican army 
division was in the field pursuing the revolutionists. President 

44 Consul Alger msg to SecState, dtd 19N0V15, quoted in Foreign Relations, 
1915, p. 842. 

^SecNav msg to Consul Garrett, dtd 23N0V15, quoted in Foreign Rela- 
tions, 1915, p. 850. 

48 SecNav msg to RAdm Cameron McR. Winslow, dtd 23N0V15, quoted in 
Foreign Relations, 191 5, p. 847. 

"San Francisco Chronicle, 26N0V15. 

48 4th Regt, MRolls, iNov-3iDeci5. 


Carranza notified our State Department on 3 December that 
order had been restored. 49 

The United States government was not ready to accept Gar- 
ranza's assurances at face value, and the Marines were to stay 
in Mexican waters for another two months. On 17 December 
they transferred to the Buffalo to steam up the coast to Guaymas, 
where they remained until 28 January 19 16. On the 29th the 
Buffalo cleared the Gulf of California and headed home. On 3 
February, she dropped anchor in San Diego harbor, where all 
but the 1 st Battalion debarked. Major Myers and his Marines 
remained aboard to return to San Francisco for a much-needed 
liberty and to pick up sea bags and other gear left behind in the 
hasty embarkation of the preceding November. 50 

On 18 February, when the 1st Battalion returned again to San 
Diego, the 4th Regiment was reunited for the first time since 22 
December 19 14, when Major Myers had taken his battalion north 
for the San Francisco Exposition. A signal company, the 29th, 
was now added, giving the regiment a capability much needed 
in independent expeditionary duty. 

The regiment settled back into the routine of garrison life at 
its home barracks in Balboa Park. Gradual attrition took its 
toll, so that, by the end of May, there were only 23 officers and 
690 enlisted men still on the regimental rolls. 51 The Marines 
of the 4th Regiment were beginning to feel that they would never 
see action. The regiment was now more than two years old, not 
counting its brief existence in 1 9 1 1 , and all it had to show were 
three brief cruises in Mexican waters and a commendation for 
speedy embarkation. 

49 Confidential Agent of the Constitutionalist Govt msg to SecState, dtd 
3Deci5; and Gen Munoz ltr to RAdm Winslow, dtd 7Deci5, both quoted in 
Foreign Relations, 191 5, pp. 835, 864. 

50 4th Regt, MRolls, iDeci5-3iJani6; "What the Marines Are Doing, A 
Monthly Summary of Activities," The Marines' Magazine, v. I, no. 2 
(Jani6), pp. 4-5. 

51 4th Regt, MRolls, 1-3 1 May 16. 


But orders from Washington which were handed to Pendleton 
on 4 June 1 9 1 6 were no false alarm. They called for the regiment 
to embark for Santo Domingo and marked the beginning of an 
eight-year tour of duty in that Caribbean republic. 


Intervention in the 
Dominican Republic 

"The Fourth Regiment ... is assigned to temporary foreign 
shore service in Santo Domingo and Haiti," read the Comman- 
dant's order. 'The Regiment, fully equipped together with its 
complete expeditionary outfit, will proceed by rail to New Or- 
leans for embarkation aboard the Hancock." 1 

The regiment left San Diego on 6 June and arrived in New 
Orleans four days later. There it was joined by the 8th Com- 
pany. Men and gear were speedily loaded aboard the naval 
transport Hancock, and on the evening of 12 June the loaded 
ship dropped down the Mississippi, bound for the Dominican 
Republic. 2 


The Latin American nation, for which Marines of the 4th 
Regiment were headed, was a country with a long and colorful 

1 CMC msg to CO MarCorpsBks San Diego, dtd 4Juni6. Unless other- 
wise noted all official documents are filed in 1975-70/5-2, Central Files, 

2 CMC ltr to SecNav, dtd 2oApri6. 

'Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is from Carl Kelsey, 
The American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic (Phila- 
delphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1922) ; Dana G. 



history. Visited by Columbus on his first voyage in 1492, it 
became the site of the first permanent European settlement in 
the New World. It enjoyed an early period of prosperity as 
capital of the Spanish Empire in the Americas but declined into 
obscurity with the discovery of gold on the mainland. A chaotic 
period of invasion and insurrection following the outbreak of 
the French Revolution in 1789 led to a further deterioration 
of Dominican society. 

Independence, achieved in 1844, did little to reverse the 
downward trend. Revolution after revolution racked the 
newly-declared republic until 1882, when the dictator Ulises 
Heureaux seized power and began a rule which was to last until 
1899. The Dominican Republic now enjoyed the first period 
of peace and prosperity in its history, but the better life under 
Heureaux was the beginning of new trouble for the unhappy 
Caribbean republic because it was financed by foreign loans 
which the Dominican government could not repay. When 
Heureaux was assassinated in 1899, his government had just 
defaulted on a consolidated loan by which the foreign debt had 
been refunded only four years before. 

The governments which succeeded Heureaux took over a 
country in desperate financial straits. They were no more able 
to deal with the problem than the dictator had been, and by 
1904 the country was bankrupt. Worse still, the French, Ger- 
man, Italian, Spanish, and Belgian governments were threaten- 
ing to collect by force the sums owed their nationals. The 
danger of European intervention in the Dominican Republic led 
to an immediate response by the United States. President 
Roosevelt in 1905 began a process of supervision over Dominican 

Munro, The United States and the Caribbean Area (Boston: World Peace 
Foundation, 1934), hereafter Munro, U.S. and the Caribbean; Sumner 
Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, 2 vols. (New York: Parson & Clark, Ltd., 1928), 
hereafter Welles, Naboth's Vineyard; and Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin Ameri- 
can Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1943), 
pp. 185-190. 


affairs which was to lead eventually to the establishment of 
American military government over the country. 

The defense of the as yet unconstructed Panama Canal was 
the reason for Uncle Sam's sensitivity to control of the Dominican 
Republic by a major European power. Even before it was com- 
pleted "the big ditch" became a prime factor in planning for 
the security of the United States. With it the Fleet could pass 
rapidly from Pacific to Atlantic and back again, thereby making 
possible speedy concentration of force on either coast of the 
United States. 

Essential to the security of the canal was control of its ap- 
proaches. On the Pacific side this was strictly a Fleet problem 
as there were no off-lying land masses, but on the Atlantic it was 
a different story. A glance at the map shows an arc of islands 
swinging all the way from a point about 100 miles off Mexico's 
Yucatan Peninsula to within a few miles of the Venezuelan coast. 
(See Map 2.) 

Hispaniola, wedged between Cuba on the west and Puerto 
Rico on the east, and containing the Dominican Republic and 
Haiti, was the keystone of this island arc. The Windward and 
Mona Passages, to the west and east of Hispaniola respectively, 
were the principal routes through the island barrier from the At- 
lantic Ocean into the Caribbean Sea. Control of these passages 
by an unfriendly power would cut off or, at least, seriously impede 
American shipping bound to and from the canal, and a foothold 
in the island arc would provide a potential enemy with a base 
for operations against the strategic waterway. 

Keeping the island arc in friendly hands became a fundamental 
of American policy. In 1905 all the lesser islands east of Puerto 
Rico were in the hands of the British, French, Danes or Dutch. 
Puerto Rico was a United States possession, and Cuba a protec- 
torate. Only Hispaniola remained as a spot where an unfriendly 
foreign power could gain a foothold. It was to prevent the cre- 
ation of such a foothold that President Roosevelt acted in 1905. 



Roosevelt realized that if the United States, in order to block 
European intrusion into the Panama defense area, were to pre- 
vent European governments from collecting just debts, the United 
States would have to do so for them. Accordingly he began ne- 
gotiations with the Dominican government which ultimately re- 
sulted in the treaty of 1907. Under its terms, an American 
receivership of the Dominican customs was established, empow- 
ered to collect all duties and to distribute the proceeds, 55 per 
cent to the foreign creditors and 45 per cent to the Dominican 
government. The treaty also prohibited the Dominican govern- 
ment from increasing its national debt until the full amount of 
the foreign obligations had been paid. 

Two other stabilizing results were hoped for from this treaty. 
First, the cutting off of the traditional source of income of revolu- 
tionists — the revenue from captured customs houses — was ex- 
pected to put a crimp in their activities. Second, through the 
efficient collection of duties by Americans, it was anticipated that 
the Dominican government would have sufficient funds with 
which to operate effectively. 

At first, these hopes seemed justified. Ramon Caceres, who 
took office as president in 1906, set an endurance record for 
Dominican presidents of the 20th century by remaining in office 
for five years. The belief in some quarters that the Dominicans 
had improved their political habits proved unfounded, for 
Caceres, who had first gained public notice as the assassin of the 
dictator Heureaux, was himself assassinated in 1 9 1 1 . 

To the American government the assassination of Caceres was 
taken as proof that the remedies applied under the treaty of 
1907 were not drastic enough. In 19 12, the United States re- 
placed the uncooperative president, Alfredo Victoria, with the 
Archbishop Adolfo Nouel. Unable to reconcile the conflicting 
interests of powerful politicians, the prelate resigned. He was 
succeeded by Jose Bordas Valdes, a compromise candidate elected 
by the Dominican Congress. Like most compromise candidates, 


Bordas lacked the support of any dominant faction and was soon 
faced with revolution. 

This was the state of affairs facing Wilson's administration 
when it took office in March 19 13. A staunch believer in the 
efficacy of the democratic process, President Wilson was deter- 
mined to settle the Dominicans' troubles by establishing a consti- 
tutional democracy in the country. Taking advantage of a 
threatening revolution against Bordas in 19 14, he compelled the 
rival Dominican politicians to agree on a provisional president 
who would then arrange a regular election of a president and 
congress. Once the constitutional government took office, no 
further revolutions would be tolerated. These steps were carried 
out, and on 5 December 19 14, Juan Isidro Jimenez was inau- 
gurated as the constitutional president. 

The Wilson plan was doomed to failure from the start. Jime- 
nez had only won election by granting Desiderio Arias, a peren- 
nial revolutionary, a cabinet post as minister of war. Trouble 
started in February 19 15 when the United States sought to in- 
crease its control over the Dominican government by securing 
the appointment of an American comptroller of finances whose 
duties would be to draw up a budget and approve disbursements. 
The Dominican Congress refused to surrender the power of the 
purse. The outbreak of revolution in the spring of 1 9 1 5 led our 
government to increase its demands. In addition to the appoint- 
ment of a financial adviser, the United States sought to organize 
a constabulary under American officers to replace the army. 

Jimenez was now in an impossible position. Arias was plotting 
his downfall within the government. He was, as usual, broke; 
and the American government would not approve additional 
loans without the granting of financial control, a measure the 
country would not accept. When it became known that the 
government would not receive any money without acceding to 
the demands of the United States, the agitation against Jimenez 
became open and determined. 


On 14 April 19 16 the long-expected crisis broke. President 
Jimenez, in an effort to destroy his enemies within the govern- 
ment, arrested the commanders of the national guard and of the 
army garrison in the capital, both of whom were followers of 
Arias. He then ordered Arias to report to him at the presidential 
country villa. But Arias, having learned of the arrest of his 
followers, went instead to the fortress in the city, forced his way 
past the guard at the point of a pistol, and took command of the 
garrison. The Dominican Congress, no doubt impressed by the 
fact that their building was surrounded by revolutionary soldiers, 
voted to impeach the president. This unfortunate individual 
found himself declared a traitor by his own government, with 
his army in revolt, and with only a few troops remaining loyal 
to him. Apparently undaunted by the odds against him, Jimenez 
assembled his meagre forces outside the city, charged Arias with 
treason and demanded his surrender. 


At this point the United States intervened again. Acting in 
accordance with the Wilsonian principles of 19 14, Secretary of 
State Robert Lansing instructed the American minister, William 
H. Russell, to announce that Jimenez would be supported by the 
United States. To give substance to the announcement, Marines 
were ordered on 30 April to Santo Domingo City. Troop move- 
ments from Haiti, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the United 
States began at once, and by 13 May there were approximately 
450 Marines ashore in positions north and west of the capital. 
Two days later Jimenez resigned, leaving the country without a 

On the 1 3th, Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, Commander 
Cruiser Force, Atlantic Fleet, arrived to take command of all 
American forces in the area. He conferred with Russell, who 
had been given full authority by the State Department to act. 


They issued an ultimatum to Arias, calling on him to surrender 
and to turn over all arms and ammunition by 0600 on 15 May, 
or the Marines would occupy the city and disarm the revolu- 
tionists by force. On the 15th, the Marines moved in to find 
that Arias and his forces had slipped out of the city and had 
withdrawn into the interior. 

Once the Marines were in possession of the capital, Russell 
began what were to be long dragged-out but ultimately unsuc- 
cessful negotiations to get a government acceptable to the United 
States. The chief stumbling block was Arias, whose supporters 
in the Congress persisted in their efforts to elect him provisional 
president. To this the United States was obviously opposed. 

As the political negotiations dragged out, Admiral Caperton 
tightened his grip on the country by occupying the two principal 
northern seaports, Monte Cristi and Puerto Plata. Puerto Plata 
was taken on 1 June by a force of Marines and bluejackets from 
the battleships Rhode Island and New Jersey, and the gunboat 
Sacramento, who stormed ashore under heavy but inaccurate 
small-arms fire. The revolutionists fled after putting up a brief 
resistance. Monte Cristi was taken without opposition the same 
day by Marines and sailors from the cruiser Memphis, the battle- 
ship Louisiana, and the torpedo tender Panther. 41 

The Marines had now occupied the principal Dominican sea- 
ports. But in view of the political stalemate and the control of 
large areas of the interior by Arias, Admiral Caperton felt he 
needed substantial reinforcements if he were to subdue the Arias 
faction and pacify the country. On 3 June the Navy Department 
granted his request for a regiment of Marines, and on the fol- 
lowing day the Commandant telegraphed the order which set 
the 4th Regiment in motion towards the Dominican Republic. 

* GO MarBn Ft San Filipe, Puerto Plata rept to CMC, dtd 4jum6; Capt 
Frederick M. Wise, rept to CMC, dtd 8Juni6. 



On 1 8 June, six days out of New Orleans, Marines of the 4th 
Regiment aboard the Hancock could see the dark mass of His- 
paniola looming on the horizon. Shaped like the open claw of 
a lobster with the business end pointed towards the west, Hispani- 
ola is divided by an irregular north-south boundary into the two 
independent countries of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. 
The latter, which occupies the eastern two-thirds of the island, 
is about the size of New Hampshire and Vermont combined. 
The Cordillera Central, a mountain range with peaks as high 
as 10,000 feet, runs east and west through the center of the 
country, dividing it in two. (See Map 3.) 

North of the mountains lies the great valley known as the 
Cibao, separated from the north coast by a smaller mountain 
range, the Cordillera Septentrional. Two rivers drain the Cibao, 
the Yaque del Norte flowing to the west, and the Yuna flowing 
in the opposite direction to empty into Samana Bay, a deep in- 
dentation at the northeast corner of the island. The Cibao is 
a region of diversified agriculture and small family farms. Major 
crops are tobacco, cacao, and coffee. Trade in these crops sup- 
ports a number of fair-sized towns in the interior (the principal 
one being Santiago) and the seaports of Monte Cristi and Puerto 
Plata on the north coast, and Sanchez on Samana Bay. Of the 
country's 894,000 inhabitants about 500,000 lived north of the 
mountains in 19 16. 5 

South of the mountains lies the capital city, Santo Domingo, 
and the sugar-producing district. Sugar, largest cash crop of 
the country, is a big business. It is financed and managed largely 
by foreigners but employs great numbers of Dominicans as field 

Aggravating the natural division of the country into northern 
and southern sectors was the almost complete lack of communica- 

5 Figures from the census of 192 1, the first ever taken, cited in Kelsey, 
op. cit., p. 167. 

519667—60 i 


tions. Roads, except in the immediate vicinity of the larger 
towns, were all but nonexistent in 1 9 1 6. Most of them were little 
better than trails passable on foot or on horseback. In rainy 
weather they were barely passable at all. One exception was the 
road from Monte Cristi to Santiago which, as the 4th Regiment 
was to prove, could be traversed by motor vehicles. There were 
two narrow-gauge railroad lines, one running from Puerto Plata 
to Santiago; the other from Sanchez to La Vega with branches 
to Moca and San Francisco de Macoris. 

When the Hancock docked at Santo Domingo City on 1 8 June, 
Admiral Caperton ordered Pendleton north to occupy Santiago 
and the other towns of the Cibao region. This was not to be 
an attack against an enemy power, but a police action designed 
to support the constitutional government of the country. Revo- 
lutionary activities were to be put down, but they were to be put 
down without alienating the population and with a minimum of 
bloodshed and destruction of property. 

This view of the character of the operation led Admiral Caper- 
ton to violate a cardinal principle of war — surprise. In an effort 
to win popular support, the admiral made public the target for 
the Marine operation. In a proclamation issued on the 19th 
he announced that it was his purpose to "occupy immediately the 
towns of Santiago, Moca, and La Vega ... as these towns are 
now in the possession of, or menaced by, a considerable force of 
revolutionists against the constituted government." 6 

There were three possible routes into the Cibao. ( See Map 4. ) 
One was along the railroad from Sanchez, rejected because of 
the vulnerability of the rail line where it crossed ten miles of 
swamp on a causeway at the eastern end. A second was by the 
railroad over the mountains from the north-coast port of Puerto 
Plata. This was the shortest route, but it, too, was rejected be- 
cause of terrain difficulties. It was, however, to be opened up 

6 ComCruLant msg to SecNav, dtd 20 Jun 16. 


as a secondary operation. The third alternative, the road from 
Monte Cristi, was the one chosen. Advantages of this route were 
generally level terrain all the way, a ready water supply from 
the Yaque del Norte River, which parallels the road, and low 
rainfall, an important consideration in a land of unsurfaced 
roads. 7 

The Hancock departed Santo Domingo City on the evening 
of 19 June, arriving at Monte Cristi on the 21st. Preparations 
for the arrival of the 4th Regiment had already been completed 
by Major Robert H. Dunlap, commanding the Marines in the 
town. In response to an order of 14 June, he had assembled all 
available lighters to transport troops and supplies ashore and 
had arranged for camp sites and quartermaster storage. 8 

Adding to his own 4th Regiment the troops already ashore in 
northern Santo Domingo, Pendleton organized a task force for 
the seizure of Santiago and the other inland towns. Under the 
long-winded title of "Provisional Detachment, U.S. Naval Forces 
Operating Ashore in Santo Domingo," the force consisted of a 
main column, a Monte Cristi base detachment, and the Puerto 
Plata detachment. Total strength of Pendleton's command was 
41 officers and 1,297 enlisted men. Its organization is shown in 
detail in the accompanying chart. 9 (See Figure 1.) 

The main column, directly under Pendleton's command, was 
to advance on Santiago by the road from Monte Cristi. Added 
to the 4th Regiment to comprise this force were the 6th and 1 3th 
Companies. The latter, an artillery unit, replaced the 25th 
Company, designated, along with the Marine detachments from 
the Louisiana and Memphis, to secure the Monte Cristi base. 

7 Maj Samuel M. Harrington, "The Strategy and Tactics of Small Wars," 
Marine Corps Gazette, v. VI, no. 4 (Dec2i ), p. 478. 

8 CO US Forces Operating Ashore in Santo Domingo, ltr to CO Monte 
Cristi, dtd I4juni6. 

9 Unless otherwise cited the following section is based on CO US Naval 
Forces Operating Ashore in Santo Domingo, rept to ComCruLant, dtd 
20J11I16, with attached repts of subordinate units, hereafter Pendleton report. 


From Puerto Plata the 4th (rifle) and 9th (artillery) Companies, 
and the Marine detachments from the New Jersey and the Rhode 
Island were to move on Santiago along the railroad, opening it 
to Marine traffic. Contact between the two columns was ex- 
pected at Navarette, a village about 20 kilometers west of San- 
tiago where the railway from Puerto Plata met the road from 
Monte Cristi. 



Provisional Det 
Col Pendleton 

1 3th Co (Arty) 
Capt Campbell 

6th Co (Provost) 
Capt Wise 

29th Co (Signal)* 
Capt Ramsey 

28th Co (MG)* 
Capt Pritchett 

Mounted Det 
1st Lt Thrasher 

1st Bn* 
Capt Mari 

Base Troops 
Capt Miller 

2d Bn* 
Maj Shav 

31st Co* 
1st Lt Vulte 

8th Co* 
1st Lt Smith 

32d Co* 

1st Lt Harrington 

26th Co* 
1st Lt Davis 

34th Co* 
Capt Williams 

27th Co* 
Capt Barker 

Puerto Plata Det 
Maj Bearss 

9th Co (Arty) 
Capt Fortson 

4th Co 
1st Lt Pierce 

25th Co (Arty)* 
Capt Miller 

New J ersey Det 
1 st Lt Berry 

Louisiana Det 
2d Lt Macrone 

: 4th Regt. 

Rhode Island Det 
1st Lt White 

Memphis Det 
1st Lt Shepard 

Pendleton planned to keep his communications open by post- 
ing detachments along the route. When he had advanced a 


sufficient distance to warrant doing so, the Marine commander 
planned to draw in his forces guarding the communications line, 
thus cutting off from the base and becoming a "flying column." 

Pendleton and his staff were handicapped in their operational 
planning by a virtual nonexistence of intelligence of the enemy. 
Admiral Gaperton at Santo Domingo City received reports from 
citizens of the northern section of the country that Arias was in 
Santiago with 1,000 men. Colonel Pendleton at Monte Cristi 
was in possession of reports from similar sources that about 100 
of the enemy were entrenched at Kilometer 27 on the Monte 
Cristi-Santiago road. Aside from these two bits of information, 
the strength, organization, and location of the Arias forces were 
unknown. 10 

Logistical arrangements were extremely simple by modern 
standards. A Marine expeditionary force of those days was 
provided with little but clothing, rations, tentage, arms and 
ammunition, and medical supplies. Any other items were ordi- 
narily purchased locally. For this reason, Captain Russell B. 
Putnam, the regimental paymaster, played a vital role. Not 
until he arrived at Monte Cristi with $150,000 in his field safe 
was it possible to procure the transportation needed for the 1 17- 
kilometer march to Santiago. 11 

With few exceptions hand-carts were the only vehicles avail- 
able to Marine expeditionary forces in those days. Space limita- 
tions on board naval vessels prevented the transportation of ani- 
mals, and motor vehicles were scarce. The Marine Corps had 
purchased its first truck only in 1909, and during the next four 
years a few more had been obtained for use at posts in the United 
States. In 19 14 the Marine Corps procured its first vehicle for 
field use, the Jeff ery Quad four-wheel drive truck, four of them 

10 ProvDet FieldO No. 1, dtd 26Juni6; ComCruLant msg to SecNav, dtd 
I2juni6. Distances were measured starting at Monte Cristi by stone 
kilometer posts which were used by the Marines as reference points. 

"BriGen Russell B. Putnam, interview by HistBr, HQMC, dtd 20ct57, 
hereafter Putnam interview (Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMC). 


accompanying the expeditionary forces to Haiti in 19 15 for use 
as artillery prime movers. 12 

When the 4th Regiment arrived at Monte Cristi, a Holt tractor, 
still on loan from the manufacturer, was the unit's only motor 
vehicle. The 13th Company brought from Haiti two JefTery 
Quads and was included in the main column because of its ability 
to move the artillery pieces. To supplement these three vehicles 
the Marines bought or rented everything in the area with four 
wheels and a motor. Fred Sparks sold the 1 2 Model T touring 
cars and 1 truck, constituting the entire stock of his Ford agency 
and volunteered his own services to keep them mnning. Two 
White trucks were also purchased locally. The two Whites towed 
wagons as trailers, and the Ford truck hauled the town water 

Supplementing the motor vehicles was a weird assortment of 
Dorriinican carts and wagons, drawn by animals of every descrip- 
tion. The revolutionists had taken all the livestock worth taking, 
leaving only a conglomeration of runty horses, mules, burros, 
oxen, and even a few cows for the Marines to put between the 
shafts. Because of the poor quality of the animals, only individ- 
ual packs and company kitchens were loaded aboard the carts 
and wagons. The bulk of the supplies were carried by the trucks 
and trailers. 

The 1 2 Model T touring cars served much as jeeps do today. 
Under the command of 2d Lieutenant Henry L. Larsen, they 
were used for reconnaissance, transporting the wounded, main- 
taining contact with the base, and similar missions. 13 

The Marines displayed considerable ingenuity in improvising 
additional transportation. Men of the 28th Company lashed 
their machine-gun carts together in pairs, attached broken tent 

32 "Motor Transportation in the United States Marine Corps" MS. no 
author, n.d. (Subj File, HistBr, HQMC). 

^LtGen Henry L. Larsen, ltr to ACofS, G-3, HQMC, dtd 23Dec57 
(Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMC) . 


poles to serve as shafts, and fashioned harness and lashings from 
canvas. Six "volunteers" took on the job of caring for the runty 
Dominican mules issued to the company. 14 

Medical service was under the direction of Surgeon Frederick 
L. Benton who had under his command 3 medical officers and 
16 Hospital Corps men. Passed Assistant Surgeons Kent C. Mel- 
horn and John B. Mears served as battalion surgeons with the 
1 st and 2d Battalions, while Passed Assistant Surgeon Dow H. 
Gasto served in a similar capacity with the machine gun, artillery, 
and signal companies. 15 Each company had a hospital apprentice 
attached to it, and with each battalion was a hospital steward. 
The one Ford ambulance was driven by the chaplain, Leroy N. 

Shortly after dawn on 26 June the Provisional Detachment 
pulled out of camp at Monte Cristi on the first lap of the long 
march to Santiago. Pendleton had organized his column into 
four elements. These were a mounted point of 1 5 men from the 
13th Company under 1st Lieutenant Thomas E. Thrasher; the 
advance guard made up of the 2d Battalion; the main body com- 
prised of the 1 st Battalion and the 13th, 28th, and 29th Com- 
panies; and the vehicle train guarded by the 6th Company. 

The march was uneventful at first, but, beginning at the nine- 
kilometer post, small groups of armed Dominicans were spotted, 
just out of range, falling back before the Marine advance. At 
the 18-kilometer post, snipers, who opened fire on the 27th 
Company at a range of about 600 to 700 yards, were put to 
flight by a few bursts of machine-gun fire. 

By 1530 the column had reached the 25-kilometer post. From 
a low ridge to the left of the road Las Trencheras could be clearly 

14 Roswell Winans, "Campaigning in Santo Domingo," Recruiters' Bulletin, 
v. 3, no. 5 (Man 7), pp. 14-15. 

"The rank of surgeon was equivalent to that of lieutenant commander; 
that of passed assistant surgeon to lieutenant; and that of assistant surgeon to 
lieutenant (junior grade). 


seen about three kilometers ahead. Located on two hills, the 
position dominated the flat surrounding country. The first hill 
rose abruptly to a height of about 75 feet above the road; the 
second hill, behind the first, was somewhat higher. Rather than 
attack what was believed to be a strongly fortified enemy position 
late in the day, Pendleton ordered his forces into camp for the 

First Lieutenant Julian C. Smith, 16 the harassed young officer 
in command of the train and rear guard, had the toughest time 
of it that first day on the road. His train was an ill-matched 
assortment of animal-drawn and motor vehicles. The trucks 
could not slow down to mule pace without their radiators boiling 
over, so they had to move out first, advancing until they caught 
up with the tail of the infantry column, then halting to wait for 
the mule carts to come up. The mule drivers had their troubles, 
too, because their animals could not understand English. But, 
except for one beast who always ran away going down hill, the 
Marines and mules achieved a state of uneasy coexistence. For 
security of the train, Lieutenant Smith placed four Colt machine 
guns and crews aboard the trucks and stationed a platoon of 
riflemen on each flank of the wagon train. A squad armed with 
a Colt machine gun brought up the rear. 17 

Added to the problems of shaking down this motley outfit on 
the march was a torrential downpour which deluged men, beasts, 
and machines and turned the dirt road into a sea of mud. All 
hands pitched in to drag and push the vehicles through the 
morass. Not until 2000 did these mud-spattered Marines reach 

In spite of this deluge, water was a problem for the Marines 
in camp that night. Nobody had bothered to catch any of the 

16 Julian C. Smith is best known to thousands of Marines as the Command- 
ing General of the 2d Marine Division in the bloody battle for Tarawa, 20-23 
November 1943. 

17 LtGen Julian C. Smith, interview by HistBr, HQMC, dtd 25Sep57, 
hereafter Julian Smith interview. 


water which fell in such liberal quantities that afternoon, and 
when i st Lieutenant Holland M. Smith and his 8th Company 
attempted to take the quad trucks the four miles to the Yaque 
River for water, sniper fire forced them back with the loss of 
one man wounded. 

During the night, preparations went forward for an attack 
on Las Trencheras the next morning. Captain Chandler C. 
Campbell emplaced the four 3-inch landing guns of his 13th 
Company to the left of the main road between the 25th and 26th 
kilometer posts and located his observation post on a ridge north 
of the road. Patrols worked their way forward to reconnoiter 
the enemy trenches. Pendleton and his staff worked late pre- 
paring the plans and orders for the attack. 

Field Order No. 2, issued early the next morning was the 
result of their work. It called for a frontal attack on Las Tren- 
cheras by two battalions abreast: Major Melville J. Shaw's 2d 
Battalion, less the 8th Company, on the left, and Captain Arthur 
T. Marix' 1st Battalion, reinforced by the 1st Platoon of the 
28th Company, on the right. Fire support was to be provided 
by the field pieces of the 1 3th Company and the four Colt machine 
guns of the 2d Platoon, 28th Company, emplaced on the right 
next to the artillery observation post. (See Map 5.) 

At 0810 the 1st Battalion began its approach march along 
the Camino Real, the old abandoned Monte Cristi-Santiago 
road which paralleled the new highway on the south. Twenty 
minutes later the 2d Battalion deployed north of the new road, 
with the 26th Company on the left and the 27th Company on the 
right. The artillery and machine-gun supporting fires began at 
0845. At first the two battalions advanced out of contact, the 
2d deployed but the 1st still in column on the Camino Real. 
Visibility was extremely limited by the heavy underbrush, so, at 
0900, Major Shaw halted his battalion and attempted to make 
contact with Captain Marix. At this moment the Dominicans 
opened up a heavy small-arms fire at a range of about 1000 yards. 


For a few moments the Marine attack stalled as Shaw attempted 
to locate Marix' battalion in the heavy brush. Marix, mean- 
while, was deploying his battalion and also attempting to make 
contact. About 0910 his left flank company, the 34th, located 
the 2d Battalion. The 32d Company, reinforced by a section of 
the 31st Company, took position on the right, while the remainder 
of the company was held in battalion reserve. 

Under orders of Major Robert H. Dunlap, Pendleton's chief 
of staff, who had just come forward to coordinate the attack, both 
battalions resumed the advance. The Marine skirmish line 
pushed forward, opening fire on the enemy trenches at a range 
of about 750 yards on the left flank and at 600 yards on the right. 
The machine guns of the 1st Platoon, 28th Company went into 
action about 0920, giving the trenches a thorough going-over. 
Under the Marines' rifle and machine-gun fire the enemy fire 
faltered and became increasingly erratic. 

Because of the heavy undergrowth, the going was slow, par- 
ticularly on the right, where the 32d Company found itself 
entering a swamp as it approached the enemy position. The 
27th Company was slowed as a consequence of overindulgence 
in "liberated" canned honey the night before, but by 0949 the 
Marine skirmish line had reached the foot of Las Trencheras. 
At a whistle signal, firing ceased. Then, with bayonets fixed, the 
Marines of the 26th, 27th, and 34th companies leaped forward 
to scramble up the steep slope and drive the enemy from his 
trenches. At sight of the Marines coming toward them, the 
Dominicans lost all stomach for fighting and fled to the higher 
line of trenches. Only a few stopped there, however, and they 
were quickly driven out by Marine fire. 

On the right of the line the reinforced 3 2d Company was 
blocked by swampy ground from carrying out its mission of en- 
veloping the enemy left flank. Leathernecks of this outfit could 
do no more than neutralize with small-arms fire the enemy flank 
position on a knoll to the right of the road. The neutralization 


fires were all that were required, however, as the enemy fled 
when the main position fell. 

The whole fight for Las Trencheras, from the first artillery shot 
to the seizure of the enemy trenches, lasted about an hour. 
Marine casualties were one killed and four wounded. No enemy 
dead or wounded, arms or ammunition were found in the 
trenches, but five bodies were discovered later in the woods. Ac- 
cording to Dominicans, the enemy losses were much greater, but 
no accurate count of his casualties could be made. In any event, 
the revolutionary forces had not been crushed. They had been 
put to flight, but they were still able to offer resistance. 

The Marines advanced no farther on the 27th. The train was 
brought up, and all hands went into bivouac. About 1300 the 
8th Company returned from the river with water, having been 
under sniper fire for the entire five-mile trip. 

That the enemy was not completely crushed became evident 
on the 28th when the Marines resumed their march towards 
Santiago. Mounted enemy scouts hung on the flanks just out of 
range, as the column, less the 1st Battalion, 8th Company, and 
train, moved out for Kilometer 42, the day's objective. The 
Marine mounted detachment could do little about it because it 
numbered only 1 5 men and its mounts were poor. As the column 
approached the 42 -kilometer post, one of the enemy horsemen 
ventured in too close and was killed. 

This stretch of road was the worst encountered on the entire 
march, making particularly heavy going for the trucks which 
had to crawl along in low gear. Undaunted by the rough going, 
the Ford train doubled back to Monte Cristi from Las Trencheras, 
a distance of 27 kilometers, then turned around and caught up 
with the column at Kilometer 42. As the Fords started from Las 
Trencheras that morning, the last car in column fell behind and 
was fired on by a small party of Dominicans. The Marines in 
the car returned the fire, then fell back to Las Trencheras to get 
assistance from the 8th Company garrisoning that place. A pa- 


trol dispatched to the scene discovered a cache of 32 rifles and 
ammunition near the spot from which the shots had been fired. 
Aside from this one incident, no enemy action was encountered 
on the trip. 

The 1 st Battalion had an independent mission on the 28th. 
While the main column was advancing along the Santiago road, 
Captain Marix' unit moved out from Las Trencheras along the 
G amino Real to Guayubin, a village five miles to the south on 
the Yaque River. To a reception committee of 30 citizens 
Marix read a proclamation by Admiral Caperton, stating that 
the Americans were friendly and wished to cooperate with the 
Dominicans in restoring law and order. The proclamation was 
not totally effective, however, for snipers fired on the Marine 
rear guard during the return march to Las Trencheras. 

At Kilometer 42 the main body made camp for the night on 
both sides of an "S" curve in the road. Ditches on both sides 
offered some protection. A machine gun outpost was placed on 
a commanding hill some 750 yards to the east, and other out- 
guards were established on the road to the rear and in the dense 
brush surrounding the camp on all sides. At about 1 9 1 5 small- 
arms fire erupted all around the Marine position. The Marine 
machine-guns opened up in reply, killing one of the enemy on 
the road and driving off the rest. Some of them retreated to the 
east, evidently unaware of the Marine machine gun outpost, for 
they came very close, talking in loud excited voices, until "Jack," 
a dog belonging to the 13th Company, barked. At the sound, 
the enemy fired wildly and ran. The Marines opened up with 
their machine guns, killing at least two Dominicans whose bodies 
were found later. One Marine was slightly wounded. 

The Dominicans evidently did not care for their reception, for 
they never again attacked the Marine camp at night. Later, 
after Santiago had been taken, Arias told the Marines that his 
men believed that the "sprinklers," as they called machine guns, 


could not be fired at night. That was one reason for attempting 
a night attack. 18 

Two destroyed bridges delayed the start of the march on the 
29th. These had spanned two dry arroyos just beyond the camp 
and were both about 100 feet long. Marine working parties 
under 1st Lieutenant Ralph E. Davis of the 26th Company and 
Lieutenant Thrasher of the Mounted Detachment, quickly 
remedied the matter by constructing a corduroyed driveway down 
into the first arroyo, and building a new bridge at a lower level 
in the second one. 

By 1 100, work had been completed, and the column, now 
including the 1st Battalion which had just come up from Las 
Trencheras, moved out, leaving the 8th Company to guard the 
bridges. At Kilometer 49 the new road ended, and the Marine 
column turned south on a cross road to pick up the Camino Real. 
Small-arms fire came from the brush as the 27th Company, 
serving as advance guard, completed this detour. The Marines 
returned the fire, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat. 

The Marines camped for the night at the junction of the 
cross road with the Camino Real. Apparently friendly natives 
came into camp during the evening, but any hope that their 
presence meant an end to Dominican resistance was quickly 
dispelled the next morning. 

The 1 st Battalion, serving as advance guard on the 30th, had 
been on the march for about half an hour when it came under 
fire from enemy concealed in the dense undergrowth at Savannah 
Ranch. Captain Marix threw out the 31st Company and one 
section of the 32 d Company to the left of the road and put the 
other 32 d Company section on the right, while machine gunners 
of the 28th Company delivered fire support from the road. The 
ensuing fire fight lasted only about 10 minutes, before the enemy, 
as usual, faded into the bush. One Marine was killed; enemy 
casualties, if any, were not reported. 

19 Putnam interview. 


As the march resumed at about 1200 Marix ordered Captain 
Charles F. Williams to take his 34th Company down a side road 
which looped to the south, then rejoined the Camino Real. For 
more than two hours the 34th Company marched along this 
route; then, within sight of the main road, brisk rifle fire burst 
from enemy concealed in the woods just north of the junction in 
position to cover both roads. The 34th Company deployed and 
returned the enemy fire. While the fire fight was in progress the 
remainder of the 1st Battalion came up along the main road and 
joined in the fight. This proved too much for the Dominicans 
who vanished into the forest. 

By the evening of the 30th, the Marines had reached the 
village of Jaibon, 64 kilometers from Monte Cristi. Navarette, 
the junction of the Monte Cristi-Santiago highway with the 
railroad from Puerto Plata, was only 26 kilometers away, and 
29th Company radio operators had received a message indicating 
that the Puerto Plata detachment had crossed the mountains. 
Colonel Pendleton then decided to cut off from his base at 
Monte Cristi and make his force a "flying column." In prep- 
aration for severing communications he dispatched the Ford train 
on a final run to Monte Cristi, pulled in the 6th and 8th 
Companies, which had been guarding the line of communication 
at Kilometers 42 and 50, and brought up part of the train 
which had been at Kilometer 50. The Louisiana detachment 
returned to Monte Cristi from Kilometer 27. 

Patrols were sent out on both 1 and 2 July, the 3 2d Company 
providing the troops on the 1st and the 34th Company on the 2d. 
The 32 d Company hit "pay dirt." One of its patrols brought 
in a prisoner who reported the enemy dug in across the road at 
about Kilometer 74, a point just beyond the village of Guaya- 
canas. According to this prisoner, the enemy were in position 
on a low ridge which was pierced through the center by a deep 
road cut. About 50 yards in front of the trenches, the prisoner 

519667—60 5 


reported, was an undefended road block of palm logs. His 
information was to prove remarkably accurate. 

By the morning of 3 July all detachments along the line of 
communications had joined up or had returned to Monte Cristi. 
It was as a "flying column" that the Marines moved out that 
morning towards Guayacanas. At 0800, after advancing about 
four miles, the 26th Company, in the lead, drew fire from rebel 
outposts, believed to be screening the Guayacanas position. 
Major Shaw called up the 27th Company, which was next in 
line, and directed Captain Frederick A. Barker, its company 
commander, to assist Lieutenant Davis and his 26th Company 
in driving in the enemy outposts. By 0830 the last of the enemy 
had pulled back out of contact. 

Pendleton now halted his force and ordered the 1st Battalion, 
minus the 8th Company but reinforced by the 29th, to attack. 
Shaw sent out a squad-size patrol from the 27th under 2d Lieu- 
tenant Egbert T. Lloyd to reconnoiter. Lloyd and his Marines 
worked their way through the dense undergrowth to within 200 
yards of the enemy and then returned to report their position 
much stronger than the one at Las Trencheras. The fortifica- 
tions included a trench across the road, a trench on a hill north 
of the road, and another on the continuation of the hill south 
of the road — all skillfully camouflaged by the removal of exca- 
vated earth. The ground for 200 yards in front of the trenches 
had been cleared, offering an unrestricted field of fire. About 
1 50 yards in front of the trenches was an undefended roadblock 
consisting of a large tree felled across the road. (See Map 6.) 

The 2d Battalion attack jumped off at 0900 with all three com- 
panies abreast — 26th south of the road, 27th in the center and 
north of the road, and 29th on the left. For these companies the 
advance was slow, not because of enemy action but because of 
the dense brush. 

Artillery fires were not only useless but nearly ended in a 
serious error. When the 13th Company opened fire with their 



3-inch guns, an error in fuse settings caused the shrapnel shells 
to burst over the heads of the advancing Marine infantry. Had 
these rounds been high explosive they might have killed or 
wounded a number of Marines. Fortunately, shrapnel explod- 
ing above the tree tops proved of little effect. Tree limbs fell 
among the infantry without causing casualties, and the 13th 
Company ceased fire when their error in range was reported. 19 

Major Dunlap, going forward on the road with a Benet-Mercie 
crew from the 13th Company, outstripped the advance of the 
skirmishers. Passing around a bend in the road, he found him- 
self fully exposed to enemy fire from the trenches a little more than 
200 yards away. He and his machine gunners rushed forward 
to take cover behind the log roadblock. Corporal Joseph A. 
Glowin emplaced the gun and opened fire. He was hit but con- 
tinued to serve his weapon until he was hit again and had to be 
dragged from the gun. Dunlap took over the gun, only to have 
it jam just as another Benet-Mercie crew from the 27th Company 
arrived and went into action. This gun, too, jammed. 

At this point the 2d Platoon of the 28th Company with their 
four Colt machine guns began to come up. They had been 
committed when Captain William H. Pritchett, the company 
commander, was given permission by Colonel Pendleton to take 
a platoon forward to support the infantry attack. The men had 
come under long-range rifle fire from the enemy trenches almost 
as soon as they started to advance. In the running fight one man 
had already been seriously wounded. Owing to frequent jams, 
the platoon had become strung out and now came up one gun 
at a time. 

Captain Pritchett, who arrived with the first gun, ordered it 
into action at once. Within a few moments Corporal George 
Frazee, the gun captain, had been killed, and four others had 
been wounded. 

19 Maj Norman C. Bates, 1st end. to CMC ltr to Maj N. C. Bates, dtd 
8N0V57 (Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMC). 


First Sergeant Roswell Winans came up with the second gun. 
He set it up and began firing it himself. From his seat on the 
Colt tripod, Winans was in plain view to the enemy in their 
trenches only 200 yards away. Their return fire became erratic 
and slackened in volume as the .30 caliber slugs from the Colt 
began to graze the top of the fortifications. The last round of the 
250-cartridge belt jammed, temporarily silencing the gun. Un- 
daunted, Winans stood up and set about clearing it in full view 
of the enemy. Not until Captain Pritchett ordered him to do so 
did he pull the gun back under cover of the undergrowth. Re- 
pairs completed, Winans and another Marine put the gun back 
into action. Meanwhile, the third gun had come up and gone 
back into action. With three guns firing, the Marines now were 
able to establish fire superiority over the Dominicans. 

It was under cover of the deadly machine gun fire that the 
riflemen advanced to within 150 yards of the trenches. The 27th 
and 29th Companies north of the road worked their way north, 
cut through a dense cactus hedge, and outflanked the enemy posi- 
tion. With a loud cheer the Marines of these two companies 
charged the northern enemy trench. First to enter were the 29th 
Company signalmen who demonstrated in this engagement the 
ability of specialist Marines to fight as infantry when necessary. 
Sergeant John H. Crall, mess sergeant of the 29th, shot and killed 
the rebel commander, General Maximo Gabral. This was enough 
for the Dominicans. They fled, abandoning all three trenches, 
although only their right flank was actually under assault. Three 
of their number were cut down by Marine rifle fire as they ran 
out of the trench. 

While the 1 st Battalion was attacking the enemy fortifications, 
Lieutenant Julian Smith and his rear guard were beating off an 
attack by a group of about 75 Dominicans. Taking position be- 
hind a log fence, the enemy opened up on Smith's rear squad with 
small-arms fire. The Marines hit the deck and returned the fire 
until Smith with two additional squads came back to reinforce 


them. A Colt machine gun was put into operation, and, when 
the bullets began to knock splinters off the top fence rail, the 
enemy decided the action was too hot and pulled out. 20 

Marine casualties during the engagement at Guayacanas were 
one killed and eight wounded, all but three hit at the machine 
gun position on the road. The number of enemy casualties could 
not be determined. For their part in the battle Winans and 
Glowin were awarded the Medal of Honor. 

The enemy trenches were carried about noon, and the 26th 
Company was pushed out about 200 yards to the east to cover the 
position. The train was brought up, and for the next three hours 
all hands sweated to haul the trucks and wagons over a section 
where the Dominicans had done a thorough job of demolition. 
This obstacle passed, the Marine column resumed its march, 
arriving at the village of Esperanza where camp was made for 
the night. 

With the 1 st Battalion as advance guard, the column got under 
way on 4 July about 0730. Just after the start, Marines of the 
32 d Company on the point exchanged shots with an enemy 
mounted patrol, easily driving them off. About eleven o'clock 
a Ford flying a Red Cross flag approached from the direction of 
Santiago carrying four Dominican doctors on their way to treat 
the enemy soldiers wounded at Guayacanas. After being blind- 
folded, they were allowed to pass through the Marine lines. 

The Marine column pulled into Navarette in the middle of 
the afternoon to find Major Hiram A. "Hiking Hiram" Bearss 
and his detachment camped at the railroad station, where they 
had arrived the day before after fighting their way from Puerto 
Plata. The "flying column" was now back to earth after a flight 
of three days. Rail communications to the coast were immedi- 
ately put to use to evacuate the wounded to Puerto Plata for 
treatment aboard the hospital ship Solace. Logistic problems for 
the remainder of the march to Santiago were now greatly simpli- 

20 Julian Smith interview. 


fied. Not only could supplies be brought up to Navarette by rail 
from the coast, but, as the tracks continued into Santiago, Colonel 
Pendleton could now move his heavy gear and supplies by rail, 
thus relieving his overworked motor and animal transport. 

Mountainous terrain and track and rolling stock in an ad- 
vanced state of decay had proven to be more formidable obstacles 
to Bearss' advance than the enemy. About four kilometers 
from Puerto Plata the railroad crossed a spur of the coastal range 
so steep that a cog rail was necessary. Once over this preliminary 
obstacle, trains began the ascent of the coastal range to an alti- 
tude of 1,580 feet. At this height a short tunnel pierced the 
mountain below the summit of the range which at this point was 
1,720 feet above sea level. After emerging from the tunnel, 
there was an equally dizzy descent to the Cibao plain. 21 

The Ferrocarril Central Dominicano, was, according to Major 
Bearss, ". . . in a most deplorable condition; another two months 
under Dominican rule and the entire outfit would have been 
worthless and useless." 22 

On 25 June Captain Eugene P. Fortson, commanding the 
9th Company, and temporarily in command of the detachment 
at Puerto Plata pending the arrival of Bearss from the United 
States, had received a radio message from Colonel Pendleton. 
He was informed that the main body of the Provisional Detach- 
ment would begin the advance on Santiago the following day; 
that it would establish a base at Navarette; and that rail com- 
munciations with Puerto Plata were to be established upon 
arrival at Santiago. In support of this operation Captain 
Fortson was ordered to ". . . reconnoiter about 20 miles along 
the railroad and keep it in repair." 23 

21 Otto Schoenrich, Santo Domingo, a Country with a Future (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 19 18), pp. 210-213. 

22 GO Railroad Bn, rept to GO US Naval Forces Operating Ashore in 
Santo Domingo, dtd 13J11I16. 

^USS Prairie msg to CO Puerto Plata Det via USS Sacramento, dtd 


Fortson was delayed in beginning his reconnaissance on the 
26th because of the disappearance of the Dominican engineer. 
A substitute was rounded up and the 4th and 9th Companies, 
with four Colt and two Benet-Mercie machine guns and a 3 -inch 
naval landing gun, pulled out of Puerto Plata at 1030. By 
1830 the detachment had arrived at the village of Perez where 
it bivouacked for the night. Total distance traveled during the 
day was about 10 miles. There was no enemy opposition; the 
slow rate of progress was due to the necessity of hauling one 
car at a time up the spur of the coastal range. 

Two squads of the 4th Company reconnoitered along the 
track for about a half-mile south of Perez on the morning of 
the 27th. This patrol reported all quiet and the rails in working 
order, so the train moved out to the south at about 1300. So 
steep was the grade that it was necessary to haul the train in two 
sections as far as the village of Llanos, a distance of about one 
mile. While the first section was halted at Llanos, waiting for 
the locomotive to bring up the remainder of the train, an enemy 
outpost opened fire on the halted Marines from extreme range. 
They replied with their 3 -inch gun, firing it from its position on 
the flat car. 

By 1 500 the second section had been hauled up to the top 
of the grade at Llanos, and the advance was resumed with the 
train now coupled together in a single section. The 4th Com- 
pany, deployed ahead of the train in an effort to locate the 
enemy and silence his fire, advanced for about one and a half 
miles before locating the Dominican position on a wooded hill 
to the left of the track. The 4th Company Marines opened 
up with rifle fire at a range of about 600 yards. The Domini- 
cans kept up a heavy return fire until a Colt machine gun was 
brought into action, then withdrew to a prepared position on a 
higher ridge. 

The Marines quickly followed up their advantage, occupying 
the recently vacated enemy position, and building up fire superi- 


ority against the new Dominican position on the higher ridge. 
Once again the Colt machine gun proved decisive. The enemy 
fire quickly ceased, and the Marines moved up and occupied 
the higher ridge without further opposition. 

Marines with the train, meanwhile, advanced slowly, repair- 
ing one section of torn-up track, and arriving at the town of 
Quebreda Honda by 1830. Ahead, a long stretch of track had 
been torn up, so the advance halted for the night. 

The 28th was a day of railroad reconstruction. In addition 
to repairing track outside Quebreda Honda, the Marines turned 
section-hands had to remove a fallen water tower lying on fire 
across the bridge at Lajas — and then repair the bridge itself. 
Work on the bridge continued throughout the day, undisturbed 
by enemy action, and was completed the following morning. 

During the night of the 28th, Major Bearss, who had landed 
at Puerto Plata during the afternoon, arrived at Lajas with the 
New Jersey detachment. He assumed command, and, after a 
quick appraisal of the situation, determined to keep the enemy 
on the run by a rapid advance, thereby preventing further de- 
struction of track, bridges, or the tunnel at the top of the pass. 
The terrain, however, was anything but encouraging for swift 
movement. From Lajas the rails headed steeply upward, wind- 
ing and twisting along the slope of a steep mountain gorge to the 
tunnel which pierced the mountainside a short distance from 
the top of the pass. 

Acting on reports that the enemy were strongly entrenched 
on the heights above the town of Alta Mira, Bearss ordered the 
4th Company to advance along ridges east of the track and the 
9th Company to accompany the train with a strong advance 
guard thrown out ahead. The New Jersey detachment served as 
rear guard. 

The Marines moved out at 0800 on 29 June, and 40 minutes 
later the 4th Company was on the outskirts of Alta Mira. Enemy 
troops rapidly evacuated the town as the Marines approached 


but, as they passed through the town, Dominicans on the hill 
to the west opened fire. The ensuing fire fight was put to an 
end by the gth Company artillerists, who, coming up with the 
train, opened up with their 3-inch gun. After a half-hour of 
shelling, the enemy retreated up the mountain towards the tunnel. 

The enemy were now reported to be in a strong position on 
La Cumbre, a mountain peak dominating the tunnel entrance. 
Major Bearss ordered the 4th Company to swing around in an 
effort to flank La Cumbre from the east. After an arduous climb, 
the Marines located the enemy position about 3,000 yards distant. 
They signalled this information to the train below, and the 3- 
inch gun was unloaded and emplaced in a position to bear upon 
the enemy on La Cumbre. 

The first shot was a little short, the second shot was over, the 
third shot took off the corner of a shack overlooking the enemy 
trenches, the fourth shot took away the right side of the shack, 
and the fifth shot exploded in the center of it. By this time the 
enemy could be seen scurrying down the mountainside towards 
the tunnel. Two rounds of shrapnel burst over them to speed 
their progress. 

Major Bearss now determined on a sprint through the tunnel 
in order to catch the enemy in the rear. Accompanied by 55 
men from the 9th Company and New Jersey detachment, he 
dashed through the 300-yard passage to see the last of the enemy 
in full flight towards Santiago. This ended Dominican resistance 
along the railroad, but owing to the necessity for sending the train 
back to Puerto Plata with the wounded and the time spent repair- 
ing a destroyed bridge, Bearss' detachment did not arrive at 
Navarette until 3 July, four days later. 

The 24th Company, an independent rifle unit, joined Pendle- 
ton's forces at Navarette on the 5th, having landed at Puerto 
Plata the previous day. These Marines arrived too late to par- 
ticipate in the fighting but added to the strength available for 
occupation duties. 


Pendleton and his united command were now ready to fight 
their way on into Santiago, but there was to be no further action. 
The Arias faction was ready to come to terms. On 5 July, 
Dominican officials called on Colonel Pendleton to inform him 
that there would be no further resistance. These emissaries were 
not of the revolutionary party but had come from Santo Domingo 
City to persuade Arias to accept Admiral Caperton's surrender 
terms. The admiral had offered to pardon the Dominican revolu- 
tionists resisting American troops if they would disarm and dis- 
perse. Now that he had been defeated in battle, Arias was 
willing to accept the American conditions. 24 

At daybreak on the 6th, the Marines resumed the march on 
Santiago, arriving at the outskirts of the city by 0800. Colonel 
Pendleton summoned the members of the peace commission and 
the newly-appointed governor, Dr. Juan B. Perez, over a tele- 
phone line connected to the Santiago city system by the signalmen 
of the 29th Company. When these Dominicans reported to the 
Marine command post, arrangements were made for an im- 
mediate occupation of the city. Early in the afternoon the 
Marine column marched into Santiago and occupied the Fortaleza 
San Luis, which was the military barracks, and the Castillo, a 
fortified hill position overlooking the city from the east. 


With the defeat of Arias and the occupation of Santiago the 
4th Regiment had accomplished the major part of its mission. 
It now remained to complete the occupation of the northern 
region of the country and to assure the maintenance of law and 
order in support of the constitutional government. 

Pendleton, a skillful military diplomat, realized from the first 
that success in this mission would depend upon the attitude of 
the Dominican people towards the occupation forces. With 

24 ComCruLant msg to SecNav, dtd 26Juni6. 


extraordinary tact he was able to convince the leading citizens 
that the Marines had no purpose other than to help in setting 
Dominican affairs in order. 25 Conditions had become so anarchic 
by the summer of 19 16 that the more thoughtful Dominicans 
accepted the Marines, at least at first, with the feeling that a 
temporary foreign occupation could not make matters worse and 
might lead to an improvement. 26 

Pendleton insisted that Marine performance live up to 
promises. He demanded absolute integrity in dealings with the 
Dominicans. The Marines paid in cash for what they needed 
and they were expected to live up to their obligations. On one 
occasion a group of local merchants came to Captain Campbell, 
commanding the 13th Company, with a large bundle of bar chits 
bearing the names of "George W ashington," "Abraham Lincoln," 
"Woodrow Wilson," and other illustrious Americans. Campbell 
was able to identify some of the men by comparing handwriting. 
These were required to honor their debts. The remainder of the 
bills were paid out of the Company funds. The merchants were 
directed to conduct only a cash business with Marines thereafter. 27 

A willingness on the part of the Marines to help Dominicans 
in their business affairs also served to cement friendly relations. 
The opening of the Puerto Plata railroad offered a good oppor- 
tunity to be of service by shipping the coffee and cacao crops to 
the coast for shipment to world markets where, under the infla- 
tionary conditions of World War I, they brought fancy prices. 
And, too, the Marine payroll and open-market purchases of sup- 
plies in Santiago and the surrounding country stimulated local 
trade. 28 

These practices paid off in an attitude, if not of approval, at 

25 LtGen Pedro A. Del Valle, interview by HistBr, HQMC, dtd 70ct57. 
Del Valle, a Puerto Rican by birth, was Pendleton's interpreter during this 

26 Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, pp. 801-824. 

27 Thrasher interview. 

28 Ibid., and Julian Smith interview. 


least of acquiescence on the part of leading Dominicans. Rear 
Admiral Charles F. Pond, who had relieved Admiral Caperton 
as Commander Cruiser Force, was particularly impressed by the 
apparent cordiality existing between Marines and Dominicans 
in Santiago. "Interviews with Dominican officials [were] cordial 
and satisfactory with no evidence of distrust or dissatisfaction," 
he reported after an inspection of the northern region. "Each 
gave assurance of willing cooperation." 29 

This concern for good working relations with the Dominicans 
also characterized the completion of the occupation of the north- 
ern section of the country. During the period 22 to 24 July 
Colonel Pendleton and his staff visited the towns of Moca, La 
Vega, and San Francisco de Macoris, and, in conferences with 
local officials, arranged for the occupation of those places by 
Marines. By the end of the month, garrisons had been estab- 
lished by the 9th Company at Moca, by the 34th Company at 
La Vega, and by the 31st at San Francisco de Macoris. In addi- 
tion, the 32d Company had garrisoned Sanchez, a port on 
Samana Bay and eastern terminus of the Samana-Santiago rail- 
road. Completing the system of outlying garrisons were the 25th 
and 24th Companies, the latter a new arrival attached to Pendle- 
ton's command, stationed at Monte Cristi and Puerto Plata re- 
spectively. Puerto Plata, with its rail connection to the interior, 
became the supply port for the 4th Regiment and other Marine 
units operating in the northern region. Colonel Pendleton's 
headquarters and all troops not assigned to outpost duties took 
station at Santiago. Except at San Francisco de Macoris, these 
occupations went off smoothly. 30 

To assure effective control of the occupation forces, two gen- 
eral subordinate commands were set up in northern Santo 
Domingo. Major Shaw, commanding the 2d Battalion, was 
placed in charge of the Santiago garrison, while Captain Marix, 

29 GomCruLant rept of ops, 23-31J11I16, to SecNav, dtd 2Augi6. 

30 See Chapter III. 


the i st Battalion Commander, assumed responsibility for the 
La Vega district, an area embracing all northeast Santo Domingo 
and including the provinces of La Vega, Pacificador, and 
Samana. 31 

Pendleton's U.S. Naval Forces Ashore in Northern Santo Do- 
mingo underwent a series of organizational changes in the late 
summer of 191 6. In August, the 24th Company and the Marine 
detachments of the Memphis and Rhode Island departed. The 
next month, the two remaining shipboard detachments ashore 
in northern Santo Domingo, those of the New Jersey and Louisi- 
ana, were reorganized as the 45th and 47th Companies and added 
to the 4th Regiment. Pendleton then had under his command, 
in addition to his own regiment, the 4th, 6th, gth, and 13th 

On 18 October, Colonel Pendleton left Santiago for Santo 
Domingo City, where he assumed larger responsibilities as com- 
mander of all U.S. naval forces ashore in Santo Domingo. A 
month later, on 22 November, this command was redesignated 
2d Marine Brigade. Colonel Theodore P. Kane took over as 
commander of U.S. naval forces ashore in northern Santo Do- 
mingo but did not take command of the 4th Regiment until 
1 January 19 17. Pendleton retained command of the. regiment 
until 1 1 December, the date of his promotion to brigadier gen- 
eral. He was then relieved by Major Marix who commanded 
the regiment until Kane took over. 32 


With the occupation of the Cibao towns and the establishment 
of law and order throughout the country north of the mountains 
the 4th Regiment had successfully completed its mission. But 
neither Admiral Pond nor Minister Russell in Santo Domingo 

81 4th Regt MRolls, iJul-3iDeci6. 

82 4th Regt MRolls, iAug-3iDeci6. 


City could claim any diplomatic success comparable to the mili- 
tary victory scored by Colonel Pendleton and his Marines north 
of the mountains. 33 The policy of the United States in July 19 16 
was to put into office a Dominican government which would 
agree to American control of finances and of the army. Dr. 
Federico Henriquez y Carvajal, the leading candidate for the 
presidency, was an avowed follower of Arias and was obviously 
unacceptable to the United States. As neither the Americans 
nor the Dominicans could agree on a new government, they at 
last settled on a compromise to break the political deadlock. On 
25 July the Dominican Congress elected Dr. Francisco Henriquez 
y Carvajal, brother of Federico and a man completely aloof 
from politics, to be provisional president for five months. 

The election of a chief executive did nothing to bring closer 
a solution to the political problem. Although Henriquez y 
Carvajal was willing to accept most of the United States demands 
for financial control, he balked at placing the Dominican armed 
forces under the command of American officers. Negotiations 
dragged on into the autumn without results. Then, in Novem- 
ber, the provisional president ordered elections foi members of 
Congress, whose terms were about to expire. He feared that 
the United States would use the nonexistence of a Congress as a 
justification for imposing military government. 

Ironically, this action, intended to forestall the imposition of 
military government, was exactly what brought it about. Under 
the complicated Dominican electoral law, members of Congress 
were chosen by electoral colleges. Most of these were controlled 
by Arias. To forestall such a result, and also because there 
seemed to be no other way to achieve the desired reforms, Sec- 
retary of State Lansing recommended to President Wilson the 
establishment of a military government. To this the President 
reluctantly consented. 

33 This section is based on Munro, U.S. and the Caribbean, pp. 126-129; 
and Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, pp. 773-792. 


Occupation Duty in the 
Dominican Republic 


"The Republic of Santo Domingo is hereby placed in a state 
of military occupation by the forces under my command and is 
made subject to military government and to the exercise of mili- 
tary law applicable to such occupation," read the proclamation 
issued on 29 November 19 16 by Rear Admiral Harry S. Knapp, 
the newly designated military governor. 1 

It was shortly past midnight at Marine headquarters in Santi- 
ago when Colonel Kane was handed a dispatch from Knapp 
announcing the beginning of military government. Plans for 
putting it in operation had already been drawn up. They were 
now ordered into effect. By radio, telegraph, and telephone 
Knapp's message was passed to every 4th Regiment post in north- 
ern Santo Domingo. In Santiago MP patrols roved through 
the streets and checked the cantinas to pass the word that liberty 
was cancelled and for all hands to return to barracks at once. 

At the Fortaleza San Luis Colonel Kane briefed company 
commanders of the Santiago garrison on the military government 
plans. He appointed a censor to keep watch on the press and 

1 Quoted in Munro, U.S. and the Caribbean, p. 129. 
519667—60 6 



a provost marshal and provost judge to apprehend and try 
offenders against the newly established military rule. He ordered 
patrols strengthened and all companies kept on alert. 

The next morning the Dominican officials — the judges, the 
ayuntiamento (city council), the chief of police, and the padre — 
were summoned to the fortaleza, where Colonel Kane told them 
they were expected to carry on in their duties, but, if any of them 
refused, the Marines were ready to take over. All readily agreed 
except Padre Gonzales, who flew into a rage, but he finally calmed 
down and agreed to cooperate. 2 

Inhabitants of northern Santo Domingo accepted the procla- 
mation of military government without protest except in San 
Francisco de Macoris. A town of about 5,000 inhabitants lo- 
cated 30 miles southeast of Santiago, it had long been a center 
of opposition to American occupation. When the 31st Company 
moved into town on 27 July, Juan Perez, the provincial governor 
and an undetermined number of armed Dominicans occupied 
the local fortaleza. At first, the populace greeted the Marines 
cordially. No effort was made to disarm Perez' followers or to 
dispossess them from the fortaleza. Relations degenerated 
quickly when it became obvious to the Dominicans that the 
Marines intended to remain, and there was occasional sniping 
in the town. 

A weak and vacillating Marine commander, unable to deal 
with the situation, was relieved by 1st Lieutenant Ernest C. 
Williams on 4 September. Reinforcements, consisting of the 47th 
Company arrived at San Francisco de Macoris on the 2 1st, bring- 
ing the Marine command to a total of 3 officers and 1 1 5 men. 
Williams lost no time in restoring order in the town, but the 
fortaleza appeared to be too tough to take with the available 
forces. The Marine officers estimated that a battalion of infantry 

2 CO Northern Dist, U.S. Forces on Shore in Santo Domingo Itr to CO 
U.S. Forces on Shore in Santo Domingo, dtd i2Deci6. Unless otherwise 
indicated, all official records are filed in 1975-70/5-2, Central Files, HQMC. 


supported by an artillery battery would be needed to do the job. 3 
Undaunted by these odds, Williams determined to act. On 
29 November he called on Perez and demanded the surrender 
of the fortaleza. The Dominican governor refused, and Williams 
returned to his headquarters to prepare for an attack on the local 
stronghold. The Marine commander planned to overcome 
superior force by surprise. Picking 12 enlisted men who were 
quartered in the Marine headquarters building, he ordered them 
to assemble that evening just before taps. Leaving the building 
as though on a routine patrol, they were to march as close to the 
fortaleza as possible without arousing suspicion, then rush the 
gate before it could be closed. The remainder of the command 
was to assemble at designated points in support of the assault, 
to attack after the storming party had secured the gate. 

At the last note of taps, the prearranged signal, the Marines 
moved out on their assigned missions. Williams and his 12 -man 
assault group marched along the street toward the Dominican 
stronghold. As they approached they could see the native soldiers 
preparing to swing the massive double doors shut for the night. 
Calling for his men to follow, Williams sprinted the last few yards 
and flung his 200-pound bulk against the doors, bursting them 
wide open. He rushed inside followed by his men. The Domin- 
icans had been taken completely by surprise but quickly re- 
covered. A short but fierce struggle ensued. Within ten minutes 
the fight was over. Many of the Dominicans escaped over the 
rear wall; others surrendered, throwing themselves face down on 
the floor. 

Of Williams' 12 -man assault party, eight had been wounded. 
The Dominicans suffered casualties of three killed and two 

3 The account of the episode at San Francisco de Macoris is from MRolls, 
31st and 47th Companies, iJul-3iDeci6; CO 31st Co rept to CO 2/4, dtd 
iDeci6; Maj Norman C. Bates ltr to CMC, i2Dec57; Otto E. Hagstrom 
ltr to Col Charles W. Harrison, dtd 3iMar58, both ltrs in Monograph & 
Comment File, HistBr, HQMC. Bates and Hagstrom were members of the 
31st Co at the time. 


wounded. For his exploit, Williams was awarded the Medal of 

The jortaleza secured, Williams sent a patrol to take the police 
station. This was done without incident, as the police offered no 
resistance, but the Marines were fired on by the snipers as they 
returned. At about midnight Williams ordered 2d Lieutenant 
James T. Reid to take a detachment and occupy the railroad 
station and telephone exchange, but they arrived too late. When 
Reid and his Marines reached the depot they found the wires cut 
and the train, carrying Perez and 200 others, already departed. 

Major Marix at La Vega received the first news of trouble 
at 2200 when a radio report of the fight at the fort ale za came in 
from Williams. At 2300 word came from Marix 5 adjutant, 2d 
Lieutenant Arthur Kingston, at the La Vega railroad station 
that a band of 100 Dominicans had seized a train at San Fran- 
cisco de Macoris. Within a few minutes the stationmaster at 
La Gina reported by telegraph that a train was coming in from 
the direction of San Francisco de Macoris. At 0240 another 
telegraph message arrived, this time from the Barbero station- 
master, reporting that the train had passed through that village 
going east toward Sanchez. ( See Map 7. ) 

Marix now realized that the Dominican insurrectionist band 
was like a base runner caught betwen first and second. All that 
remained was to make the run down. Radio orders were dis- 
patched to 1 st Lieutenant Samuel M. Harrington at Sanchez to 
move out with his 32d Company west along the rail line, and 2d 
Lieutenant Charles A. King was ordered to take a detachment 
from the 34th and 48th Companies east along the railroad from 
La Vega. 

Harrington's Marines had been manning defensive positions 
on the western outskirts of Sanchez for about an hour and a half 
when Marix' order came through at 0430. Rumors, which 
proved to be unfounded, that the rebels were approaching were 
the occasion for the 32 d Company alert. The Marines now 


rounded up a train consisting of an engine, a box car, and three 
flat cars, sandbagged it for defense, and put on board ten days' 
rations. While these preparations were in progress a radio 
message from Major Marix was received transferring command 
of the company to Captain John A. "Johnny the Hard" Hughes, 
a tough Marine of the old school who was passing through on 
his way to Santiago. 

At 0800 Hughes' command, 3 officers, 70 enlisted men, and 
a civilian interpreter, pulled out of Sanchez bound for San Fran- 
cisco de Macoris. By 0930 the Marines had covered about 20 
miles and were crossing a trestle on the outskirts of the village 
of La Ceiba when a torn-up rail threw the train from the track. 
Hughes at once established an outpost ahead of the train. This 
position within sight of La Ceiba railroad station was fired upon by 
a small group of Dominicans armed with pistols and a few rifles. 
Leaving one squad to guard the train, Hughes deployed the re- 
mainder of his command as skirmishers and swept through the 
village, driving out the rebel band, and killing one of them. 

Loading their ammunition, blanket rolls, and one day's rations 
aboard two handcars found at La Ceiba, the Marines pushed on. 
Occasional snipers fired on the advancing column, but the 
swampy ground and dense undergrowth prevented the use of 
patrols to clear the flanks. The heaviest sniping occurred on the 
outskirts of the town of Pimental, where the Marines were fired 
on at close range from the swamp on the left of the tracks. They 
returned the fire and could hear the attackers shouting and 
crashing about in the underbrush as they retreated. 

At this point a Dominican on horseback rode out of the town 
waving a white flag. He said that all but a few of the citizens 
of Pimental were friendly. Accompanied by their new-found 
friend, the Marines entered the town and pushed on across the 
open savannahs beyond. About three miles beyond Pimental 
they saw a locomotive and three coaches approaching on the 
far side of a savannah. The Dominican assured the Marines 


that the train was in the hands of friends, took a swig of rum, 
rode forward, and returned with the train. It turned out to be 
the one stolen by the revolutionaries at San Francisco de Macoris 
the night before. They had evidently abandoned it when they 
realized they were trapped between two Marine forces converging 
from Sanchez and La Vega. Mounting the recaptured train, 
the Marines of the 32 d Company pushed on to San Francisco 
de Macoris without further incident, arriving there about 1900. 4 

Lieutenant King and his detachment, 55 men from the 48th 
Company and a five-man machine gun crew from the 34th Com- 
pany, left La Vega at 1 1 15 with orders to clear the track as far 
as La Gina and make a junction with Captain Hughes at the 
point. As he neared La Gina, King saw a train approaching 
from the opposite direction. Upon sighting the Marines, the 
engineer threw the locomotive into reverse and beat a hasty re- 
treat. King did not give chase because he interpreted his orders 
to mean that he should not go farther along the main line than 
La Gina. Instead, without waiting for Hughes, he turned north 
towards San Francisco de Macoris where he arrived without 
further incident. 5 

Captain Hughes, as senior officer present, now took command 
of the Marine forces in San Francisco de Macoris. The prompt 
action of Colonel Kane in concentrating troops in the trouble 
spot proved effective in quenching the revolutionary spark before 
it could be farmed into flame. Except for occasional sniping 
there was no further opposition to the occupation forces. By 2 
December the situation was well enough in hand for the 32 d 
and 48th Companies to return to their regular stations at Sanchez 
and La Vega. Manuel Perez, the rebel leader, surrendered to 
the military government in March 19 1 7. 

4 CO 32d Co rept to Dist Cdr, dtd 8Deci6; Capt John A. Hughes rept to 
Dist Cdr, La Vega, dtd 1 Dec 16. 

5 HQ La Vega Dist, FieldO No. 1, dtd 30N0V16; 2dLt Charles A. King 
rept to HQ La Vega Dist, dtd 3Deci6. 



The abortive revolt at San Francisco de Macoris was the last 
organized resistance to the 4th Regiment in northern Santo 
Domingo. During the next five and a half years Marines of 
the 4th were to be engaged in police and civil administration 
functions under the military government. These duties were new 
and strange to most men of the regiment. They were trained 
as soldiers of the sea, equally at home aboard the cruisers and 
battlewagons of the fleet, in landing on foreign shores to protect 
American lives and property, or in conducting extended combat 
operations ashore. Administering the affairs of a foreign country, 
with strange customs and language, was outside their experience, 
but versatility is a tradition of the Marine Corps, and Marines 
of the 4th Regiment had ample opportunity to demonstrate it 
in the Dominican Republic. 

The intention of the United States in establishing military 
government was to restore order and to reform local institutions 
so that order, once restored, could be maintained by the Domini- 
cans themselves. There was, however, no intention to remodel 
completely the political structure; only the changes necessary 
to the conduct of responsible government were to be undertaken. 
With this objective in mind, the Military Governor was directed 
to maintain as many of the Dominican officials in office as pos- 
sible. But the native cabinet ministers all resigned and, as no 
other Dominicans were willing to serve, the cabinet posts had 
to be filled by Marine and naval officers. Below the minister 
level, the native civil servants remained on the job in the execu- 
tive departments. In the provincial and local governments, too, 
Dominicans stuck to their posts. 6 

6 Unless otherwise cited, this section is based on Munro, U.S. and the 
Caribbean, pp. 129-137; Sumner Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, pp. 792-820; 
and Lt Col Charles J. Miller, "Diplomatic Spurs, Our Experience in Santo 
Domingo," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 19, no's. 1, 2, and 3 (Feb, May, 


In like manner, the Dominican judicial system was kept in 
operation. The republic's own civil and criminal codes remained 
in force, and the native courts and prosecutors continued to 
administer justice. But they could not be expected to try cases 
involving members of the American military occupation, nor 
could they function where violations of executive orders of the 
military government were concerned. Provost marshals and 
judges were appointed by the military government to handle 
such cases. 

Political and economic reforms undertaken by the military 
government included the creation of up-to-date systems of edu- 
cation, public health, and public finance, and the construction 
of modern roads, bridges, port facilities and other public works. 
They were the responsibility of the executive departments of the 
military government. 

Maintenance of law and order was primarily the responsibility 
of the 2d Marine Brigade. As the military garrison of the coun- 
try, it stood ready to put down insurrections against the military 
government. In addition, it carried out a wide variety of civil 
functions. These included the collection of firearms, the arrest 
and trial of offenders against military government decrees or 
personnel, administration of prisons, prevention of smuggling, 
enforcement of health regulations, and the preparation of military 
maps and handbooks of the country. 

Assisting the Marines in these police and security duties was 
the Guardia Nacional Dominic ana. 7 Established on 7 April 
191 7 with a strength of about 1,000 officers and men, it was at 
first too poorly trained and equipped to be very effective. Not 
until 1 92 1, when a complete reorganization was carried out and 
a thorough training program introduced, did the Policia begin 
to measure up as a security force. Organization and training 
were carried out by Marine officers and NCOs assigned exclu- 

7 The title was changed to Policia Nacional in June 192 1. 


sively to that duty by brigade headquarters. Unlike the various 
civil functions assigned to the brigade, the regiments did not 
participate in this native training program. When the Marines 
departed in the summer of 1924, they left behind a well-disci- 
plined military force commanded by competent native officers. 

To assure effective execution of occupation duties the country 
was divided into Northern and Southern Districts, with the 
boundary line running generally along the crest of the Cordillera 
Central. Each district was made the responsibility of a regi- 
ment — the 4th in the north and the 3d in the south. In 19 19 
an Eastern District was carved out of the Southern District to 
give better direction to anti-bandit operations there, and an ad- 
ditional regiment, the 1 5th, was brought in as the garrison. The 
regimental commanders doubled as district commanders. In 
this capacity they were the representatives of the military gov- 
ernor in their respective districts, responsible for carrying out 
the edicts of the military government. 

In the absence of insurrection or the threat of insurrection in 
the Northern District, Colonel Kane and his successors in com- 
mand of the 4th Regiment functioned mostly in this latter capac- 
ity. It was as commanders of the Northern District that they 
performed all their duties which were not of a purely military 
character. The provost marshals and provost judges were the 
principal agents of the district commanders in carrying out civil 
functions. Without exception they were Marine or naval medical 
officers of the regiment, serving in their provost capacities as 
additional duty. These provost marshal offices and provost 
courts, located in each of the provinces composing the Northern 
District, were the most intimate point of contact between the 
military government and the Dominican people. It was the 
provost marshals and the provost judges who enforced the orders 
of the military government, who apprehended and tried persons 
accused of crimes against the occupation forces, and who investi- 


gated charges brought by Dominicans against members of the 
occupying forces. 

Much of the credit for the peaceful occupation of the Northern 
District must go to the junior officers of the 4th Regiment who 
performed these exacting duties. They were the visible agents 
of the military government, and their conduct largely determined 
the attitude of the Dominican population toward the occupying 
forces. That the occupation of the Northern District was carried 
on for eight years with so little friction attests to the skill with 
which the junior officers discharged their responsibilities. 

One of these young officers, Captain Samuel M. Harrington, 
received tangible evidence of the success of his efforts in the form 
of a petition to the military governor signd by 39 citizens of 
Sanchez. "Captain Samuel M. Harrington is an admirable 
example of moral greatness, his heart inspired by pure and gener- 
ous sentiments, dedicated entirely to justice, social and juridicial, 
on which rests human fraternity," read the petition. "Having 
unofficial knowledge that it is intended to take [him] . . . 
away . . ., this town . . . collectively request of you, high 
Functionary of the Executive, to grant us a reconsideration . . . 
of the disposition ordering a change in the authority who serves 
the interests of peace in this town, to who we are so grateful for 
the treatment given us, who is adorned by such unquestioned 
merit and virtue, for whom we treasure imperishably loyal affec- 
tion and the cordiality inspired by respect." 8 

If the Marine provost marshals and judges did not always act 
perfectly to serve the cause of justice in every case brought before 
them, at least no accusations of unfair or cruel treatment were 
made against members of the 4th Regiment. A Senate investi- 
gating committee, which visited the country in 192 1, held hear- 
ings at which many Dominicans testified, accusing the occupation 

8 Juanico Jose, et al. ltr to Military Governor, dtd 28Febi 7. 


forces of acts of cruelty and injustice. None of the accusations, 
however, was directed against the 4th Regiment. 9 


The Northern District covered an area of 8,350 square miles 
and contained a population of about 500,000. To discharge its 
many occupation duties the 4th Regiment had only 26 officers 
and 908 enlisted men in January 191 7. By June this figure had 
increased to 24 officers and 997 enlisted men, a figure which 
represented the peak strength of the regiment during the eight- 
year occupation of the Dominican Republic. The low point 
came in July 19 18 when the regiment could muster only 32 
officers and 424 men. After that date the strength gradually 
increased to over 800 officers and men, only to decline again to 
a little more than 500 by January 1920 as a result of the demobili- 
zation of those who enlisted for the duration of World War I. 
The 4th Regiment's strength was built up once more, and, for 
the remainder of the occupation, fluctuated between about 650 
and 750 officers and men. 10 

Organizational changes were frequent during the occupation 
of the Dominican Republic. In December 19 16, the 4th, 6th, 
and 9th Companies had departed, leaving the 4th Regiment in 
sole occupation of the Northern District. Reinforcements con- 
sisting of the 10th and 48th Companies arrived in January 19 17 
to offset the loss. The 33d Company, mounted, was organized 
in March, giving the regiment a highly mobile unit which proved 
invaluable for extensive patrolling and anti-guerrilla operations. 

a Of the charges made before this committee, the only proved cases of 
cruelty involved one Marine officer who was engaged in anti-guerrilla opera- 
tions in the Eastern District in 19 18. The officer in question was arrested 
for his misdeeds in 19 18 and committed suicide while waiting trial. U.S. 
Congress, Senate, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and 
Santo Domingo, Hearings before a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo 
Domingo, 67th Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions, 2 vols. (Washington: 1922). 

10 Strength figures from 4th Regt MRolls, 1917-24. 


These additions brought the 4th Regiment up to a total of 
14 companies, but the entry of the United States into World 
War I quickly led to a decline in this number. In April 19 17, 
the 8th, 26th, 34th, 45th, and 47th Companies were transferred, 
reducing the regiment once again to nine companies. The addi- 
tion of the 69th Company in June 19 17 partially made up the 
loss. In moves to strengthen the command and administrative 
capabilities of the regiment, Headquarters Detachment was ex- 
panded to a Headquarters Company, and a Supply Company 
was added in September 19 19. The 29th Company was dis- 
banded and the communication personnel were added to Head- 
quarters Company. A little more than a year later, in July 
1920, the 27th Company was also disbanded. 

The battalion organization did not prove effective for occu- 
pation duties. The companies were scattered in individual 
garrisons, and the Northern District was small enough for the 
regimental commander to control all the garrisons directly. Only 
at Santiago, where the garrison consisted of two or more com- 
panies, was a battalion commander useful in the capacity of 
garrison commander. In August 191 7, the 1st Battalion head- 
quarters moved to Santiago and the 2d Battalion headquarters 
to La Vega where it remained until it was dropped from the 
rolls in September 19 18. 11 

Early in 1922 the Commandant ordered a much more sweep- 
ing change in the organization of the 4th Regiment. New tables 
of organization were being published incorporating the combat 
experience of World War I. These called for an infantry regi- 
ment made up of a headquarters and headquarters company, 
service company, howitzer company, and three battalions. Each 
battalion included a machine gun company and three rifle com- 
panies. Authorized strength of this new regiment was 58 officers 
and 1,510 enlisted men — more than twice the size of the 4th 
Regiment in February i922. Lack of personnel made it im- 

11 4th Regt MRolls, iDeci6-3iJul20. 


possible to adopt the new organization in the 4th Regiment. 
All that could be done was to add to the existing organization a 
Howitzer Company, which did not function as such but ran 
the regimental training center near Santiago, and a Headquarters 
Company, 1st Battalion. For the remainder of the Dominican 
occupation the 4th Regiment was organized as shown in the 
Table below. 12 

4th Regiment 





— HqCc 

— 1 0thCo 


— 28thCo 





The tranquil conditions of the Northern District were unfor- 
tunately not duplicated in all parts of the country. From the 
beginning of 19 17 until the middle of 1922 the 2d Marine 
Brigade was engaged in almost continuous operations against 
guerilla bands in the two eastern provinces. To Marines, 
Dominican guerrillas were all "bandits," a term which govern- 
ments have all too frequently applied to rebellious subjects. It 
is a natural reaction to lump together in one group all who 
violate the laws of the regime, whether they be common criminals 
who seek personal financial gain or persons seeking to bring about 

"USMG T/O No. 25, dtd 25Apr22; 4th Regt MRolls, 1922-24. 


by force changes in the political and economic structure of their 

The Marines in Santo Domingo had to deal almost exclusively 
with the criminal variety. Not that opposition to the American 
occupation did not exist. There were many Dominicans who 
disliked American rule and who strove to bring the occupation 
to an end, but their activities were largely in the political and 
propaganda spheres. Seldom, if ever, did these eloquent patriots 
take the field in guerrilla operations against the Marines. 

Banditry, as practised in the Dominican Republic, long ante- 
dated the American occupation. When the Marines arrived in 
the summer of 1 9 1 6 they found the central government exercising 
only the haziest sort of control over the two easternmost 
provinces — Seibo and Macoris. (See Map 7.) All but a narrow 
strip of mountains on the northern edge of these two provinces 
is fertile coastal plain, but only a small portion had been cleared 
and put under cultivation. A 12 -mile strip on the south coast 
was devoted to the raising of sugar cane, an industry dominated 
by large corporations, mostly foreign-owned. To the north of 
the sugar-producing district, the country was sparsely populated. 
There were a few cattle raisers and small subsistence farmers, 
but, for the most part, the land was uninhabited. A dense scrub 
forest, traversed by a few trails, this region was a natural refuge 
for outlaw bands. 

Towns were few in number and sparse in population. San 
Pedro de Macoris, with about 14,000 inhabitants, was the largest 
of these and the principal seaport of the eastern region. The only 
other port of consequence was La Romana, a company town of 
the Romana sugar estate with a population of about 5,600. Three 
inland villages which were the centers of communications and 
administration were the only other places of consequence. From 
west to east, they were Hato Mayor, Seibo, and Higuey. None 
had more than 2,000 inhabitants. 

The sugar estates were big employers of labor, but employment 


in the cane fields was, for the most part, restricted to the grinding 
season. There were, therefore, long periods of unemployment. 
Once having become wage-earners, even under these unfavorable 
conditions, the inhabitants were reluctant to return to their farms, 
particularly as the depredations of bandits made the country dis- 
tricts unsafe. As a result, production of foodstuffs declined, 
forcing up prices and further aggravating the misery of the 
wage-earners. 13 

These conditions, added to all but impassable country, con- 
stituted a most favorable environment for banditry. Local 
chieftains controlled much of the back country in both provinces. 
They exacted tribute from the large sugar estates, robbed the 
small farmers and storekeepers for supplies and animals, and im- 
pressed the poor field hands and laborers into service in their 
private armies. The Americans refused to condone this system, 
but, at first, there were too few Marines to do anything about it. 
Not until the beginning of 19 17 were troops available for the 
occupation of the eastern provinces. 

Outside this area, banditry was practically nonexistent. In the 
remainder of the Southern District and in the Northern District 
it never became a problem. The 4th Regiment was, therefore, 
not primarily concerned with bandit suppression. So short was 
Marine manpower on the island, however, that 4th Regiment 
detachments up to company size were pressed into service under 
3d Regiment command in the eastern provinces in two separate 
anti-bandit operations. 

The first of these, the Chacha-Vicentico operation, began in 
January 191 7 when "Hiking Hiram" Bearss, by then a lieutenant 
colonel and commanding officer of the 3d Provisional Regiment, 
ordered one mounted and two rifle companies to make a sweep 
through Macoris and Seibo. The Marines were to investigate 
conditions, confer with local officials, suppress disorder, protect 

13 2d MarBrig, Handbook of the Dominican Republic, Pt. 1, dtd 23Apr23 
(Santo Domingo File, HistBr, HQMC). 


life and property of persons and communities along the line of 
march, and collect arms and ammunition. 14 

On 10 January, Major Jay McK. Salladay, with the two rifle 
companies, put into San Pedro de Macoris aboard two small 
vessels. Ashore, Salladay found everything quiet, but there were 
rumors that the bandit Chacha had taken to the bush with about 
ioo followers. While Major Salladay was making his inspection, 
a small group of Dominicans opened fire on the Marines' ships, 
killing one officer and wounding another. Patrols fanned out 
from the docks throughout the city, but there was no trace of the 

Lieutenant Colonel Bearss, on receiving the news of the attack, 
set out at once himself with an additional rifle company for San 
Pedro de Macoris on board the New Hampshire. He arrived on 
the night of the ioth, and the next day advanced inland with the 
full Marine force to the Consuelo sugar estate, where a band of 
Chacha's men under Vicentico Evangelista was contacted and 
put to flight. Eleven days of vigorous patrolling followed, culmi- 
nating in the surrender of Chacha on 23 January. His capture 
did not put an end to bandit activities, for Vicentico and a band 
of varying size remained at liberty. But in a skirmish on the 
27th Vicentico was reported to have been badly knocked about, 
most of his arms and horses lost, and his band scattered. The 
Marines continued to scour the country but without further 
bandit contacts. By the middle of February, Bearss reported that, 
although the search for Vicentico was continuing, Macoris and 
Seibo had been effectively pacified. 15 

Bearss proved to be overly optimistic, for, in the middle of 
March, Vicentico ambushed a 30-man patrol near Hato Mayor. 
He was repulsed, however, and left 11 of his men dead on the 

14 HQ US Forces South Santo Domingo, FieldO's 3 and 4, dtd 7 and 

15 CO 3d ProvRegt repts to CG 2d ProvMarBrig, dtd 2Febi7, 8Febi7, 

519667—60 7 


field. Following this engagement the bandit leader disappeared, 
and the Marine command assumed that he had learned his lesson. 
Except for a garrison in San Pedro de Macoris and a few scattered 
outposts, Marines were withdrawn from the eastern provinces. 

Fighting broke out again in May when two American engi- 
neers in the employ of the Romana Sugar Company were waylaid 
and murdered by bandits believed to be members of Vicentico's 
band. Reinforcements were rushed to the eastern area, and 
Lieutenant Colonel George C. Thorpe, newly appointed com- 
mander of the 3d Regiment, went out with them to take com- 
mand in person. Small Marine patrols combed the brush over 
a wide area with indifferent success. They had very few con- 
tacts with the bandits, none of them decisive. 

Where military measures failed, diplomacy succeeded. First 
Sergeant William West, in command of a Marine outpost at Hato 
Mayor, visited Vicentico's camp and found the rebel chief ready 
to surrender for a price. West arranged a meeting between Vi- 
centico and Thorpe, who persuaded the outlaw to surrender 
himself and his whole band. On 4 July the bandits came in. 
All but Vicentico and two of his relatives were disarmed and 
allowed to return to their homes. Vicentico was sent under guard 
to San Pedro de Macoris, where he was killed while attempting to 
escape. 16 

The 4th Regiment played a very minor role in these operations 
in pursuit of Chacha and Vicentico. It contributed one small 
detachment for a brief period at the end of January and another 
during May, June, and July. The first unit, 2 officers and 50 
enlisted men of the 48th Company under 1st Lieutenant Harry 
W. Weitzel, left its home station at La Vega on 1 6 January for 
Consuelo. It travelled by train to Sanchez where it went on 
board the gunboat Machias to ferry across Samana Bay to Sabana 
de la Mar. On the 1 8th the Marines struck out across country 
for Consuelo. For the next five days they struggled over narrow 

18 GO 3d ProvRegt rept to CG 2d ProvMarBrig, dtd 8J11I17. 


muddy trails, up and down slopes so steep they seemed like 
vertical walls, and through woods so thick the sun could hardly 
penetrate. On the 2 2d, Weitzel and his men reached Consuelo 
and reported to Lieutenant Colonel Bearss. 17 

On the 25th, 26th, and 27th of January the 48th Company 
Marines patrolled in the vicinity of Consuelo. But they en- 
countered no bandits, nor did they uncover any persons or 
activities which could even be considered suspicious. On the 
31st, Lieutenant Colonel Bearss decided that the 48th Company 
was no longer needed, and, on 2 February, Weitzel and his 
Marines, feeling like the King of France who "marched up the 
hill and marched down again," started on the long return trip 
to La Vega. 18 

Major William H. Pritchett and a detachment of the 32d 
Company operated on the south shore of Samana Bay during 
May, June, and July to block Vicentico's escape in that direction. 
These Marines crossed the mountains to the south in early June 
and again a few days after Vicentico surrendered. Owing to 
poor communications, Thorpe, in the south, was unable to co- 
ordinate effectively with Pritchett north of the mountains. 

After the surrender of Vicentico a deceptive calm settled over 
the provinces of Seibo and Macoris. Bandit depredations ceased, 
country people came freely into the towns to sell their produce, 
and travel became safe again. But this state of affairs was not 
to last. On 21 March 19 18, Sergeant William R. Knox was 
ambushed and killed between Seibo and Hato Mayor. The 
Marine garrisons took the field at once to track down the killers. 
They made a couple of contacts with bandit groups during April, 
but the Marine numbers had been so reduced during the peaceful 
period that not enough troops remained to cover the area 
thoroughly. Bandit activities increased, until by July Lieutenant 

17 CO 48th Co Rept to CO, dtd 23 Jam 7. 

"CO 48th Co Rept to CO, dtd 28Jani7; and CO US Forces Operating 
in the Province of Macoris rept to CG 2d ProvMarBrig, dtd 2Febi7. 


Colonel Thorpe determined to wage an aggressive campaign 
against the lawless elements. 

Three detachments of the 4th Regiment crossed the mountains 
to reinforce the 3d Regiment's anti-bandit drive at the end of 
July 1 9 1 8. These included the 33d Mounted Company, 3 officers 
and 54 enlisted men under command of Captain Harry L. Jones; 
a 30 -man detachment of the 25th Company commanded by 
Captain James M. Bain; and a 30-man detachment of the 48th 
Company commanded by Captain James T. Moore. Totalling 5 
officers and 114 enlisted men, these detachments constituted 
nearly 25 per cent of the 4th Regiment. 19 

Captain Bain and the 25th Company detachment had a skir- 
mish with bandits before they even arrived in the 3d Regiment 
zone of operations. The 25th Company Marines departed Sa- 
bana de la Mar on 3 1 July. Two days later they were climbing 
the mountain ridge just south of the village of La Loma. The 
Marine column had climbed about a quarter of a mile up the 
slope when fire erupted from the top of an embankment to the 
right of the trail. Corporal Clyde R. Darrah, in command of 
the point, ordered his men to take cover and to return the fire. 
Marines of the main body also opened up, aiming at puffs of 
smoke in the bush. Once the Marines began shooting, the Do- 
minicans lost all stomach for fighting. They ceased fire and 
found nothing but a few tracks, which they made no effort to 
follow up. 

They were to learn by bitter experience the folly of their fail- 
ure to follow up the enemy. In anti-guerilla operations contacts 
were to be cherished. The elusive enemy, operating in his home 
territory and indistinguishable from the peaceful inhabitants, 
proved to be an elusive quarry. In fact, Bain's detachment made 
its first and last contact with Dominican bandits on 2 August. 20 

Upon arrival in the 3d Regiment zone the three 4th Regiment 

19 GO 1/3 rept to CO 3d ProvRegt, w/encl, dtd 4Sepi8. 

20 Capt James M. Bain rept to CO San Pedro de Macoris, dtd 5Sepi7. 


detachment commanders reported to Lieutenant Colonel Thorpe 
who assigned to each a zone of responsibility. The 33d Company 
zone of about 180 square miles lay southwest of Hato Mayor, 
with the base of operations at the La Paja sugar plantation on 
the southern edge of the zone. Captain Bain and his detachment 
were assigned responsibility for an area of about 1 50 square miles 
southeast of Hato Mayor. Their base was at Diego on the south- 
ern edge of their area. With a base at Seibo, Captain Moore 
and his detachment were responsible for an area of about 190 
square miles to the east of their base. 21 

The 3d Regiment suffered the frustrations usual to regular 
troops attempting to engage guerrillas. The enemy, of course, 
wore no uniforms. If cornered by a Marine patrol they simply 
threw their weapons into the brush and then could not be 
distinguished from peaceful citizens. To identify them as guer- 
rillas under these conditions proved all but impossible. In most 
cases, a Marine detachment would receive a report that bandits 
had raided a village or country store. Rushing to the scene to 
find the bandits gone, the Marines would pursue, following tracks 
or using information from the inhabitants. Invariably the tracks 
would peter out or the information prove inaccurate, so, after 
hiking vigorously over the countryside for a day or two, the 
Marines would return to base to wait the next report of a bandit 
raid. Contacts between Marines and bandits did occur, but only 
when the bandits chose to attack small Marine partols with 
greatly superior numbers. 

Of the three 4th Regiment detachments, those under Captains 
Bain and Moore never made a bandit contact in operations under 
3d Regiment command. They were called out on several fruit- 
less pursuits but never caught up with their quarry. 

In the 33d Gompany zone the bandits were both more active 
and more daring. On 15 August, 2d Lieutenant Jack H. Tandy, 
Assistant Surgeon Herbert L. Shinn and 10 enlisted men on 

21 CO 1/3 rept to GO 3d ProvRegt, dtd 4Sepi8. 


patrol north of La Paja stopped at a farm house for supper. 
The woman of the house appeared friendly, inviting the Marines 
to use the fire in her kitchen. Her husband left soon after the 
Marines arrived, saying he had to go into the woods to look 
for his cattle. 

By the time the meal was prepared it was already dark. 
The men went into the house to get their food, coming outside 
again to eat. All but four were gathered on one side of the 
building when a rifle bullet pierced the house from the opposite 
side and passed through Private John M. Poe's hat. Bullets 
then began whining out of the darkness from all sides, and a 
band of about 80 men, armed with an assortment of rifles, 
pistols, and machetes closed in on the Marines. Within five 
minutes the Marines and bandits were locked in hand to hand 
combat. After about 20 minutes the bandits withdrew, leaving 
17 dead on the field. 

During the fight Lieutenant Tandy had been separated from 
his men. Assistant Surgeon Shinn had taken command and di- 
rected the Marine defense. After the bandits withdrew, he led 
his men out onto the open savannah about 100 yards from the 
house where they spent the remainder of the night. The next 
morning the Marines rounded up their horses and returned to 
base. There was no trace of Lieutenant Tandy, and he was 
believed to have been killed or captured. He turned up two 
days later at La Paja, having made his way back alone through 
the woods for fear of being discovered by the bandits. 22 

The failure of patrolling tactics to eradicate banditry led 
Lieutenant Colonel Thorpe to adopt more drastic measures. His 
Campaign Order No. 1 called for the zone commanders to 
advise all law-abiding people in their respective zones to come 
into the towns by 24 August, bringing their livestock and enough 
food for a month. After that date the Marine detachments in 

22 istLt Jack H. Tandy, rept to CO, La Paja, dtd 3oSepti8; AsstSurg 
Herbert L. Shinn, rept to GO, 33d Go, dtd 1 1 Sep 18. 


the several zones were to make a thorough sweep, arresting all 
armed Dominicans, shooting those who refused to surrender, and 
arresting any suspected of banditry. 23 

In the operations that followed, the 4th Regiment detachments 
made only three contacts with bandits. The first occurred on 
25 August when the 33d Company pack train encountered a 
large band of armed men between the villages of Mata Palacio 
and Pringamosa. The Marines escorting the pack train opened 
fire, killing two of the Dominicans. At the sound of the shots 
a patrol under Lieutenant Tandy came up on the flank of the 
Dominican band, putting it to flight. As usual, the Dominicans 
disappeared into the brush without a trace. 

In spite of this defeat the bandits continued to act with great 
boldness. On 28 August they raided the town of Dos Rios in 
the 33d Company zone, carrying off all foodstuffs in the local 
store and picking up a number of recruits. Ten days later, they 
ambushed Colonel Thorpe and a ten-man detachment in this 
same vicinity. The Marines, including two privates of the 33d 
Company, were attacked while crossing a stream just west of 
Dos Rios. After a desperate fight at close quarters the Domini- 
cans withdrew, leaving at least nine dead. The Marines suffered 
no casualties, but, as their ammunition was nearly exhausted 
and the pack mule carrying their rations had disappeared during 
the fight, they were unable to pursue. 24 

The 33d Company kept up its vigorous patrolling, and on 
24 September very nearly succeeded in trapping a major bandit 
group. The previous day a 1 5-man patrol exchanged shots with 
bandits near Mata Palacio. Captain Jones turned out a 30-man 
patrol the next morning before dawn, and by daybreak it had 
reached the spot where the skirmish had taken place the day 
before. Leaving their horses, the Marines deployed and started 
into the bush. They had advanced about 2,000 yards when 

23 GO 1/3 Campaign Order No. 1, n.d. 

21 CO 1/3 rept to CO 3d Regt, dtd 8Sepi8. 


they were challenged by a bandit sentry who fired his revolver 
and dived into the brush. Other shots rang out from different 
parts of the wood, and the Marines rushed toward two or three 
shacks they could see ahead of them. They searched the build- 
ings, then scattered through the woods and found about 30 other 
shacks, all showing signs of having been hastily evacuated. 
Clothing and fresh food were scattered all around, and four 
horses and a mule were tied nearby. Seven trails, all cleverly 
concealed, led out from the bandit camp, which had evidently 
been used as headquarters for some time. The Marines searched 
in all directions from the camp but found nothing except three 
fresh graves about two miles away. 25 

The 33d Company, still assigned to the 4th Regiment, con- 
tinued its operations against bandits under 3d Regiment command 
until 25 February 19 19 when it was reassigned to the newly 
activated 15th Regiment. As the Bain and Moore detachments 
had already rejoined their parent unit in northern Santo Do- 
mingo, the reassignment of the 33d Company ended the partici- 
pation of the 4th Regiment in anti-bandit operations in Santo 

The 15th Regiment was no more successful at wiping out 
banditry than the 3d and 4th Regiments had been. Tactics of 
the type already mentioned were continued by the new regiment, 
and with the same lack of results. Operations dragged on year 
after year, and by the beginning of 1922 the Marines were no 
nearer to stamping out banditry than they had been three years 

During the spring of 1922 new leaders employing new tactics 
finally put an end to banditry in the Dominican Republic. 
Brigadier General Harry Lee, an outstanding Marine leader of 
World War I, was now in command of the 2d Brigade. On 13 
March he assigned Colonel Charles H. Lyman to command of 
the 15th Regiment and the Eastern District. Lee and Lyman 

25 GO 33d Co rept to CO 1/3, dtd 24Sepi8. 


devised a new double-barreled approach to the bandit problem. 
Learning from native sources that many Dominicans had joined 
outlaw bands out of fear of the Marines, they offered to pardon 
all bandits who surrendered, gave up their arms, and returned 
to peaceful occupations. Those guilty of "criminal acts of a 
heinous nature" would have to take their chances before a provost 
court. To deal with bandits who failed to accept these terms, 
a special force of civil guards was recruited and organized into 
groups of 15, each commanded by a Marine officer. Most of 
these civil guards had suffered at the hands of bandits. 

On 19 April the civil guards took the field, and, by the end of 
the month, they had fought six engagements with bandits, inflict- 
ing heavy casualties upon them. Following these encounters, 
the bandits began to surrender in large numbers, and by 22 May 
all the leaders had surrendered, together with their followers and 
arms. 26 


The "bandit" operations had not been the work of patriots 
seeking to drive the invaders from Dominican soil. There was, 
however, a determined political and propaganda effort to end 
the occupation. 27 The resignation with which the Dominicans 
had accepted military government of their country at first, turned 
to resentment when it became apparent that the Americans did 
not plan an early departure. Rear Admiral Thomas R. Snowden, 
who had relieved Knapp as military governor in 1 9 1 8, shocked 
the Dominicans when he declared, early in 19 19, that the occupa- 
tion would last until citizens then in the cradle reached adult age. 

Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, who had been provisional 

26 CG 2d MarBrig rept to CMC, dtd 24AugQ2. 

27 Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on Munro, U.S. and the 
Caribbean, pp. 133-136; and Welles, Naboth's Vineyard, pp. 830-834. 


president in 1916, assumed the leadership of an independence 
movement and organized juntas of intellectuals and prominent 
business and professional men to work by political and propa- 
ganda means for a return of home rule. In February 1919, 
Henriquez y Carvajal sailed for Paris where he attempted to 
bring the Dominican question before the World War I peace 
conference. He later visited Washington to urge a speedy end 
to the American occupation of the country. This visit brought 
the Dominican problem, neglected because of preoccupation with 
World War I, to the attention of the American government and 
people. To the public, military rule of the Dominican people 
against their consent was distasteful, and the government was 
concerned about rising anti- Americanism all over Latin America. 

Secretary of State Lansing took control of Dominican affairs. 
Seeking to make the occupation more responsive to Dominican 
needs, he directed the military governor to appoint a Junta 
Consultiva of prominent citizens to advise the military govern- 
ment. Upon the advice of the Junta and at the insistence of the 
State Department, Snowden repealed the censorship order of 
19 16 requiring prior submission of all articles mentioning the 
military government. But he replaced it with what was, in effect, 
a sterner restriction on freedom of expression by making it a 
crime to write or say anything which might lead to overthrow of 
the military government or which was of a "socialistic or bolshe- 
vik" character. 

When a great number of violently inflammatory articles ap- 
peared in Dominican newspapers following repeal of the earlier 
law requiring submission prior to publication, the military govern- 
ment cracked down hard, fining and imprisoning a number of 
editors and writers for violation of the later law prohibiting 
seditious statements. The Junta Consultiva then resigned and 
an extreme nationalist group, the U nion Nacional Dominicana, 
appeared. Its announced objective was the immediate end of 
the American occupation. 


Colonel Dion Williams, commanding officer of the 4th Regi- 
ment since 18 April 19 19, attempted to enforce the censorship 
orders in the Northern District without antagonizing the Domin- 
icans any more than necessary. Most news critical of the occupa- 
tion originated in the capital, Santo Domingo City, either in one 
of the capital papers or as a reprint from them in the Santiago 
Informacion. Williams took the position that news already 
printed elsewhere in the country was not his responsibility and 
took no action against it. 28 

The same moderation was followed with regard to public 
speeches and lectures. When the Spanish poet, Francisco Villa- 
espesa, lectured in northern Santo Domingo during the winter 
of 1920 for the avowed purpose of helping the Dominican people 
free themselves from American rule, Williams merely kept "track 
of his movements and speeches ... To arrest him would make 
a hero of him and do more harm than good." 29 

Following Villaespesa's visit, signs of unrest were reported to 
the district commander. From Puerto Plata, the commander of 
the 28th Company in garrison there reported that, according to 
a former provincial governor, Emilio Garden, a violent uprising 
could be expected. According to another report, labor agitators 
were planning a general strike as a prelude to active revolution. 
Williams doubted that such a plan would be very effective, but 
he did expect "considerable disorder in the towns and agitations 
under the guise of banditry in the outlying districts." 30 

To meet these reported threats, the 4th Regiment commander 
requested reinforcements, particularly of officers and NCOs. 
Only 29 officers and 525 enlisted men were assigned on 1 Janu- 
ary 1920 to the regiment for occupation of the entire northern 
district. Upon the request of the military governor, the Marine 

28 Cdr Northern District ltr to CG 2d MarBrig, dtd i5Mar20 (Box 16, 
RG 38, NA). 

w Cdr Northern District ltr to CG 2d MarBrig, dtd 25jan20. 
^Cdr Northern District ltrs to CG 2d MarBrig, 4Feb20 and i2Feb20 
( 1 975-70/5-2 Box 4, RG 38, NA) . 


Corps Commandant, Major General John A. Lejeune, agreed 
to a modest increase for the 2d Brigade. Reinforcements began 
arriving in the late summer and fall of 1920, and by the end of 
the year the 4th Regiment stood at 29 officers and 687 enlisted 

The uprisings feared by Colonel Williams never materialized, 
and the danger of armed revolution diminished when, on 24 De- 
cember 1920, President Wilson announced that the time had 
come to begin an orderly withdrawal of United States forces 
from the Dominican Republic. 


The first United States proposal for ending the occupation 
was presented in a proclamation of 14 June 1921. Its terms, 
calling for continued American control of the Dominican armed 
forces and finances after withdrawal, were not acceptable to the 
Dominican representatives. They continued negotiations, how- 
ever, resulting, in June 1922, in an agreement eliminating the 
objectionable provisions. Its terms were as follows : 

1. A provisional government, appointed by a committee of 
representative Dominicans, was to conduct elections for a perma- 
nent government without interference from American occupation 

2. When the provisional government took office the 2d Marine 
Brigade was to turn over all law enforcement functions to the 
Policia Nacional and concentrate in one, two or three places to 
be determined by the military governor. 

3. The provisional government would accept a convention rati- 
fying all contracts made by the military govenment and ratifying 
all its acts and executive orders which had levied taxes or au- 
thorized expenditures. 

4. When the duly elected government was installed the Marines 
would be withdrawn. 


An agreement was reached between the military governor and 
the brigade commander early in August 1922 specifying the con- 
centration points for the Marines. The 4th Regiment was to 
concentrate at Santiago, except for one company, the 69th, which 
was to remain in Puerto Plata to secure the regiment's supply 
port. 31 

Withdrawal of the 4th Regiment from its outposts began soon 
after the conclusion of the concentration agreement. On 1 1 Au- 
gust the 25th Company evacuated Monte Cristi, to be followed 
on the 31st by the Howitzer Company from Sanchez, and on 
24 September by the 33d Company from San Francisco de 
Macoris. As the posts at Moca and La Vega had been given 
up the year before — 15 July and 1 December 192 1 respectively — 
the withdrawal of the 33d completed the concentration of the 
regiment. 32 

The provisional government took office on 21 October 1922, 
and, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, took over 
all civil functions as of that date. 33 The 4th Regiment and the 
other units of the 2d Brigade now became a garrison force only. 
Their presence was still required because the Policia Nacional, 
though adequate for routine constabulary duty, was still not 
ready to take on full responsibility for maintaining law and order. 
The Marines were on hand to back up the Policia in case of an 
attempt at revolution against the provisional government. 

Under the guidance of Sumner Welles, special United States 

commissioner, the Dominican provisional government set about 

the task of preparing for national elections, and on 15 March 

1924 the Dominican voters went to the polls to elect Horacio 

Vasquez as president. His inauguration was set tentatively for 

the first ten days in June. Planning for withdrawal of the 

Marines as soon thereafter as practicable now began. 

31 MilGov ltr to Mr. Welles, dtd 3iAug22 (Folder 2, Box 98, RG 38, NA). 
82 4th Regt MRolls, iAug~3oSep22. The 33d Company had rejoined the 
4th Regiment on 8 March 1920. 

33 ActSecNav ltr to MilGov, dtd 23May22. 


Among the first decisions made was that the 4th Regiment 
would go back "home" to San Diego to reinforce West Coast 
expeditionary forces. As the first Marine unit to be stationed 
there, the 4th Regiment was considered by San Diegans to belong 
in San Diego. Strength of the regiment upon departure from 
the Dominican Republic was to be cut back to a little more than 
400 officers and men. 34 

The reduction in strength took effect on 1 July, at which time 
all the existing companies within the regiment were disbanded 
to be replaced by Companies A, B, and C. An additional com- 
pany, Company D, was organized from other 2d Brigade units 
and added to the 4th Regiment the following day. On the 6th 
of July the reorganized regiment moved overland to Santo 
Domingo City by the new highway built under the military 
government. 35 

On 12 July, Vasquez was inaugurated as President of the 
Dominican Republic in impressive ceremonies at the capital. 
Three weeks later, on 6 August, the Henderson, with the 4th 
Regiment on board, slipped quiety out of the harbor of Santo 
Domingo City, bound for San Diego. 

What had been accomplished in eight years of occupation? 
The regiment had restored and maintained order in the Northern 
District, thereby attaining the minimum requirement for the 
reform program instituted by the military government. Whether 
that program was successful or whether it should have been 
undertaken in the first place are still controversial questions. But 
the Marines of the 4th Regiment were not concerned with de- 
termining matters of high policy. Their job was to carry out 
orders of higher authority; they had no voice in preparing those 

As is generally the case when a nation is forcibly occupied by 
troops of a foreign power, the Marines were not universally liked 

34 CMC ltr to SecNav, dtd 2gMay24. 
85 4th Regt MRolls, 1-31J11I24. 


by the Dominican people. But it is to their credit that dislike 
stemmed from their presence as an occupying force and not from 
acts of cruelty or abuses of power. 

USMC Photo 522071 

San Diego Exposition, 1915— Above, RAdm T. B. Howard, Commander in 
Chief, Pacific Fleet, inspects the regiment. Below, the regimental band enter- 
tains exposition visitors. 

USMC Photo 517225 

519667—60 S 

USMC Photo 517356 

Action in Santo Domingo, 1916 — Above, riflemen of the 8th Company some- 
where between Monte Cristi and Santiago. Below, cannoneers of the 13th 
Company at Guayacanas. 

USMC Photo 521542 

USMC Photo 521541 

The march to Santiago — Above, truck-drawn artillery on the road from Monte 
Cristi. Below, riflemen of the Puerto Plata Detachment cross the mountains 
by rail. 

USMC Photo 515346 

"V •••• 

USMC Photo 521559 

Mounted troops in Santo Domingo-Above, Dominican guerrillas. Belo 
the 33d Company ready to leave on patrol from La Romana sugar estate. 

USMC Photo P. B. 1825 

USMC Photo 521567 

Above, 4th Regiment staff, Santiago, 19 16. Front (1 to r) Capt F. C. Ramsey, 
istLt H. B. Pratt, Capt R. B. Putnam, Col J. H. Pendleton, Maj R. H. Dun- 
lap, istLt D. M. Randall. Rear (1 to r) Surg F. L. Benton, istLt D. S. Barry, 
istLt P. A. del Valle, Chaplain L. N. Taylor. Below, Fortaleza, San Francisco 
de Macoris, after its capture. 

USMC Photo 521790 

USMC Photo 521793 

Above, Marines wounded in the capture of the Fortaleza at San Francisco de 
Macoris. Below. Marines guard the mails. 

USMC Photo 521128 

USMC Photo 522279 

Shanghai— Above, marching into the city, 21 March 1927. Below, billet of 
Hq and Hq Co, 1st Battalion, 4th Regiment. 

USMC Photo 6183 

USMC Photo 522631 

Troops and commanders — Above, 1/4 passes in review on the race course. 
Below, Col C. S. Hill, who brought the regiment to Shanghai in 1927, and 
Col R. S. Hooker, regimental CO during the Sino- Japanese fighting of 1932. 

USMC Photo P. B. 3694 

USMC Photo 515646 

USMC Photo 522635 

Recreation at Shanghai — Above, a Rugby match with the Shanghai Interpost 
Team. Below, a 2d Battalion dance. 

USMC Photo 

USMC Photo 521024 

Regimental officers, 1937. Front (1 to r), Maj H. N. Stent, LtCol W. H. 
Rupertus, Col C. F. B. Price, LtCol R. Winans, Cdr Virgil H. Carson; 2d 
row (1 to r), Capt R. A. Boone, Maj L. S. Swindler, LtCol H. C. Pierce, Maj 
M. A. Edson, Capt W. M. Greene. Jr. ; 3d row (1 to r), Maj M. J. Kelleher, 
istLt V. H. Krulak, Capt R. E. Hogaboom, Maj B. G. Jones; 4th row (1 to r), 
Capt M. H. Mizell, Maj R. E. West, Chaplain F. R. Hamilton, Maj P. Lesser, 
Capt H. R. Huff. 

USMC Photo 522049 

Defending the International Settlement, 1932 — Above, Marines of the 3d 
Battalion guarding the barrier across Markham Road Bridge. Below, a sand- 
bagged heavy machine-gun position on the bank of Soochow Creek. 

USMC Photo 522630 

\ i 

The International Settlement in peril, 1937 — Above, Marines man sandbag 
defenses. Below, Japanese victory march passes through the Settlement. 

USMC Photo 522637 

U. S. Army Photo 224672 

The Philippines— Above, a view of Corregidor looking east from Topside 
towards Malinta Hill and the tail of the island. Below, a Marine machine- 
gun unit with its weapons loaded on carts. 

USMC Photo 58752 

USMC Photo 58735 

USMC Photo 50578 

Rank and file on Corregidor — Above. left, LtCol C. T. Beecher, CO of 1/4; 
above right, LtCol J. P. Adams. CO of 3 4, Col S. L. Howard, CO 4th Marines, 
MajGen G. F. Moore, USA, commander of the fortified islands in Manila Bay. 
Below, enlisted Marines relax during a lull in the siege. 

USMC Photo 58749 

USMC Photo 58733-A 

Defensive preparations — Above, Marines teach Filipinos how to operate a 
heavy machine gun. Below, barbed wire strung along the beach. 

USMC Photo 58733 

U.S. Army Photo 

The end on Corregidor — Above, the Japanese land. Below, American prisoners 
under Japanese guard. 

USMC Photo 114538 


Force in Readiness- 
Austerity Model 

It was a happy lot of Marines who crowded the decks of the 
Henderson when she docked at San Diego on a summer Mon- 
day, 25 August 1924. After words of welcome by civic officials, 
the regiment marched up a flag-and-bunting decorated Broad- 
way, to be reviewed at the Plaza by Major General "Uncle Joe" 
Pendleton, their former commanding officer, now retired. At 
the gate of the new Marine Corps Base, on the north shore of 
the harbor, "a bevy of pretty San Diego maidens" presented the 
men with baskets of fruit to conclude a heart- wanning welcome. 1 

The 4th Regiment, "San Diego's Own," was home again after 
eight years of foreign service. But it was a changed San Diego 
and a changed United States to which the regiment returned in 
the summer of 1924. The new base, begun in 19 17 as a perma- 
nent home station for West Coast expeditionary forces, was ready 
for occupancy. 2 Of much more consequence to the regiment, 
and to the whole Marine Corps, was the postwar letdown with 
its resulting neglect of national defense. Having just finished 
the "war to end war" the American people were in no mood to 

1 Los Angeles Times, 26Aug24. 

2 Elmore A. Champie, Brief History of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, 
San Diego, California — Marine Corps Historical Reference Series, No. 9 
(Washington: HistBr, HQMG), p. 13. 

519667—60 9 



pay heavy taxes for military expenditures. For the armed serv- 
ices a period of austerity had set in. 

But, for the Marine Corps, dwindling means were not accom- 
panied by reduced missions. The nation still expected its force- 
in-readiness to live up to its name. "The Marines have landed 
and have the situation well in hand" was a message most Ameri- 
cans never doubted they would hear whenever the Corps was 
called upon to protect the national interest. 

The 4th Regiment was momentarily spared from the economy 
ax by an alert for expeditionary service in China. Alarmed by 
the danger to American lives and property in a China torn by 
civil war, the Commander in Chief, Asiastic Fleet, had asked 
for a reinforcement of 500 Marines. He was assigned the Marine 
garrison on Guam. The 4th Regiment was to replace them, or, 
if necessary, proceed directly to the Asiatic Fleet. 3 

In preparation for China service the Commandant, Major 
General John A. Lejeune, on 19 September, ordered the 4th 
Regiment increased to 42 officers and 1,000 enlisted men. By 
transfer from other units at San Diego the existing strength of 
26 officers and 653 men was built up to the desired size. 4 

Every day saw a busy schedule of training. Specialist schools 
were organized. Men practiced at bayonet fighting, communica- 
tions, and the building of entrenchments. They worked with 
machine guns, automatic rifles, Stokes mortars, and 37mm guns. 
Lectures on gas warfare and use of the gas mask were part of 
the training. In short, the 4th Regiment again geared — and 
fast — for combat. By 10 October, Colonel Alexander S. Wil- 
liams, who had taken command on 23 July 1923, reported the 
regiment was at "a high state of efficiency" — set to go. 

The revocation of the orders on 15 October may, therefore, 

3 CMC msg to CG, MarPac, dtd igSep24, and CMC msg to CG, MarPac, 
dtd 2oSep24 (both in Subj File: MarCorps Bks San Diego, HistBr, HQMC). 

*CMC msg to CG, MarPac, dtd igSep24 (Subj File: MarCorps Bks San 
Diego, HistBr, HQMC) ; 4th Regt MRolls, iAug-3oSep24. 


have been disappointing, yet the work had provided good experi- 
ence. The men could resume garrison duty with added confi- 
dence that they would always be, in the Marine Corps tradition, 
a force-in-readiness, whatever happened. As General Lejeune 
had said, the orders were "in the direction of readiness, so that 
we may not fail to be ready in the event of the emergency 
arising." 5 

Once the China alert was cancelled, the 4th Regiment felt 
the stroke of the economy ax with a vengeance. Demands from 
other posts subtracted rapidly from its numbers. By 3 1 October, 
the strength had fallen to 34 officers and 765 men, and this was 
just the beginning. Congressional appropriations for the fiscal 
year 1926 provided for only 18,000 Marines, a cut of 1,500 over 
the previous year. The 4th Regiment took its share of the reduc- 
tion, and by 30 September 1925 could muster only 44 officers and 
493 enlisted men. 6 


Working with what was left, the Marine Corps turned to per- 
fecting a device which would minimize the effects of economy, 
namely, the cadre system — the small, highly trained nucleus of 
key personnel, quickly expandable. 

Previously, when no fully-organized regiment was available, 
emergency had been met by hastily throwing together individuals 
or small units at the gangplank. Colonel Doyen, in 191 1, had 
resorted to the former expedient; Colonel Pendleton, in 19 14, 
had employed the latter. The resulting military efficiency left 
something to be desired in both cases. 

5 CO 4th Regt rept to CO, MarCorps Bks, San Diego, dtd 23jun25, and 
CO, MarCorps Bks, San Diego rept to CMC, dtd 1J11I25 (both in 2295- 
40/7-525, Central Files, HQMC) ; CMC msg to CG, MarPac, dtd 2oSep24 
(Subj File : MarCorps Bks San Diego, HistBr, HQMC) . 

9 4th Regt MRolls, i-3iOct24 and i-3oSep25; CMC, Report . . in 
Annual Reports of the Navy Department, IQ25 (Washington: Navy Dept, 


The plan now was to maintain a nucleus of trained key per- 
sonnel for each unit called for by the Table of Organization and 
to add the necessary individuals to bring the regiment to full 
strength on the eve of active service. No claim was made that 
the regiment would then be combat ready, but it would be more 
nearly so. In any event, it was the best that could be done with 
the limited personnel at hand. 

The 4th Regiment was, therefore, again reorganized on 1 Octo- 
ber 1925. However short of personnel, it was to contain all the 
units called for by the Table of Organization of 1922. These 
included a headquarters company, service company, howitzer 
company, and three battalions, each with a headquarters com- 
pany, machine gun company, and three rifle companies. 

Only two battalions had been included in the 4th Regiment 
when it was reorganized upon its return from Santo Domingo at 
the end of August 1924. Originally below complement, all 
regimental units had been built up to full authorized strength 
for expeditionary service in China, but no additional organiza- 
tions had been added. 

The few available officers and men were to be spread thin 
enough to provide a cadre for every unit. So reduced in numbers 
was the regiment, however, that the third rifle companies could 
not be activated. Upon completion of the reorganization the 
regiment was formed as shown below : 7 

Hq Co istBn: 2d Bn: 3dBn: 

Service Co Hq Co Hq Co Hq Co 

Howitzer Co 10th Co 31st Co 25th Co 

27th Co 3 2d Co 29th Co 

28th Co 33d Co 26th Co 

(MG) (MG) (MG) 

7 CMC ltr to CO 4th Regt, dtd 18JU1125 (2385-30/9-4, Central Files, 
HQMC); 4th Regt MRolls, i-3oSep24 and i-3iOct25. 



Participation in large-scale Army-Navy amphibious maneuvers 
in Hawaii in the spring of 1925 helped sharpen preparedness of 
the 4th Regiment. The maneuver plan called for an assault on 
the Hawaiian Islands by the United States Fleet, with a landing 
force of Marines to seize Pearl Harbor and Honolulu for use as 
advance fleet bases. 8 

General Lejeune welcomed the chance for Marine participation 
in the exercise, particularly as he wished to refute the Army 
contention that Marines were incapable of conducting any opera- 
tion of larger than regimental size. 9 

He approved the basic plan for Marine Corps participation 
on 8 January 1925. This called for a Blue Expeditionary Force 
of two divisions with a strength of 42,000. The Marine Corps 
was, of course, unable to put in the field a force anywhere near 
that size. In fact, only about 120 officers and 1,500 men could 
be scraped together from Quantico and San Diego. 10 

The 4th Regiment was to supply the largest contingent. On 
29 January the Commandant ordered the 4th raised to a strength 
of 750 men by 1 March and maintained at that level until the 
departure in the Henderson, scheduled for early April. For ma- 
neuver purposes a Provisional Company of specialists, mostly com- 
municators, was authorized. Organized on 1 March, it included 
97 men drawn from units of the regiment. This new company 
was attached to the 1st Battalion which was itself reorganized 
for the maneuvers to include the Headquarters, 10th, 25th, 28th, 
3 1 st and 32d Companies — all built up to full strength by stripping 
the other units of the regiment. It furnished the one actual bat- 

8 GNO memo to CMC, dtd 5N0V24 (Exercise File, Plans & Policies Div, 
HQMC, at HistBr, HQMC, hereafter P&P File) ; Blue MarCorpsExpedFor, 
JANExercise, 1925, Problem No. 3, Basic Plan, dtd 8Jan25, hereafter Basic 
Plan (P&P File.) 

9 LtGen Merrill B. Twining ltr to ACofS, G-3, HQMC, dtd 25^57 
(Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMC). 
10 Basic Plan; CMC ltr to CG, MarPac, dtd 3ijan25 (P&P File). 


talion which landed. The 2d and 3d Battalions were represented 
during the maneuvers by Marines from the ships' detachments. 11 

From Quantico came one troop unit, the 692-man 1st Pro- 
visional Battalion, 10th Regiment (artillery). It joined the 1st 
Battalion, 4th Marines for a week of preliminary training, cul- 
minating in a full-dress attack problem in Mission Valley, four 
miles inland from San Diego. 

In addition, the Quantico contingent included staff officers 
and students of Marine Corps Schools, designated for command 
and staff posts. Colonel Williams, the commanding officer of the 
4th Marines, joined this group as a brigade commander. Other 
command and staff billets were filled by some of the Corps' most 
distinguished officers — Major General Wendell C. Neville, a fu- 
ture Commandant; Brigadier General Logan Feland, a combat 
leader of World War I; and Colonel Robert H. Dunlap, a pio- 
neer in the development of amphibious doctrine. 12 

On 10 April the 1st Battalion, 4th Regiment and the Provi- 
sional Battalion, 10th Regiment sailed on board the Henderson 
for a rendezvous with the Blue Fleet at San Francisco. Here a 
number of the Quantico Marines were transferred from the 
Henderson to other ships. On the 15th, the Blue Fleet sortied 
from San Francisco bound for Hawaii. It included the advance 
force, made up of the scouting force and the aircraft carrier 
Langley; the main body, comprised of the battle fleet; and the 
train which included the transports carrying the Marine Corps 
Expeditionary Force. 

In Hawaii the Black defenders stood ready to repulse the land- 
ing. Unlike many of the attacking units, the defense force was 

11 CMC ltr to CG, MarPac, dtd 2oJan25 (2385-30/9-4, Central Files, 
HQMG) ; Blue MarCorpsExpedFor, ForMemo No. 1, dtd gFeb25 (P&P 
File); 4th Regt MRolls, i~3iMar25; CMC ltr to CinC, BattleFlt, USS 
California (Flagship), dtd i3Feb25, P&P File; CMC ltr to GO, MarCorps 
Bks San Diego, dtd i4Feb25 (P&P File). 

12 "Marines Stage Final Practice for Oahu Maneuver," Leatherneck, v. 8, 
no. 17 (25Apr25),p. 1; iothRegt MRolls, i~3iMar25. 


actual, not constructive. To Black were assigned the Regular 
Army garrison of Oahu, the Hawaiian National Guard, and the 
Army reserves in the islands — a total force of about 16,000 men 
and 63 aircraft. Black naval forces included 30 scout and tor- 
pedo-bombing aircraft, 20 submarines, and a few mine sweepers, 
mine layers, and light auxiliary vessels. 13 

Seizure of Molokai Island for use as an air base by the Blue 
Advance Force on 25 April was the opening round of the exer- 
cise. A Marine landing force from cruisers and the battleship 
Wyoming stormed ashore to capture an airfield, and 84 con- 
structive Marine planes flew off the carrier Langley to base there. 
But Blue was not to profit from this success. Before any strikes 
could be flown, either for preliminary softening up of the Black 
defenses or for direct support of the landings on Oahu, the 
umpires grounded the simulated Marine aircraft for the 
duration. 14 

It was a weakened Blue force that moved in to assault the 
Oahu beaches on the night of 26-27 April. Following a feint 
at Maunalua Bay near Diamond Head, the ships took position 
for the landing operations. The main effort was to be made on 
the northwest coast, an area of good beaches backed by enough 
open ground to deploy a large force. By way of diversion, a 
secondary landing attack was to go in at Barber's Point on the 
southwest corner of the island. 

Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, defying Lord Nelson's 
axiom that "a ship's a fool to fight a fort," moved in close to 
soften up the Black defenses. Searchlights, used by both sides 
to simulate heavy artillery, stabbed the darkness as the ships and 
shore batteries engaged in a spirited duel. 

It had been planned to begin the landings at 0130 on 27 April, 
but the time was moved up four hours to avoid "the inevitable 

13 ComAdvFor, Advance Force Tasks Solution, JANProblem No. 3. dtd 
7Apr25 {P&P File). 

14 ComBlueFlt, JAN Problem No. 3, Rept to CominCh, n.d. (P&P File). 


hazards to life and materiel involved in making landings at 
night." 15 So the first waves landed just before daylight. 

As the morning of 27 April dawned, nature seemed inclined 
to play along with the game. In fact, for almost the first time 
in the history of the Islands, she withdrew the seasonal winds 
from the northwest coast, moving them to the south. So, con- 
trary to expectations, there was practically no surf, and the 
weather was ideal — almost too good for adequate tests of landing 
equipment and techniques. 16 

As if to counterbalance the benevolence of the weather, aircraft 
of the greatly superior Black air force flew low, raining blank 
machine gun fire on the boat waves and the Marines on the 
beaches. Fighter aircraft launched from the Langley were too 
few in numbers to offer effective resistance. 

The small secondary landing force was stopped by superior 
numbers of the Black force, but the diversionary purpose of the 
landing was served. At the main landing on the northwest coast, 
successive waves got ashore, consolidated for attack, and moved 
inland. When the Blue 2d Division penetrated a depth of sev- 
eral miles by noontime the umpires called a halt, leading to 
facetious comment by a correspondent that the action "began 
and ended between breakfast and lunch," a "war [which was] 
born in an egg and died in a can." 17 

The umpires made no decision as to the over-all victor on 
Oahu. That would have required further action under tactical 
conditions. What was important, anyhow, were the lessons 

^MajGen John L. Hines, USA, "Grand Joint Army and Navy Exercise 
No. 3," lecture at ARWC, 26Jun25, hereafter Hines Lecture (P&P File). 

16 BriGen Dion Williams, "Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force," 
Marine Corps Gazette, v. X, no. 2 (Sep25), pp. 77-78, 84-86; Basic Plan; 
Hines Lecture. 

"Williams, op. cit., p. 86; "This Glorious War," Leatherneck, v. 8, no. 21 
(23May25), p. 6. 


First was the need to develop special landing craft to replace 
the awkward ships' boats with their high bows and relatively 
deep drafts. Training at rapid debarking on the beach was being 
defeated by the total unsuitability of ships' boats, which were the 
only landing craft at this time. At the secondary landing the 
boats were surprised by an unexpectedly large wave and thrown 
headlong onto the beach. As the first craft grounded, a coral 
head tore a gash in its side, and all hands and equipment were 
tossed overboard. 18 

The second point emphasized by the exercise was the need of 
additional aviation with the attacking fleet. Black's air superior- 
ity had been overwhelming. But this requirement was already 
being met by the current fleet construction program. The car- 
riers Saratoga and Lexington were commissioned in 1927. 

In the realm of communication — by radio, field telegraph, 
and telephone — the maneuvers showed the desirability of small 
compact apparatus. The Marine force had carried 11 Army 
Signal Corps radio sets, while ships of the fleet were equipped 
with 24 portable field sets, complete with bluejacket crews, for 
use on shore. 19 

As General Hines recalled the maneuvers, he held "no doubt 
that highly-trained, well-led infantry can establish a beachhead 
once the troops are ashore — but getting ashore, there's the rub." 20 
To iron out that rub became a main task of the Marine Corps 
through the years which lay ahead before World War II. This 
was the essence of amphibious warfare: "getting ashore." 

While Headquarters Marine Corps was already examining the 
lessons of the maneuvers, men of the 4th Regiment enjoyed a 

18 Hines Lecture; "No 'Constructive' War," Leatherneck, v. 8, no. 21 
(23May25), p. 11; Williams, op. cit., pp. 87-88; Div Ops & Trng, HQMC, 
memo to BriGen Logan Feland, dtd igjan25 {P&P File). 

"Williams, op. cit., 87-88; CinC, BattleFlt, msg to CMC, dtd i6Feb25, 
P&P File. 

20 Hines Lecture. 


liberty in Honolulu before the Henderson weighed anchor for 
home on 30 April. By 8 May, when the Henderson docked at 
San Diego, the 4th Regiment was again in business on its familiar 
site. 21 

As the regiment resumed its daily training at San Diego, it 
stood ready, at a moment's notice, for any call to service. Such 
an occasion was not long in coming. 

Hardly had the Marines heard of an earthquake at Santa 
Barbara on the morning of 29 June 1925 before they found them- 
selves en route to the scene. President Coolidge, then at Plym- 
outh, Vermont, telegraphed the Secretary of the Navy to dispatch 
aid to the stricken area. Second Lieutenant Thomas B. White, 
regimental communication officer, left with the radio unit of 
Headquarters Company the same day for Santa Barbara to 
restore her contacts with the outside world. At first it was neces- 
sary to work from the naval tug Koka offshore. Then, on 1 
July, Major Francis T. Evans took 218 Marines of the 2d Bat- 
talion to Santa Barbara, to relieve the Los Angeles police as 
guards. A Marine camp was set up at Peabody Stadium. 

Throughout July the Marines lent a helping hand, winning 
the gratitude of citizens of Santa Barbara. These people would 
have echoed the sentiments of the Chicago Evening Post which, 
just a few days before the earthquake, had said editorially : 22 

'Emergency' and 'Marine' may not be synonymous terms, 
but they come pretty close to being simultaneous. In the 
matter of mobility, to say nothing of agility, these sea- 
soldiers have a way of being johnny-on-the-spot, and Amer- 
ican minds rest easier, whatever the disturbing occasion, 
when the message is flashed: 'The Marines have landed.' 

21 4th Regt MRolls, 1 Apr-3 iMay25- 

22 4th Regt MRolls, 1-31J11I25; San Francisco Chronicle, 30JUI125, 1- 
2JUI25; "The Broadcast," Leatherneck, v. 8, no. 29 (18J11I25), p. 6, and 
"The Broadcast," Leatherneck, v. 8, no. 34 (22Aug25), p. 3; editorial, 
"The Marines Are on the Job," Chicago Evening Post, 25jun25. 


For more than a year after their return to San Diego at the 
end of July, life for the Marines of the 4th Regiment was one 
of uneventful garrison routine. Strength fluctuated sharply dur- 
ing the period — from 45 officers and 670 men at the end of 
July 1925 to a low of 37 officers and 347 men by the end of 
January 1926. Six months later, the figure had risen to 20 offi- 
cers and 581 men. With so few personnel it was no longer prac- 
tical to maintain a three-battalion organization, and, on 6 July 
1926 the regiment was reorganized again into two battalions. 23 
Then, in October, emergency once again called the 4th Regiment 
to service. 


A product of the gangster 1920's was a crime now hardly 
heard of: mail robbery. In 192 1, President Harding had turned 
out the Marines to fight it. By 1926, however, a new series of 
outrages broke out. 

Violence reached a climax in a robbery by eight men at Eliza- 
beth, New Jersey, when on 14 October one of two bandit cars 
crowded a mail truck to the curb while another slammed against 
a motorcycle policeman, throwing him to the street. After kill- 
ing the mail truck driver, wounding a postal guard and a by- 
stander, the bandits fled with five bags of mail — a loot of some 
$150,000 — while shielding their escape with machine guns and 
sawed-off shotguns. 

There had been other incidents, no less a mockery of the law, 
but it was the Elizabeth robbery which prompted decisive action. 
On the next day, 15 October, Postmaster General Harry S. New 
addressed a letter to Curtis D. Wilbur, Secretary of the Navy, 
citing the necessity of immediate moves. Receiving quick agree- 
ment, New then conferred with General Lejeune. In less than 

23 4th Regt MRolls, 1-31J11I25, i-3ijan26, and 1-31J11I26. 



a week, on 20 October, President Coolidge formally approved the 
use of 2,500 Marines to guard the mails. It brought a public 
sigh of relief. 24 

On the basis of an informal understanding that the President 
would approve, the Commandant had wired on 18 October to 
Headquarters, Department of the Pacific : "You will organize a 
force from the Fourth Regiment, to be known as the Western 
Mail Guards . . . ." He designated Brigadier General Smedley 
D. Butler to command it, with Headquarters at San Francisco. 

The 4th Regiment would be spread out through Montana, 
Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Wash- 
ington, Oregon, Nevada, and California. But the Commandant 
desired that the existing organization of the 4th be preserved "as 
far as practicable." The inactive 31st and 32d Companies were 
restored to strength for the mail guard duty. 

The eastern boundary of the Western Mail Guard area was 
modified on 22 October to weave through Williston, North Da- 
kota; Green River, Wyoming; Denver, Colorado; Albuquerque, 
New Mexico; and El Paso, Texas. On the other side of the line 
were the Eastern Mail Guards, commanded by General Feland 
at Quantico. 25 

Just three days after the Commandant's first order, 15 officers 
and 630 men left San Diego en route to their posts as the Western 
Mail Guards. Four officers and 1 74 men reported to Los Angeles 
and neighboring towns. Four officers and 234 men went on to 
San Francisco. Proceeding to Portland were 1 officer and 41 

2 *"The Mail Guard," Marine Corps Gazette, v. XI, no. 4 (Dec26), 
pp. 267, 270; "Marines to Guard the Mails," Leatherneck, v. 9, no. 15 
(DeC26), pp. 45-46; San Francisco Chronicle, I50ct26 and I70ct26; Capt 
Allen H. Turnage ltr to Maj Edward W. Sturdevant, dtd 16N0V26, in 
1645-80, Central Files, HQMG. Unless otherwise cited, all further docu- 
ments on the Western Mail Guard are from this file. 

25 HQMC msg to CG, MarPac, dtd i80ct 2 6; HQMG msg to CG, MarPac, 
dtd 220ct26; 4th Regt MRolls, i-3iOct26. 


men; to Seattle, 2 officers and 60 men; to Salt Lake City, 2 officers 
and 55 men; to Spokane, 1 officer and 34 men; and to Denver, 
1 officer and 32 men. 26 

As in 192 1, Marines were assigned not only to trains carrying 
precious mail shipments but also to mail trucks and to guard duty 
at post offices and railway stations. Altogether, some 40,000 
miles of railroad and post offices in 28 cities west of the Mississippi 
came under Marine protection. 27 

Each Marine was well-armed. The gangster in the jungles 
of America's underworld in the 1920's was not the poorly armed 
bandit the Marines had often encountered in Santo Domingo. 
To fight fire with fire, the mail guards were equipped with 
pistols, 1 2 -gauge riot type shotguns, and the .45 calibre Thompson 
submachine gun. 

The men were quartered, wherever practicable, in buildings 
owned or controlled by the Government. Otherwise, the Corps' 
Quartermaster General leased space. For example, in San 
Francisco the Marines lived at the Army & Navy YMCA. 28 

On 9 November, General Butler reported to Headquarters 
Marine Corps that the strength of the Western Mail Guard 
stood at 25 officers and 679 men, and he listed where they were, 
as follows: 29 

29 4th Regt MRolls, 1-3 iOct26. 

27 CG, MarPac msg to HQMG, dtd 240ct26; CG, MarPac ltr to CO, 
MarCorps Bks, San Diego, dtd 260ct26; CG, WMG msg to HQMC, dtd 
9N0V26; CMC, Report . . .. in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for 
the Fiscal Year IQ21 (Washington: Navy Dept, 1921); San Francisco 
Chronicle, 22-23-24-290^26. 

28 "Marine Corps Mail Guards Carry Improved Machine Gun," Leather- 
neck, v. 9, no. 15 (Dec26), p. 44; "Marines to Guard the Mails," op. cit. } 
pp. 45-46; "The Mail Guard," op. cit., pp. 267-68; 4th Regt MRolls, 
1-30N0V26; San Francisco Chronicle, 220ct26. 

29 CG, MarPac ltr to CO, MarCorps Bks San Diego, dtd 260ct26; 4th Regt 
MRolls, i-3iOct26; CG, WMG, msg to HQMC, dtd 9N0V26. 




San Francisco 28th Co and 29th Co, 2d Bn 8 148 

Stockton 6 

Fresno 8 

Reno 16 

Sacramento 13 

Bakersfield 6 

San Jose 8 

Oakland 30 

Berkeley 1 

Los Angeles 27th Co and 31st Co, ist Bn 5 127 

Albuquerque 8 

El Paso 1 1 

Phoenix 5 

Pasadena 1 

Riverside 1 

San Bernardino 1 

Salt Lake City 10th Co, ist Bn 2 45 

Ogden 18 

Boise 4 

Portland Hq Co, 2d Bn 2 42 

Seattle 25th Co, 2d Bn 3 59 

Tacoma 4 

Bellingham 4 

Spokane 3 2d Co, 2d Bn 2 31 

Helena 1 13 

Butte 13 

Denver Regimental Hq Co 2 43 

Pueblo 9 

Trinidad 4 


In carrying out their new task, Marines were instructed to 
follow the Manual for the Western Mail Guards, 1926. This 
prescribed that "if your duty requires you will, after proper 
warning, arrest or shoot, but never, under any circumstances, 
enter into an argument with, or lay hands on, anyone." 30 

Whether the mail robbers read the Manual is not known. At 
least, not one of them chose to argue with a Marine. Just a 
single attempt at mail robbery occurred during the guard duty — 
and that happened on a train which did not carry valuable mail 
and was therefore not accompanied by Marines. 

Viewing the peaceful landscape, Leatherneck inquired: 
"Where Are the Mail Bandits Now?" Where, asked the editor, 
are "all those gentlemen who have been making an easy living 
by robbing mail trains and mail trucks . . .?" 31 

Instead of chasing mail robbers, the 4th Regiment became a 
quiet and assuring presence throughout the West — a fact which 
brought fully as much credit to the Marine Corps. Many Ameri- 
cans met, for the first time, their nation's historic sea-soldiers, 
whose "splendid military appearance" they praised. At the daily 
inspection, citizens could stop to admire the colorful holding of 

A movie, "Tell It to the Marines," which featured 4th Regi- 
ment personnel and starred Lon Chaney as a gunnery sergeant, 
was shown during January at various towns where mail guards 
were stationed. 32 It served to inform Americans further on the 
tasks performed by the Marine Corps, both in war and peace. 

Toward the end of 1926, it became evident that the 4th Regi- 
ment's next task was again going to be expeditionary duty. 

30 Manual for the Western Mail Guards, 1Q26 (1645-80, Central Files, 

31 Editorial, "Where Are the Mail Bandits Now?" Leatherneck, v. 10, no. 1 
(Jan27), p. 26. 

82 CO Det 32d Co, 4th Regt, WMG, Spokane, wkly rept to CG, WMG, 
dtd i5Feb27; "'Tell It To the Marines' Opens," Leatherneck, v. 10, no. 1 
(Jan27), p. 35; 4th Regt MRolls, 1-31J11I27. 


Rebel forces in Nicaragua were seizing American property, while, 
across the Pacific, in China, civil war and prejudice against 
foreigners threatened the lives of Americans. 

In view of affairs, the Commandant decided upon a gradual 
withdrawal of Marines from mail guard duty. Started on 10 
January, the withdrawal was set for completion by July. But 
it soon became imperative to execute full withdrawal before the 
end of February. 33 Foreign needs could not wait. 

On 10 January, General Butler reported to Washington that 
9 officers and 138 men had been returned to San Diego in the 
first of the homeward moves. The withdrawals continued 
throughout the month and on into February. The 10th Com- 
pany at Salt Lake City and the 29th Company at San Francisco, 
among the last units to be recalled, continued on mail guard duty 
until 1 8 February. A day later, Headquarters and Headquarters 
Company, 2d Battalion, at Portland, the 31st Company at Los 
Angeles, and the 3 2d Company at Spokane were secured. When 
these units returned to San Diego they found that most of their 
buddies in the regiment had sailed for Shanghai on 3 February. 34 

At the end of the mail guard duty the Marine Corps was 
showered with praise for the service it had performed. Of the 
"highest order of excellence," wrote Postmaster General New. 
The San Francisco postmaster summed up the tone of the praise : 

Efficiency and courtesy were combined to a degree that 
could not but evoke a wholesome respect for the Marine 
Corps, that fine arm of the service which by reason of its 
training may be utilized in any character of emergency. 

The mail guard duty had taxed the Marine Corps' pocket- 

33 CMC, Report . . ., in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the 
Fiscal Year ig2y (Washington: Navy Dept, 1928); Professional Notes — 
"Mail Guard," Marine Corps Gazette, v. XII, no. 1 (Mar27), pp. 51-52; 
Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps (New York: 
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), PP- 5*9-53 

84 CG, WMG, msg to HQMG, dtd ioJan27; 4*h Regt MRolls, ijan- 


book, but from a public relations standpoint it was well worth 
the cost. As the Gazette remarked, it "made the Marine in uni- 
form a familiar sight to millions of citizens." 35 

Without a shot or a casualty, the Marines had won a sizeable 

35 Postmaster General ltr to SecNav, dtd i6Feb2 7; James E. Power, Post- 
master, San Francisco, ltr to CMC, dtd i7Mar2 7; editorial, Marine Corps 
Gazette, v. XII, no. i (Mar27), pp. 67-68. 

519667—60 10 


China Marines 

On 28 January 1927, the 4th Regiment received orders to 
embark for expeditionary duty in the Far East. Thus began a 
15-year tour in China, protecting the lives and property of Ameri- 
can citizens in the International Settlement of Shanghai. The 
Marines never engaged in combat during all those years, yet they 
successfully carried out their mission, though next door to the 
Chinese revolution and the pitched battles of the Sino- Japanese 
war. It was a situation where the existence of a force in readi- 
ness on the spot achieved a national policy merely by its presence. 
It was a condition where, according to John Van A. Mac Murray, 
the American minister to China, "the only possible escape from 
the necessity to apply force . . . [was] an obvious readiness to 
employ it." 1 


The regiment, under the command of Colonel Charles S. Hill, 
sailed from San Diego in the naval transport Chaumont on 
3 February. On board were the regimental Headquarters and 
Service Companies, Major Theodore A. Secor's 1st Battalion, 
and the newly organized 3d Battalion. Formed on 10 January 

1 Minister in China msg to SecState, I5jan2 7, Foreign Relations, 1927, 
p. 47. 



under the command of Major Alexander A. Vandegrift, 2 the new 
battalion included the 19th, 21st, 2 2d, and 24th Companies. 
Total strength on board the Chaumont was 66 officers and 1,162 
enlisted men. The 2d Battalion, which was still engaged in 
winding up the mail guard operations, had to remain behind. 
No more disappointed group of Marines ever wore the uniform 
than those of the 2d Battalion when their comrades sailed for 
expeditionary service without them. 3 

The Chaumont reached the China coast on 24 February. 
Long before sighting the shore, Marines crowding her decks 
could tell they were approaching land, as the water was colored a 
dismal yellow for miles out to sea by the tons of mud disgorged 
by the Yangtze River. The first sight of China was a disappoint- 
ment. There were no pagodas, no temple bells, no spice-laden 
breezes. Instead, there was a large billboard stuck in a mud 
bank advertising, in English, a well-known brand of American 
chewing gum. 

As the Chaumont churned her way through the silt-laden 
waters of the Yangtze, a thin blue line on either side gradually 
materialized into the shore. Then, to port, was a cluster of low 
houses — the first Chinese village, Woosung, squatting on the 
corner where the Whangpoo River flows into the Yangtze. 
Turning hard to port, the transport steamed up this tributary 
stream. The river was crowded now with junks, chunky wooden 
vessels, with eyes painted on their bows, their dark, patched sails 
bellying in the chill breeze. There were occasional villages, with 
low houses and willow trees on both banks. Then the silver 
storage tanks of the Standard Oil Company came into view on 

2 Vandegrift became one of the great Marine combat leaders of WW II. 
He commanded the 1st MarDiv at Guadalcanal, and later served as the 18th 
Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

3 Div Ops & Trng, HQMC, "Protection of American Interests," Marine 
Corps Gazette, v. XII, no. 3 (Sep27), pp. 179-183; 1st and 3d Bns, 4th 
Regt, Recs of Events, 3Feb2 7« Unless otherwise cited, official records are in 
MarCorps Units in China, 192 7-1 938 File, HistBr, HQMC. 


the left shore. Here the Chaumont stopped and picked up a 
mooring off the oil company property. (See Map 8.) 

Colonel Hill boarded a launch and continued on up river the 
remaining five miles to Shanghai. There he reported to Admiral 
Clarence S. Williams, Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet, in his 
flagship, the cruiser Pittsburgh. The admiral assigned to the 
4th Regiment the mission of protecting the lives and property 
of Americans within the International Settlement of Shanghai. 4 


The International Settlement had its origins in the Opium 
War of 1842 when Great Britain forced the Chinese to grant 
full trading privileges and the right of residence at Shanghai. 5 In 
an area set aside for them outside the city walls, the British and 
other foreign merchants, under the doctrine of extraterritoriality, 
established a settlement where they governed themselves, exempt 
from Chinese authority. A form of city government was estab- 
lished under regulations drawn up in 1 854 by the British, Ameri- 
can, and French consuls, providing a municipal council, elected 
by the foreign taxpayers. 

The French withdrew in 1862 under orders from Paris and 
established an independent concession on land they held under 
treaty with the Chinese just south of the International Settlement. 

Shanghai in 1842 was a sleepy provincial town, but the ar- 
rival of the white man began a remarkable commercial boom. 
By 1927 the city had a population of about three million. It was 
the leading port of China, the gateway to the vast Yangtze Valley. 

4 CO 4th Regt ltr to CinCAF, dtd 26Feb27 (Subj File: China, HistBr, 

6 The material on Chinese history is from Foster Rhea Dulles, China and 
America, the Story of their Relations Since 1784 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1946). 



Nearly 34 million tons of merchandise passed through it each 
year. 6 

The nerve centers for this commercial activity were the for- 
eign concessions of which the International Settlement was the 
largest and most important. It covered about 5,500 acres, or 
nearly half the entire metropolitan area. Within its borders 
lived about one-third of the city's population. The French Con- 
cession was about half the size of the International Settlement, 
both in population and area. 

Surrounding the foreign concessions was the native city. In 
addition to the old quarter, squeezed between the French Con- 
cession and the river, were three sectors which had sprung up 
after the arrival of the foreigners. These were Nantao to the 
south, Pootung across the Whangpoo to the east, and Chapei 
to the north. This last was the most important, containing many 
businesses and factories, both Chinese and foreign-owned. Here 
lived many of the young progressive Chinese. The native sec- 
tions were only about one-fourth the size of the foreign conces- 
sions, but they contained about the same number of inhabitants. 

The British, who had taken the lead in extracting special privi- 
leges from China, had dominated the life of the Settlement ever 
since. They handled about a third of the tonnage passing through 
the port; they set the social tone; and they represented the second 
largest group of foreigners, with 7,047 residents in 1926. This 
dominant position was increasingly threatened by the Japanese, 
who, by 1926, already had twice the number of residents and 
were handling more than a fourth of the tonnage. 

The American stake in Shanghai was a modest one. Only 
1,800 Americans resided there in 1926, and they handled only 
1 2 per cent of the tonnage passing through the port. This was 
representative of the total United States stake in China, where 

6 "Shanghai," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1944, v. 20, pp. 455-458. 


our commerce amounted to less than four per cent of our for- 
eign trade during the decade 1921-1930. 7 


The danger to foreigners living in the International Settlement 
in 1927 was the end result of nearly a century of commercial ex- 
ploitation carried out with little regard for Chinese sovereignty 
or national pride. The original privileges, which had been ex- 
tracted from a reluctant Chinese government at the mouth of a 
cannon, were only the beginning of coercive exploitation on a 
grand scale. 

The British and French forced the opening of the interior to 
foreign trade in 1858. Extraterritoriality was demanded by, and 
accorded to, almost all Western nations; coastal trade was domi- 
nated by foreigners ; and a five per cent limitation on tariff rates 
was enforced in the face of rising domestic prices, giving foreign 
merchants every advantage in the Chinese market. Concessions 
were also obtained for the construction of railroads and telegraph 

The crowning humiliation came in 1895 when defeat by Japan 
in war revealed the utter impotence of China. Formosa and the 
Pescadores fell to the victor as spoils. To make matters worse, 
the European powers were encouraged by this evidence of weak- 
ness to step up their encroachments on Chinese sovereignty. 
Germany acquired the port of Tsingtao and recognition of the 
province of Shantung as her special sphere of influence; Russia 
exacted a leasehold at Port Arthur ; Britain extended her grip on 
the Yangtze Valley ; and France seized Kwangchow Bay in South 

The reaction of the Chinese to these foreign aggressions can 
well be imagined. Citizens of one of the world's oldest and great- 

7 Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: 
Henry Holt & Co., 1942), pp. 759-760. 


est empires, they took pride in their own society, and, though not 
generally hostile to strangers, looked upon them as inferiors. The 
violent intrusion of foreigners into China was bitterly resented. 

This resentment came to a head in 1900 in the Boxer Rebellion. 
The Boxers were a Chinese patriotic society, which, with the 
acquiescence of the Chinese government, stirred up an armed 
rebellion against the "foreign devils." Ripping up portions of 
the Peking-Tientsin railway, the Boxers cut off Peking from the 
outside world, murdered the secretary of the Japanese legation 
and the German ambassador, and besieged the legations in the 
city. An international relief force of about 1 9,000 men, includ- 
ing a regiment of Marines, finally fought its way through to 
relieve the besieged legations. 

Hatred for "foreign devils" and a determination to drive them 
from the country continued to flourish. It was one of the pri- 
mary objectives of the revolutionary party organized by Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen which overthrew the Manchu dynasty in 1 9 1 1 . Dr. Sun, 
unable to give China a strong central government, was soon 
reduced to nominal control of the Canton area. A period of 
anarchy, dominated by local war lords, set in. 

Though deprived of real political authority, Sun Yat-sen still 
exerted a wide ideological influence. His "Three Principles" — 
nationalism, democracy, and the peoples' welfare — had a strong 
appeal among the new student and merchant classes of the coastal 
cities. After World War I, Dr. Sun gained powerful allies in 
the Communists, both Chinese and Russian. From the latter he 
received military and political advisers and arms. 

He also acquired, in Chiang Kai-shek, a competent Chinese 
military commander who established an officer training school, 
the famous Whampoa Academy, which began to turn out the 
nucleus for professional military leadership. With the Whampoa 
graduates, Chiang organized and trained what was, by Chinese 
standards, an efficient modern army. 

With this new army Sun Yat-sen planned the conquest of all 


China, but he died before military operations got under way. 
Chiang Kai-shek then took over and, in July 1926, set his armies 
in motion. Using a combination of military operations, bribery, 
and political infiltration, the Nationalists swept everything before 
them. By autumn they were in the Yangtze Valley of central 
China. 8 

As Chiang Kai-shek's force ground its way steadily northward, 
foreigners in the International Settlement became increasingly 
apprehensive. Nobody expected the poorly trained and half- 
starved troops of the war lord Chang Tsung-ch'ang, who was then 
in control of the area around Shanghai, to put up effective re- 
sistance. Moreover, the anti-foreign sentiment of the National- 
ists, particularly their Communist faction, was not reassuring. 
Old China hands recalled the violent outbursts of the Boxer 
Rebellion and began to urge their governments to send ships and 

As if to confirm the worst fears of the most jittery treaty port 
residents, Nationalist soldiers overran the British concession in 
Hankow early in January 1927, looting and burning. Loss of 
life was averted only by the timely arrival of landing parties from 
British destroyers and gun boats. To make matters even more 
alarming, the Nationalist commander in the area had previously 
assumed responsibility for maintaining law and order and had 
assured the British that they had nothing to fear. 

In response to the violence at Hankow, Minister MacMurray 
cabled the State Department on 10 January 1927 an urgent rec- 
ommendation that, "in order to protect foreign life and property 
at Shanghai and prevent the seizure of the Settlement ... by 
mob violence . . ., landing forces at Shanghai should be in- 
creased to maximum available . ..." 9 A few days later Mac- 

8 F. F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1956), pp. 25-35. 

9 Minister in China msg to SecState, dtd ioJan2 7, Foreign Relations, 1927, 
p. 44. 


Murray forwarded to Washington an estimate by Admiral Wil- 
liams, that 20,000 troops would be required to defend the Settle- 
ment against a determined attack by the Nationalists. 10 


President Coolidge, realizing that the American people were 
in no mood for a war with China, opposed sending a large regu- 
lar Army force. He preferred to use naval forces in numbers 
sufficient to protect American life and property at Shanghai, but 
not so great as to arouse the Chinese or to become embroiled in 
fighting the Nationalist army. On 28 January he ordered a 
Marine regiment sent to the Far East. 

In his desire to avoid a clash with organized Chinese armies, 
Coolidge handicapped our forces in carrying out their mission 
of protecting American lives and property. Even before addi- 
tional Marines were ordered to Shanghai, Secretary of State 
Frank B. Kellogg cabled MacMurray that "it must be definitely 
understood that this force is present for the purpose of protecting 
American life and property at Shanghai. This Government is 
not prepared to use its naval force at Shanghai for the purpose 
of protecting the integrity of the Settlement . ..." 11 

MacMurray replied that protection of American lives and 
property could not be divorced from the defense of the Inter- 
national Settlement. "Conditions in Shanghai are so inflam- 
mable," he reported, "that there is certain to be an explosion if 
the Nationalists extend control to that area unless . . . [they] are 
convinced . . . that the powers are prepared wholeheartedly to 
unite on a stand for the protection of their nationals and interests 
in Shanghai. To distinguish between concerted attack by or- 
ganized forces and mob violence would prove to be . . . impossi- 

10 Minister in China msg to SecState, dtd i6Jan27, Foreign Relations, 1927, 
p. 50. 

11 SecState msg to Minister in China, dtd 23Dec26, Foreign Relations, 1926, 
P- 663. 


ble," he continued. "Throughout their recent campaign the 
characteristic tactics of the Nationalists have been to filter their 
men into hostile territory where later they would assmble as an 
organized . . . force. When in the midst of dealing with mob 
violence within the Settlement it is altogether likely that foreign 
forces would suddenly find themselves confronted with such Na- 
tionalist units." 12 

The question of Settlement defense came up in concrete form 
on 22 February at a meeting of the British, French, Japanese, 
and American naval commanders. The British commander, 
whose government had already decided to defend the Settlement 
at all costs, 13 proposed the formation of an international defense 
force. Admiral Williams felt that his instructions would not per- 
mit unqualified American participation, so he replied that U.S. 
naval landing forces could not join the perimeter defense. They 
would operate within the Settlement to protect American lives 
and property up to the moment when the Nationalists should de- 
mand to take control of the city, when they would be withdrawn. 
The only protection afforded American citizens would then be 
assistance in evacuation. 14 

MacMurray, when he learned of this, sent a strongly worded 
cable to Washington, pointing out that our honor was involved, 
and that we could not withdraw our troops under fire, leaving 
the forces of other nations to protect our citizens. 

The State Department replied with a cautiously worded in- 
struction for Williams as follows: "You are hereby authorized, 
at your discretion, to utilize in the protection of the lives and 
property of American citizens all forces under your command." 15 

12 Minister in China msg to SecState, dtd I5jan27, Foreign Relations, 1927, 
p. 47. 

13 British Embassy to the Dept of State, dtd 26Jan2 7, Foreign Relations, 
1927, p. 56. 

14 Minister in China msg to SecState, dtd 22Feb27, Foreign Relations, 1927, 
P- 75- 

15 Quoted in ActSecState msg to Minister in China, dtd 23Feb27, Foreign 
Relations, 1927, p. 78. 


In view of the repeated statements from Washington that Ameri- 
can forces were to avoid conflict with regular Chinese armies, 
Williams did not feel that he should exercise his discretion to 
order the Marines to defend the Settlement perimeter. He in- 
formed Hill that the 4th Regiment would be limited to internal 
security duty. 

The landing of the 4th Regiment in Shanghai was also delayed 
by political considerations. Fearing that the appearance of the 
Marines on the streets would be used as a pretext for anti-foreign 
propaganda, the State Department instructed Clarence Gauss, 
the consul general in Shanghai, not to request military aid until 
danger to American life and property was irnminent. As a 
result, the Marines remained in their cramped quarters aboard 
the Chaumont. 16 


Although an immediate landing was prohibited, there was 
nothing in the orders to prevent planning for the defense of the 
International Settlement. At the direction of Admiral Williams, 
Colonel Hill called upon Major General John Duncan, senior 
British Army commander, who had been requested by the 
Municipal Council to take charge of the defense of the 

General Duncan's plan was to throw a cordon around the 
perimeter of the International Settlement and two areas outside 
where foreign interests were concentrated. These extra-Settle- 
ment areas were the residential district to the west, and the 
predominantly Japanese district, a narrow salient extending to 
the north along North Szechuan Road. The French did not 
join in the common defense scheme but made their own military 
arrangements. 17 

16 Minister in China msg to SecState, dtd I3jan27, Foreign Relations, 1927, 

P. 45- 

17 Ibid. 


The International Settlement was a Western enclave in a 
hostile city of three million inhabitants. About half of its bound- 
ary rested on natural barriers — Soochow Creek on the northwest, 
and the Whangpoo River on the southeast. On the west, the 
defense perimeter was pushed out beyond the political boundary 
to the tracks of the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railroad, the 
embankment of which made a natural defensive position. On 
the south the French Concession offered a measure of protection, 
but, in the absence of any agreement with the French or any 
knowledge of their plans, this boundary also had to be fortified 
and manned. To the northeast was the densely populated 
Chinese quarter of Chapei. 

Except as previously mentioned, General Duncan could not 
occupy terrain outside the Settlement boundaries where he might 
more advantageously fend off a Chinese army. All he could 
do was to outpost a few exterior key points and rely on the 
manned barricades of sandbags and barbed wire forming the 
perimeter. 18 

Duncan's forces numbered about 20,000. Great Britain, with 
the most at stake, contributed the largest contingent — a division 
of about 13,500, consisting of three infantry and four artillery 
brigades and an armored car company. 19 Other elements in- 
cluded 3,000 Japanese, 1,505 Americans, 230 Italians, 160 
Spanish, 130 Portuguese, and 120 Dutch. In addition, there 
was the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, a local militia of 1,426, 
equipped by Great Britain and trained and commanded by reg- 
ular British army officers. Of these troops only the British, 
Japanese, and Italians were employed on the perimeter, the 

l8 LtCol Baird Smith, British Army, "The Shanghai War," The Army 
Quarterly, v. XXIV, no. 2 (J11I32), pp. 323-330. 

19 The British infantry brigade at this time was the equivalent of an 
American infantry regiment and their artillery brigade the equivalent of a 
U.S. artillery battalion. 


remainder being used for internal security. In their Concession 
the French had about 3,000 troops. 20 

Reinforcing the 4th Regiment as the American contingent 
was the Provisional Battalion made up of Marines sent from 
Guam and the Philippines, and from the Marine detachments of 
the Yangtze River gunboats Sacramento and Asheville. Under 
the command of Major Julian P. Willcox, this battalion included 
the 88th, 89th, 90th, 91st (machine gun), and headquarters 
companies. Total strength of the battalion as of 1 March was 
1 6 officers and 321 men. 21 

The Marines were responsible for internal security in two 
unconnected areas comprising about two-thirds of the Settlement. 
The Eastern Area included all of the Settlement east of Hongkew 
Creek, and the Western Area encompassed all of the Settlement 
west of Carter Road except for the northwest tip. Vandegrift's 
3d Battalion was assigned the Western Area, while Secor's 1st 
Battalion and Willcox' Provisional Battalion divided the Eastern 
Area. All officers and a good many noncommissioned officers of 
the regiment made a thorough reconnaissance of these areas, 
while Colonel Hill and his staff conferred with municipal officials 
to determine the location of vital installations, such as telephone 
exchanges and power plants, which would require guards. 22 (See 
Map 9.) 

The regiment remained cramped aboard ship some five miles 
down stream from the Bund, the heart of Shanghai's waterfront. 
The only transportation to the city was by lighter — a matter of 
concern to Colonel Hill who requested Admiral Williams to 

20 4th Regt strength is as of 1 Apr and includes the ProvBn, 4th Regt 
MRolls, i-3oApr27; SVC strength is from H. G. W. Woodhead, ed., The 
China Year Book, 1928 (Tientsin: Tientsin Press, n.d.), p. 1301; all others 
are from LtCol Frederick D. Kilgore ltr to CO 4th Regt, dtd 28Jun29 
(Subj File: China, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter Kilgore letter. 

21 ProvBn, 4th Regt MRolls, i-3iMar2 7. 

22 3/4 FieldO No. 2, dtd 8Mar 2 7. 



order the Chaumont to move to a wharf on the Shanghai side 
of the stream. Nothing was done, however, in spite of a com- 
munication from her skipper, Captain John H. Blackburn, that 
unloading by lighter would take four times as long as at dockside. 
For the officers and men of the regiment, the position of the 
Chaumont was a hard blow. Liberty was liberally granted, but 
boats were in such short supply that the Marines had to hire a 
civilian lighter to carry them between the ship and Shanghai for 
$100 (U.S.) a day. 23 

A limited amount of training was possible in spite of the fact 
that the regiment was still aboard ship. The Standard Oil 
Company compound was used for close order drill and exercise, 
and on 5 March the regiment made a practice march through the 

Enlivening the training routine on 4 March was the recapture 
of a Standard Oil Company launch. The stolen boat, Mee Foo 
XIV, was sighted towing a string of barges loaded with Chinese 
troops of the local warlord. Piling into another oil company 
boat, 30 Marines of the 2 2d Company, commanded by Lieuten- 
ant Colonel Frederick D. Kilgore, the regimental executive officer, 
gave chase, overhauled the stolen vessel, and retook her without 
resistance. 24 

A second training march took place on 2 1 March. When the 
Marines left the Chaumont that morning they were ready for 
action. Every man had been issued ammunition, and an addi- 
tional supply of 20 boxes had been loaded aboard the lighters — 
a precaution taken because the Nationalist vanguard had arrived 
at Lungwha Junction on the southern outskirts of the city the 
previous evening. Along the Settlement perimeter General Dun- 
can's men stood ready for trouble. The 4th Regiment's march 

23 Kilgore letter and end (b) thereto: CO 4th Regt ltr to CinCAF, dtd 
26Feb2 7; 1st end to Kilgore letter, CO Chaumont to CinCAF, dtd 26Feb27- 
24 2 2d Co Rec of Events, dtd 4Mar2 7. 
519667—60 11 


through the Settlement went off uneventfully, however, and by 
noon the Marines were back on board their ship. 


As he stepped aboard the Chaumont, Lieutenant Colonel 
Kilgore, temporarily in command because of Colonel Hill's ab- 
sence in the city, was called to the phone and ordered by 
Admiral Williams' chief of staff to land the regiment at once. 
Consul General Gauss had finally approved the landing, for 
the Municipal Council had declared an emergency, called out 
the Volunteers, and requested assistance of the foreign forces. 
The troops were handed hot coffee and sandwiches on the run 
as they piled back on board the lighters. Five hours later they 
were on duty in the Eastern and Western Areas. 25 

As the Marines manned their fixed posts and sent out their 
patrols, they could hear sporadic small-arms fire from Chapei. 
Anticipating the arrival of the Nationalist Army, the Communist 
Workers' Militia had staged an uprising, and a fierce struggle 
was in progress between them and the remnants of the army of 
Chang Tsung-ch'ang. 

The miserable peasants making up the forces of this warlord 
were only too eager to escape, and most of them quickly melted 
away. One group numbering about 1,000 sought to enter the 
Settlement through the lines of the Durham Light Infantry along 
Range Road late in the afternoon. They were turned back, but 
with the Communist militia closing in on them, the desperate 
Chinese attempted to rush the British barricades, only to be 
mowed down by machine gun and rifle fire. The survivors 
threw down their arms and were then allowed to pass through 
the British lines to be rounded up and interned. 

Kilgore letter; Consul Gen Shanghai msg to SecState, dtd 2iMar2 7, 
Foreign Relations, 1927, p. 89. 


Around the North Station a group of White Russian mer- 
cenaries, manning an armored train, put up the stiff est fight 
against the Communists. Throughout the night and the next 
day they resisted bitterly but finally surrendered about 1800 
on the 2 2d. Shortly afterward, the Nationalist 1st Division, 
which had been at Lungwha Junction, only ten miles away, since 
the previous evening, finally moved in and took up positions in 
Chapei. 26 

An uneasy calm now settled over the Chinese sectors of the 
city. General Pai Tsung-hsi, the Nationalist commander in the 
Shanghai area, had issued a statement on the 2 2d, accepting 
responsibility for maintaining law and order and denying that 
the Nationalists intended to recover China's sovereign rights by 
force. But Pai was having serious troubles of his own, which 
cast doubt on his ability to live up to his promises. The Com- 
munist militia controlled most of the native city, and the 1st 
Division, Pai's only troop unit in Shanghai, was thoroughly 
infected by Communism. 27 

On the other side of the barricades, General Duncan's Defense 
Force tightened its grip on the Chinese population. On 25 
March a curfew was imposed between the hours of 2200 and 
0400. Security patrols were ordered to arrest and turn over to 
the Municipal Police all Chinese found abroad during those 
hours, except employes of essential services to whom special 

26 Failure of the Nationalist army to come to the help of the Communist 
Workers' Militia on 21-22 March has been interpreted as a stratagem in the 
struggle for power between the Communists and the Right Wing within the 
Kuomintang. The Communist leaders in Shanghai still looked upon the 
advancing Nationalists as liberators. They rose in anticipation of the early 
entry of these supposed allies into the city. But Chiang, according to some 
authorities, deliberately held up his forces outside in the hope that the 
rising would be crushed. The plan backfired, however, when the Communists 
were victorious over the forces of Chang Tsung-ch'ang. Harold N. Isaacs, 
The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1954), PP. 1 36-141. 

27 Ibid.; and The North China Daily Herald, 26Mar27- 


passes had been issued. Foreigners not on urgent business were 
warned to return home. 28 

While the Marines of the 4th Regiment braced for an attack 
on the Settlement by Chinese Nationalists, Admiral Williams con- 
sidered the situation so serious that he requested of the Navy 
Department a reinforcement of 1,500 Marines. His request was 
granted the same day, and orders were issued by the Comman- 
dant to embark the 6th Regiment, less the 3d Battalion, one 
battery of 75mm tractor-drawn artillery from the 10th Regiment, 
two squadrons of aircraft, and brigade service and headquarters 
companies. These troops sailed from San Diego on board the 
Henderson on 7 April. 29 

Along the perimeter British, Italian, and Japanese troops con- 
tinued to stand on guard. Although there were no attempts to 
rush the barricades after the abortive effort of 21 March, the 
British officer commanding the front along Soochow Creek, antic- 
ipated trouble. On the 23d he asked Major Vandegrift for 
support at Markham Road Bridge. With the approval of Colonel 
Hill, the 3d Battalion commander moved a rifle squad, a machine 
gun section, and a mortar section to the threatened area. The 
expected trouble failed to materialize, and the Marines returned 
to their billets two days later. 30 

On the 25th, Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler 31 arrived 
at Shanghai to take command of all Marines ashore. At first 
designated Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, Asiatic Fleet, 
Butler's command was renamed 3d Marine Brigade on 4 April. 

After familiarizing himself with the situation, Butler issued an 

28 Internal SctyFor, Special Instructions No. 3, 25Mar2 7- 

29 SecState to Sec War, dtd 26Mar27, Foreign Relations, 1927, p. 93; Div 

Ops & Trng, HQMC, "Protection of American Interests," Marine Corps 

Gazette, v. XII, no. 3 (Sep2 7),pp. 179-183. 

30 4th Regt Rec of Events, 23-25Mar2 7. 

31 General Butler was no newcomer to China. At the age of 1 9 he had 
won a brevet captaincy for gallantry before the walls of Peking during the 
Boxer Rebellion. 


order clarifying the mission of the 4th Regiment. Under the 
original instructions from Admiral Williams, U.S. naval landing 
forces were only to protect American lives and property within 
the Settlement. They were not to man the perimeter nor were 
they to assume responsibility for preserving the integrity of the 
Settlement. Colonel Hill's order to Vandegrift on the 23d, to 
support the British line, might have been interpreted as a viola- 
tion of Williams' instructions. Butler now vindicated Hill's ac- 
tion by directing the Marines to support the perimeter defenses 
if necessary to prevent a breakthrough. Only in this way could 
the Marine mission be accomplished, for if armed Chinese mobs 
were to break through the defenses it would be impossible to 
protect the lives and property of foreigners within the Settlement. 

To make sure that supporting action would be speedily and 
effectively carried out, Butler revised the Marine tactics. From 
the date of landing, the 4th Regiment had been discharging its 
responsibility for internal security by an extensive system of foot 
patrols. But the area was so large and the Marines so few that 
they were being run ragged. Even with patrols reduced to as 
few as four men, some Marines were on duty as long as 24 hours 
at a stretch. 

This exhausting work was unnecessary as the Shanghai Mu- 
nicipal Police and the Shanghai Volunteer Corps were doing a 
thorough job of interior patrolling. Availability as a powerful 
centrally located reserve force to deal with a major uprising 
within the Settlement or a breakthrough from outside was the 
proper mission for the Marines. 

To remedy this situation Butler replaced the foot with motor 
patrols on 26 March. In each area a truck carrying an officer 
or NCO-led patrol of eight men armed with a Browning Auto- 
matic Rifle (BAR) and a Thompson sub-machine gun was 
constantly patrolling the streets. At each billet another similar 
truck patrol was on constant alert. In the event of a Chinese 
attack, battalion commanders were authorized to commit as much 


as 50 per cent of their commands to defense of the perimeter 
without further authority from Expeditionary Force Head- 
quarters. 32 

Reassuring nervous Americans was an additional responsi- 
bility for the Marine commanders in Shanghai. Many individ- 
uals who lived in residential districts in the French Concession, 
where Marines were not allowed to operate, were naturally 
worried. On 15 April, the Safety Committee of the American 
Chamber of Commerce called on General Butler who explained 
that American forces could not set foot on French soil without 
permission of the French authorities, but that, in case of real 
danger, the Marines would take whatever steps were necessary 
to protect American lives. 33 

Fortunately, there was no occasion to take these "necessary 
steps." Neither General Butler nor Colonel Hill had made any 
effort at liaison with the French authorities who were conducting 
the defense of their own Concession independently of the Inter- 
national Settlement. So complete was the isolation of the two 
foreign communities that the British commander had ordered 
barbed wire and sandbag defenses installed along the boundary 
between them. After receiving the first complaints from Ameri- 
can residents of the French Concession, Butler inspected its de- 
fenses without asking the consent of French officials beforehand 
or paying courtesy calls during the inspection tour. A formal 
protest from the French to the American consul general was the 
result. 34 

A new threat to the Settlement appeared imminent on the 26th 
when the 4th Regiment was requested by General Duncan to 
man the line between the International Settlement and the 

82 GG MarCorpsExpedFor memo to GO 4th Regt, dtd 26Mar27; CG 
MarCorpsExpedFor ltr to CMC, dtd iApr27 (Subj File: China, HistBr, 

83 CG MarCorpsExpedFor ltr to CMC, dtd iApr2 7- 

84 CG 3dMarBrig ltr to CMC, dtd iApr27 (Subj File: China, HistBr, 


French Concession. Nationalist troops were reported entering 
French territory, and it was feared that they might try to break 
into the Settlement. Colonel Hill ordered Major Vandegrift 
to man all crossroads along Avenue Foch, the boundary line, 
in his battalion zone. Vandegrift in turn directed Captain 
Ray A. Robinson, commanding the 21st Company, to block all 
these intersections with squad-size posts. In addition the 25th 
Company of the 1st Battalion was moved over to reinforce the 
3d Battalion in the Western District. 

Marines worked most of a cold, rainy night filling and piling 
sandbags to reinforce the defenses already installed by the Brit- 
ish. General Butler, who inspected the positions at about 1900, 
reported that "the sight of these tired men, out along these empty 
streets, with everything quiet as a grave . . . irritated me very 
greatly. The following morning, I spoke to the Admiral [Wil- 
liams] and he stopped it." 35 As a result of the admiral's inter- 
vention with the British authorities the alert was cancelled on the 
27th, the 25th Company returning to the Eastern District, and 
the 21st Company abandoning positions on Avenue Foch and 
resuming regular patrol duties. 36 


Across the barricades in the Chinese city a bitter struggle for 
power was in progress — a struggle which was to have a profound 
effect on the safety of the Settlement. On 26 March, Chiang 
Kai-shek had arrived in Shanghai on board a Nationalist gun- 
boat to find a precarious balance of power between the Com- 
munists and his own Nationalist forces under Pai Tsung-hsi. 
Chiang, who had accepted Communist support reluctantly and 
primarily because Soviet Russia had been the sole source of arms 

35 CG MarCorpsExpedFor Itr to CMC, dtd iApr27 (Subj File: China, 
HistBr, HQMG). 

88 4th Regt Rec of Events, 26-2 7Mar27. 


and needed military guidance, now realized that he must destroy 
the Communists or be destroyed by them. 

As he looked about him that gray March afternoon, the Na- 
tionalist leader saw that this position was precarious. Patrolling 
the city were about 2,700 armed Communists, a number which 
could be instantly expanded by the Communist General Labor 
Union which was functioning as a military command. Only 
3,000 Nationalist troops were in the city, and these were of the 
red-tainted 1st Division. 

Chiang, however, could count on the support of powerful 
allies. The Chinese bankers and industrialists were with him to 
a man, and they were ready to back their convictions with cash. 
Standing ready to put the money to good use were the Green 
and Red Societies — tremendously powerful underworld gangs 
which controlled much of the criminal activity in Shanghai. 

By 1 2 April, Chiang was ready to strike. He had replaced the 
1 st Division with troops whose political reliability was unques- 
tioned, and the underworld gangs had organized a so-called 
"white labor movement" which was actually an organization of 
armed hoodlums. At a given signal early on the morning of the 
1 2th, these gangs fell upon the Communist headquarters through- 
out the city. Those who resisted were shot down where they 
stood, while the remainder were led away to be killed elsewhere. 
Marines of the 4th Regiment could hear sporadic bursts of rifle 
and machine gun fire as Chiang's forces went about their grisly 
work. By the next day it was all over, and Chiang was uncon- 
tested master of Shanghai. 37 

The crisis at Shanghai had passed. Security measures within 
the Settlement were gradually reduced. The 4th Regiment cut 
officer-led patrols to three a day on 26 April, discontinued all 
patrolling on 10 May, and on the 16th secured all guard posts 
except those at its own billets and sentries at the American Con- 
sulate General. "The regiment is now taking up normal train- 

37 Isaacs, op. ext., pp. 142-175; hiu,op. cit., pp. 41-43. 


ing," wrote Colonel Hill in his Record of Events for the day. 
"Record of Events will be suspended until such time as events 
or operations are of sufficient importance to justify its prep- 
aration." 38 


The victorious advance of the Nationalist armies into the 
Yangtze Valley, in addition to endangering foreign life and prop- 
erty at Shanghai, posed a threat of future danger to foreigners 
in North China. As early as 29 March, MacMurray had cabled 
the State Department predicting a victory for Chiang Kai-shek 
over the northern war lords, and warning that violence, similar 
to that at Hankow and Nanking, was likely to be repeated. 
Admiral Williams, who agreed with MacMurray as to the danger 
to foreign life and property, proposed the establishment of a 
strong point on or near the North China coast where Americans 
could be gathered in behind a defensive perimeter if necessary. 

These views met with a friendly reception by the Administra- 
tion in Washington and led to the following plan : Tientsin was 
to be the concentration point in North China; at his discretion, 
Admiral Williams was to move the 6th Regiment there; and a 
reinforcement of another 1,500 Marines was to be sent out from 
the United States. 39 

The Marine reinforcement, which included the remainder of 
the 1 st Battalion, 10th Regiment (artillery), a light tank platoon, 
an engineer company, an aviation unit, the 3d Battalion, 6th 
Regiment, and the 2d Battalion, 4th Regiment, departed San 
Diego on 17 April on board the liner President Grant. Upon 
arrival at Olongapo in the Philippines on 4 May, the engineers, 

38 4th Regt Rec of Events, i6May2 7. 

39 Minister in China msg to SecState, dtd 2gMar27; GinCAF msg to CNO, 
dtd 2Apr2 7; SecState to Minister in China, dtd i2Apr27, all in Foreign 
Relations, 1927, pp. 94-107. 


artillery, and tanks transferred to the Chaumont and proceeded 
to Shanghai, where they constituted, along with the 6th Regiment, 
a balanced force which could be lifted in a single ship. The two 
infantry battalions left behind at Olongapo were formed into a 
Provisional Regiment. 40 

The movement to Tientsin began at the request of MacMurray, 
on 2 June, when the 6th Regiment and supporting elements left 
Shanghai aboard the Henderson. General Butler and the 3d 
Brigade headquarters departed for the north on the 21st to be 
followed two days later by the Provisional Regiment from 
Olongapo. 41 

With the departure of these units the 4th Regiment became 
the only Marine organization in Shanghai. This reduced gar- 
rison was further cut back the following October when its Pro- 
visional Battalion was disbanded. That same month the 4th 
Regiment lost its only connection with the Tientsin garrison, 
when the Provisional Regiment was redesignated the 12 th Regi- 
ment. The 2d Battalion, 4th Regiment — which had had only a 
tenuous connection with its parent regiment — became an inte- 
gral part of the new organization. 42 

Smedley Butler and his command were due for a disappoint- 
ment in Tientsin. North China was quiet and peaceful when 
they arrived and it continued to be so. No Nationalist invasion 
of the north was in progress, for Chiang Kai-shek was still en- 
gaged in his struggle with the Communists. It was January 1928 
before he got his armies under way. In a series of battles he 
completely crushed the northern war lords, and on 4 June the 
Nationalists entered Peiping. Contrary to the expectations of 
the old China hands, their behavior was reasonably correct. 

40 CofS 3d MarBrig, ltr to GO ProvRegt, dtd 4May27 ( i975-7o/5-3> 
Central Files, HQMC). 

41 Div Ops & Trng, "Protection of American Interests," op. cit., pp. 1 79- 

42 3d MarBrig MRolls, i-3iOct27- 


There was no looting of foreign property nor attacks upon for- 
eign residents. 43 


After the transfer of power in North China to Chiang Kai- 
shek's forces had gone off without harm to Americans, our govern- 
ment began the gradual reduction of the numbers of Marines 
ashore in China. Over a period of about five months, beginning 
in September 1928, all of the 3d Brigade, except the 4th Regi- 
ment, was pulled out. The Brigade was disbanded on 1 3 Janu- 
ary 1929, and the last Marines left Tientsin on the 23d. 44 

Admiral Mark L. Bristol, who had relieved Admiral Williams 
as Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, proved to be the most 
persuasive of the senior American representatives in China when 
this redistribution of Marines was decided upon. From the first 
he had been uneasy about the stationing of the bulk of the 3d 
Marine Brigade at Tientsin, where it was 20 miles from the near- 
est water navigable by warships and could be neither supported 
nor evacuated by the Asiatic Fleet. To encourage Americans 
to concentrate there would afford them protection from mobs or 
disorganized soldiers, but it would invite isolation if a Chinese 
army were to cut the route of withdrawal. 

Shanghai, in Admiral Bristol's opinion, had none of these dis- 
advantages. The metropolis on the Whangpoo was within easy 
reach of the largest vessels of the Asiatic Fleet. If worse came 
to worst, cruisers and destroyers could back up the Marines 
ashore with naval gunfire; passenger liners could carry Ameri- 
cans away from the troubled zone; and, if our government de- 
cided to abandon the China mainland altogether, Marine land- 
ing forces could easily be embarked in transports under cover of 
guns of the fleet. Shanghai was also a centrally located base 

43 Liu, op. cit. } pp. 48-52. 

44 CG 3d MarBrig, Final Rept to CMC, dtd I4jan2g (1975-70/5-3, 
Central Files, HQMG). 


from which contingents of the 4th Regiment could be embarked 
to protect American interests wherever the Asiatic Fleet could 

In drawing up his recommendation to the Navy Department, 
Admiral Bristol had overruled General Butler who proposed 
the retention of the 6th Regiment, reinforced, at Tientsin and 
the withdrawal of the 4th Regiment from Shanghai. He had 
also opposed MacMurray's recommendation that both Tientsin 
and Shanghai continue to be garrisoned by Marines. The ad- 
miral's plan was accepted by both the State and Navy 
Departments. 45 


Admiral Bristol, in his recommendations for reducing Ameri- 
can forces ashore in China, had expressed the hope that condi- 
tions would soon permit evacuation of all Marines. But our 
government never found it opportune to make this final with- 
drawal until the end of November 1941 — only a few days before 
Pearl Harbor. So the 4th Regiment became, in effect, a per- 
manent garrison in the International Settlement at Shanghai. 
As such, it was maintained as a two-battalion unit with an 
approximate strength of 1,200 officers and men, a size and 
structure established in October 1927 when the Provisional Bat- 
talion had been disbanded and the 2d Battalion had been 
transferred to the 12th Regiment. 

Its mission was still the protection of American lives and 
property within the Settlement. Since Chiang Kai-shek's con- 
quest of the Yangtze Valley and his split with the Communists 
in the spring and summer of 1927, immediate threats to Ameri- 
cans at Shanghai had practically ceased. There was, however, 
always the possibility that trouble might break out again, for 
Chiang was still engaged in fighting the Communists, and he 

45 Ibid.; CinCAF msg to American Minister in China, dtd 7N0V28; Minis- 
ter in China msg to SecState, dtd 1N0V28, Foreign Relations, 1928, p. 316. 


had made deals with powerful war lords which might break 
down at any moment. 

A primary requirement for the 4th Regiment was, therefore, 
accurate intelligence of all things Chinese. Accordingly, the 
regimental intelligence section was gradually expanded to in- 
clude some functions normally performed by a national intelli- 
gence service. These included collection and evaluation of 
information concerning political, economic, and military condi- 
tions. An additional function was to keep track of the military 
and political activities of other foreign powers in China. The 
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the Commander, 
Yangtze River Patrol, used the 4th Regiment's reports to 
supplement their own intelligence services. 46 

Shanghai was one of the worst places on earth to maintain 
a regiment in fighting trim. Temptations were plentiful and 
cheap, and were close at hand with the regiment quartered in 
the narrow confines of the International Settlement. Lack of 
space also placed a serious limitation on training. Only small 
areas around the Columbia Country Club and Jessfield Park, 
both on the western outskirts, were available for field problems; 
close order drill was held on vacant lots near the billets; regi- 
mental parades and ceremonies were conducted on the huge 
Shanghai Race Course in the center of the city; and marches 
were made early in the morning over city streets before traffic 
became heavy. Marksmanship facilities were the one bright 
spot in the training picture. The Shanghai Volunteer Corps' 
excellent range in Hongkew was made available to the Marines 
for machine gun, rifle, and pistol firing. Chinese range crews 
who pulled the targets made the Hongkew range particularly 
desirable to the Marines who were accustomed to labor in the 
butts themselves. 47 

46 4th Regt 1929 AnnlntelRept, dtd 1J11I29 (2295-10-10/9-4, Central 
Files, HQMG ) . 

47 4th Regt Ann Ops & Trng Repts, 1929-31 (2295-10-10/9-4, Central 
Files, HQMC ) . 


Regimental commanders hoped for a disposition of troops 
on the Asiatic Station which would permit rotation of units 
from China to the Philippines. Colonel Henry Davis, who com- 
manded the 4th Regiment from 7 October 1927 to 28 September 
1928, wrote longingly of the advantages of the Islands where he 
could institute a schedule "of an intensive nature and get the 
booze and deviltry boiled out of these men by keeping them hard 
at field work in the hot weather and over the wide terrain which 
is available in Olongapo." 48 

Billets and headquarters buildings were converted schools, office 
buildings, or private mansions, rented from their owners or the 
Shanghai Municipal Council. When the regiment landed in 
March 1927, Shanghai was so crowded with foreign troops that 
good quarters were at a premium. Only the 3d Battalion, in the 
residential Western Area, could be housed in comfortable modern 
buildings at first; the other two battalions in the industrial East- 
ern Area were housed in old buildings and temporary huts so 
unsanitary as to be condemned by the regimental surgeon. On 
14 May modern buildings were finally obtained in the Western 
Area for the 1st Battalion, but the Provisional Battalion had to 
remain where it was until it was disbanded in October. 49 

As the permanent American garrison at Shanghai, the 4th 
Regiment was not only the guardian of American lives and prop- 
erty but also the representative of our country in a foreign land. 
Every Marine, from the regimental commander to the youngest 
private, was a model for opinions formed about America and 
Americans by Chinese and foreigners alike. There was also a 
natural desire to out-do the crack British regiments present, such 
as the Coldstream Guards. The Marines of the 4th Regiment 
impressed even that seasoned campaigner, General Butler, who 

48 CO 4th Regt ltr to GMG } dtd 3N0V27 (Subj File: China, HistBr, 

49 CO 4th Mars ltr to CMC, dtd 7J11I27 (Subj File: China, HistBr, 
HQMC) ; 4th Mars MRolls, 1 May-3 1 Oct2 7. 


remarked after an inspection that "the men were blancoed and 
shined until one was positively dazzled by looking at them." 50 
After a review on the Race Course, Butler remarked that he had 
"never seen a finer regiment. It reminded me of the 5th at 
Quantico in its palmiest days." 51 

An ambitious sports program in a sports-minded city served 
also to foster friendly relations between the Marines and Shanghai 
residents and members of the other foreign garrisons. In addi- 
tion to military and naval teams of many nations, there were 
numerous civilian athletic clubs. Nor was competition limited 
to Shanghai. Teams from Tientsin, Hong Kong, and Japan 
made frequent visits to take on the Marines and other local teams. 
The Marines' baseball team repaid the Japanese visits, making 
several trips to Japan to play college and professional teams. 

Basketball, boxing, wrestling, track, swimming, tennis, golf, 
and bowling, as well as baseball, were popular sports with the 
Marines. Because there was no competition, football was seldom 
played, but the British game of Rugby proved an excellent sub- 
stitute. The Marines took to it with such enthusiasm that they 
quickly equalled the British at their own game, winning for 
several years the Spunt Cup, symbol of the Shanghai Rugby 
championship. This ability to beat the other fellow at his own 
game won respect for the regiment from foreign residents and 
garrisons alike. 52 

The 4th Regiment band also served to foster friendly rela- 
tions. It played for parades, reviews, and other military cere- 
monies. It gave concerts for the entertainment of the Marines 
and the public. Its dance orchestra was much in demand for 

60 CG 3d MarBrig ltr to CMC, dtd 5 Aprs 7 (Subj File: China, HistBr, 

51 CG 3d MarBrig ltr to CMC, dtd 5May27 (Subj File: China, HistBr, 

53 For sports see the Walla Walla (4th Regt newspaper), Shanghai, 1928- 
1941 ; Leatherneck; Fourth Marines Annual, 1931-1932 (Shanghai: Mercury 
Press, n.d.) ; Annual Fourth Marines, 1935 (Shanghai: Mercury Press, n.d.). 


dances and social gatherings of the regiment, other foreign mili- 
tary organizations, and civilian groups. And its concert orches- 
tra contributed to Shanghai's cultural life. 

In one respect, the 4th Regiment band was unique. It was 
the only one in the Marine Corps to include a fife and drum 
corps. This was the result of a gift of a set of fifes and drums 
from the American Company and Troop of the Shanghai Volun- 
teer Corps. Named the Fessenden Fifes in honor of Sterling 
Fessenden, the American chairman of the Shanghai Municipal 
Council, the new musical corps was taught to play the instru- 
ments by drummers and fifers of the Green Howards, a famous 
British regiment then stationed in Shanghai. 53 

A sign of progress during the years of garrison service was the 
acquisition of a new regimental designation. By order of the 
Commandant, the regiment changed its name on 13 February 
1 930. From that date, the 4th Regiment was officially designated 
the 4th Marines, a change which applied to all regiments in the 
Marine Corps. 54 

The peaceful years of garrison service passed uneventfully, but 
by the summer of 1931 a new crisis was in the making. It was 
to have far-reaching consequences for the 4th Marines in the 
International Settlement of Shanghai and was to impose new 
obstacles to the protection of American lives and property far 
more serious than any yet encountered. The source of the new 
danger came not from anti-foreign agitation by the Chinese but 
from the imperialist ambitions of Japan. This new crisis began 
on 18 September 1931 when the invasion of Manchuria marked 
the beginning of Japanese efforts to conquer China. 

53 Capt Evans F. Carlson, "The Fessenden Fifes," Leatherneck, v. n, no. 2 
(Feb28), p. 11. 

54 Change 4 to Art 5-41, Marine Corps Manual (1926) was authority for 
this change, put into effect 13 February 1930; 4th Regt MRolls, i-28Feb30. 


Japan Goes to Town 


"In establishing relations with foreign countries," said Lord 
Hotta, the Japanese prime minister in 1858, "the object should 
always be kept in view of laying a foundation for securing the 
hegemony over all nations . ..." 1 To make this object a reality 
became the goal of Japanese policy, with only short lapses, until 
the end of World War II. 2 

The rapid westernization of Japan — political, economic, and 
military — which followed Commodore Matthew C. Perry's open- 
ing of the country to foreign intercourse in 1853 was ^ e ^ rst 
step towards world dominion. Exploitation of the newly ac- 
quired military power quickly followed. Defeat of China in 
1 894-1 895 added Formosa to the Mikado's dominions; ten years 
later his warriors challenged and defeated a major power, Russia ; 
and in 19 10 they annexed the kingdom of Korea. In 19 14, 

1 Quoted by Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1942), p. 360. 

2 Unless otherwise cited, this section is based on A. Whitney Griswold, 
The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and Company, 1938) ; Harold M. Vinacke, A History of the Far East in 
Modern Times (New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1947), pp. 76-115, 
166-182, 35i-373> 494-536; and Samuel Eliot Morison, The Rising Sun 
in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942 — History of United States Naval Operations 
in World War II, v. Ill (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1954), pp. 3- 
79, hereafter Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific. 

519667—60 12 1 49 


Japan entered World War I on the side of Great Britain and 
France, and, with no fighting worth mentioning, acquired the 
former German Pacific island possessions, her concession at Tsing- 
tao, and her special rights in the Shantung Peninsula. This was 
only the beginning. In the 21 Demands, made on Peking in 
19 1 5, the Japanese revealed their objective to be the complete 
subjugation of China. Protests by Great Britain and the United 
States forced the postponement, but not the abandonment, of 
this ambition. At the Versailles Peace Conference of 19 19 the 
Japanese had to be content with a mandate over all former Ger- 
man Pacific possessions north of the equator. 

There was a pause in the march of conquest during the 1920's. 
A liberal Japanese government accepted the five-five-three Naval 
ratio at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, returned 
control of the Shantung Peninsula to China, and signed the 
Nine-Power Treaty safeguarding the rights of China. More 
important than the surrender of territory and the renunciation 
of aggression as a policy, was the assumption by the elected 
government of power over the armed forces. Since 1889, under 
the doctrine of "imperial command," only the emperor could 
determine the size and composition of the Japanese armed forces, 
but if the civilian government could regulate the size of the navy 
by treaty, it could deprive the army and navy leaders of their 
dominance over national policy and effectively block their 
program of world domination. 

The rise to power of Chiang Kai-shek also worried the Jap- 
anese militarists, who realized that the Nationalist drive to the 
north was a threat to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria. Japan 
did not want a strong China; she wished to keep China weak 
and to exploit the weakness. The growing power of Chiang 
Kai-shek forced the Japanese militarists to take drastic action 
before it was too late. 

On 18 September 193 1, following a minor explosion on the 
South Manchuria Railway, the Japanese forces moved out from 


positions guarding the track to occupy the principal southern 
Manchurian cities against negligible Chinese resistance. This 
action effectively stopped the Nationalist Chinese from seizing 
control of what they called the northeastern provinces. It also 
led to a state of war between China and Japan which permitted 
the militarists to take control legally of the Japanese government. 

The opposition of the United States to the invasion of Man- 
churia was expressed by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson. 
He perceived three reasons why America should attempt to 
restrain Japan: 

First: The direct material damage to our trade which 
would inevitably be caused .... 

Second: The immense blow to the cause of peace and 
war prevention throughout the world which would in- 
evitably result if . . . Japan were permitted to violate . . . 
the group of post-war treaties which she had ratified .... 

Third: The incalculable harm which would be done 
immediately to American prestige in China and ultimately 
to the material interests of America and her people in that 
region, if after having for many years assisted by public and 
private effort in the education and development of China 
towards the ideals of modern Christian civilization, and 
having taken the lead in the movement which secured the 
covenant of all the great powers, including ourselves, "to 
respect her sovereignty, her independence and her terri- 
torial and administrative integrity," we should now cyni- 
cally abandon her to her fate when this same covenant was 
violated. 3 

Cooperation with the League of Nations in its appeal to both 
the Japanese and Chinese to refrain from further hostilities was 
Stimson's first effort to protect the vital interests of the United 
States. When the Japanese ignored this appeal, Stimson took 
the lead in urging the League to apply economic sanctions. 

8 Henry L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1936), pp. 88-90, quoted in Griswold, op. cit., pp. 422-423. 


When this proposal also met with failure, Stimson decided to 
act on his own. On 7 January 1932, he announced that the 
United States would not recognize Japan's Manchurian con- 
quest. Japan's answer was to proclaim "independence" of 
Manchukuo under the puppet emperor, Henry Pu Yi. 

2 MARCH 1932 

Defeated on the battlefield, the Chinese turned to economic 
warfare. A crippling anti- Japanese boycott went into effect, 
and nowhere was it more effective than in Shanghai, the com- 
mercial capital of China. Chinese firms refused to handle Jap- 
anese merchandise, Chinese shopkeepers no longer served 
Japanese, Chinese customers stopped buying Japanese goods, 
and Chinese banks would not honor Japanese bills of lading, 
even when the necessary funds were on deposit. On the docks, 
Japanese goods piled up because the coolies refused to move 
them, and Chinese passengers no longer took passage in Japanese 

Commercial relations between China and Japan were shat- 
tered. Japanese stores and businesses were closed. Many of 
the owners and employees departed for home, and those who 
remained did so at the risk of bodily harm. Vicious posters 
appeared in the streets. "Down with Japanese Imperialism," 
"Kill the Japanese," they said. And a Chinese field army, the 
Nineteenth Route, moved into Chapei. 

Violence flared up on 18 January 1932, when a Chinese mob 
attacked five Japanese Buddhist monks, killing one and seriously 
wounding three others. At a protest meeting two days later a 
Japanese crowd estimated at 12,000 listened to speakers denounce 
the Japanese consul for not obtaining satisfaction for the outrage 
and for failing to put a stop to the boycott. Inflamed by the 
oratory, the crowd marched through the Settlement to the Jap- 


anese Naval Landing Force headquarters in Hongkew, smashing 
windows and beating up Chinese on the way. 4 

The Japanese naval commander, Rear Admiral Shiozawa, was 
quick to act. On the 2 2d he presented Mayor Wu of Shanghai 
with the following demands : 1 ) an official apology for the assault 
on the five monks; 2) arrest and punishment of their assailants; 
3 ) payment of compensation and medical expenses ; and 4 ) sup- 
pression of all anti- Jap anese activities and organizations. Arrival 
the next day of reinforcements consisting of an aircraft carrier, 
a cruiser, four destroyers, and 500 men of the Special Naval 
Landing Force indicated that Shiozawa meant business. 5 

This was the situation facing the 4th Marines at the end of 
January. The Japanese had seized Manchuria and were threat- 
ening military action at Shanghai. Our government's policy 
was to oppose Japanese aggression against China, but our gar- 
rison at Shanghai (the 4th Marines) was a partner of the Japa- 
nese and other powers in a plan to defend the International 
Settlement against the Chinese. 

This International Defense Scheme, intended to protect the 
Settlement against Chinese attack, had been drawn up the pre- 
ceding May by the commanders of the British, American, and 
Japanese garrisons at Shanghai. It provided for the division of 
the Settlement into four sectors — each one made the responsibility 
of one of the garrison forces. Sector "A" was assigned to the 
Japanese, "B" to the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, "C" to the 
Americans, and "D" to the British. As in 1927, two extra- 
Settlement areas were included within the defenses. These were 
the "tongue, 55 a narrow strip extending north along North Sze- 
chuan Road in Sector "A 55 , and the territory stretching west to 

* Consul Gen Shanghai msg to SecState, dtd 2ijan32, Foreign Relations, 
1932, v. Ill, p. 41. 

6 Ambassador in Japan msg to SecState, dtd 22jan32, Foreign Relations, 
1932, v. IV, p. 46; Consul Gen Shanghai msg to SecState, dtd 25jan32, 
Foreign Relations, 1932, v. Ill, p. 58. 


the Shanghai-Ningpo-Hangchow Railway. This Western Area 
comprised all of Sector "D". (See Map 10. ) 

Direction of Settlement defense was placed in the hands of the 
Defense Committee, made up of the garrison commanders, the 
police commissioner, and the Shanghai Volunteer Corps com- 
mander. Brigadier Fleming, the British commander, was elected 
chairman, but his only function was to preside at meetings. 
Under this committee system, there was no supreme commander 
over all Settlement defenses. Each commander was supreme in 
his own sector — so complete was his authority that, under terms 
of the Defense Scheme, armed units of other defense forces could 
not enter his sector without his permission. All agreed to come 
to the aid of any of the others upon request. Any problem 
involving the defense of the Settlement as a whole had to be 
settled by mutual agreement among the Defense Committee 
members. 6 

There was no provision for dealing with a situation where one 
of the partners to the agreement attacked the Chinese, but that 
question was uppermost in the minds of the Settiement authori- 
ties and defense force commanders during negotiations over the 
Defense Scheme. At a meeting on 27 November 1931, called 
specifically to discuss what action should be taken if the Sino- 
Japanese fighting should spill over from Manchuria, Baron Shi- 
beyama, then commander of the Japanese Special Naval Landing 
Force at Shanghai, stated that he would abide by the provi- 
sions of the Defense Scheme, subject to the approval of his 
government. 7 

This proved to be the last discussion the Defense Committee 
was to have with the Japanese on the subject. Tokyo's answer 

6 No copy of the "International Defense Scheme" is available, but its 
main provisions are set forth in Consul Gen Shanghai msg to SecState, dtd 
3Feb32, Foreign Relations, 1932, v. Ill, pp. 187-188; and Dept of State 
memo to Navy Dept, dtd 3Sep32, Foreign Relations, 1932, v. IV, p. 224. 

7 Consul Gen Shanghai msg to SecState, dtd 3Feb32, Foreign Relations, 
i932>v. Ill, pp. 187-188. 



was delivered on the night of 28 January when troops of the Spe- 
cial Naval Landing Force attacked Chinese forces in Chapei. 
The attack was unexpected, for at 1600 Mayor Wu's reply to the 
Japanese demands had been accepted by Consul General Murai. 
Apparentiy, the threat of military action had been averted, but 
the Japanese Navy commander felt no compunction to abide by 
the decisions of the Foreign Office. Even as Murai was assuring 
his opposite numbers that the crisis was over, Shiozawa was pre- 
paring to seize Chapei. From the outset, his actions compro- 
mised the neutrality of the International Settlement. Taking 
advantage of a declaration of a state of emergency by the Munic- 
ipal Council at 1600, Shiozawa moved his assault units into 
jump-off positions in the "tongue" — action he disguised as a 
normal defensive deployment under the terms of the Interna- 
tional Defense Scheme. 8 

The Japanese admiral made one serious miscalculation. He 
underestimated his enemy. Chapei proved to be no Manchuria 
for the bluejackets of the Japanese Special Naval Landing Force, 
who ran into a hail of rifle and machine-gun fire and were re- 
pulsed with heavy losses. The tough young soldiers of the Nine- 
teenth Route Army made up in morale what they lacked in 
equipment. Burrowed into the maze of shacks and alleys making 
up the Chinese quarter, they refused to budge. 

Thanks to the declaration of emergency, the 4th Marines were 
already occupying their defensive positions when the Japanese 
attack started. Sector "C" — assigned to the regiment under the 
International Defense Scheme — comprised the western third of 
the Settlement and was an enlargement of the area occupied by 
the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines in 1927. It included about 76 
city blocks. Three and one-half miles of Soochow Creek sep- 

8 Consul Gen Shanghai msg to SecState, dtd 2gjan32, Foreign Relations, 
1932, v. Ill, pp. 89-90; Hallett Abend, My Life in China (New York: Har- 
court, Brace and Company, 1943), pp. 186-187; 4 tn Mar R-2 rept, 2 8 Jan 
32 (MarCorps Units in China, 1927-1938 File, HistBr, HQMC, hereafter 
China File) . 


arated Sector "C" from Chinese territory, and the Marines' front 
lines were on the south bank of the creek. Major William C. 
Powers' 3d Battalion occupied the right half of the sector and 
Major George H. Osterhout's 1st Battalion the left. 9 (See Map 

The 4th Marines were now in a delicate position. They were 
right next door to a shooting war with orders to protect American 
lives and property within a specified area. Obviously, this as- 
signment would become impossible if the shooting were to spread 
into the Marine defense sector. It was essential, therefore, to 
maintain neutrality there. The nonpartisanship of the Settle- 
ment as a whole had already been hopelessly compromised by the 
Japanese who had landed their troops within the Settlement 
boundaries; had moved them to the line of departure through 
the Settlement; and had jumped off in the attack from North 
Szechuan Road, which, though not within the boundaries, was 
under Settlement control. The Japanese Sector "A", therefore, 
had to be excluded, for practical purposes, from the Settlement 
defenses. Of vital concern to the 4th Marines, and to their 
British and Shanghai Volunteer Corps allies, was to preserve 
the neutrality of the remainder. 

There was little reason to fear a violation of the International 
Settlement by the Chinese. They had already appealed to the 
League of Nations and to the United States for help in stopping 
Japanese aggression and could not afford to offend the Western 
Powers at Shanghai. The Japanese, on the other hand, had 
already displayed their contempt for international opinion by in- 
vading Manchuria and ignoring the pleas of the League. For 
the Japanese there were, in addition, sound tactical reasons for 
violating the neutrality of the International Settlement. From a 
line of departure along North Szechuan Road, the Japanese at- 
tack moved parallel to the Settlement defenses along Soochow 

°GO 4th Mar ltr to CMC, dtd 26Mar32 (2385-30/9-4, Central Files, 



Greek. As the Chinese right flank rested on these defenses, the 
Japanese were tempted to take advantage of their membership 
in the Settlement defense scheme by passing troops through the 
American and British zones, thereby outflanking the Chinese in 

During the first week of the conflict the Japanese seemed to 
be attempting such an end-run through the American and British 
sectors. A force of about 500 Special Naval Landing Force 
troops occupied the Japanese-owned cotton mills in Sector "C" 
along Soochow Creek. Here they emplaced a number of machine 
guns aimed at the Chinese positions on the opposite bank. Jap- 
anese motor and foot patrols were active throughout the area, 
terrorizing the Chinese population and committing a number of 
atrocities. At least three Chinese were reported shot by the 
Japanese and two others were bayoneted. 

Because of orders to avoid a fight with regular Japanese troops, 
the Marines could do nothing but protest. They could, however, 
do something about armed Japanese civilians — the so-called 
ronin, or rowdies, who invaded Sector "C" on 30 January. That 
night two such groups were arrested. The first incident occurred 
at the corner of Singapore and Haiphong Roads. The Marine 
sentry posted there heard two shots and saw two groups of 
Japanese civilians running down the street. Halting the larger 
party, he took them to regimental headquarters, where they were 
found to be armed with a rifle, a Luger pistol, a tomahawk, and 
a heavy iron bar. The prisoners stated they had been ordered 
by Japanese naval authorities to occupy one of the Japanese mills 
in the American sector. A second group of six armed Japanese 
civilians was arrested the same night by a Marine patrol on 
Gordon Road. 10 

10 Consul Gen Shanghai msg to SecState, dtd 3Feb32, Foreign Relations, 
1932, v. Ill, pp. 187-188; CO 4th Mar msg to CinCAF, 3oJan32 (1975- 
7°/5-3j Central Files, HQMC); Minister in China msg to SecState, dtd 
22Feb32, Foreign Relations, 1932, v. Ill, p. 414. 


At a meeting of the Defense Committee the next morning, 
Colonel Richard S. Hooker, the 4th Marines commander, told 
Baron Sambijima, commander of the Japanese Special Naval 
Landing Force, that Marines would shoot armed civilians in 
Sector "C" on sight. The Japanese then promised to withdraw 
the ronirij but declined to remove the regular troops without 
orders from higher authority. The following day, Hooker and 
Fleming met with Sambijima again in an effort to bring about 
the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the American and Brit- 
ish sectors. Hooker accused the Japanese officer of preparing 
to attack the Chinese from the American sector under the guise 
of protecting Japanese property there. Sambijima promised to 
withdraw all except small security detachments in the Japanese 
cotton mills. 

This agreement was kept, but a Marine patrol on the morn- 
ing of 3 February discovered the security guard in one of the 
Japanese mills using panels to signal aircraft attacking Chinese 
positions across Soochow Creek. When he learned of this, Colo- 
nel Hooker again protested to the Japanese commander and in- 
sisted on the withdrawal of all Japanese troops from the American 
sector. U.S. Marines were to take over the guarding of all 
Japanese property in the American sector. The Japanese agreed 
and by 4 February had completed the withdrawal. 11 

"This greatly eases the situation," reported Admiral Mont- 
gomery M. Taylor, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet. "This 
gives control of mills and prevents their use to display panels 
for aircraft, and eliminates danger which Chinese feared of 
flank attack. 5 ' 12 

n CO 4th Mar msg to CinCAF, dtd 2Feb32 (1975-70/5-3, Central Files, 
HQMC) ; Consul Gen Shanghai msg to SecState, dtd 3Feb32, Foreign Rela- 
tions, 1932, v. Ill, p. 191; Minister in China msg to SecState, dtd 22Feb32, 
Foreign Relations, 1932, v. Ill, p. 414; CO 4th Mar ltr to CMC, dtd i2Feb 
32 (Subj File: China, HistBr, HQMC). 

"CinCAF msg to OpNav, dtd 4Feb32 (1975-70/5-3, Central Files, 


The departure of Japanese troops from the regimental zone 
eased the tension considerably, but the reinforcements which 
arrived from the Philippines aboard the Chaumont and the 
cruiser Houston on 4 and 5 February were still gladly received. 
A total of 572 Marines, including the newly arrived normal 
replacements for the Asiatic Station and the Marine detachment 
of the Houston, reported for duty. These new arrivals brought 
the strength of the regiment up to 1,625 officers and men. An 
additional reinforcement arriving aboard the Chaumont was 
the 31st Infantry, U.S. Army. This unit, totaling about 1,100, 
took over Sector "B" from the Shanghai Volunteer Corps. The 
International Defense Forces then numbered approximately 
7,800 as follows: 13 

The reinforced 4th Marines now turned to and strengthened 
the defenses along Soochow Creek. By 7 February, the entire 
three and one-half miles of front lines had been completely barb- 
wired; 51 sandbagged strong points had been constructed; and 
16 machine guns had been emplaced. Manning these defenses 
was a forward echelon of about 550 officers and men, supported 
by a rear echelon of about 500. Rotation from front to rear 
took place about every two days. The remainder of the regiment, 
about 550, remained in billets to provide for internal security 
within the regimental sector. 14 

13 4th Mar figures from CO 4th Mar ltr to CMC, dtd 26Mar32 (2385- 
30/9-4, Central Files, HQMC ) ; all others from H. G. W. Woodhead, ed., 
The China Year Book, 1932 (Shanghai: The North China Daily News and 
Herald, n.d.), p. 592. 

u CO 4th Mar ltr to CMC, dtd 26Mar32 (2385-30/9-4, Central Files, 
HQMC); 4th Mar R-i rept, i5-29Feb32 ( 1975-70/5-3, Central Files, 

British Brigade 
4th Marines 
31st Infantry 

3, 600 

1, 100 



After the departure of Japanese troops from the regimental 
area on 4 February, neither they nor the Chinese attempted to 
encroach on neutral territory. Nor did the riots within the 
Settlement, so confidently predicted by old China hands, material- 
ize. As a result, security duty became pretty much a matter of 
routine for the 4th Marines. But from their front lines they had 
grandstand seats for the war. For the first two weeks of February, 
Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces, supported by naval 
aircraft and naval gunfire, battered against the lines of the 
Chinese Nineteenth Route Army in Chapei with little success. 
Repeated Japanese infantry assaults were thrown back by the 
detemiined Chinese defenders. Air attack was no more success- 
ful. Following the failure of the initial ground assault, Admiral 
Shiozawa ordered his naval aircraft to bomb Chapei. This raid 
and those that followed resulted in great destruction of buildings 
and loss of civilian life, but they had a negligible effect on the 
ground battle. The Chinese troops burrowed into the rubble 
and fought back as tenaciously as before. 

There were times when the Marines felt a little too close to 
this battle for comfort. Their positions followed Soochow Creek 
where it looped to the north behind the Chinese lines and were 
thus directly beyond the targets of Japanese artillery located in 
Hongkew Park. "Overs" from these guns fell regularly within 
the Marine sector whenever the fighting flared up. Japanese 
bombardiers and pilots were no more accurate than the artillery- 
men, with the result that bombs intended for Chinese frequently 
landed on the Marine side of the creek. Chinese antiaircraft 
guns firing on the attacking planes used an obsolete type of 
ammunition which burst only on contact. As the Chinese gun- 
ners seldom scored a hit on a plane, most of these shells did net 
explode until they hit the ground. A good many of the pro- 
jectiles fell in the regimental sector. It was remarkable that no 
Marine was hit by any of these misdirected bombs or shells, 


although there were a good many near-misses, and men on front- 
line duty learned to take cover. 15 

By the middle of February the Japanese Navy's offensive had 
stalled completely. The Army then took over, launching an 
attack on 20 February north of Shanghai at the Chinese left 
flank. At first, the Japanese made some limited advances, but 
the Chinese stiffened, and by the 23d the advance had been 
stopped. The Japanese now attempted a much wider flanking 
movement, landing a division at Liuho farther upstream on 
the Yangtze. With these reinforcements ashore they renewed 
the attack on 1 March. This time they succeeded, for the 
Chinese were hopelessly outflanked. On 2 March they evacu- 
ated Chapei, retreating to prepared positions 12 miles to the 

On 3 March, the Japanese commander announced that he 
had ordered his forces to cease fighting and to hold their posi- 
tions. The Chinese commander announced a similar action 
later in the day. For the next three months a special League 
of Nations Committee worked to arrange a peace settlement, 
and on 5 May achieved success. By the terms of the agreement 
of that date, the Japanese withdrew to positions occupied before 
28 January. The Chinese forces remained where they were 
and agreed to come no closer to the city, creating, in effect, a 
neutral zone. 16 

On 13 June the Municipal Council ended the state of emer- 
gency. The 4th Marines and other defense forces abandoned 
their defense positions and stopped their internal security patrol- 
ling. From the Commandant, Major General Ben H. Fuller, 
came a "well-done." "The nature of the operations was such 
as to call for the highest discipline and forbearance on the part 

15 Fourth Marines Annual, 1 931-1932 (Shanghai: The Mercury Press, 
n.d.), pp. 29-46. 

16 "Reports of the League of Nations Shanghai Committee," and "Shang- 
hai Peace Agreement," quoted in The China Year Book, op. cit., pp. 670-674. 


of the rank and file and sound judgment on the part of the 
commander," he wrote in his Annual Report for 1932. "The 
highest traditions of the Marine Corps were upheld during the 
operations at Shanghai." 17 


With the end of the state of emergency on 13 June, the 4th 
Marines resumed the normal garrison routine. A progressive 
training program in basic military subjects was put into effect. 
Each week the regiment held a parade at the race course, and 
once a month there was a drill in the Sector "C" defense plan. 
Extra-curricular activities were taken up again and came to 
play an important part in the lives of the Marines and of the 
civilian community. These included an active sports program, 
band concerts and broadcasts, and the regimental church 

An extra duty was added on 25 November 1933 when the 
regiment was given the responsibility for guarding vessels of the 
Yangtze Rapid Steamship Company on their voyages up the 
river. Because of the vastness of the Chinese hinterland and 
the inability of the Nationalist government to give effective police 
protection everywhere, ships plying the river were at times at- 
tacked by pirates. The greatest danger of attack was in the 
"middle river" — the stretch from Hankow to the gorges — where 
the stream was shallow and constantly shifted its channel. In 
this stretch, vessels often ran aground and were attacked while 
helplessly immobilized on a mud bank. But the pirates were 
not distinguished for bravery, and the presence of four to six 
Marines under an officer was sufficient to deter attack. The 
Marines assigned to armed guard duty aboard river vessels were 
never called upon to repel boarders, but they had an unexcelled 

17 CMC, Report . . in Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the 
Fiscal Year IQ32 (Washington: Navy Dept, 1933). 


opportunity to see the interior of China away from the treaty 
ports. After i July 1935 armed guards were withdrawn from 
the river steamers. 18 

In spite of the return of normal conditions, no one in the regi- 
ment believed that peace would be permanent. The Japanese 
had suffered a reverse, but there was no reason to believe they 
had abandoned their plans for conquest. To guard against a 
new emergency, Colonel Hooker was "strongly of the opinion 
that the sector assigned to the 4th Marines be maintained in the 
future. American prestige in Shanghai has been greatly raised 
by having our troops defending lives and property in the front 
lines." 19 

A strength of about 1,600, the peak size attained during the 
1932 crisis, was, in Hooker's opinion, adequate for the security 
of the regimental sector. Authorized strength, however, was only 
1,145, an d the speedy build-up to the higher figure in 1932 had 
only been possible because the Chaumont had just arrived in 
Manila with replacements, and Marine Barracks, Cavite, had 
been somewhat overstrength. Hooker preferred not to rely on 
such a fortuitous combination of circumstances for reinforcements 
in a future emergency, so he requested that his regiment be built 
up to 1 ,600 by the addition of a third battalion. 20 

General Fuller approved the increase on 1 3 June, but not until 
1 8 September were sufficient personnel available. On that date, 
the 2d Battalion was organized — made up of the 10th, 29th, and 
31st Rifle Companies, and the 32d Machine Gun Company. Its 
commander was Major Lyle H. Miller. Strength of the regiment 
then stood at about 1,800, but personnel shortages within the 

18 4th Mar AnnRepts 1934 & 1935 (2 295- 10- 10/9-4, Central Files, 
HQMC); Annual Fourth Marines, 7935 (Shanghai: The Mercury Press, 

19 GO 4th Mar ltr to CMC, dtd 26Mar32 (2385-30/9-4, Central Files, 

20 Ibid. 

519667—60 13 


Marine Corps did not permit the maintenance of the regiment at 
this level for long. On 19 December 1934, the 3d Battalion and 
Companies C and G were disbanded — a reduction to 1,073 officers 
and men. 21 


The reduction in strength of the 4th Marines was not related 
to any easing of tensions in China. At the beginning of 1933 the 
Japanese seized Jehol, the Chinese province bordering Man- 
churia, and secured withdrawal of all Chinese forces from the 
area north of the Great Wall. Still not satisfied, the Japanese 
obtained, in July 1933, control of the police in this region. Two 
years later, they tightenend their grip over this area under the 
Ho-Umetsu Agreement. Under its terms the Chinese gave way 
to the following Japanese demands : 1 ) the removal of objection- 
able officials; 2) the virtual elimination of the authority of the 
Central Government from the area of Japanese interest; and 3) 
the suppression of anti- Japanese activities in the area. 

Not satisfied with control of China north of Peiping and Tient- 
sin, the Japanese attempted to extend their influence over all 
North China. In 1935 they announced that, by popular demand, 
the five northern provinces (Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi, and 
Shantung) would establish a government autonomous of Nan- 
king. But the hoped for popular support did not materialize. 
All that resulted was an autonomous regime in east Hopei — the 
area around Tientsin. 

By these encroachments on Chinese sovereignty, the Japanese 
had revealed their design for making North China a puppet state 

21 Numerical designations for companies had been replaced by letters on i 
January 1933. The 25th Company became Company A; the 26th Company 
B; the 27th Company C; the 28th Company D; the 10th Company E; the 
29th Company F; the 31st Company G; the 32d Company H; the 19th 
Company I; the 21st Company K; the 22d Company L; and the 24th Com- 
pany M. 4th Mar MRolls, iSep32-3iDec34. 


similar to Manchukuo. But Chinese determination to resist this 
nibbling process upset the Japanese plans, and after 1935 China 
refused to accede to further demands. Any further subjugation 
of China would have to be by force of arms. 

On 7 July 1937 Chinese and Japanese troops clashed at the 
Marco Polo Bridge outside Peiping. Thus began a war of con- 
quest that ended only with the defeat of Japan by the United 
Nations in August 1945. 22 


Fighting broke out at Shanghai on 13 August. Ever since 
the Marco Polo Bridge incident, tension between Chinese and 
Japanese residents had been mounting. A sign of anticipated 
trouble was the exodus of Chinese from Chapei and neighboring 
districts by the thousands into the sanctuary of the International 
Settlement and the French Concession. By late July both sides 
were building up their military forces: the Japanese by rein- 
forcing the Special Naval Landing Force in the city; the Chinese 
by moving up units of their German-trained Central Army to 
positions between Shanghai and Woosung. From these move- 
ments it was evident that the Chinese intended to make their 
main defensive effort in the Yangtze Valley. 

On 9 August two members of the Japanese Naval Landing 
Party were shot and killed by the Chinese Peace Preservation 
Corps (a local militia) near Hungjao Airfield on the western 
outskirts of town. Shanghai Mayor O. K. Yui met with the 
Japanese naval and diplomatic authorities and agreed to settle 
the dispute through diplomatic channels. The local residents 
were not reassured. The exodus from Chapei was renewed, 
and thousands of Chinese again streamed south across Soochow 

22 Vinacke, op. cit., pp. 539-571- 

23 Unless otherwise cited this section is based on CO 4th Mar AnnRept 
1938 (2295/9-4, Central Files, HQMC). 


Creek. On the nth, nine more Japanese warships arrived, 
bringing the Japanese naval strength in the Whangpoo to 27 
vessels. Naval landing parties disembarked to reinforce the 
troops already ashore. The next day troops of the Chinese 88th 
Division moved into Chapei and occupied sandbagged barricades 
and emplacements erected during the night. 

By evening of 12 August, two hostile forces glared at each 
other over sandbags and through barb wire. The Japanese had 
evacuated all their nationals from the area, and the Chinese were 
fleeing to sanctuary across the creek as fast as they could. Al- 
though the Japanese authorities had agreed to settle the incident 
of 9 x\ugust through diplomatic channels, they became more 
belligerent with arrival of each reinforcement, leading to the 
belief that offensive action on their part had already been decided 
upon. 24 

Members of the 4th Marines had been closely following the 
worsening crisis across the creek. It came as no surprise, there- 
fore, when liberty was restricted to 50 per cent on the afternoon 
of the 1 2th and suspended altogether at 2200. Colonel Charles 
F. B. Price, the regimental commander, spent much of the day 
in conference with the American consul general, Clarence Gauss, 
and with Brigadier A. P. D. Telfer-Smollett, commander of the 
British Shanghai Area Force. When the Municipal Council 
mobilized the Shanghai Volunteer Corps and requested assistance 
of the British and American garrisons, Gauss suggested that 
outposts supporting the Municipal Police along Soochow Creek 
might be all that was necessary. Because fighting had not yet 
broken out, his plan was put into effect. 25 

At 0130, 13 August, the 4th Marines occupied positions in 

2 * George Bruce, Shanghai's Undeclared War (Shanghai: Mercury Press, 
I 937)> PP- 7 -12 ? 4 tn Mar Weekly Intel Summaries, dtd 28Jul, 4Aug, 
nAug37 (China File). 

25 Consul Gen Shanghai msg to SecState, dtd 12 Aug 37, Foreign Relations, 
1937, v. Ill, p. 389; 4th Mar R-2 rept, i3Aug37 (China File). 


Sector "C" in support of the Municipal Police, who had already 
closed gates across roads leading into the Settlement from the 
north and were controlling all movement into the Settlement. 
The Marines were to leave to the police the control of refugees 
and other civilians, but they were ordered to prevent the entry 
of armed members of the Chinese forces. Japanese troops under 
arms were to be afforded gentler treatment. If encountered, 
their presence was to be reported to regimental headquarters at 
once. Under no circumstances were Marines to fight the 
Japanese. 26 (See Map 12.) 

About 0900 shots were exchanged by Chinese and Japanese 
outposts along the Shanghai-Woosung Railway. The second 
battle for Shanghai had begun. As the Japanese worked their 
way cautiously into Chapei's maze of alleys, the Marines rushed 
defensive preparations. In anticipation of orders to execute Plan 
"A" — defense of Sector "C" from outside attack — they busied 
themselves filling sandbags and assembling barbwire for the con- 
struction of defensive emplacements along Soochow Creek. 

Of great concern to Colonel Price and Consul General Gauss 
was whether the belligerents would respect the neutrality of the 
International Settlement. In 1932 an attempted end run by the 
Japanese through the American and British sectors had only been 
stopped by refusal of the American and British commanders to 
permit the violation of the neutrality of their zones. At Gauss' 
suggestion, the State Department directed Ambassador Nelson 
Johnson to request of the Chinese government that its field com- 
manders be instructed to respect those areas of the Settlement 
patrolled by neutral forces. Johnson took up the matter with 
Chiang Kai-shek and was assured that our wishes would be re- 
spected, provided that Japanese did not use the neutral area as a 
base for attacks on Chinese forces outside. "Neutral forces . . . 
should exclude fighting forces of both sides," concluded Johnson, 

4th Mar OpO No. 5, dtd i3Aug37 (China File). 



"and I have no doubt that neutrality of [the] area will be 
respected." 27 

While the State Department was sounding out the Chinese, 
officers of the 4th Marines were making similar approaches to the 
Japanese naval authorities in Shanghai. Captain Ronald A. 
Boone, the regimental intelligence officer, was informed by Com- 
mander Takeda of the Japanese Special Naval Landing Force 
that his government had no intention of passing troops through 
the American sector to attack the Chinese. He said that the 
Japanese forces then guarding Japanese cotton mills in Sector 
"C" would be withdrawn or reduced, but not increased, and 
asked for American protection of Japanese lives and property. 
On the 14th the Japanese withdrew all their troops from the 
American sector and were assured by Colonel Price that the Ma- 
rines would extend to the Japanese the same protection accorded 
all Sector "C" residents. 28 

Thus by the end of the second day of fighting both belligerents 
had given assurances that they would respect the neutrality of the 
Marine sector. Whether they would live up to their guarantees 
only time would tell. 

The second day of the war saw a step-up in the action as both 
sides exchanged air raids. The Chinese led off about 1000 with 
a dive-bombing attack on the ancient cruiser Idzumo and the 
Japanese consulate. Neither target was hit, but one bomb struck 
the American-owned Shanghai Power Company, wounding one 
American employee. The Marine guard of the gunboat Sacra- 
mento was rushed ashore to protect the electric installation. 
Japanese float planes struck back early in the afternoon at Hung- 
jao Airfield, their bombs hitting the field but doing little damage. 
Consul General Gauss ordered all Americans to evacuate the 

"Consul Gen Shanghai msg to SecState, dtd i3Aug37; Ambassador in 
China msg to SecState, dtd i3Aug37 (both Foreign Relations, 1937, v. Ill, 
pp. 392,405). 

^thMarR-Q repts, 13, i4Aug37 (China File). 


areas north of the creek, and the 4th Marines sent three trucks 
and an ambulance to help out. Colonel Price, Brigadier Telfer- 
Smollett, and Colonel F. R. W. Gordon, British officer command- 
ing the SVC, met to consider defense measures and decided to 
hold all of the International Defense areas under their control, 
including that part of Area "B" north of the creek. (See Map 


In mid-afternoon the cruiser Augusta, flagship of the Asiatic 
Fleet, steamed up the Whangpoo after a fast trip from Tsingtao. 
Aboard was the Asiatic Fleet commander, Admiral Harry E. 
Yarnell. He immediately went into conference with Colonel 
Price, and at 1600 ordered the 4th Marines' commander to 
execute Plan "A". All previously selected positions along Soo- 
chow Creek were occupied, and hasty sandbag emplacements and 
protective wire entanglements were thrown up. 

Admiral Yarnell issued the following order to the regimental 
commander : 

Armed Chinese and Japanese troops will not be per- 
mitted to enter the American Sector of the International 
Settlement .... Every effort must be made to prevent 
the entry of armed combatants by means other than rifle 
fire, such as tear gas. As a last resort, to prevent the actual 
entry, fire may be opened'. 29 

Unarmed Chinese soldiers would be permitted to enter and 
would be segregated under guard. 

While the Marines were moving out from their billets to man 
the Soochow Creek defenses, tragedy struck the International 
Settlement and French Concession. Four Chinese bombers, 
aiming for the Idzumo, dropped two bombs in Nanking Road 
near the Bund. Two other bombs fell in the intersection of 
Avenue Edward VII and Boulevard de Montigny in the French 
Concession, jammed with innocent people watching the air 
attack. The carnage was terrible. 

29 Quoted in 4th Mar AnnRept, 1938. 


Under Plan "A" the 4th Marines sector was divided into 
two battalion subsectors along Medhurst Road. Lieutenant 
Colonel William H. Rupertus 5 1st Battalion was on the left; 
Lieutenant Colonel Roswell Winans' 30 2d Battalion was on the 
right. The entire 7,200-yard main line of resistance (MLR) 
on the south bank of the creek was protected by a continuous 
band of wire. There were 58 sandbagged strong points, all 
providing frontal and overhead cover. Twenty-nine heavy ma- 
chine guns were emplaced to give interlocking bands of fire in 
front of the MLR, and both battalion and regimental reserve 
lines were designated for occupation if necessary. 

Shortages of personnel seriously handicapped the execution of 
the defensive plan. On 12 August the 4th Marines totalled 
59 officers and 1,013 enlisted men, organized into regimental 
Headquarters, Service, and Motor Transport Companies, and 
two battalions of two rifle and one machine gun companies each. 
Company E lacked one platoon, and Company B lost its 3d 
Platoon by redesignation as regimental military police platoon. 
Both losses were made up by attaching the regimental bandsmen 
to the rifle companies. Battalion reserves consisted of the 
howitzer platoons of the machine gun companies. Emplace- 
ments for the 37mm howitzers were reconnoitered and staked out 
but were not occupied. In the absence of a third battalion, the 
regimental reserve consisted of the MP platoon and a provisional 
platoon drawn from Headquarters, Service, and Motor Transport 

The personnel shortage was alleviated somewhat by the land- 
ing of the Augusta's party of 50 Marines and 57 bluejackets to 
reinforce the regimental reserve. On the 19th a rifle company 
of 2 officers and 102 enlisted men arrived from Cavite and was 
added to the 1st Battalion as Company C. And on 26 August, 

30 Winans, it will be recalled, had won the Medal of Honor while serving 
as 1st Sergeant of the 28th Company, 4th Regiment, in the attack on Guay- 
acanas, Santo Domingo, 3 July 19 16. He had been commissioned in 19 17 
and had served with distinction in France during WW I. (See Chapter II). 


another rifle company of the same strength from Cavite joined 
the 2d Battalion as Company G. In addition to his own regi- 
ment, Colonel Price had available a battalion of the SVC as a 
police reserve for handling internal disturbances within Sector 
"C", and an additional bluejacket force of 13 officers and 200 
men ready to land from the Augusta. 

An additional duty for the 4th Marines was to help in the 
evacuation of American nationals. At a conference on the 1 5th, 
Colonel Price, Admiral Yarnell, and Consul General Gauss de- 
cided that American women and children should be urged to 
leave, but that no general evacuation order would be issued. The 
first group left for Manila aboard the liner President Jefferson 
on the 1 7th, and the evacuation continued throughout the month 
as other vessels arrived. Because of the fighting, these ships did 
not enter the Whangpoo but anchored off Woosung, their passen- 
gers being ferried down to them on lighters. Marine guards were 
placed on board each of the small craft. There were no incidents 
on any of these trips, but furnishing the guards imposed an extra 
burden on the regiment. 

North of Soochow Creek the Chinese and Japanese were 
locked in combat. Badly outnumbered, the Japanese Special 
Naval Landing Force was pushed back into a pocket in the east- 
ern part of the Settlement, their backs to the Whangpoo. Only 
naval gunfire saved them from being pushed into the river. On 
24 August the tide of battle turned in favor of the Japanese, when 
army troops swarmed ashore on the south bank of the Yangtze 
in an amphibious operation. Their beachhead stretched from 
Woosung to Liuho, a distance of about 1 5 miles. In fierce fight- 
ing, the Japanese pushed inland, and by 29 August had pene- 
trated about seven miles. The front lines then stretched from 
the North Station in Chapei northwest to the Yangtze bank just 
beyond Liuho. Here the Chinese stiffened and held. In spite of 
heavy attacks, the Japanese could advance no farther. The 
fighting had stalemated. 


With the extension of the front to the northwest, fighting in 
Shanghai slacked off. There were occasional infantry fights, but 
most of the activity consisted of air and artillery bombardments. 
And, as in 1932, stray shells and bombs occasionally fell in the 
4th Marines' sector. There was one casualty. Pharmacist's Mate 
Floyd Arnold was wounded by an antiaircraft machine-gun bul- 
let while on duty at the regimental hospital on 1 7 August. 

Welcome reinforcements for the hard-pressed 4th Marines 
arrived on 19 September, when the Chaumont made port with 
the Headquarters 2d Marine Brigade, Brigade Troops, and the 
6th Marines aboard. These reinforcements had been requested 
by Yarnell and Gauss about a month before. 31 Brigadier Gen- 
eral John C. Beaumont, Commanding General, 2d Marine 
Brigade, after conferring with Colonel Price and inspecting the 
defenses of Sector "C", decided to relieve the 4th Marines on 
the MLR with the 6th Marines. On 23 September the 4th 
Marines, after 40 days of continuous duty on the front lines, 
passed into Brigade reserve. 

After ten days rest the 4th Marines returned to the front lines 
on 4 October. Sector "C" was now reorganized on a brigade 
basis into two regimental subsectors divided along Medhurst 
Road. The 4th Marines took over the right subsector, while 
the 6th Marines retained control of the left. With only half 
the territory to cover, Colonel Price was now able to deploy one 
battalion on the MLR and hold the other in reserve. An addi- 
tional duty for the 4th Marines — performed by Company E — was 
to take over the guard of the Shanghai Power Company from 
the Sacramento detachment. 32 

Duty conditions during October were much as they had been 
in August and September. On the 15th the regiment suffered 

31 4th Mar R-2 rept, i5Aug37 {China File); Adviser on Political Rela- 
tions memo to SecState, dtd i6Aug37, Foreign Relations, 1937, v. Ill, p. 420. 

32 4th Mar OpO No. 20, dtd 20ct37 (China File). 


its second casualty — Private Milton O. Hiatt of Company D, 
slightly wounded by a .25 caliber bullet. 33 

On the fighting front a Japanese offensive, launched on 23 Oc- 
tober, finally succeeded in breaching the Chinese line, necessitating 
a general withdrawal of a few miles, including the evacuation 
of Chapei. For the first time since 13 August the 4th Marines 
were no longer looking straight into the front lines on the other 
side of Soochow Creek. Following up their success, the Jap- 
anese, on 5 November, landed two divisions in Flangchow Bay 
to the south. Pushing rapidly inland, the Japanese landing 
force imperiled the entire Chinese position in the lower Yangtze 
Valley. And the capture of the communications center of 
Sunkiang on the 9th forced a general withdrawal towards 
Nanking. 34 ( See Map 13.) 

With the cessation of hostilities in Shanghai, the front line 
strength of the 4th Marines was reduced, on 9 November, to 
one rifle company and one machine gun platoon. The mission 
was to maintain outposts at the southern end of Wuchen, Stone, 
and Markham Road Bridges, and to maintain observation of 
the Settlement perimeter along Soochow Creek at all times by 
patrols. 35 


The withdrawal of the Chinese armies from Shanghai left the 
International Settlement and the French Concession as two tiny 
islands of Western authority in a hostile Japanese sea. On every 
street and bridge of importance leading from the foreign-con- 
trolled areas there was a barricade or blockhouse manned by 

33 4th Mar R-2 Rept, I50ct37 (China File). 

34 Chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook, 1937-1943 (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1943), pp. 352-353; HQ, USSAFE and 
Eighth Army (Rear), "Japanese Monograph No. 179 — Central China Area 
Operations Record, 1937-1941," pp. 13-20 (OCMH). 

35 CO 4th Mar msg to COs 1/4 and 2/4, dtd 9N0V37 {China File). 



Japanese sentries. Backing up those sentries was a field army 
of from 300,000 to 500,000 men, a formidable navy in complete 
control of the Yangtze and its approaches, and a strong air force. 
A Chinese puppet government, put into office by the Japanese 
and completely subservient to them, stood ready to do its master's 

For the Japanese the International Settlement and the French 
Concession were a constant source of irritation — reminders of 
the power of Great Britain, France, and the United States. Worse 
still, they were invaluable to Chiang Kai-shek in carrying on 
China's struggle for existence. Since the three Western Powers 
all recognized Chiang's Nationalist regime as the legal govern- 
ment of China, they refused to permit the Japanese to interfere 
in any way with official or other Chinese activities inside the 
foreign-controlled area. The Japanese had to watch in helpless 
rage while rich cargoes unloaded at the Bund and paid duty into 
Chiang's custom house. The Chinese post office, radio and tele- 
graph offices, and central bank all continued to operate within 
the Settlement and the Concession. The Japanese were furious 
because they could not direct the policies of these institutions nor 
lay their hands on the rich revenues. 36 

The military forces of the foreign areas were never strong 
enough to resist a determined Japanese attack. After the de- 
parture of the 6th Marines and 2d Brigade troops on 17 Feb- 
ruary 1938, the 4th Marines became again the only American 
troop unit in Shanghai. Its strength never exceeded 1,200 and 
averaged about 1,000 officers and men. The British main- 
tained a garrison which never exceeded 2,500 and was withdrawn 
altogether on 26 August 1940. The French garrisoned their 
Concession with about 4,000 troops but they were of negligible 
value after the collapse of France in the summer of 1940. And 
the 750 Italian troops, because of the alliance of their government 

39 Abend, op. cit., p. 286. 


with Japan, were of dubious value in preserving the neutrality of 
the foreign-controlled areas. 37 

The Japanese were not restrained from seizing the Concession 
and the Settlement by the strength of the foreign garrisons. But 
the Tokyo government did not wish to antagonize unduly Great 
Britain, France, and the United States. Efforts at a take-over 
were, therefore, limited to various forms of subtle pressure de- 
signed to undermine the position of the Western Powers, to in- 
filtrate the municipal government, and to subvert it. To resist 
these pressures became the primary duty of the 4th Marines in 
carrying out its mission — a mission which continued to be the 
preservation of the neutrality of Sector "C". 

There was, of course, always the danger that a hotheaded 
Japanese militarist might launch an attack on his own authority 
at the slightest provocation or no provocation at all. Before all 
the Marines, from the commanding officer on down, stood the 
exacting task of sustaining their position without offering the 
Japanese an excuse for aggression. 

An example of the irresponsible and often irrational behavior 
of some Japanese army officers occurred in the International 
Settlement on 3 December 1937. Over the protests of Settlement 
authorities, the Japanese army staged a victory parade through 
the Settlement. Although the Municipal Police cleared all 
Chinese from the route of march, about 1230 one man got close 
enough to lob a hand grenade from a side street into the passing 
Japanese column on Nanking Road just north of the Race 
Course. Three soldiers and three municipal policemen were 
wounded. The assassin was immediately shot down and killed 
by a Chinese constable of the Municipal Police, and the Japanese 
resumed their march, leaving a 36-man gendarme (military po- 
lice) detachment to investigate. 

Lieutenant Colonel Yuki Fukabori was the officer in charge 

37 Strength figures from 4th Regt MRolls, iFeb38-3oNov4i ; Abend, op. 
cit.,p. 287. 


of the press section on the staff of General Iwane Matsui, com- 
mander of the Central China Area Army. He rode in a staff 
car at the head of the column and did not learn of the bombing 
until he reached the end of the march in Hongkew. He then 
rushed back to the scene, made a brief investigation, and re- 
turned to Japanese Army headquarters in Hongkew. He gave 
a highly-colored account to a major general on Matsufs staff, 
the officer who had persuaded his reluctant chief to stage the 
march in the first place. The major general told Fukabori to 
go back to the scene of the incident and take charge and promised 
that a battalion would be sent to reinforce him. 

When he reached there about 1500, Fukabori took command 
of the 36 gendarmes and ordered them west along Nanking Road 
and south along Yu Ya Ching Road. "We will extend our line 
of sentries south through the French Concession and make con- 
tact with our forces in Nantao," Fukabori is reported to have 

"May I point out, colonel, that the line you speak of is 3,000 
yards in length and we have only 36 men," remonstrated the 
gendarmerie officer. "What you propose is impossible." 

"Nothing is impossible," replied Fukabori. "Napoleon said 
so." This last remark was greeted with laughter from the by- 
standers. And Fukabori thought better of it. He decided to 
wait for reinforcements. 

Meanwhile, the gendarmes ordered west had unknowingly 
entered the American sector and had placed portable barbwire 
barricades across Bubbling Well Road. x\bout 1630 Colonel 
Price and Captain Boone arrived on the scene. By this time the 
Japanese reinforcements were about an hour overdue, having 
been detained by the intervention of Major General Harada, one 
of the "moderates" in the Japanese command. 

Fukabori, realizing that his faction had been thwarted in their 
efforts to use the bombing as an excuse to seize some or all of 
the foreign-held territory, complied with Price's request to with- 


draw from the American sector. And by 2030 all Japanese had 
returned to their own sector. 38 

Fukabori and the Japanese Army hot-heads he represented 
lost out at Shanghai on 3 December. But a tragic instance of 
what such men were capable of occurred nine days later. On 1 2 
December, Japanese naval aircraft attacked and sank the Ameri- 
can gunboat Panay on the Yangtze above Nanking. Later in- 
vestigation revealed that the attack was no accident but had been 
deliberately ordered by the responsible Japanese commander. 39 

Colonel Price cautioned his subordinates to be on the alert 
against further Japanese aggression. "Any incident, such as 
the recent bombing on Nanking Road in Sector "B", which re- 
sults in the movement of Japanese military personnel into the 
International Settlement within the present perimeter south of 
Soochow Creek, is of vital importance to this Headquarters," he 
informed his battalion commanders. "Such incidents may 
rapidly develop to the point that the Japanese armed forces will 
attempt to enter, take control of and patrol areas including part 
or all of Sector 'C. Any movement into the International 
Settlement or increased or abnormal activity therein by Japanese 
armed forces," he directed his subordinates, "will be reported 
immediately to this Headquarters . . . ." 40 

A series of Japanese violations of Sector "C" confronted the 
4th Marines during February 1938. Beginning about the 12th, 
Japanese Army patrols attempted to enter the American zone. 
When detected, they were turned back by Marine patrols; and, 
on the 1 6th, Colonel Price reminded the Japanese authorities 
that, under the International Defense Agreement, each force was 
responsible for its assigned sector. The Marines, said Price, 

38 BriIntelO msg to CG 2d MarBrig, dtd 7Dec37 (War Plans Sec Files, 
Misc, HistBr, HQMC) ; 2d MarBrig B-2 Rept, 4Dec37 {China File). Fuka- 
bori's remarks were repeated to Capt Boone by a bystander. 

39 Morison. Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 16-18. 

40 4th Mar field msg to CO's 1st and 2d Bns, dtd 4May38. "China-Radio- 
grams, 3iOct24-6Dec39" (War Plans Sec Files, Misc, HistBr, HQMC). 

519667 — 60 14 


could keep order in their area. The Japanese, in a conference 
with Marine officers the next day, said that the patrols were to 
supervise members of their military forces who might enter the 
American sector "informally." Even as negotiations were in 
progress, Marines were turning back a 13-man Japanese army 
patrol at the sector boundary. Faced with the Marine refusal 
to yield on the issue of patrolling, the Japanese backed down, and, 
on the 1 8th, Price was able to announce an agreement by the 
Japanese to keep their forces out of Sector "C". 41 

This agreement did not put an end to incidents. Another 
annoying habit of the Japanese Army was to run vehicles through 
Sector "C" without seeking permission of the 4th Marines. This 
traffic became so heavy that Colonel Price protested to Japanese 
Army Headquarters, securing an agreement on 24 March that 
traffic would be limited to 30 trucks a day. Within a week, the 
agreement had been violated by the Japanese, who stepped up 
their truck movements through the American sector until as 
many as 260 were counted in one day. Price made repeated 
protests and got some improvement, but incidents continued. 42 

A violation of Sector "C" neutrality, leading to the arrest of 
three Japanese soldiers, occurred on 13 August — the first anni- 
versary of the outbreak of Chinese- Japanese hostilities at Shang- 
hai. Early that morning Gunnery Sergeant Milton C. "Slug" 
Marvin, 43 the regimental boxing coach and a hard-charging non- 
com with a reputation for aggressiveness both in and out of the 
ring, was leading a street patrol from Company H. At about 
0600 the Marines came upon a Japanese Army car parked in 

41 The New York Times, i5-i8Feb38. 

42 Consul Gen Shanghai msg to SecState, dtd 2 7May38, Foreign Relations, 
1938, v. Ill, p. 188. 

43 Marvin was typical of the many fine professional noncommissioned offi- 
cers whom the Marine Corps bred during the years of peace, and who served 
with distinction in commissioned status in World War II. As a member of 
the 3d Marine Division he was mortally wounded on the Asan-Adelup beaches 
during the recapture of Guam in July 1 944. He was posthumously awarded 
the Navy Cross. 


front of a Chinese home on Robinson Road. One Japanese was 
forcing the Chinese home owner to lower and hand over the 
Chinese Nationalist flag at the point of a pistol. Marvin and 
his Marines rushed up and ordered the Japanese and three others 
sitting in the car to turn over their arms. One refused and had 
to be persuaded by a rifle butt stroke to the head. 

Colonel Price, accompanied by some other officers, arrived at 
this moment and ordered the Japanese taken to the Municipal 
Police Station. He then notified the chief of the Japanese Army 
Special Service Section, 44 to which the prisoners belonged, that 
his men had been picked up in Sector "C" and charged with 
disturbing the peace and unlawful possession of arms. A Jap- 
anese officer called at the police station and signed a receipt for the 
prisoners, who were then released in his custody. With this ac- 
tion, the incident was closed. 45 

An increase in acts of terrorism within the International Set- 
tlement — most of them directed at Chinese puppets of the 
Japanese — began about i January 1939. In response, the Jap- 
anese authorities demanded of the Municipal Council the right 
to send their own gendarme patrols into the Settlement to "main- 
tain order." Acting under orders from Admiral Yarnell, Colonel 
Joseph C. Fegan, who had relieved Price as Commanding Officer, 
4th Marines, on 24 October 1938, appeared before the Municipal 
Council on 25 February to protest any agreement allowing Jap- 
anese forces to operate in Sector "C". The next day the council 
rejected the demands but agreed to cooperate with the Japanese 
in suppressing terrorism in the International Settlement — the de- 
tails to be worked out by the Commissioner of the Municipal 
Police and the commanding officer of the gendarmerie. 

Within a few weeks the Japanese interpretation of "coopera- 

44 The Special Service Section was the secret police organization of the 
Japanese Army. 

45 The New York Times, i3~i4Aug38; CinCAF AnnRept, fiscal 1939, dtd 


tion" was clearly revealed. On 12 March, Colonel Fegan was 
notified by the Commissioner of the Municipal Police that the 
gendarmerie had established an office in the Shanghai Hotel, 
within the Settlement. Acting in his capacity as Senior Garrison 
Commander, Colonel Fegan called a meeting on the 13th of all 
concerned at the office of the Chairman of the Municipal Coun- 
cil. It was agreed that the British commander, in whose sector 
the Shanghai Hotel was located, would write a letter of protest 
to the commanding officer of the Japanese gendarmerie. 

That same day two gendarmes were apprehended in the Ameri- 
can Sector attempting to arrest a Chinese. Fegan wrote the 
gendarmerie commander protesting this unauthorized invasion, 
but no reply had been received when, on 20 March, a similar 
incident took place. Three gendarmes entered Sector "C" and 
arrested four Chinese employees of a business concern located 
there. Before a letter could be sent protesting this action, the 
Japanese gendarmerie commander called on Colonel Fegan on 
22 March and apologized for the incidents of the 13th and 20th, 
stating that they would not happen again. The Japanese was 
as good as his word, and the incidents stopped. 46 

As war clouds darkened European skies during the summer 
of 1939, Shanghai's foreign residents worried about what a Euro- 
pean war would mean for them. Rumors were plentiful that 
the Japanese would take advantage of the preoccupation of the 
colonial powers with the struggle in Europe to seize the Settle- 
ment and the Concession. Reflecting the atmosphere of un- 
easiness, the Assistant U.S. Naval Attache, Major James M. 
McHugh, USMC, cabled to the Navy Department on 23 August 
that he had "reliable information that representatives of the 
orange [Japanese] army, navy, and consular service of this area 
are now in the fatherland with detailed plans to blockade the local 
concessions ... all the river traffic to be stopped at Woo- 
sung .... The military people," he continued, "estimate that 

^CinCAF AnnRept, fiscal 1939 (CNO Files, RG 38, NA). 


sufficient troops can be gathered together in 24 hours to effec- 
tively cut off the Settlements .... Two thousand Nips arrived 
Shanghai via railroad from Nanking during the last 48 hours. 
French have reports total eight transports due here next few 
days." 47 

It was with a vast sigh of relief, therefore, that Shanghai's 
foreign population greeted the outcome of a defense force com- 
manders' meeting on 14 September. Instead of the drastic 
measures that had been feared, the Japanese proposed only to 
revise the International Defense Scheme. This document, first 
drawn up in 1931 and revised in 1934, had been rendered obso- 
lete by the Japanese conquest of Central China. But the pro- 
posed changes were totally unacceptable to the British and 
Americans. Calling for the abandonment by the British of the 
extra-Settlement Western Area (Sector "D"), the turning over 
to the Italians of the portion of Sector "B" north of Soochow 
Creek, and the disbanding of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, 
the Japanese proposals were nothing more than a thinly-veiled 
attack on the integrity of the Settlement. The adamant opposi- 
tion of the British and American defense force commanders led 
the Japanese to drop their plans. No changes were made in the 
International Defense Scheme. 48 

Another form of pressure on the International Settlement was 
exerted by the Shanghai Special City Government Municipal 
Police. During September this Japanese-dominated native con- 
stabulary began patrolling the extra-Settlement Western Area 
in detachments numbering as many as 25 men, interfering with 
the International Settlement Municipal Police and attempting 
to usurp their authority over the municipal roads outside the 
Settlement. The 4th Marines feared that the Japanese puppet 

* 7 Asst ALUSNA Shanghai msg to OpNav, dtd 23Aug39 (War Plans Sec 
Files, Misc, HistBr, HQMC ) . 

^CinCAF AnnRept, fiscal 1940, dtd 3oJun40 (2295-20-10 Central Files, 
HQMC) ; The New York Times, i4Sep39. 


police, if given the opportunity, would attempt a take-over of 
law enforcement within the Settlement. Any of its members ap- 
prehended in uniform within Sector "C" were, therefore, taken 
into custody by the Marines and escorted out of the Sector. This 
action brought forth many complaints from the commanders of 
the puppet police, but Colonel Fegan refused to meet with them 
or to listen to their complaints. 49 

To the problems created by Japanese pressure on the Inter- 
national Settiement was added another when Italy entered World 
War II on the side of Germany in June 1941. The Italians and 
British, now enemies, had adjacent defense sectors, and their 
street patrols passed within a few yards of each other. Fearing 
trouble, Colonel DeWitt Peck, who had taken command of the 
4th Marines on 3 January 1940, hastened to call separately on 
the Italian and British commanders to urge them to respect the 
international character of the Settlement. Both readily agreed 
in principle but could not come to terms regarding policing of 
liberty areas frequented by both nationalities. As the most popu- 
lar recreation spots were in the American Sector, Peck finally 
secured approval for joint patrols of American, British, and 
Italians under American command in the areas in question during 
liberty hours. 50 

There were no serious intrusions on the neutrality of the 
American Sector by the Japanese during the winter and spring 
of 1940, but this new-found policy of noninterference was rudely 
shattered on 7 July. This was the anniversary of the outbreak 
of the Sino- Japanese war, and, as usual on such occasions, special 
security regulations were in effect throughout the International 
Settlement. On this particular anniversary General Juzo Nishio, 
commander of Japanese forces in Central China, chose to make 
a tour of inspection through the Settlement. 

49 CinCAF AnnRept, fiscal 1940 (2295-20-10, Central Files, HQMG). 
50 MajGen DeWitt Peck ltr to ACofS, G-3, HQMG, dtd 23J1U158 (Mono- 
graph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMC ) . 


Colonel Peck did not learn of Nishio's presence until the Jap- 
anese commander had arrived at a reception in his honor at the 
Palace Hotel in the American Sector. Peck immediately detailed 
a heavy escort of Marines under an officer to accompany the 
Japanese commander during the rest of his inspection. 

Shortly after ordering the escort for General Nishio, Peck re- 
ceived a request from the Shanghai Municipal Police for assist- 
ance in arresting a number of Japanese loitering suspiciously along 
Bubbling Well Road. Lieutenant Colonel Eugene F. Collier and 
25 Marines of his 1st Battalion responded to the call for help and 
picked up 1 6 armed Japanese. Some refused to surrender their 
arms; others resisted arrest and had to be lifted bodily into a 
truck for transportation to Marine headquarters. At headquar- 
ters, the men were identified as Japanese gendarmes assigned to 
guard Nishio's route of inspection. Their leader was permitted 
to telephone his superiors, and a Japanese gendarme major called 
at 4th Marines' headquarters to talk with the prisoners. He was 
told the men would be freed whenever a responsible officer signed 
a receipt for them. He refused to sign, saying he did not have the 
authority. About 1500 Major General Saburo Miura, the gen- 
darmerie commander, called on Colonel Peck to express his regret 
over the incident, saying it was all a mistake and would not hap- 
pen again. The prisoners were released and the incident appeared 
to be closed. 51 

The next day the Japanese Army press spokesman delivered 
the most bitterly anti-American statement issued at Shanghai 
since the beginning of hostilities three years before. He accused 
the 4th Marines of an "unfriendly act," and with "insulting the 
honor of the Japanese gendarmes and the Japanese Army." 
According to the spokesman, "the arrested men were . . . forced 
to squat while the Marines covered them with loaded rifles, the 

51 Ibid.; CO 1/4 memo for ExO 4th Mar, dtd 18J11I40 (Subj File: China, 
HistBr, HQMC) ; CO 4th Mar ltr to MajGen Saburo Miura, dtd 22JUI40, 
Foreign Relations, Japan 1931-1941 , v. II, pp. 101-104. 


gendarmes being treated like condemned criminals sentenced to 
death. The arrested men were also struck brutally in the face 
when they asked to use the lavatory." 52 

Letters from General Miura and Rear Admiral Moriji Takeda, 
Special Naval Landing Force commander, repeated, practically 
word for word, the charges made by the army spokesman. And 
on the night of the i ith a Japanese mass-meeting heard speakers 
denounce America and the Marines and demand an official 
apology for the insult. 53 

By the next day, calmer heads had evidently prevailed among 
the Japanese. Colonel Peck wrote Miura stating that he had 
conducted an exhaustive investigation and that the Marines were 
innocent of all the cruelties charged. The statement was ac- 
cepted by the Japanese, and the incident was closed. 54 

A new threat to the neutrality of the International Settlement 
came up on i o August, when the British government announced 
the withdrawal of all their forces from Shanghai and North 
China. On the 15th the Defense Committee met to reallocate 
the British defense sectors. Rear Admiral Takeda proposed that 
his forces take over both British sectors, and Colonel Peck 
countered by suggesting that both sectors be given to the 4th 
Marines. Failure to reach an agreement led to a temporary 
solution on 20 August, when the Shanghai Volunteer Corps 
took over Sector "B" — the heart of the city. Sector "D" was not 
provided for, and the Japanese gendarmerie took over by default. 
On 26 August the last British troops departed, leaving the 4th 
Marines and the Italians as the only foreign garrisons in the 
International Settlement. 55 

About a week after the British troops left, the Japanese made 

52 Quoted in The New York Times, 9J11I40. 
63 The New York Times, 1 1 J11I40. 

54 The New York Times, 12J11I40 ; CO 4th Mar ltr to MajGen Miura, 22 
JUI40, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1Q31-IQ41 , v. II, p. 10 1. 

55 CinCAF AnnRept fiscal 1941, dtd nSep4i (2295-20-10, Central Files, 


another challenge to the Marine position. General Miura invited 
Peck to his office and, as senior defense force commander, ordered 
the Marine commander to abolish one of the posts maintained at 
the American end of a bridge over Soochow Creek. Peck re- 
fused, on the ground that, under the International Defense 
Scheme, Miura lacked the authority to issue him orders. Peck 
suggested a meeting of the Defense Committee to discuss the 
matter, but no meeting was ever called. It was Peck's opinion 
that the Japanese were merely feeling him out to see how far the 
Americans could be pushed, now that they no longer had the 
support of British forces. 56 


By the end of 1940, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, who had re- 
lieved Yarnell as Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet on 25 July 
1939, was convinced that war with Japan was inevitable. In 
preparation for hostilities, he began withdrawal of his command 
from their dangerously exposed positions along the China coast. 
All but the 4th Marines and the Yangtze River Patrol gunboats 
had departed by early 1941. Hart had suggested withdrawal of 
the 4th Marines at the same time, but without success. By the 
end of July, "entirely convinced that war was coming," he dis- 
patched an official "appreciation" urging withdrawal "in the 
near future." 57 

Hart's convictions were well-founded. On 26 July President 
Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in the United States, thereby 
choking off trade between the two countries, particularly the 
essential Japanese imports of oil. With a domestic production 

36 MajGen DeWitt Peck ltr to ACofS, G-3, HQMG, dtd 23JU1158 (Mono- 
graph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMC) . 

87 Adm Thomas G. Hart, Narrative of Events, AsFlt, Leading up to War 
and From 8Dec4i to i5Feb42, written before njun42 (NavHistDiv) ; and 
Hart ltr to CMC, dtd ioOct56 (Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, 


amounting to only 12 per cent of her annual peacetime needs, 
Japan had either to give up her conquests and renounce her 
plans for future aggression, or accept war with the United States 
and seize the sources of oil in Southeast Asia. The freezing of 
Japanese assets was the last of a series of moves by the United 
States to halt Japanese expansion in Asia by steps short of war. 
A first step had been the moral embargo on the export of aircraft 
to Japan — declared by Secretary of State Cordell Hull on 1 July 
1938 as a result of bombings of American and Chinese civilians 
and repeated outrages against American lives and property in 
China. The shift of Japanese conquest to the southward, begin- 
ning in April 1939 with the seizure of Hainan Island, combined 
with repeated bombings and other atrocities against civilians in 
China, had led to the move of the United States Fleet from the 
West Coast to Pearl Harbor in May of 1940. Two months later, 
shipments of war material had been stopped. 

Japanese occupation of northern Indochina in August and 
her alliance with Germany and Japan in the Tripartite Pact, 
on 27 September had resulted in stepped-up war materials re- 
strictions and to strategic conversations among the Americans, 
British, and Dutch concerning Pacific defense. When the Jap- 
anese completed their Indochina occupation in July 1941, 
President Roosevelt countered by his order freezing Japanese 
assets. 58 

In Shanghai, the 4th Marines had been making every possible 
preparation for the outbreak of hostilities. Colonel Peck had 
been advised by Hart as early as November 1940 that he would 
withdraw the regiment as soon as possible. To clear the decks 
for departure, Peck ordered the members of the regiment to send 
their families home in December. 

After departure of the dependents, Peck prepared a desperate 
escape plan, to be put into effect if the Japanese attacked the 
International Settlement. Mounted in all available motor ve- 

Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, pp. 35-65. 


hides, the 4th Marines was to break through the road blocks 
on the Settlement boundary and drive west towards territory 
controlled by Chiang Kai-shek. 

One Japanese division was known to be astride the axis of 
this proposed movement, some 40 miles west of Shanghai. Peck 
intended to keep the 4th Marines together as a military force as 
long as possible. But, "when the regiment hit something it 
couldn't crack," the men were to be instructed to break up into 
small groups and attempt to make their way as best they could 
to the nearest Nationalist-held territory and then to Chungking, 
some 900 miles away. This plan was never put in writing, but 
both Admiral Hart and the battalion commanders were told 
about it — a desperate plan to be sure but much preferable to 
laying down their arms, or remaining in Shanghai to be 
pulverized by overwhelming Japanese military strength. 59 

January and February passed without any extraordinary inci- 
dents. There were a few minor episodes involving Marine and 
Japanese sentries at the Soochow Creek bridges, but they were 
all settled peacefully. There was one instance of the seizure of 
two municipal policemen by Japanese in the American sector. 
The incident was settled by negotiation and the men released. 

In March the regiment faced a new problem — this time in- 
volving the security of Chinese Nationalist government banks 
rather than the integrity of the International Settlement. These 
banks had continued to function within the sanctuary of the In- 
ternational Settlement and the French Concession, much to the 
annoyance of the Japanese. On 24 March, bombs exploded 
simultaneously in the Central Bank of China buildings in Sector 
"C" and the French Concession. At the request of the Municipal 
Police, a Marine guard was posted over the wreckage in the 
American Sector. On 1 April the bank reopened under Marine 
guard. Three weeks later, attacks were made on judges of the 

58 MajGen DeWitt Peck interview by HistBr, HQMC, dtd 9J11I58 (Mono- 
graph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMC) . 


Chinese court located in the American Sector. As a result, special 
Marine outposts were established in support of the Municipal 
Police at key barrier points on the Sector boundary. 60 

The summer months passed, and still there were no with- 
drawal orders. In September, Colonel Samuel L. Howard, since 
14 May 1 94 1 the commanding officer of the 4th Marines, joined 
Rear Admiral William A. Glassford, commander of the Yangtze 
River Patrol, and Consul General Frank B. Lockhart in urging 
upon Admiral Hart an immediate withdrawal. Hart naturally 
concurred and proposed to the Navy Department that the troops 
depart on the Henderson, due to make a routine call at China 
ports in September. But approval was not forthcoming, the De- 
partment replying that a meeting with the State Department was 
to be held in about two weeks to consider the problem. Hart 
repeated his recommendation for withdrawal, stating that "it was 
not a question that could be delayed for weeks but must be acted 
on immediately." 61 Finally, on 10 November, permission was 
granted, and the liners President Harrison and President Madi- 
son were chartered for the purpose. 

Colonel Howard planned to embark half his command in the 
Madison on the 27th, and the remainder in the Harrison on the 
30th. The 2d Battalion, one half of Headquarters and Service 
Company, and half of the regimental hospital went aboard the 
Madison on the 27th as scheduled and departed that afternoon 
for the Philippines. 

At about 1 000 that day Howard received orders from Hart to 
speed up the evacuation. Howard, Glassford, and the captain 
of the Harrison met and decided to load the remaining Marines 
and supplies the next day and to sail not later than that afternoon. 

60 CinCAF AnnRept fiscal 1941, dtd nSep4i (2295-20-10, Central Files, 
HQMG ) . 

61 Quoted in BriGen Samuel L. Howard, Rept on the Operation, Employ- 
ment and Supply of the old 4th Mar from Sep4i to the surrender of Cor- 
regidor, 6May42, made from memory and notes, dtd 26Sep45 (Philippines 
Area Op File, HistBr, HQMC ) , hereafter Howard Rept. 


Major Reginald H. Ridgely, Jr., the regimental quartermaster, 
began loading at once, giving priority as follows : i ) ammunition ; 
2 ) field equipment ; 3 ) medical supplies ; 4 ) rations ; 5 ) motor 
transport; 6) clothing; 7) miscellaneous; and 8) household 
effects. All these supplies had to be transported to the dock, 
loaded on lighters and taken out to the ship anchored a mile 
downstream. The Japanese attempted to delay the loading op- 
erations as much as possible without actually using force. During 
the afternoon they closed Garden Bridge over Soochow Creek 
to traffic, holding up the Marine trucks for over an hour until 
Colonel Howard could contact the Japanese commander and 
get the bridge reopened. Customs officials, evidently acting under 
instructions from the Japanese, insisted that all the supplies pass 
through customs. Ridgely and his men ignored these instructions 
and loaded the gear directly aboard lighters. During the night, 
the Japanese instigated three strikes among the stevedores. In 
spite of this interference more than 500 tons of supplies were 
aboard the Harrison by 1 300 on 28 November. 

About 0900, the remainder of the 4th Marines formed outside 
the 1 st Battalion billet and marched down Bubbling Well and 
Nanking Roads to the President Line dock on the Bund. Thou- 
sands of cheering people waving American and Chinese flags 
lined the streets to see the regiment, which had played such an 
intimate part in community life for over 1 4 years, parade through 
the Settlement for the last time. At the dock, members of the 
Municipal Council, the foreign consuls and diplomatic represen- 
tatives, the commanding officers of all military units, including 
the Japanese, and the heads of many civic organizations were 
gathered to bid the Marines farewell. 

All hands boarded a power lighter and were ferried down- 
stream to the waiting President Harrison. At 1400, on 28 No- 
vember, the ship dropped her mooring and headed down the 
Whangpoo, bound for the Philippines. 


Defense of the Philippines 

The 4th Marines' first campaign of World War II ended in 
defeat and captivity. Committed to the defense of Corregidor 
and Bataan in the Philippines, the regiment, along with the other 
American and Filipino forces, finally surrendered to overwhelm- 
ing Japanese strength on 6 May 1942. But the four months of 
stubborn resistance slowed the Japanese timetable of conquest 
and won time for the mobilization of American industry and man- 
power. As a stimulant to sagging morale, the Philippine cam- 
paign was equally important. Not since the Alamo had such in- 
spiration been drawn from a battle lost. Though defeated, the 
American soldiers, sailors, and Marines, by their heroic defense 
against overwhelming odds, inspired their comrades in arms and 
the civilians back home to redouble their efforts for final victory. 1 


The 4th Marines arrived in the Philippines just a week before 
the outbreak of war — on 30 November and 1 December when 
the first and second echelons debarked from the President Madi- 

1 Unless otherwise noted this chapter is based on LtCol Frank O. Hough, 
Maj Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal — 
History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, v. I (Washington: 
HistBr, HQMC, 1958), pp. 155-202; Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philip- 
pines — The War in the Pacific — United States Army in World War II 
(Washington: OCMH, Dept of the Army, 1953), hereafter Morton, Fall of 
the Philippines; Howard Rept. 



son and President Harrison at Olongapo. At this naval station 
on Subic Bay, work was still in progress on hastily constructed 
housing for the regiment. About half the Marines moved into 
the incompleted buildings; the remainder went under canvas on 
the station rifle range. 

The regiment was assigned its mission on 3 December when 
Colonel Howard reported to Admiral Hart in Manila. The 4th 
Marines was to defend the Olongapo Naval Station and the Mari- 
veles Naval Section Base, at the mouth of Manila Bay on Bataan, 
the peninsula forming the Bay's northern side. (See Map 14.) 
The defensive missions would be performed under the direction 
of Rear Admiral Francis W. Rockwell, Commandant 16th Nava) 
District, who, on 5 December, directed Howard to transfer a 
battalion to Mariveles on the 8th. Preparations for quartering 
and rationing these troops were made by the 4th Marines' com- 
mander on 6 December during a personal reconnaissance of the 
Mariveles area. 

The 4th Marines was ill-prepared for combat operations when 
it arrived in the Philippines. It was only a skeleton unit, the 
result of Admiral Hart's policy of holding back replacements to 
Shanghai, where capture by the Japanese was a danger. Total 
strength of the regiment was only 44 officers and 772 enlisted 
men, organized into Headquarters and Service Companies and 
two battalions, each including a machine gun and two rifle com- 
panies which lacked their third platoons. Howard planned to 
increase regimental strength by adding Marines of the Olongapo 
guard detachment, but he delayed making these transfers because 
of the possibility that the 4th Marines might be ordered to move 
out on a new mission. According to rumors, which Colonel 
Howard was unable to confirm or disprove, the U.S. Army com- 
mand in the Philippines wanted the regiment for guard duty at 
its Manila headquarters or to train Filipino troops. In either 
event a security force would have to be left behind for the 
Olongapo installation. 



In addition to the two naval installations guarded by the 
4th Marines, there was one other in the Manila Bay area. Situ- 
ated at Cavite on Manila Bay a few miles from the capital, 
it was the major base for the Asiatic Fleet. Guarding Cavite 
was the 1st Separate Marine Battalion, a unique organization 
trained to function either as infantry or antiaircraft artillery. 
The unit was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John P. Adams 
and numbered about 400 officers and men. 

The U.S. Asiatic Fleet, which based on these shore stations, 
was responsible for the naval defense of the Philippines. But 
its strength of only 3 cruisers, 13 destroyers, 29 submarines, 
miscellaneous auxiliary vessels, and 32 PBY patrol aircraft was 
obviously no match for the Japanese naval power which could 
be sent against the islands. Admiral Hart, therefore, was au- 
thorized to shift his base of operations south to a British or Dutch 
port at his discretion, leaving the ground and air forces to defend 
the Philippines with very little in the way of naval support. 

General Douglas MacArthur's United States Army Forces in 
the Far East (USAFFE) included 31,000 U.S. Army troops 
and approximately 120,000 officers and men of the Philippine 
National Army. The military value of the latter component 
was dubious in view of the fact that most of its men were un- 
trained and poorly equipped, particularly in supporting arms. 
In the air, Mac Arthur could muster a force of 35 modern heavy 
bombers and 107 fighters. With these forces the USAFFE com- 
mander planned to defend every inch of Philippine soil. His 
plan, put into effect during the summer and fall of 1941, was 
far more optimistic than the previous concept of defending only 


Even as Colonel Howard and the 4th Marines were busy with 
plans and preparations for war, time was rapidly running out. 


Already the Japanese carrier force was preparing to launch the 
attack which was to cripple the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. 
And at 0350 on 8 December 2 the radio operator at Olongapo 
picked up this message from Admiral Hart to the Asiatic Fleet: 
"Japan started hostilities, govern yourselves accordingly." 3 

A few moments later the shrill sound of the naval station 
power plant whistle roused the Marines from their early morning 
slumbers. The Marine sentry at the main gate started pounding 
the ship's bell of the old USS Fulton, and the bugler sounded 
"Call to Arms." As the men mustered in front of their barracks 
and tents they were put to work digging foxholes and setting up 
machine guns for antiaircraft defense. In the midst of the con- 
fusion, Lieutenant Colonel Curtis T. Beecher's 1st Battalion 
departed aboard the naval tug Vaga for Mariveles. Next day 
the regiment established a bivouac area two miles from Olongapo 
for use if enemy air attacks should make the naval station un- 
tenable. Impressing the seriousness of the situation on all hands 
was the transfer of the band to the 2d Battalion for duty as a 
rifle platoon. 4 

Air raid alarms came at frequent intervals during the first few 
days of hostilities. All proved to be false until 12 December, 
when a flight of carrier-based Zeroes followed a Navy PBY flight 
into its anchorage off the naval station. The Japanese pilots 
caught the flying boats at their moorings and destroyed them 
all. Turning inland, the enemy fliers strafed the naval station. 
Marines on the ground opened up with what they had — .30 cali- 
ber machine guns and rifles. Two Marines on top of the water 
tower enjoyed themselves firing at low-flying planes with BARs 

2 All times are local time. Because of the international dateline, 7 Decem- 
ber in Hawaii was 8 December in the Philippines. 

3 4th Mar Rec of Events, 8Dec4i. Unless otherwise cited, all official 
documents are in Philippine Area-Op File, HistBr, HQMG. 

4 This transfer made such an impression on the sergeant who kept the 
regimental Record of Events that he entered the fact with an exclamation 


until one of the Japanese located them. A game of hide-and- 
seek around the tower followed as the Marines tried to keep it 
between themselves and the enemy. The Japanese pilots were 
unsuccessful, and only succeeded in making a sieve of the water 

The enemy was back the next day — this time with 27 bomb- 
ers flying above the range of the Marines' .30 caliber machine 
guns. The only bomb damage was in the town of Olongapo, 
where several houses were set afire and the church was hit. The 
naval station escaped damage altogether, but the Marine hospital, 
located in Gordon's Riverside Cabaret on the north side of 
town, was straddled by bombs and had to be moved to a more 
secure location about a mile farther out on the Manila road. 
Two Marines were wounded. One, Colonel Howard's chauf- 
feur, leapt from his car and was running for shelter when the 
concussion from an exploding bomb blew him through a bamboo 
fence. The Filipino civilians were not so fortunate. One bomb 
hit into a crowd who were standing under a tree watching the 
raid, killing 22 persons and wounding many more. The Jap- 
anese returned on the 20th and attacked Fort Wint, a harbor 
defense post on an island in Subic Bay. Marksmanship was 
poor, and all bombs fell in the bay. 5 

Defense of the Olongapo area from Japanese landing over 
nearby beaches or advancing from the north was one of Colonel 
Howard's chief worries. News that the Japanese had landed 
on northern Luzon on 10 December spurred the Marines to 
hasten defensive preparations covering both approaches. The 
expected enemy attack appeared imminent on 22 December 
when, at 0130, Hart alerted the 4th Marines to prepare for 
action under USAFFE command against a major Japanese 
landing attempt expected momentarily at Lingayen Gulf. The 
regiment was also alerted for a secondary Japanese landing at 

5 CWO Charles R. Jackson ltr to CMC, ioOct56 (Monograph & Comment 
File, HistBr, HQMC) . 


Subic Bay or at Bagac some 20 miles to the south on the west 
coast of Bataan. 6 By daybreak the regiment was ready to move 
out, but, in spite of the fact that the Japanese came ashore at 
Lingayen as expected, no orders committing the 4th Marines 
came from MacArthur's headquarters. The Japanese secondary 
landings failed to materialize. 

The 4th Marines was transferred from Navy to Army control 
on 22 December after repeated requests from MacArthur's head- 
quarters. The first request had been made on 13 December to 
Lieutenant Colonel William T. Clement, Fleet Marine Officer, 
Asiatic Fleet, when he visited USAFFE headquarters. On that 
occasion, Mac Arthur had been most flattering in his praise of 
Marines. He said he knew Marines wanted to be in the thick 
of it and that he had just the job for them as guards for his 
headquarters. Clement replied that all available Marines were 
still engaged in naval assignments but that he was sure that 
Admiral Hart would want them used to the best advantage when, 
and if, they were released from naval duties. After he left Gen- 
eral MacArthur's office, Clement discussed the employment of 
Marines with Brigadier General Richard K. Sutherland, 
USAFFE Chief of Staff, who listed three possible missions : 1 ) as 
guards for MacArthur's headquarters ; 2 ) defense of the Bataan 
Peninsula south of the Limay-Bagac Road; and 3) defense of 
the beaches of Corregidor, a fortified island at the mouth of 
Manila Bay. This was the first time Corregidor had been 
mentioned as a Marine mission. 

The next day Sutherland called on Admiral Hart to discuss 
Marine employment, and on the following day, the 1 5th, General 
MacArthur brought up the subject again. At this time Admiral 
Hart said he would release the Marines to the tactical control 
of USAFFE when no longer needed for naval duties. But he 
insisted that the Marines serve in a combat mission and preserve 

6 CinCAF msg to CO 4th Mar, 0130 22Dec41, copy in 4th Mar Rec of 
Events, 22Dec41. 


their identity as the 4th Marines. In addition, all other naval 
personnel released to the Army, both sailors and Marines, were 
to be assigned to the regiment. On the 20th, MacArthur for- 
mally requested that the 4th Marines be placed at his disposal as 
soon as they could be spared. And on the 2 2d, when the Jap- 
anese successfully landed in force at Lingayen Gulf, Admiral 
Hart released the regiment to Army control. 

Colonel Howard reported to Manila for instructions on the 
24th. He called first at Asiatic Fleet headquarters in the Mars- 
man building, where Hart, who was preparing to leave Manila 
the following day, assigned him the 1st Separate Battalion and 
told him to report to General MacArthur for orders. 

Howard, accompanied by Clement, then went to USAFFE 
headquarters where he found everything in confusion, as the head- 
quarters personnel were packing for departure to Corregidor. 
MacArthur greeted the two Marines with his usual cordiality 
but cut the interview short. General Sutherland then took over 
and painted a gloomy picture of the military situation. The 
Japanese had landed in force in northern and southern Luzon, 
had pushed back the American and Filipino defenders, and were 
converging on Manila from three directions. 

The city was even then being evacuated by the military forces, 
and MacArthur had ordered a withdrawal into Bataan for a 
last-ditch stand. Originally USAFFE hoped to employ the 4th 
Marines to cover the withdrawal of the Philippine Army from 
the Lingayen area. But the enemy advance had been too swift 
to permit an employment of the Marines in a blocking position. 
Sutherland ordered Howard to withdraw all Marines to Mari- 
veles and then to Corregidor for defense of the beaches. 7 

Howard then returned to Asiatic Fleet headquarters and in- 
formed Hart of the orders from USAFFE to withdraw the 4th 
Marines to Corregidor. As he was leaving Hart's office, the 4th 

7 FltMarO, USAsFlt rept to CMC, dtd 6Apr42. 


Marines commander met Admiral Rockwell who ordered the 
immediate destruction of the Olongapo Naval Station. 

Returning to Olongapo, Howard set in motion the withdrawal 
of the 4th Marines to Mariveles. About 2200 the advance eche- 
lon, a platoon each of Companies F and H and a detachment of 
regimental headquarters, under the command of Lieutenant Col- 
onel Donald Curtis, departed by truck for the new station. And 
the next day, Christmas, all but a demolition party and a small 
rear guard moved to Mariveles. 

No better man could have been found to demolish the naval 
station than Captain Francis H. "Joe" Williams. Years before, 
as a young 2d lieutenant at Philadelphia, Williams had lost 
several days quarters' allowance through a legal technicality. He 
jokingly claimed that his demolition assignment was his chance 
to get even with Uncle Sam, but he went about the job so thor- 
oughly that his fellow officers thought he might have been half- 
serious. Using demolition charges improvised from 300-pound 
submarine mines, Williams and his crew set about "erasing the 
naval station from the face of the globe." 8 What they did not 
blow up they burned down, leaving only the Marine barracks 
standing because it was too close to the town of Olongapo to be 
burned without danger to civilian property. The final act of 
destruction was the sinking of the old armored cruiser Rochester 
to block the channel — an attempt which failed when she drifted 
at the last moment. 

The last Marines left the smoking ruins of the Olongapo Naval 
Station after dark on Christmas night to join the main body of 
the regiment at Mariveles. The bivouac site there was at an old 
Army rest area called "Camp Carefree" — a somewhat ironic 
designation in view of the situation. The 1st Battalion had been 
there since 7 December and had been joined on the 23d by the 
forward echelon of the 1st Separate Battalion from Cavite. The 

8 Capt Frank W. Ferguson, Personal Experiences, 8Dec41 to 6May42, with 
the 4th Marines, hereafter Ferguson Rept. 


remainder of this unit arrived on the 25th and 26th. Already 
the 1 st Battalion, 4th Marines had suffered casualties of two men 
killed and three wounded when the merchant ship they were 
guarding at Mariveles had been bombed by the Japanese on the 


The movement to Corregidor began on the night of 26 Decem- 
ber, when 14 officers and 397 men of the 1st Separate Battalion 
were ferried across the seven and a half miles of water separating 
the island from the Bataan shore. On the next night the re- 
mainder of the 1st Separate Battalion, the 2d Battalion (less 
Company F ) , and an advance echelon of regimental head- 
quarters crossed. On the 28th all remaining troops of the regi- 
ment, except a detachment of Sendee Company, and Batteries 
A and C, 1st Separate Battalion displaced to Corregidor. 

The Marines moved from the dock by narrow-gauge electric 
railway to their new quarters in Middleside Barracks, a modern 
concrete, and supposedly bombproof, structure. In addition to 
the troops, rations for 2,000 men for six months, 10 units of fire 
for all weapons, two years' supply of summer khaki, and medicines 
and equipment for a 100-bed hospital were brought along. 

The transfer to the island fortress was greeted with enthusiasm 
by all hands. Although none of the Marines had ever been there 
before, they talked knowingly of impregnable defenses, barracks 
buried deep underground, and passages leading direct to gun 
positions. From Mariveles Japanese bombers had been seen ma- 
neuvering out of range of the island fortress' antiaircraft batteries, 
leading to the belief that the Japanese did not dare bomb it. 9 

The illusion was quickly shattered. Shortly before noon on 29 
December air-raid sirens wailed, but no one paid much attention 

B LtCol Robert F. Jenkins, Jr., informal rept of defense of Corregidor, n.d., 
hereafter Jenkins Rept. 


because Corregidor had never been bombed before. A few 
minutes later all hell broke loose. There was the roar of planes, 
bombs screaming down and exploding with a crash, the crack 
of antiaircraft guns, and the neat "plop plop" of their shells 
bursting all over the sky. "There we were," reported one offi- 
cer, "the whole regiment flat on our bellies on the lower deck of 
Middleside Barracks." 10 An Army officer came into the room 
and said not to worry because the roof was bombproof. No 
sooner had he spoken than a bomb hit and penetrated the roof at 
the other end of the building but failed to explode. When the 
Japanese aircraft finally withdrew at a little after 1400, the 
building was a shambles from the concussion of near misses, but 
Marine casualties were remarkably low — only one killed and four 


By the time the last Japanese bomber withdrew, most of the 
myth of Corregidor as a Gibraltar of the Far East had gone up 
in smoke. In actual fact, Corregidor was far from an impreg- 
nable fortress in December 1 94 1 . Originally intended to defend 
the entrance of Manila Bay, its fortifications, as completed in 
1 9 14, were designed to withstand attack by the most powerful 
naval vessels then in existence. The advent of the military air- 
plane greatly weakened this elaborate system of fortification, and, 
under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, addi- 
tional defenses or a modernization of those already built was 
prohibited. An elaborate tunnel system under Malinta Hill, 
ostensibly for storage of supplies, was the only major construction 
undertaken after 1922. When the Japanese attacked in Decem- 
ber 1 94 1, the defenses were practically the same as they had 
been 20 years before. 

Corregidor is a tadpole-shaped island three and a half miles 

Ferguson Rept. 


long and one and a half miles across at its widest point. Situ- 
ated in the mouth of Manila Bay, it lies about two and a half 
miles from Bataan and about eight and a half miles from the 
opposite shore. The broad western end of the island constitutes 
the tadpole's head. Rising about 500 feet above the water, it 
is named Topside. Here were located the headquarters, some 
barracks, and officers' quarters. To the east of Topside is a 
lower plateau called Middleside. The hospital, service club, and 
additional barracks were located here, and it was in Middleside 
barracks that the 4th Marines was quartered upon arrival on 
Corregidor. East of Middleside the island narrows sharply to 
form the tadpole's tail. At the base of the tail were the docks, 
shops, warehouses, power plant, and cold storage buildings in an 
area known as Bottomside. East of Bottomside is Malinta Hill, 
containing a maze of tunnels. Beyond the hill the island trails 
off to a point, with Kindley Field, a light plane strip, located 
near the end of the tail. 

The seacoast defenses of the fortified islands were formidable. 
On Corregidor no fewer than 56 guns, ranging in size from 
3- to 12-inch caliber, bristled to seaward. On the lesser islands 
were an additional 39 seacoast weapons of calibers from 3- to 
14-inches. For antiaircraft defense Corregidor boasted 28 3-inch 
guns and 48 .50 caliber machine guns. On the other islands 
were ten 3 -inch guns. 

The weakness in Corregidor's defenses became all too obvious 
to the Marines when they took over the island's beach defenses 
on 29 December. Colonel Howard had reported early that 
morning to Major General George F. Moore, USA, command- 
ing the harbor defenses of Manila Bay, and had been appointed 
beach defense commander of Corregidor, relieving Lieutenant 
Colonel Delbert Ausmus, USA. Accompanied by Colonel Sam- 
uel McCullough, USA, Moore's intelligence officer, Howard had 
made a reconnaissance of the island and had just completed it 
when the Japanese bombers struck at noon. 


As soon as the "all clear" sounded, Howard assigned defense 
sectors to his battalions, and before dark the troops moved out 
to the new bivouac areas. Lieutenant Colonel Curtis T. Beech- 
er's i st Battalion took over the East Sector — the area from Malinta 
Hill (inclusive) to the tail of the island. The ist Separate Bat- 
talion, which was redesignated 3/4 on 1 January, occupied the 
Middle Sector, including the beaches of Bottomside and most 
of Middleside up to a line including Morrison Hill and Govern- 
ment Ravine. Lieutenant Colonel Herman R. Anderson's 
2d Battalion became responsible for the West Sector, embracing 
the remainder of the island. A regimental reserve from Head- 
quarters and Service Companies under Major Stuart W. King 
bivouacked in Government Ravine. 

In addition to the beach defense mission at Corregidor, the 
4th Marines was assigned similar duties at Forts Hughes and 
Drum and antiaircraft missions on Bataan and Corregidor. 
Between 30 December and 5 January two machine gun platoons 
from 3/4, one .50 and the other .30 caliber, and a ten-man 
detachment from 2/4 with four more .30's were assigned to 
bolster the defenses of Fort Hughes. To Fort Drum, 3/4 dis- 
patched a section of 14 men equipped with two .50's. A .50 
caliber machine gun platoon of 3/4 added six antiaircraft weap- 
ons to Battery I, 60th Coast Artillery (AA) on Corregidor, while 
two additional antiaircraft units of 3/4, which had been left at 
Mariveles, bolstered the defenses of Bataan. These were Battery 
C (65 officers and men) manning 3-inch guns, and Battery A 
(64 officers and men) manning .50 caliber machine guns. 


The Marines of Batteries A and C were the first of the 4th 
Marines to meet Japanese ground troops in combat. As mem- 
bers of the naval battalion, which had been organized to defend 
the Mariveles Naval Section Base, they attacked an enemy land- 


ing force attempting to outflank the American battle line across 
Bataan. 11 When MacArthur had withdrawn into Bataan he 
organized his forces into three commands — I and II Corps, man- 
ning the line, and Service Command, including all Bataan south 
of the corps rear boundaries except for the Mariveles Naval Reser- 
vation. To defend Service Command's more than 40 miles of 
extremely rugged coast line there was only a hodgepodge of 
Philippine army and constabulary troops and five grounded U.S. 
Army pursuit squadrons. 

The Navy Section Base at Mariveles was not included in the 
Service Command but remained under naval control. For de- 
fense, a naval battalion was formed under Commander Francis 
J. Bridget, the senior naval aviator in the Philippines. Beached 
and grounded sailors constituted most of Bridget's battalion. 
Numbering about 480 in all, the bluejackets included 150 from 
Air, Asiatic Fleet, 130 from the submarine tender Canopus, 80 
from the Cavite Naval Ammunition Depot, and 120 general duty 
men from Cavite and Mariveles. Giving a much needed leaven 
of infantry experience to the naval battalion were the some 120 
Marines of Batteries A and C. 

First Lieutenant Willard C. Holdredge's Battery C set up its 
3-inch antiaircraft guns in a rice paddy between the section base 
and the town of Mariveles. Battery A, commanded by 1st Lieu- 
tenant William F. Hogaboom, which had been ordered to aban- 
don its 3 -inch guns at Cavite, was held at Camp Carefree as 
replacements for Battery C. But a new mission was assigned to 
Hogaboom's Marines on 5 January when they were ordered to 
guard USAFFE's advance headquarters on Bataan. This mis- 

u In addition to the sources already cited in footnote i, this section is based 
on istLt William F. Hogaboom, rept of ops in the Philippines, i40ct4i-6May 
42 ; Cdr Francis J. Bridget Rept, Action at Longoskawayan Point, dtd gFeb42 
(NHD) ; GySgt Harold M. Ferrell rept, Temporary Duty of Mortar Platoon, 
vicinity of Mariveles, Bataan, Philippine Islands, 25~3oJan42, dtd 3ijan42; 
2dLt Michael E. Peshek, Rept of ops of Marine Detachment sent to Bataan 
on 25jan42 ; CO Btry C, Narrative of Events, 2Feb42. 


sion lasted just long enough for Battery A to become comfortably 
settled in their new bivouac when, on the 1 4th, orders from Brid- 
get bought the unit back to Mariveles to man nine .50 caliber 
antiaircraft machine guns and to assist in organizing and train- 
ing the naval battalion. A detachment of 2 officers and 47 men 
from 2 /4 took over the Hq USAFFE guard. 

The serious business of training the bluejackets of the naval 
battalion got under way on 16 January when a naval aviator, 
Lieutenant (j.g.) Leslie A. Pew and the first of about 65 blue- 
jackets joined Battery A. The remainder joined the next day, 
and an additional officer, Ensign Grundels, and about 40 sailors 
were attached to Battery C on the 18th and 19th. In both 
Marine units the Navy personnel were organized into rifle pla- 
toons with Marine NCOs as instructors and squad leaders. 
Marine and Navy officers served as platoon leaders. Owing to 
the necessity for manning antiaircraft weapons, few Marines were 
available for infantry duty. As reorganized, Battery A included 
three platoons — one of Marines manning the antiaircraft .50 
caliber machine guns and two rifle platoons of sailors with 
Marine NCOs under Hogaboom and Pew. A similar organiza- 
tion was put into effect in Battery G, where Holdredge and 
Grundels were the two rifle platoon leaders. Training of this 
force of grounded airmen and beached sailors in the ways of the 
combat infantrymen now proceeded in a desperate race against 
time, for a Japanese attack was only a few days away. 

By 7 January, MacArthur's forces on Luzon had withdrawn 
into Bataan and had dug in on their main battle position — a 
line running across the peninsula from Mauban to Mabatang. 
A weakness of this defensive line was that the two corps — Major 
General Jonathan M. Wainwright's I Corps on the left and Major 
General George M. Parker's II Corps on the right — were not in 
contact. They were separated in the center by the 4,2 2 2 -foot 
mass of Mt. Natib. On 9 January, Lieutenant General Masa- 
haru Homma, the Japanese commander in the Philippines, began 


operations designed to seize Bataan and destroy the American 
and Filipino forces under Mac Arthur's command. Following 
two days of artillery bombardment, the Japanese assault troops 
jumped off in the attack, and, after ten days of heavy fighting, 
succeeded in turning the exposed interior flanks of both I and II 
Corps. When all but one regiment of the reserves had been com- 
mitted, MacArthur had no recourse but to order a withdrawal on 
22 January to the rear (and final) battle position — a line stretch- 
ing from Bagac to Orion. ( See Map 15.) 

Before the American withdrawal to the rear battle position, 
the Japanese were planning an amphibious end run designed to 
outflank Wainwright's I Corps. By 2 1 January the 3d Battalion, 
20th Infantry had established itself on the west road behind 
Wainwright's main line of resistance. To Major General Naoki 
Kimura, the enemy commander in western Bataan, the road 
seemed clear south to Bagac, from where he could move east to 
take II Corps in the rear. To prevent a possible American 
reaction south of Bagac and to protect his right flank once he 
started to move east across the peninsula, Kimura decided to land 
a force at Caibobo Point, five miles south of Bagac. 

On the night of 22 January some 900 officers and men of 
the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment embarked at Moron in 
landing craft and set out along the coast for Bagac. Things 
went wrong from the first. Available maps were totally inade- 
quate; the Bataan shore line merged into the looming silhouette 
of the Mariveles Mountains, making identification of a particular 
cove or headland impossible; tides and currents were treacher- 
ous; and a U.S. Navy PT Boat — Number 34, Lieutenant John D. 
Bulkeley commanding — intercepted and sank two of the troop- 
laden landing craft. As a result, the Japanese landing force was 
soon lost and split into two groups. Not a single enemy soldier 
reached Caibobo Point. One group came ashore at Quinauan 
Point; the other landed at Longoskawayan Point, a finger-like 
promontory only 2,000 yards west of Mariveles. This latter 





group of 7 officers and 294 men moved along the jungle-matted 
cliffs to Lapiay Point, the next promontory to the north, and 
advanced inland to the slopes of Mt. Pucot before they were 
discovered. (See Map 16.) 

Mt. Pucot, 617 feet high, dominates Mariveles and the west 
road leading from the harbor north to the main battie line. 
Realizing the importance of the height, Commander Bridget had 
posted a 24-hour lookout on the summit. Hostile machine-gun 
fire directed at the small group of Marines manning this lookout 
post was the first evidence that Japanese forces were in the 

Commander Bridget received word of the presence of the 
enemy at 0840 on 23 January from his Mt. Pucot lookout just be- 
fore it pulled back to Mariveles. Calling Hogaboom and Hold- 
redge, Bridget ordered his Marine battery commanders to send out 
strong patrols. In response to this order, five platoons took the 
field. Bluejacket platoons under Grundels (Battery C) and Pew 
(Battery A) moved out immediately to secure Mt. Pucot itself. 
A bluejacket platoon commanded by Hogaboom followed soon 
after to sweep the ridge south of Pucot; and two others, blue- 
jackets under Holdredge and Marines from the 3-inch gun crews 
of Battery C under 1st Lieutenant Carter B. Simpson, pushed 
through to investigate Longoskawayan and Naicklek Points. 

Pew's platoon moved rapidly to Mt. Pucot, deployed as it 
neared the top, and attacked. Machine-gun and rifle fire greeted 
Pew's men as they neared the observation post, but the Japanese 
quickly withdrew as the Americans pressed their attack. Grun- 
dels' platoon ran into stiff er opposition. Moving down Pucot's 
southeast slope early in the afternoon it ran head-on into a small 
Japanese patrol on the trail. The sailors deployed, hit the deck, 
and opened fire on the Japanese who fired a few rounds in return,, 
then vanished into the jungle. 

Hogaboom's patrol, meanwhile, had climbed the heights im- 
mediately behind the naval station and had swept along the ridge 



towards Mt. Pucot. There was no sign of the enemy until the 
platoon approached this dominant peak, when the sound of rifle 
fire sent Hogaboom and his sailors down the slope towards the 
firing. They came upon Grundels' sailors deployed and firing 
at random into the bushes. Learning from Grundels, who had 
been wounded, what had happened, Hogaboom's platoon ad- 
vanced farther along the trail, but the Japanese had disappeared. 
Simpson's Marine group investigated Point Naicklek without 
making contact with the enemy, while Holdredge had the same 
experience at Longoskawayan. 

At dusk the patrols assembled on Mt. Pucot and set up a de- 
fense on its crest and along the ridges to the south. The five 
officers conferred and agreed that the Japanese had landed only 
a small harassing patrol. 

Bridget, meanwhile, had not been idle. During the day he 
had rounded up about 30 sailors of Air, Asiatic Fleet, and the 
Naval Ammunition Depot and sent them up the hill to reinforce 
the defenses. Sailors of the General Detail Company were held 
in reserve on the West Road. Additional reinforcements were 
provided by USAFFE's Service Command. In response to a 
request from Bridget, Brigadier General Allan C. McBride made 
available men of the grounded 3d Pursuit Squadron, 60 men of 
the 301st Chemical Company, and a 2.95-inch mountain pack 
howitzer and crew from the 71st Philippine Army Division. 

The defensive position on the night of 23-24 January was 
as follows : Battery C, and the Air, Asiatic Fleet, and Naval Am- 
munition Depot Companies along the ridges southeast of Mt. 
Pucot; Battery A on Mt. Pucot; the 301st Chemical Company 
detail on the north slope of the mountain; and the 3d Pursuit 
Squadron extending the line north to the coast at Biaan Point. 
The pack howitzer was emplaced on the saddle southeast of Mt. 

When the sun rose the next morning the Americans looked 
down from their positions along the ridge at jungle-clad slopes 


falling away to the shore of the South China Sea. Jutting out 
from the shore line were two points — the blunt and wide Lapiay 
immediately below Mt. Pucot, and narrow finger-like Longoska- 
wayan Point to the southeast. 

The attack plan was to sweep down the slope and drive the 
Japanese into the sea. To Battery G was assigned the clearing of 
Longoskawayan, while Battery A was to take care of Lapiay. 
For the day's operations the sailors of Air, Asiatic Fleet, and the 
Naval Ammunition Depot were organized into a platoon under 
Platoon Sergeant Robert A. Clements and attached to Battery C. 

Hogaboom's Marines and sailors jumped off shortly after dawn. 
Descending the trail they flushed a couple of Japanese but 
reached the shore north of their objective without further inci- 
dent. They worked their way along the shore to the base of 
Lapiay Point, deployed, and attacked, only to be pinned down by 
a machine gun concealed by a dense mat of jungle vines and 
undergrowth. Hogaboom and Corporal Raymond H. Collins 
worked their way around into a draw behind this gun, but the 
jungle growth was so thick that hand grenades could not be 
thrown through it. Hogaboom dispatched a runner for help, 
and Pew and Simpson soon arrived on the scene with their pla- 
toons, but, even with these reinforcements, advance was not pos- 
sible. A second Japanese machine gun opened up, then mortar 
and howitzer rounds fired from Longoskawayan Point began to 
drop in among the sailors and Marines. As dusk was fast ap- 
proaching, Hogaboom ordered a withdrawal to the jump-off 
position on Mt. Pucot. 

Holdredge's unit had no better luck on Longoskawayan. A 
BAR man and rifleman serving as the point started the action 
when they surprised a Japanese howitzer crew setting up their 
weapon. The two Americans hit the deck and opened fire, 
dropping several of the Japanese. The enemy reaction was 
swift, and Holdredge was forced to withdraw, fighting a rear 
guard action off the point, then pulling back to the defense line 


on Mt. Pucot. When the two Marine battery commanders con- 
ferred that night they concluded that there were at least 200 
Japanese on the two points and that it would take a full-strength 
infantry battalion with supporting weapons to dislodge them. 

Part of this requirement was fulfilled on the 25th, when 2d 
Lieutenant Michael E. Peshek brought over from Corregidor 
a heavy machine gun platoon of Company H and the mortar 
platoon of 3/4. Arriving at Mariveles shortly after noon, Peshek 
and his Marines moved forward, emplaced the two 8 1 mm mortars 
on the saddle north of Mt. Pucot, and opened fire on both Longo- 
skawayan and Lapiay Points. 

Under cover of the mortar fire, the rifle platoons of the naval 
battalion moved down from the ridge into positions opposite the 
two points. When the fire lifted, the attack jumped off. Hoga- 
boom's unit moved onto Lapiay to find that the Japanese had 
withdrawn. On Longoskawayan, Holdredge's force, made up 
of several platoons, ran into heavy Japanese fire, was badly cut 
up, and had to pull back to the ridge. Holdredge himself was 
among the wounded. 

Failure of the attack on 25 January led USAFFE to reorganize 
the command set-up in the rear service area of Bataan and to 
bring up additional fire support. The two corps commanders 
took over the defense of the Service Command Area — each as- 
suming responsibility for the zone behind his own corps. One 
result of this command change was the assignment by General 
Wainwright of a 75mm gun battery of the 88th Field Artillery 
Philippine Scouts ( PS ) to support the naval battalion. An ad- 
ditional, and most impressive, source of fire support came from 
the 1 2 -inch mortars of Battery Geary on Corregidor. Shortly 
after midnight on the 26th the giant weapons laid several rounds 
on Longoskawayan Point. Four of these shots were seen to hit 
the shore line by observers on Mt. Pucot ; the others landed in the 
water. The 26th was given up to artillery "softening up" of 


Longoskawayan preparatory to an all-out assault the next day. 
Infantry action was limited to patrolling. 

At 0700 on 27 January, the 4th Marines' 81 mm mortars, the 
2.95-inch mountain howitzer, the 88th Field Artillery's 75mm 
guns, and the 12 -inch mortars of Battery Geary all opened up 
in a preparatory bombardment of Longoskawayan Point. About 
0800 the infantry — a conglomerate force of about 200 men, of 
whom only 60 to 75 were Marines — moved out in the attack. 
The Marines were scattered among the bluejackets all along the 
line. The plan of attack was to base the advance on the progress 
of the center in taking the series of knobs forming the central 
spine of Longoskawayan Point. 

On the left and right flanks the Marine-sailor skirmish line 
moved steadily ahead, but in the center there was little progress 
in spite of complete silence from the Japanese. About an hour 
after the jump-off, Hogaboom went forward to investigate. He 
found that the failure to advance was not due to enemy action 
but to lack of leadership. No commissioned officer was present, 
and the NCOs appointed as squad leaders were not acting as 
such. The men were under cover waiting for orders. Two 
Marine sergeants, Albert J. Morgan and Leslie D. Sawyer were 
put in command, and, under their leadership, the center of the 
line moved forward. 

The first hill of the central spine was occupied with no opposi- 
tion, and the attack pushed on. Supporting mortar fire had 
now ceased, allowing the Japanese to reoccupy defensive posi- 
tions. As Sergeant Morgan led the point up the forward slope 
of the next hill, enemy machine-gun and rifle fire began to 
sweep the military crest and reverse slope of the hill just captured. 
Efforts to build up fire superiority failed because all favorable 
weapons positions were being swept by enemy fire. There was 
no alternative but to withdraw out of range of the Japanese fire. 
The Marines and sailors fell back under covering mortar fire 
behind the first hill and dug in. 


The Japanese then counterattacked. Mortar rounds strad- 
dled the command post, but timely fire from Peshek's tubes 
silenced the Japanese before they could score a hit. Enemy in- 
filtrators worked their way through the gap in the line which 
had opened up when the left flank had advanced ahead of, and 
out of contact with, the center. As the position on Longoska- 
wayan was becoming untenable, Bridget approved a request to 
withdraw to the Mt. Pucot ridge line. Harassed by enemy 
machine-gun and rifle fire, the Marines and sailors pulled back 
to their original position. Peshek's mortars did yeoman service 
by laying down a barrage to cover the withdrawal. 

At the end of five days of fighting, Bridget's force had made 
little progress in driving the Japanese from Longoskawayan Point. 
Three infantry attacks had failed, and there was no reason to 
believe that another would succeed. In spite of high morale 
the naval battalion was too weak in numbers, in organic fire- 
power, and particularly in ground combat skill to make much 
headway against a well-trained and dug-in enemy. 

MacArthur realized the danger in allowing the Japanese to 
maintain a beachhead threatening USAFFE's communication 
lines and rear areas. Fearing a Japanese effort at reinforcement, 
he ordered Wainwright on the 27th to eliminate the enemy pockets 
as soon as possible. The I Corps commander responded by 
ordering two Philippine Scout infantry battalions to the threat- 
ened areas. During the night of the 27th the 2d Battalion, 57th 
Infantry (PS), relieved the naval battalion on the Mt. Pucot 
ridges. The next morning the Scouts attacked and, two days 
later, the evening of the 29th, had reached the tip of Longoska- 
wayan Point. Only isolated Japanese pockets and stragglers 
remained, and these were mopped up by naval battalion patrols 
and armored launches from the Canopus operating along the 
shore. By 13 February the last Japanese straggler had been 
killed or captured. 

The 3d Battalion, 45th Infantry (PS), and other troops had 


meanwhile wiped out the Japanese landing force on Quinauan 
Point after bitter fighting. An effort by the Japanese to reinforce 
their position was defeated by two Philippine Scout battalions 
and other units. 

The naval battalion suffered 37 casualties — 11 killed and 26 
wounded — during the battle for the points, while the Scouts lost 
1 1 killed and 27 wounded. The Japanese lost their entire landing 
force of about 300 men. 

The action at Longoskawayan Point illustrated the old military 
lesson that combat-ready troops can easily achieve what men 
untrained in ground operations, no matter how willing, find 
difficult or impossible. Nevertheless, the sailors and Marines of 
the naval battalion, by prompt action, seized and held the vital 
heights of Mt. Pucot on the first day of action and bottled up 
the Japanese in Longoskawayan Point until trained troops could 


Life on Corregidor, meanwhile, had been far from uneventful. 
While their comrades were fighting the Japanese landing force 
in the jungle of Longoskawayan, the main body of the regiment 
on Corregidor and the small detachments on the lesser fortified 
islands were undergoing intermittent aerial and artillery bom- 
bardment. The attack of 29 December marked the beginning of 
ten days of air attacks by planes of the 5th Air Group (Army) 
and nth Air Fleet (Navy). Damage was limited almost en- 
tirely to above-ground wooden buildings and supplies stored in 
the open or in wooden structures. Concrete buildings suffered 
less, and most of the supplies in them could be salvaged. Weap- 
ons suffered only minor damage and were quickly repaired. No 
over-all record of total casualties was kept, but at least 36 men 
were killed and another 140 wounded on the first two days of 
the attack alone. Cessation of the bombings on that date was 


dictated by necessity rather than by choice, because the $th Air 
Group was reassigned to Thailand, leaving Homma with only a 
few planes which he could not afford to risk against Corregidor. 

The end of the first aerial bombardment gave the defenders of 
the fortified islands only a brief respite, for, on 5 February, 
Japanese artillery opened up from the Gavite shore. These were 
the four 105mm and four 155mm guns of the Kondo Detach- 
ment — named Japanese-style after the commanding officer, 
Major Toshinoro Kondo. Fires from Kondo's weapons were 
mostly harassment for the defenders of the islands in the bay. 
The only serious damage was to the power plant on Corregidor 
and to several observation posts on Fort Hughes. 

By the end of February the Kondo fires had slacked off to 
occasional harassing rounds, but the Japanese were not abandon- 
ing bombardment of the fortified islands from the Cavite shore. 
They were, rather, strengthening their artillery for a greater 
effort. Reinforcements, consisting of the 1st Heavy Artillery 
Regiment and the 2d Independent Heavy Artillery Battery, ar- 
rived early in March. The strengthened unit, now named the 
Hayakawa Detachment after Colonel Masoyoshi Hayakawa, its 
commanding officer, opened up on 15 March with a volley of 
240mm fire and continued until the 2 2d when Hayakawa and 
his detachment were recalled to Bataan. Damage was much 
greater than that inflicted by the Kondo Detachment. Forts 
Drum and Frank, nearest to the Cavite shore, suffered most. Two 
antiaircraft guns on Frank were destroyed, and the seacoast guns 
were heavily damaged. 

The withdrawal of the Hayakawa Detachment from Cavite 
on 22 March provided only a two-day respite from bombard- 
ment for the Americans and Filipinos on the "Rock." On the 
24th a second and far heavier air assault was launched by the 
heavy bombers of the 60th and 6sd Bombardment Regiments 
(Army) and by two land-based and one carrier-based squadrons 
of navy bombers. From their base at Clark Field near Manila 


and from the carrier deck the Japanese aircraft rose to batter 
Corregidor. During the last week in March there were no 
fewer than 60 air-raid alarms lasting for a total of 74 hours. 

In spite of the intensity of the attack, damage on Corregidor 
was not extensive. Profiting from earlier attacks, the members 
of the "Rock's" garrison had dug themselves in. Supplies and 
vital installations had also been sandbagged or otherwise bomb- 
proofed. Most of the buildings remaining above ground were 
demolished, the few supplies still stored in the open were de- 
stroyed, and a few ammunition dumps went up. But the de- 
fenses of the island remained intact. 

The 4th Marines on Corregidor did not suffer heavily from 
all these Japanese aerial and artillery attacks since 29 December. 
Through 9 April, the day when the fall of Bataan gave the 
enemy greatly superior artillery positions from which to pound 
the island fortress, Marine casualties amounted to only 5 killed 
and 55 wounded. 12 


By the end of March the heavy aerial assault on Corregidor 
was over. Homma then shifted the bulk of his aircraft to sup- 
port the all-out drive on Bataan. The war was then nearly four 
months old, and for three of those months, the Japanese had 
been battering Corregidor from land and air. In spite of these 
attacks, the defenses of the "Rock" were actually stronger at 
the end of March than they had been at the end of December. 

When the 4th Marines took over the defense sectors on 29 De- 
cember there was much to be done before the beach defenses 
could hope to turn back a Japanese landing attack. The West 
and Central Sectors, with a few pillboxes set deep in the ravines 
leading to Topside and Middleside, were better prepared than 

13 Casualty figures from PersAccountingSec, HQMC, Final WW II casualty 
tabulation, dtd 26Aug52 (copy in HistBr, HQMC). 


the East Sector, where practically nothing had been done except 
to prepare a final defense line on the east side of Malinta Hill. 

There was more than enough work for all hands to prepare 
adequate positions covering the likely landing beaches, and short- 
ages of personnel and equipment added to the difficulties of the 
task. In early January 1942, the 4th Marines totalled about 
1,600 officers and men, of whom only about 1,250 were available 
for Corregidor beach defense. The remainder were on Bataan 
and at Forts Hughes and Drum. Of the 1,250 assigned to 
defend the beaches, 375 were assigned to 1/4 in the East Sector, 
350 to 3/4 in the Middle Sector, 360 to 2/4 in the West Sector, 
and 145 to Headquarters and Service Companies in reserve. 
(See Map 17.) 

After a thorough reconnaissance of the island and consulta- 
tions with his staff, Colonel Howard decided upon a "positive" 
beach defense. This plan, approved by General Moore, com- 
mitted the 4th Marines to turn back a Japanese landing attempt 
at the beaches. Accordingly, all hands turned to digging 
trenches and weapons emplacements and to stringing wire close 
to the water's edge wherever the terrain was favorable for a 

The most vulnerable area was the East Sector, where there 
were long stretches of open beaches with only a slight rise in 
elevation blocking movement inland. The best landing areas 
were on the north side from the eastern tip of the island to a 
line across the island from Monkey Point to Infantry Point. 
The convex curve of the shore line minimized the defensive fire- 
power which could be brought to bear on any given spot. To 
the west, the shore became steep and indented, providing the 
defenders with dominating positions for enfilade fire against an 
attacker landing on the beaches. From the attacker's point of 
view, however, there was one serious disadvantage to landing on 
eastern Corregidor — the mass of Malinta Hill blocked egress 



from the narrow tail to the broad tadpole head represented by 
Middleside and Topside. 

The Middle and West Sectors offered little encouragement to 
the amphibious attacker. Bottomside, though flat, was domi- 
nated by high ground on either side. Middleside and Topside, 
which rose steeply from the sea, were nearly inaccessible from 
the water. The best approaches were through three ravines — 
James and Cheney on the west and Ramsay on the south. 

January, February, and March slipped by. Each day was 
much like another for the Marines of the 4th Regiment. They 
worked continually on the defenses, digging weapons emplace- 
ments, trenches, foxholes, and tank traps, and stringing barbed 
wire along the rocky beaches. Marines did all the digging with 
picks and shovels, and they cared for their tools "like precious 
gems" 13 because the rocky ground was hard on the irreplaceable 
tools. Sandbags were in short supply, so powder cans of all 
sizes, from 3 to 12 inches, were filled with dirt and used as 
substitutes. Working under these handicaps, without proper 
tools and equipment, the 4th Marines nevertheless completed an 
impressive amount of engineering work. By the end of March 
over 20 miles of barbed wire had been strung in the East Sector 
alone. Anti-boat cables had been put in place across both the 
north and south harbors. Mines improvised from aerial bombs 
were laid along the beach in South Harbor from South Dock 
to a point 375 yards west, in front of the tank barrier on 
Cavalry Point Beach, and behind the tank barrier on Camp 
Point. Trenches and observation posts had been dug and sand- 
bagged. In addition, the Army engineers had built concrete 
splinter-proof roofs over some of the 75mm gun emplacements. 

Firepower of the beach defenses was impressive. By the end 
of March the 4th Marines, by diligent search and exploitation 
of all possible sources on Corregidor, possessed a total of 225 
machine guns — 167 .30 caliber watercooled, 49 .50 caliber, and 

13 Jenkins Rept. 


9 Lewis .30 caliber. There were, in addition, 20 37mm guns, 
some of which had formerly been mounted on the tubes of 
Corregidor's heavy guns for use in subcaliber practice firing. 
Dismounted from the gun tubes, they were repositioned as anti- 
boat guns in the beach defense. Reinforcing the organic fire- 
power of the 4th Marines was the Beach Defense Artillery, 
Colonel Delbert Ausmus, USA, commanding. It included one 
155mm, 23 75mm, and 2 3-inch naval guns — a total of 26 
weapons. Finally, many of the heavy seacoast weapons could 
be brought to bear on the waters separating Corregidor from 

The some 1,250 Marines assigned to the beach defenses of 
Corregidor on 29 December were far too few to provide an 
effective beach defense for the island. Typical of how spread- 
thin the Marines were was the East Sector, where 1 /4 with only 
375 men was responsible for approximately 9,000 yards of beach. 
The other sectors were no better. On 3 January a modest rein- 
forcement, in the form of 128 retired Filipino Navy mess men 
recalled to active duty from the Fleet Reserve, reported in and 
were assigned to the defense sectors. About six weeks later, 
on 1 7 February, an additional reinforcement arrived from Bataan. 
Included were 731 Philippine Air Force cadets and 9 Navy 
officers and 327 sailors from Mariveles. 14 

The Filipinos gave many of the Marines their first idea of 
how rugged the fighting was on Bataan. The cadets, who were 
mostly young boys, had been used as infantry since they had no 
planes. Many of them were weak from lack of food and fatigue. 
Some were sick from malaria and dysentery. Although they 
had been serving as infantry and were equipped with old Enfield 
rifles, few of them had any knowledge of infantry tactics. Most 
of them had never even been trained in rifle marksmanship. 

On 1 9 February, Hogaboom's Battery A was withdrawn from 
Mariveles, disbanded, and its personnel reassigned to Headquar- 

14 4th Mar Rec of Events, 3jan, i7Feb42. 


ters Company, 4th Marines, to strengthen the reserve. Since 
the arrival of the regiment on the "Rock" all personnel of Head- 
quarters and Service Companies not assigned to the battalions 
had been formed into a Regimental Reserve Company. Its 
members continued to perform specialist functions but were ready 
to act as infantry if necessary. With the assignment of the 
Marines from Battery A, some Filipinos from the Fleet Reserve, 
and a few Philippine Air Force men, the regimental reserve was 
reorganized as a two-company battalion. Major Max Schaeffer 
became battalion commander on 19 February, relieving Major 
King. Captain Robert Chambers took command of Company 
O and Hogaboom of Company P. 15 

From the end of December to the beginning of April the de- 
fenders of Corregidor had worked to strengthen their defenses 
in spite of Japanese shelling and air attack. For three months 
they had been striving to make every possible preparation for 
the expected Japanese landing attack. On 9 April the final 
collapse of American and Filipino resistance on Bataan was to 
precipitate the ultimate test for the defenders of the "Rock." 


Since the failure of the Japanese to crack MacArthur's main 
battle position in January and February, Homma had been mak- 
ing ready for another try. His depleted units had been rebuilt 
with replacements from the homeland, and fresh troops, con- 
sisting of a division, a strongly reinforced infantry regiment, two 
heavy bomber regiments, and additional 240mm howitzers, had 
been added. While the Japanese grew stronger, the Americans 
and Filipinos were becoming weaker. On half rations since 5 
January, the food allowance was further cut to % ration on 2 
March. The USAFFE Surgeon General had estimated that the 
defenders of Bataan were only 55 per cent combat efficient in 

13 4th Mar Rec of Events, igFeb42. 


mid-February as a result of the ravages of malaria, dysentery, 
and general malnutrition. A month later, General Wainwright 
recalled after the war, the troops wanted to fight but "with not 
enough food in their bellies to sustain a dog." 16 

Changes in the top-level American command had taken place 
during March. On the i ith MacArthur, on orders from Presi- 
dent Roosevelt, left the Philippines to take over the new Allied 
command in the Southwest Pacific. To replace USAFFE the 
War Department created a new command entitled, United States 
Forces in the Philippines (USFIP) . Wainwright, now promoted 
to lieutenant general, became USFIP commander. Major Gen- 
eral Edward P. King, Jr., took over as commander of Luzon 
Force — the American and Filipino troops on Bataan. 

The Japanese attack jumped off on 3 April and was successful 
from the start. The half-starved, disease-ridden Americans and 
Filipinos were unable to stop the enemy assault. By the 7th the 
last reserves had been committed but to no avail, for the Japa- 
nese had broken through King's defenses and were pushing 
steadily ahead towards Mariveles at the tip of the peninsula. 
Under the circumstances, King had no choice but to surrender, 
so he ordered the destruction of all ammunition and other stores 
which could not be moved to Corregidor, and the evacuation of 
nurses and antiaircraft batteries and the 45th Infantry (PS) to 
the "Rock." This done, he went forward under a white flag to 
seek terms from General Homma. 

About midnight of the 8th, Marines on Corregidor were jolted 
by violent explosions on Bataan as the ammunition stores at 
Mariveles were set off. According to one observer, "the southern 
end of Bataan was a huge conflagration which resembled more 
than anything else a volcano in violent eruption . . . ." 17 

10 Gen Jonathan G. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, Robert 
Gonsidine, ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1946), 
p. 76. 

17 LCdr T. C. Parker, "The Epic of Corregidor-Bataan, December 24, 1941- 
May 4, 1942," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 69, no. 1 
(Jan43), p. 18. 


Through a lethal rain of falling fragments and debris, frantic 
refugees jammed aboard everything that would float and shoved 
of! for Corregidor. The next morning an observer on Corregidor 
could plainly see "several small launches in the North Channel, 
loaded with men escaping from Bataan .... As we watched, 
Jap artillery . . . opened fire on them. The first shots were 
misses, but soon we could see shells hitting and completely pierc- 
ing the hulls, leaving large ragged holes. People jumped over- 
board and swam toward Corregidor; some made it, but many 
did not." 18 

Of the 4th Marines stationed on Bataan, only the 2 officers 
and 64 enlisted men of Battery C escaped to Corregidor. Miss- 
ing and presumed to be prisoners of war were 6 officers and 7 1 
enlisted men. 19 

Most of the troops who escaped from Bataan were attached 
to the 4th Marines to bolster the beach defense. Regimental 
strength was thus greatly reinforced by the addition of about 
1,200 officers and men of the U.S. Navy, Army, and the Philip- 
pine armed services. But their contribution to beach defense was 
far less than the numbers would indicate. The Bataan survivors 
were weakened by disease and malnutrition. "I had never seen 
men in such poor physical condition," reported 1st Lieutenant 
Robert F. Jenkins, commander of 1/4's reserve. "Their clothing 
was ragged and stained from perspiration and dirt. Their gaunt, 
unshaven faces were strained and emaciated. Some of them were 
already suffering from beri-beri as a result of a starvation diet of 
rice for weeks." 20 

The 4th Marines, as finally constituted, was undoubtedly the 
strangest Marine regiment in history. No fewer than 142 organ- 
izations, representing all U.S. and Philippine armed services, 
were included. Total strength was 3,891 officers and men on 1 

18 Jenkins Rept. 

19 4th Mar Rec of Events, 9Apr42. 

20 Jenkins Rept. 


May, but only 1,440 were Marines. This strength was distributed 
as follows: 21 

I St 












O O T 

33 1 



1 uu 

t /i a rt 
I, 44O 












1 1 



JTllllllJUlXlC ixdvy 


T T 
1 1 


A A 


Philippine Army 





Philippine Air Force 






Philippine Constabulary 





Philippine Scouts 











3, 891 

In addition to the American and Filipino personnel distributed 
among the three regular battalions and the reserve battalion, a 
4th Battalion was made up of sailors from Mariveles on 9 April. 
Major Francis H. Williams and five NCOs were the only 
Marines in the battalion. A group of 9 Army and 18 Navy 
officers filled the staff positions and provided the company com- 
manders and platoon leaders. Four rifle companies, designated 
Q, R, S, and T, formed the battalion and were the highest any 
Marine had ever heard of. Another boast of the 4th Battalion 
men was that they were the highest-paid battalion in the world, 
since most of the men were petty officers of the higher grades. 

To make of 4/4 a battalion in more than name was a formida- 
ble task. Few if any of the sailors had any knowledge of infantry 
tactics ; most of them had not even fired a rifle since their days in 
Navy boot camp. Training was all but impossible, for the inten- 
sity of the Japanese bombardment kept the men huddled in the 
foxholes along the trail between Geary Point and Government 
Ravine. Whenever the fire let up, small groups of men gathered 
around the Army officers and Marine NCOs for training in 
weapons and infantry tactics. At night, when the Japanese artil- 

21 4th Mar Rec of Events, iMay42. 
519667—60 17 


lery was limited to harassing and interdictory fire, the sailors 
listened attentively to the Army veterans of Bataan expound on 
enemy tactics. 

The mission of 4/4 was to reinforce the reserve of the beach 
defense — a task ordinarily assigned to a highly trained and well- 
equipped combat unit. The 4th Battalion was neither well- 
equipped nor well-trained. Rifles and hand grenades constituted 
the only weapons, and the incessant enemy bombardment pre- 
vented the drilling of the men in tactical exercises. If it became 
necessary to commit the reserve to repulse the long-expected 
Japanese landing attack, the poorly trained and equipped sailors 
of 4/4 would have to move out from their bivouac area under 
heavy shellflre and probably in darkness. They would have to 
deploy and attack under these difficult conditions, with constant 
danger that the units would become separated or that the attack 
would stall. But Colonel Howard, having committed his regular 
battalions to the beach defense lines, had no recourse except to 
use the remaining troops assigned to him for his reserve. What 
the men of 4/4 lacked in skill and firepower they would have to 
make up in courage. 


On 9 April the victorious Japanese on the tip of Bataan could 
look across the two-mile wide North Channel at their final target 
of the Philippine campaign — Corregidor. The enemy attack 
plan called for a two-pronged assault at opposite ends of the 
island. The 4th Division, reinforced, was designated as the land- 
ing force. In the first stage the two-battalion 61st Infantry 
Regiment was to land in successive waves, battalions abreast 
between Cavalry and Infantry Points on the north coast of the 
East Sector. Once ashore, the landing force was to split — a 
smaller force cutting straight across the island, and the larger 
group driving against Malinta Hill. The landing was scheduled 


for the night of 5 May, and by dawn Malinta Hill was to be 
taken. Twenty-four hours after the first landing, the main 
body of the 4th Division (four heavily reinforced infantry bat- 
talions) was to come ashore on the north coast of Topside and 
Middleside between Rock Point and Battery Point, with the main 
effort between Morrison and Battery Points. In addition, a 
tank force was to land in Corregidor Bay. 

Preparations for landing began but an immediate assault was 
not possible, owing to the necessity for assembling landing craft 
in Manila Bay. Three weeks were required for this concentra- 
tion because the guns of Corregidor limited movement to small 
groups under cover of darkness. 

The Japanese, meanwhile, took advantage of commanding 
positions on Bataan to emplace an overwhelming force of artil- 
lery with which to batter the defenses of Corregidor. At least 
37 batteries, with weapons ranging from 75 to 240mm were 
employed. 22 Enemy artillerists on Bataan, aided by aerial spot- 
ting, had every inch of the island under observation, and they 
took advantage of it to blanket the "Rock" with artillery fire. 
As the American antiaircraft guns were knocked out, Japanese 
pilots became increasingly bold, swooping ever lower to pinpoint 
their targets for bombing attacks. The shelling and bombing 
never really stopped. So many were the weapons available to 
them that the Japanese were able to maintain fire almost con- 
tinuously. The once dense vegetation was stripped away, and 
movement above ground became practically impossible in 

Japanese air and artillery attacks during April reached a 
climax on the 29th — Emperor Hirohito's birthday. That day, 
according to one observer, even "the kitchen sink came over." 23 
But the month of May opened with an even heavier bombard- 

23 This is the figure given in HistSec, G-2, GHQ, FEC, Japanese Studies 
in WW II No. 1, 14th Army Ops, 187 (OCMH). 

28 Parker, "The Epic of Corregidor-Bataan," op. ext., p. 18. 


ment. Homma's forces were now poised for the assault. Jap- 
anese artillery and aircraft opened the final pre-assault 
bombardment, intended, according to Homma's orders, to crush 
the defenses and exterminate the defenders. For four days Jap- 
anese aircraft and artillery pounded Corregidor incessantly. On 
4 May the bombardment reached its climax with an estimated 
16,000 shells of all calibers striking the island in a 24-hour 

By the evening of 5 May the great batteries of Corregidor 
were silenced. Of the seacoast artillery only three 155mm guns 
remained in action. The 1 4-inch guns of Forts Frank and Drum 
were still firing but were not effective against the Japanese 
batteries on Bataan because of the extreme range. All wire 
communication was gone, making central command all but 

The beach defenses had suffered heavily but were not totally 
destroyed. Defense installations suffered most. Wire entangle- 
ments, tank traps, mine fields, wire communications, and weap- 
ons emplacements had been practically all destroyed. The 
weapons themselves had not suffered so badly. Of the 25 beach 
defense artillery pieces, only 9 had been destroyed by enemy 
action by the time Corregidor surrendered. Four of the nine 
weapons in the east sector had been knocked out. 24 

No record exists of how many of the machine guns assigned 
to the beach defense had been knocked out by enemy fire before 
the landing. But that some of them were still operative is at- 
tested by the fact that they opened up on the Japanese landing 
craft. The commander of the two-gun battery at Hooker Point, 
for instance, reported that the continuous stream of tracer bullets 

21 MajGen George F. Moore, Rept on GA Command and the Harbor De- 
fense of Manila and Subic Bays, i4Feb4i-6May42, Exhibit G, Beach Defense 
Artillery Tabulation (OCMH), hereafter Moore Rept. This tabulation was 
made by Col Delbert Ausmus, USA, the Beach Defense Artillery Commander 
who personally inspected all the gun positions immediately after the 


from the shore gave enough light to iUuminate the enemy craft 
in the water. 

Casualties within the regiment were not excessive prior to the 
landing. Available figures indicate that 20 Marines were killed, 
and 75 wounded between 9 April and 2 May. 25 No figures are 
available to show casualties among the attached personnel of 
other services. Losses among unit leaders, who exposed them- 
selves to check defenses, were disproportionately high. In the 
1 st Battalion alone, two company commanders and five other 
officers were casualties. 


The intensity of the bombardment during the first five days of 
May indicated to Corregidor's defenders that a Japanese landing 
was imminent. It was no surprise, therefore, when about 2100 
on 5 May the delicate sound locators of the antiaircraft command 
picked up the noise of many landing craft motors off the Bataan 
shore. About an hour later, landing craft were sighted approach- 
ing the tail of the island, and at 2230 the order was issued to 
"prepare for probable landing attack." 26 

The men of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, were eating their 
evening meal when the invasion alarm was sounded. At about 
2130 there had been a lull in the bombardment, and hot food 
was being delivered to the men, who had not eaten since morn- 
ing, at their positions. Deployed along the north shore were 
three units: the Reserve Company (1st Lieutenant Robert F. 
Jenkins) on the slopes of Malinta Hill; a rifle platoon formed 
from Headquarters Company (Captain Lewis H. Pickup) from 
Engineer to Infantry Points ; and Company A ( also commanded 
by Pickup since the death of Major Harry C. Lang) manning 
the rest of the north shore. 

25 PersAccountingSec, HQMC, Final WW II casualty tabulation, dtd 
26Aug 52 (HistBr, HQMC). 
28 Moore Rept., p. 71. 


The Company A sector was further broken down into three 
platoon sub-sectors as follows: ist Lieutenant William F. Harris' 
i st Platoon, Infantry to Cavalry Points; Master Gunnery Sergeant 
John Mercurio's 2d Platoon, Cavalry to North Points; and ist 
Sergeant Noble W. Well's 3d Platoon, North Point to the tip of 
the island. Company B (ist Lieutenant Alan S. Manning) 
manned the entire south shore of the East Sector, and the heavy 
machine guns of Captain Noel O. Castle's Company D were 
emplaced to support the beach defenses on both sides of the 
island. The company's few mortars were emplaced near Malinta 
Hill. (See Map 18.) 

The heavy Japanese preliminary bombardment had practically 
destroyed the coordinated and cohesive defenses of the Eastern 
Sector. Lieutenant Colonel Beecher, from his command post in 
Malinta Tunnel, could communicate with his subordinates only 
by runner, as all wire communications had been destroyed. And 
the intense enemy shellfire made the use of runners hazardous 
and uncertain. By the evening of 5 May, 1/4's sector had been 
reduced to isolated strong points. 

Soon after the invasion alert was sounded, the Japanese re- 
sumed their bombardment, laying down the heaviest barrage yet 
delivered. These fires fell on the beaches defended by Harris' 
ist Platoon of Company A — the area selected by the enemy for 
the landing of Colonel Sato's 61st Infantry Regiment. Shortly 
after 2300 these fires shifted west from the beaches to seal off 
the tail of the island. Sato's assault waves failed to land as 
planned. Carried eastward by a strong and unexpected current, 
the Japanese landing craft of the ist Battalion headed in toward 
the North Point beaches manned by Mercurio's 2d Platoon. 

When the defenders ashore sighted the landing craft heading 
in towards the beaches, they opened up with every available 
weapon. The two-gun 75mm battery near the tail of the island 
and a few 37mm guns opened up at a range of about 300 yards. 
Machine guns and rifles added to the fire. At point-blank range 



they sank a number of landing craft and caused heavy casualties. 
The 2d Battalion, 6ist Infantry was carried farther out of posi- 
tion than the ist Battalion and began to land about midnight. 
Under the light of the moon, which had now risen, the Japanese 
were clearly visible to the beach defenders. There was now 
enough light for heavy artillery fire, and all the remaining weap- 
ons on Corregidor and Fort Hughes opened up, churning the 
waters of the channel into a froth. To the Japanese soldiers in 
the boats it seemed as though "a hundred guns rained hot steel 
on them." 27 

The Japanese, who had expected to land unscathed, suffered 
heavily. Estimates by enemy officers of casualties in the ist 
Battalion ranged from 50 to 75 per cent, while losses in the 2d 
Battalion were believed to be higher, one officer placing the 
number of drowned alone above 50 per cent. Total casualties 
numbered in the hundreds, but Sato landed enough of his troops 
to overcome the beach defense and push inland towards his 

One force pushed south across the island, reaching Monkey 
Point on the opposite shore by 0100 and cutting off the troops 
on the eastern tip. Sato's main body, meanwhile, advanced 
west along the spine of the island towards Malinta Hill. By 
0130 the Japanese were in possession of the position formerly 
occupied by Denver Battery on the ridge south of Cavalry Point. 

Marine Gunner Harold M. Ferrell of Company D was the 
first Marine to discover that Denver Battery was in enemy hands. 
Going up to establish contact with the defenders, he found the 
place swarming with enemy soldiers. Ferrell ran back to his 
defense position and brought up some men to form a line "to 
prevent the enemy from coming down on the backs of the men 
on the beaches." 28 Pickup, informed by Ferrell of what was 

27 Kazumaro Uno, Corregidor: Isle of Delusion (Shanghai: Press Bureau, 
Imperial Japanese Army, China, 1942), quoted in Morton, Fall of the 
Philippines, p. 556. 

28 WO Harold M. Ferrell, Informal Rept., Corregidor, 5~6May42. 


going on, at first considered pulling Harris' platoon off the 
beaches to counterattack the Japanese on Denver. But he de- 
cided against it because the withdrawal would leave several 
hundred yards of beach undefended. All the men who could be 
spared were sent from the beach defenses to reinforce the line 
astride the ridge line just west of Denver, but it was clear that 
the Japanese were stronger than the force trying to contain 
them. Before long, snipers and infiltrating groups began to 
show up in the rear of the Company A position. 


Colonel Howard at his command post in Malinta Tunnel was 
informed by runner of the situation at Denver. About 0200 he 
committed the first element of his reserve — Major Schaeffer's 
Reserve Battalion. This unit was standing by in Malinta 
Tunnel, having been ordered to move up from bivouac posi- 
tions in Government Ravine shortly after the Japanese landed. 
Schaeffer's Marines started out of the tunnel along the deeply 
cratered road to Denver Battery. Hogaboom's company in the 
lead followed the left fork of the road under the guidance of 
Captain Golland L. Clark, Jr., adjutant of 1/4. Once clear 
of the tunnel, Hogaboom deployed his men as skirmishers and 
advanced towards the Denver position. Reaching the 1st Bat- 
talion's defense line, he tied in on the left with the remnants 
of Harris' platoon. But Hogaboom's right flank was open. 
Captain Chambers' Company O, which had followed Company 
P out of the tunnel, had been caught by heavy Japanese artillery 
fire. Only Quartermaster Clerk Frank W. Ferguson's 1st 
Platoon came through in condition to fight. Of the other two 
platoons only about a dozen men reached the firing line opposite 
Denver Battery. 

Major Schaeffer took command of the line facing Denver 
and launched three separate counterattacks. All failed. The 


skillfully emplaced Japanese automatic weapons defied every 
effort of the American and Filipino riflemen to jar them loose. 
Mortars were urgently needed but were not available. Casual- 
ties were so heavy that SchaefTer's command was rapidly becom- 
ing ineffective, and the Japanese automatic weapons fire seemed 
as strong as ever. 

At 0430 Howard threw in his last reserves. He ordered 
Major Williams to move his battalion up to reinforce the Denver 
defense line, and the sailors of 4/4 moved out of the tunnel 
shortly before dawn. A heavy barrage which caught them 
about 500 yards east of the exit scattered the column and caused 
many casualties. Regrouping, Williams' men pushed on in line 
of skirmishers to join the firing line. Companies Q and R, com- 
manded by Army Captains Paul C. Moore and Harold E. 
Dalness, reinforced the remnants of Companies A and P on the 
left flank; Navy Lieutenant Bethel B. Otter's Company T took 
position in the center opposite Denver Battery itself; and two 
platoons of Company S filled in the gaps on the right. 

By mutual consent Williams took over command from SchaefTer 
(who was senior) and set the attack hour for 0615. Every 
officer and man still able to stand took part in the attack; there 
was no reserve left. Moore and Dalness on the left drove the 
Japanese back about 200-300 yards but failure of the rest of the 
line to advance forced Williams to hold up the attack on the 
left. Japanese machine guns and mortars in the Denver bat- 
tery position had stalled the attack along the rest of the line. 
In a desperate attempt to knock out one Japanese heavy machine 
gun which was particularly bothersome, Lieutenant Otter and 
five volunteers armed with hand grenades worked their way to 
within 30 yards of the gun positions. They hurled grenades 
among the enemy gun crew, temporarily silencing the weapon, 
but other Japanese took over and opened fire again, killing Otter 
and four others. 

An attempt was made to bring the obsolete 3-inch Stokes 


mortars of 1/4 into action to knock out the Japanese in Denver 
Battery, but these weapons had no sights and were so inac- 
curate that Williams had to order them to cease fire when stray 
rounds fell among his own men. The attack had stalled com- 
pletely, casualties were mounting, and Japanese were beginning 
to infiltrate along the beaches into the rear areas. About 0800, 
Howard committed an additional reserve — Captain Herman 
Hauck, USA, and 60 men of the 59th Coast Artillery, just made 
available by General Moore. Williams put Hauck's unit into 
the line on the left flank to stop enemy infiltration along the 

But Williams' position was still desperate. Unable to advance, 
his last reserves committed, with casualties steadily mounting, 
and with the enemy build-up continuing, there was little hope 
of success. The final blow came about 0930 when three Jap- 
anese tanks landed and went into action. The men in front 
of Denver Battery spotted them and began to fall back just as 
Japanese artillery delivered a heavy barrage. Williams and his 
surviving leaders tried to stop the withdrawal but were prevented 
by the enemy shellfire from regaining control. 

At 1030 Williams ordered a general withdrawal to the ruins 
of a concrete trench a few yards forward of the entrance to 
Malinta tunnel. Through a barrage which rolled back and 
forth between Denver and the tunnel entrance the remnants of 
Williams' command made their way back to the trench. It 
was a pitiful handful who finally made it — about 150 officers 
and men, many of them wounded. About 1 130 Williams, who 
was wounded tamself, went into the tunnel to ask Howard for 
anti-tank guns and reinforcements. But it was all over : General 
Wainwright had decided to surrender. 


The landing of the Japanese tanks had been the deciding 
factor in Wainwright's decision to surrender. Realizing that 


the defenses outside Malinta tunnel could not hold out much 
longer and expecting further Japanese landings that night, 
Wainwright decided to sacrifice one day of freedom in exchange 
for several thousand lives. He was particularly fearful of what 
would happen were the Japanese to capture the tunnel where 
lay 1,000 helpless wounded men. Orders were issued for the 
destruction of all weapons larger than .45 caliber. The veterans 
of the 2d and 3d Battalions, who had been forced to stand idly 
by while their comrades were engaged in a desperate struggle 
at the eastern end of the island, bitterly smashed their rifles 
against the rocks. Colonel Howard burned the regimental and 
national colors to prevent their capture by the enemy. About 
1300, Captain Golland L. Clark and Lieutenant Alan S. Man- 
ning, accompanied by an interpreter and a field music, went 
forward with a white flag to carry Wainwright's surrender 
message to the Japanese. 

The survivors of the regiment were quickly rounded up by 
the victorious Japanese. Casualties of the Marines for the entire 
Philippines campaign totalled 331 killed in action, died of 
wounds, and missing and presumed dead, and 357 wounded in 
action. 29 With the surrender, the regiment ceased to exist, but 
the spirit of the 4th lived on among those Marines who had 
served in it in happier days. That a new 4th would be created 
to carry on the traditions of the old and to redeem its honor in 
total victory over the Japanese, was practically a certainty from 
the dark moment on 6 May when Colonel Howard burned the 
regimental colors and led his Marines into captivity. 

29 PersAccountingSec, HQMG, Final WW II casualty tabulation, dtd 
26Aug 5 2 (HistBr, HQMC). 


Emirau and Guam 


On i February 1944, one year and nine months after the sur- 
render of Corregidor, the 4th Marines was reactivated on 
Guadalcanal. Forming the nucleus of the new 4th Regiment 
were the Marine raiders, some of the Corps' most colorful and 
battle-hardened units. Organized to carry out hit-and-run tactics 
against enemy rear areas and communications lines, the raiders 
had distinguished themselves both in their original role and in 
regular infantry missions. 

The 1 st Raider Battalion had participated in the seizure of 
Tulagi Island in the Solomons on 7-8 August 1942. After cap- 
ture of the island had been completed, the battalion moved across 
to Guadalcanal, where it participated in several patrols behind 
enemy lines, and held a key sector of the 1st Marine Division per- 
imeter during the Japanese attack of 12-14 September 1942. 

Two companies of the 2d Raider Battalion landed on 17 Au- 
gust 1942 from submarines on Makin Island in the Gilberts to 
destroy enemy installations. The whole battalion then moved to 
Guadalcanal where it arrived in time to join in the final opera- 
tions which drove the Japanese from the island. 

With the activation of the 3d and 4th Battalions, the four 
raider units were consolidated on 15 March 1943 into the 1st 
Raider Regiment. A part of this regiment took part in the New 
Georgia operation during July and August 1943; then in Sep- 
tember the 2d and 3d Battalions were detached to form the 2d 



Raider Regiment (Provisional) . Attached to the 3d Marine Di- 
vision, this raider regiment participated in the Bougainville 
operation. 1 

By the end of 1943 the need for hit-and-run tactics was no 
longer sufficient to justify units specially organized for the pur- 
pose. At the same time, the recently authorized expansion to 
six divisions would require every available Marine. General 
Holcomb decided, therefore, to disband the raiders and to use 
the personnel thus released to organize an additional regular 
infantry regiment. 

Selection of the 4th Marines as the new unit was proposed by 
Lieutenant General Alexander A. Vandegrift, who had arrived 
in Washington to succeed General Holcomb as Commandant. 
The traditions and battle honors would thereby be preserved, 
and, too, the stigma of defeat and capture would be partially 
removed. Rebirth of the 4th Marines would symbolize the turn- 
ing tide of the war from defeat to victory. 2 

Lieutenant Colonel Alan Shapley became the commanding 
officer of the newly reactivated 4th Marines. A former Naval 
Academy football star, Shapley had commanded in turn the 2d 
Raider Battalion, the 2d Raider Regiment (Provisional), and 
the 1 st Raider Regiment. He had been decorated for bravery 
on the first day of the war, when, as commander of the Marine 
Detachment on board the battleship Arizona, he had been blown 
from the mainmast control station during the Japanese raid on 
Pearl Harbor. Though stunned, he had rescued another man 
from drowning, thereby winning the Silver Star. 3 

^oel D. Thacker, "The Marine Raiders in World War II," MS, n.d. 
(HistBr, HQMC). 

2 Ibid.; Gen Ray A. Robinson and MajGen DeWitt Peck ltrs to ACofS, 
G-3, HQMC, dtd 22 and 14N0V58 (Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, 

3 Bevan G. Cass, ed., History of the 6th Marine Division (Washington: 
Infantry Journal Press, 1948), p. 6; 2dLt Ernest B. Furgurson, Jr., "The 
4th Marines: A History," MS, dtd i5Mar55 (HistBr, HQMC), p. 91, here- 
after Furgurson, "The 4th Marines." 


Shapley's new command was new to him in name only, since 
the personnel of his ist Raider Regiment had been absorbed by 
the new 4th Marines. The raiders' Headquarters and Service 
Company, the ist, 3d, and 4th Battalions became Headquarters 
and Service Company, and ist, 2d, and 3d Battalions, 4th 

From the raiders the 4th Marines inherited its famous regi- 
mental motto: "Hold High the Torch." Adapted by Shapley 
from a line of John McCrae's familiar World War I poem, "In 
Flanders Fields," the motto was painted on a huge billboard put 
up at the edge of the 4th Marines' camp area at Tassafaronga, 
on Guadalcanal. 4 

The first job for the new 4th's commander was to adapt the 
raider units to the organization of an infantry regiment. Because 
their mission was to operate against enemy rear areas and lines 
of communications, raider units sacrificed firepower for mobility. 
At regimental level, raiders lacked the 75mm self-propelled and 
the 37mm antitank guns of the weapons company of an infantry 
regiment ; and at battalion level they were not equipped with the 
8 1 mm mortars found in an infantry battalion weapons company. 
The change-over from raider to regular infantry organization 
was made by absorbing personnel of the disbanded 2d Raider 
Battalion to form a regimental weapons company and by con- 
verting the fourth rifle company of each of the other former raider 
battalions to weapons companies for the infantry battalions of 
the 4th Marines. 5 

An additional organizational change came on 22 February 
when the Commandant directed Major General Roy S. Geiger, 
Commanding General, I Marine Amphibious Corps (IMAC), to 
build up the 4th Marines to the strength of a reinforced infantry 

* MajGen Alan Shapley interview by HistBr, HQMC, dtd 7Apr59 (Mono- 
graph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMC). 

6 4th Mar MRolls, i-2gFeb44; MarCorps T/O's E-10, i5Apr43, and 
E-310, igOct43. 


regiment. For this purpose, plans were made to add a 75mm 
pack howitzer battalion; engineer, pioneer, medical, tank, and 
motor transport companies; and service and supply, war dog, 
reconnaissance, and ordnance platoons. 6 

The purpose of these additions was to equip the regiment for 
independent operations, but, before the reinforcing process could 
be completed, the newly reactivated 4th Marines was assigned 
its first combat mission. 


Emirau Island was the target. A part of the St. Mathias 
Group, about 230 miles northwest of Rabaul, Emirau was in- 
tended to be the last link in a chain of Allied air and sea bases 
forged around that Japanese Southwest Pacific bastion. Rabaul, 
with its excellent harbor, five first-class airfields, and an elab- 
orate system of base facilities and supply installations, was the 
key to Japanese positions in the Bismarcks Barrier. This chain 
of islands, skillfully fortified by the Japanese, effectively blocked 
the northward movement of Allied forces from Australia. Until 
the Bismarcks Barrier was broken, the Allied forces of General 
MacArthur and Admiral William F. Halsey were unable to 
advance north toward the Philippines and the home islands of 
Japan. 7 

The first Allied offensive moves in the South and Southwest 
Pacific had taken place in the late summer and fall of 1942. 

9 CMC ltr to CG IMAC, 22Feb44 (003A53445, S&C Files, HQMC) ; 
MarCorps T/O E-330: InfRegt, Reinf, i5Apr43- 

7 Unless otherwise cited, this section is based on Samuel E. Morison, Break- 
ing the Bismarcks Barrier — History of United States Naval Operations in 
World War II, v. VI (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950), hereafter 
Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier; Maj John N. Rentz, Bougainville 
and the Northern Solomons (Washington: HistSec, Div of Information, 
HQMC, 1948) ; CTF-31 AR, Seizure & Occupation of Emirau Is, 2oMar- 
7Apr44, dtd i6Apr44, hereafter CTF-31 AR; CG Emirau LdgFor rept, Ops 
of the Emirau LdgFor, i5Mar~9Apr44, dtd 2oApr44 (both documents in 
Emirau Area-Op File, HistBr, HQMC). 


In August the ist Marine Division had landed on Guadalcanal 
and Tulagi, and the following month the U.S. Army's 32d Divi- 
sion had begun operations to drive the Japanese from Buna and 
Gona on the northeast coast of New Guinea. Successful 
completion of these operations by mid-February 1943 had 
opened the way for further advances. Under Admiral Halsey, 
forces of the South Pacific Area had pushed up the Solomons 
chain, until, by Christmas day, they had built a bomber strip 
within a perimeter seized at Cape Torokina on Bougainville, 
the northernmost island of the group. Flying distance to Rabaul 
from this field was only 210 miles. The Southwest Pacific 
Forces of MacArthur, meanwhile, had leapfrogged west along 
the northern shore of New Guinea, and had seized Cape Glouces- 
ter at the western tip of New Britain, thus securing passage 
through the Bismarcks Barrier by the Vitiaz and Dampier 
Straits. (See Map 19.) 

All that remained to complete the isolation of Rabaul was 
to establish a base to the north. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) had originally designated Kavieng on New Ireland for 
this purpose, but, when intelligence studies disclosed that Kavieng 
was heavily fortified, Halsey began to consider bypassing it in 
favor of one of the St. Mathias Group. Late in December he 
directed Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, commander of 
South Pacific amphibious forces, to "prepare plans for the 
seizure and occupation of Emirau island and the construction of 
airfields thereon." 8 

Planning for Emirau had just begun when it was set aside in 
order to prepare for the still-scheduled Kavieng operation set 
for 1 April. But Emirau was substituted by the JCS on 12 
March as a result of the intervention of Halsey and Admiral 
Chester W. Nimitz. The South Pacific commander had 
pointed out the dangers of an invasion of Kavieng to Admiral 

8 FAdm William F. Halsey ltr to RAdm Theodore S. Wilkinson, dtd 
22Dec43, quoted in Rentz, op. cit. } p. 115. 
519667—60 IS 






MAP 19 . 






20° x v\ > ^ — — t—f—T-r 

EQUATOR — J — 1 — 


• — 











Ernest J. King during a visit to Washington in January, and 
Admiral Nimitz had followed up by pointing out that air action 
from Bougainville against Rabaul made the seizure of Kavieng 
unnecessary. 9 

Early in the morning of 15 March a dispatch order from 
Halsey to "seize and occupy Emirau at the earliest practical 
date, not later than 20 March," 10 arrived at Wilkinson's head- 
quarters on Guadalcanal. The South Pacific Commander 
recommended the employment of the 4th Marines to make the 
landing. With D-Day only five days away, speed was essential. 
Fortunately the headquarters of III Amphibious Force, I MAC, 
and the 4th Marines were all in the same area, so Wilkinson 
was able to summon their commanders to a conference in the 
small hours of the morning of 15 March. Wilkinson, Com- 
modore Lawrence F. Reifsnider of the Transport Group, III 
Amphibious Force, General Geiger, and Lieutenant Colonel 
Shapley dusted off the previous plans for an Emirau landing 
and quickly came up with a scheme for the amphibious phase. 
Halsey approved it on his arrival at Guadalcanal that afternoon. 

The Emirau Attack Group, under Reifsnider's command, was 
organized to conduct the operation. It included the landing 
force, two transport sections with destroyer escorts, and a salvage 
unit. Backing up Reifsnider's command were a carrier unit of 
two flat tops and a force of three cruisers and screening 

The landing force, 11 under command of Brigadier General Al- 
fred H. Noble, included a staff recruited from IMAC and the 3d 
Marine Division, a signal detachment, an air command detach- 
ment, a naval advance base unit, and the 4th Marines, reinforced. 
Of the regiment's reinforcing units called for by the Comman- 

9 FAdm William F. Halsey and LCdr J. Bryan, III, Admiral Halsey 1 's Story 
(New York: Whittlesey House, 1947), pp. 186-188. 

10 GomSoPac msg to GTF-31, dtd i4Mar44, quoted in CTF-31 AR. 

11 The term "landing force," as used in this operation, included elements 
normally listed as part of the base development or garrison forces. 


dant in his letter of 23 February, only the tank and medical com- 
panies had been added by the sailing date of 1 7 March. Other 
reinforcing elements, including amphibious tractor and pioneer 
companies, a composite automatic weapons battery of the 14th 
Defense Battalion, and motor transport and ordnance platoons, 
were attached for the Emirau operation. Total strength of the 
landing force was 4, 8 50. 12 

Colonel Shapley, as commander of the assault element of the 
landing force, was responsible for the detailed planning and ex- 
ecution of the landing. Allied intelligence reported Emirau to 
be eight miles long. Coral reefs surrounded the island except for 
one clear beach at the eastern tip within a small harbor sheltered 
by the adjacent islet of Elomusad. By Shapley's operation order, 
two battalions were to land simultaneously on separate beaches. 
On Beach Red, within the harbor sheltered by Elomusad, 1/4 
would go ashore, while 2/4 would land about 1,000 yards to the 
west on Beach Green. A detachment of 1/4 was also to occupy 
Elomusad, and 3/4 was to remain boated in position to support 
either landing. Although intelligence reports indicated there were 
uo Japanese on the island, the Marines were to land in assault 
formation. Naval gunfire by supporting destroyers was to be 
delivered only if the enemy opened fire on the ships or landing 
craft. 13 (See Map 20.) 

When Shapley returned to his command post at Tassafaronga 
early on the morning of the 15th he immediately started prepa- 
rations for loading supplies and equipment on board ship. The 
troops and their gear were already on the beach ready to load 
out for Kavieng, but changes in the shipping assigned meant 
that every item had to be resorted and redistributed. The work 
went on all day and throughout the next night. Loading began 
on the morning of the 1 6th and was completed the following day. 

12 4th Mar MRolls, iMar-3oApr44. 

13 4th Mar OpO 1-44, dtd i7Mar44 (Emirau Area-OpFile, HistBr, 



On 1 7 March the Emirau Task Group sortied from Guadal- 
canal and two days later arrived off the target island. Under 
a continuous air cover from the carriers, the 4th Marines landed 
on 20 March according to plan and without opposition. Na- 
tives who met the attacking troops on the beaches reported that 
the last Japanese had left Emirau two months before. By night- 
fall the eastern end of the island had been occupied, tanks had 
scouted the rest of the island, the ships had been unloaded, supply 
dumps established, antiaircraft defenses set up, and reconnais- 
sance for airfield sites begun. At 1530 Noble opened his com- 
mand post ashore and issued his first operation order, setting up 
the Emirau defenses. 14 

The next day Noble's command occupied the remainder of 
Emirau, and completed the organization of the island for de- 
fense. Because of Allied naval and air superiority the Japanese 
made no attempts to attack. The main job for all hands became 
the preparation of beaches to make them suitable for unloading 
the supplies and equipment of the second echelon, scheduled to 
arrive on 25 March. In addition, service troops attached to the 
4th Marines operated the dumps and distributed all supplies. 
After the 25th Army and Navy service organizations began to 
take over, and on 11 April a garrison force, the 147th Infantry, 
relieved the 4th Marines of its defensive duties. 


Marines of the 4th Regiment returned to Tassafaronga on 
Guadalcanal in mid-April to begin a new mission in a new 
organization. On the 19th the regiment was assigned to the 
1 st Marine Provisional Brigade to take part in the reconquest 
of Guam. Thus the regiment was given a chance to participate 

"Emirau LdgFor, Jnl., 1530, 2oMar44; Emirau LdgFor OpO 1-44, dtd 
9Mar44 (both Emirau Area-Op File, HistBr, HQMC), 


in the decisive campaign of the Pacific war and to share in the 
recapture of the first American territory rewon from the Japanese. 

Guam, along with Saipan and Tinian, its sisters in the Mari- 
anas island group, occupied a central position dominating the 
Western Pacific. Capture of these key positions in the Japanese 
inner defense ring would enable U.S. forces to cut enemy com- 
munications with the conquered territories to the south, and to 
strike at the Japanese home islands themselves. 

These advantages had been apparent to many American offi- 
cers for some time. Admiral King, as early as the fall of 1942, 
had urged his colleagues on the JCS to approve an offensive 
drive across the Central Pacific leading to the capture of the 
Marianas. General MacArthur, however, with his base of opera- 
tions in Australia, favored a drive north along the New Guinea 
coast, through the Bismarcks Barrier to the Philippines. Ad- 
vances along both roads to Japan — MacArthur's from the south 
and Nimitz' from the east — were approved by the JCS in the 
spring of I943- 15 

But only a start along the two roads was approved. No de- 
cision was reached regarding the course to be taken farther along 
the route. King and Nimitz hoped to push straight on across 
the Pacific to the Marianas. MacArthur, with his own problems 
in mind, wanted the Central Pacific road to veer south through 
the Carolines and Palaus toward the Philippines. 

A decision by the JCS in favor of the Marianas came in 
December 1943, and it was General Henry H. Arnold of the 

15 Unless otherwise cited the remainder of this chapter is based on Samuel 
E. Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas — History of United States Naval 
Operations in World War II, v. VIII (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
*953) ; Ma J* O. R. Lodge, The Recapture of Guam (Washington: Historical 
Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1954), hereafter 
Lodge, Recapture of Guam; Philip A. Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas — 
The War in the Pacific — United States Army in World War II (Washington: 
OCMH, Dept of the Army, i960) ; 1st ProvMarBrig SAR, Guam, dtd 19 Aug 
44, hereafter 1st ProvMarBrig SAR (Guam Area-Op File, HistBr, HQMC). 


U.S. Army Air Forces whose arguments were decisive. With the 
B-29 strategic long-range bombers coming into operational use, 
bases within range of Japan were essential. Locations in China 
had proved too vulnerable to capture; the Marianas were the 

With the go-ahead from the JCS, preliminary planning for the 
seizure of the Marianas began. Admiral Nimitz at Pearl Harbor 
issued plan GRANITE, a schedule of Central Pacific operations 
for 1 944 listing the seizure of Saipan and Tinian for 1 November 
and of Guam for 1 5 December. Unexpectedly swift conquest of 
the Marshall Islands led to a speed-up in operations, and, by a 
directive of 1 2 March, the JCS set the target date for the seizure 
of the Marianas, operation FORAGER, for 15 June. On 28 
March, Nimitz issued an order allocating forces and directing the 
preparation of operation plans. 

Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Commander Fifth Fleet, was 
named over-all commander of FORAGER. Under Spruance 
was Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner in command of the 
Joint Expeditionary Force, which in turn was divided into North- 
ern and Southern Attack Forces. The Northern Attack Force, 
which was to seize Saipan and Tinian, was also commanded by 
Turner and included Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith's 
V Amphibious Corps (VAC). The Southern Attack Force 
(Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly) included Major General 
Roy S. Geiger's III Amphibious Corps (IIIAC), and was to take 
Guam. 16 The 3d Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine 
Brigade made up the III Amphibious Corps. In addition, the 
Army's 27th and 77th Divisions were designated Expeditionary 
Troops Reserve and Area Reserve respectively. In addition to 
VAC, General Smith commanded all ground forces under the 
title, Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops. 

IMAC had been redesignated IIIAC on i5Apr44. 



The i st Provisional Marine Brigade, activated at Pearl Harbor 
on 21 March 1944, included the 4th and 2 2d Marines, Rein- 
forced, and Brigade Signal, Military Police, and Headquarters 
Companies. Absence of many of a Marine brigade's normal 
supporting units reflected the fact that both infantry regiments 
were heavily reinforced by organizations of this type, thereby 
making duplication of them at the higher level unnecessary. 

Soon after returning from Emirau, the 4th Marines added 
the remainder of the reinforcing elements originally authorized 
and was further strengthened for the Guam operation by trans- 
formation into a regimental combat team (RCT). These last 
additions, made in accordance with the standard procedure for 
amphibious operations, included platoons from the brigade's 
military police and signal companies, as well as the 4th Platoon, 
2d Ammunition Company, and a detachment of the 5th Field 

The pack howitzer battalion was detached from the regiment 
and joined with the similar unit of the 2 2d Marines in a brigade 
artillery group — a move made to give central fire control and 
direction. Additional reinforcements at brigade level were an 
antiaircraft group, the 53d Naval Construction Battalion, and 
Medical Battalion, IIIAC. 

Commanding the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was Briga- 
dier General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., a veteran of the 4th 
Marines who had served as regimental adjutant in Shanghai in 
1928 and 1929. 


Admiral Conolly and General Geiger and their staffs and sub- 
ordinate commanders began work on Guam invasion plans late 
in March. By the end of May detailed plans had been com- 
pleted on all levels. 


Guam, the target for the men, ships, and planes of the South- 
ern Attack Force, is an irregularly shaped island about 30 miles 
long and about 9 miles wide at its broadest point. Divided by a 
rugged and swampy lowland belt into roughly equal northern 
and southern parts, the island is heavily jungled. In the north 
an irregular coral limestone plateau underlies the dense growth, 
and to the south is an extensive mountain range. Apra Harbor, 
formed by Orote Peninsula and Cabras Island, lies on the west 
coast just below the waist. A coral reef, varying in width from 
20 to 700 yards, fringes almost the entire island; high cliffs rise 
from just behind the narrow beaches to rim the northern shore- 
line. In the south the coast is less rugged, but cliffs effectively 
block egress from the beaches in many places. Heavy surf, 
thrown up by the prevailing trade winds, rules out the south and 
southeast coasts for landing operations. ( See Map 21.) 

Marine and Navy planners were, therefore, restricted in their 
choice to a few beaches on the west coast. They selected two 
landing areas — the beaches south of Orote Peninsula between 
the town of Agat and Bangi Point, assigned to the 1st Provisional 
Marine Brigade; and the beaches north of Apra Harbor between 
Adelup and Asan Points, assigned to the 3d Marine Division. 
W-Day (the landing date) was set for 18 June, three days after 
the Northern Attack Force was scheduled to hit the beaches of 

For General Shepherd and the 1st Provisional Brigade Staff, 
serious planning began on 27 April with the receipt of a staff 
memorandum from Admiral Turner directing the preparation 
of detailed plans for the FORAGER operation. About one 
month later, on 22 May, Operation Plan Number 1 was com- 
pleted. It provided for a landing by two RCTs abreast to seize 
a beachhead between the town of Agat and Bangi Point, and 
then for a drive north and west to capture Orote Peninsula. 

After landing on the right flank White Beaches, RCT-4 would 
advance inland a distance of about 2,700 yards. Hill 40, just 


MAP 21 


behind the beach on the right of the regimental zone, and Mt. 
Alifan, an 820-foot peak about 1,700 yards inland, were the crit- 
ical terrain features in the 4th's zone. RCT-22 would land to 
the left of RCT-4 over the Yellow Beaches to seize Agat, and 
then would wheel left and advance on Orote Peninsula. 17 

On Guam the IIIAC would face a relatively weak Japanese 
garrison in view of the considerable area to be defended. Lieu- 
tenant General Takeshi Takashina's defending force numbered 
only about 18,500 men in mid- July on the eve of the U.S. attack. 
Two battalions of the 38th Infantry, reinforced by a company 
of the gth Tank Regiment, defended the landing beaches assigned 
to the 1 st Provisional Marine Brigade, while the 54th Naval 
Guard Force was dug in on Orote, ready to repel the invader. 

Training for the 4th Marines and for other troops of the IIIAC 
proceeded simultaneously with the preparation of invasion plans. 
At Tassafaronga the 4th Marines, after two weeks of rest and 
rehabilitation following their return from Emirau, began a unit 
training program on 27 April. Tank-infantry teamwork came 
in for special attention, and, in spite of crowded training areas, 
the work proceeded apace. On 14 May, the amphibious phase 
of preparation started when the regiment embarked in vessels of 
the Southern Transport Group. Two days, the 16th and 17th, 
were spent in combat team landing exercises, followed on the 
1 8th by a brigade landing. In addition to polishing ship-to- 
shore techniques, Marines of RCT-4 got a chance to become 
acquainted with the sailors of the transport division and to perfect 
the teamwork so necessary in amphibious operations. 

Final rehearsals for the Guam landing came on 25 May. On 
a beach at Cape Esperance, the northwest tip of Guadalcanal, 
the Marines and sailors executed the Guam assault plan as 
closely as possible. There was no fringing reef, but realism was 
preserved by transferring troops from boats to tractors at an 

17 1 st ProvMarBrig OPlan No. 1, 3oMay44 (Guam Area-Op File, HistBr, 
HQMG ) . 


arbitrary point simulating the edge of the reef. Ashore the 
men maneuvered according to the operation plan. Only token 
amounts of supplies and equipment were landed, but shore party 
personnel had their chance to practice the next day during 
unloading exercises back at Tassafaronga. 18 


The first elements of the 4th Marines sailed for Guam on 
31 May, only five days after rehearsals had been completed. 
The assault battalions, Major Bernard W. Green's 1/4 and 
Major John S. Messer's 2/4 boarded LSTs 19 in company with 
the other assault units of the I II AC and sailed for the staging 
area at Kwajalein. On 4 June the remainder of the regiment, 
including Major Hamilton M. Hoyler's 3/4, supporting units, 
and Lieutenant Colonel Shapley's regimental headquarters, sailed 
in transports of the Southern Transport Group. Shapley opened 
his command post on board the transport Zeilin, flagship of the 
Southern Attack Force. By 8 June the LSTs and transports 
had arrived at the staging area at Kwajalein, where they took on 
fuel, water, and provisions. The first LSTs cleared the atoll on 
the 9th, and by 12 June all ships were on their way to Guam. 20 

Guam had first come under attack the previous day when 
carrier planes from Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher's Task Force 58 
raided the island. Japanese fighters rose to beat off the attack, 
and in the ensuing battle about 150 enemy aircraft were de- 
stroyed in the air and on the ground. For the next four days 
Mitscher's fliers smashed at runways, aircraft facilities, 
antiaircraft, and coast defense guns. 

18 1 st ProvMarBrig WarD, iApr-3oMay44 (Unit Hist Rept File, HistBr, 
HQMG ) . 

M The LST, a tank landing ship, was a workhorse of World War II, but its 
conspicuous size and speed led to it being nicknamed by Marines as a "large, 
slow target." 

20 1 st ProvMarBrig WarD, 1-30,^44 (Unit Hist Rept File, HistBr, 


Invasion of the Marianas began on schedule on 15 June when 
Marines of VAC hit the Saipan beaches. In a dispatch to 
Conolly that evening, Spruance confirmed W-Day for Guam as 
1 8 June, but this landing date was postponed indefinitely almost 
as soon as it was issued. The Japanese Combined Fleet, in 
keeping with a decision of the naval high command in Tokyo, 
had sortied from Philippine bases seeking a decisive engagement 
with the United States task force concentrated in the Marianas. 
When submarines detected the advancing Japanese ships, 
Spruance postponed the Guam landing and concentrated his 
strength for the expected engagement with the Japanese fleet. 
In the Battle of the Philippine Sea, fought on 19-20 June, the 
Japanese were repulsed with heavy losses. 

Removal of the threat of naval attack did not lead to an im- 
mediate invasion of Guam. Heavy resistance on Saipan had 
forced the commitment of the 27th Infantry Division from Ex- 
peditionary Troops Reserve on 1 6 June, and the IIIAC was held 
afloat in case added reinforcements were needed. Not until the 
30th was the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade released from this 
stand-by reserve and ordered to Eniwetok in the Marshalls. 

On the sandy beaches of this coral atoll, Marines of RCT-4 
were able to stretch their legs for the first time in more than a 
month. Small unit tactical exercises and athletics were the order 
of the day. In spite of exercise ashore, life at Eniwetok was far 
from comfortable. Men of the assault battalions rigged shelter 
halves, tents, and tarpaulins over the LST decks in an effort to 
make some shade. One officer compared the landing ships to "a 
tenement district with Marines' bedding strewn everywhere in an 
effort to find a flat place to lie down." 21 But living on the LSTs 
was better than existence on the transports where the hot rays of 
the tropical sun turned the troop spaces into infernos. Added 

21 LtCol Calvin W. Kunz, Jr., ltr to Maj O. R. Lodge, dtd 27Feb52, quoted 
in Lodge, Recapture of Guam, p. 30. 


to the discomfort was the monotony. The Marines had been 
briefed so often on the Guam landing beaches that, according 
to one naval officer, they spoke of them "as though they were 
Coney Island, Old Orchard, Daytona, or a California beach." 22 

It was a combat-ready regiment of Marines which departed 
Eniwetok on 1 5 and 1 7 July. Though they griped at the discom- 
forts of confinement on board ship for so long, the men were lucky 
that the original landing date had been delayed. Alarmed by 
the tenacious resistance of the Japanese on Saipan, the top U.S. 
commanders had reinforced the IIIAC by assigning the 77th In- 
fantry Division from area reserve and had greatly increased the 
preliminary naval gunfire and air bombardments. Under a new 
tactical plan, the 305th RCT was attached to the 1st Provisional 
Brigade, while the remainder of the 77th Division remained afloat 
ready to reinforce either the northern or southern beaches. If 
not needed to strengthen the 3d Division in the north, the 77th 
Division would land and take over the southern beachhead from 
the 1 st Provisional Brigade, freeing Shepherd's Marines for an 
all-out assault on the Orote Peninsula. 

Sporadic carrier air attacks hit the Japanese on Guam during 
the last half of June, and on 4 July intensive bombardment began. 
From that date on, ships and planes moved in to batter the island 
in the most impressive preliminary bombardment yet delivered 
in the Pacific war. By evening of 20 July, opinion aboard Conol- 
ly's amphibious force flagship, Appalachian, was that not one 
fixed gun larger than a machine gun was left in commission on 
the west coast, and Geiger's naval gunfire officer reported that 
the assault troops would meet little resistance. 23 The truth of 
these estimates would soon be tested. 

23 Cdr H. E. Smith, "I Saw the Morning Break," United States Naval Insti- 
tute Proceedings, v. 72, no. 3 (Mar46), p. 406. 

23 TF 53 Op Rept, Guam, NGF End, ioAug 4 4; IIIAC SAR, Guam, NGF 
End, 3Sep44 (both Guam Area-Op File, HistBr, HQMC) . 



The order to land was flashed to the Southern Attack Force 
on 20 July. W-Day was set for 21 July; H-Hour was 0830. 
During the night LSTs and transports carrying RGT-4 and 
other 1 st Provisional Brigade troops steamed into designated 
transport areas and by 0600 reached positions preparatory to 
launching landing craft. At 0700 the bows of the LSTs swung 
open to disgorge the LVTs 24 carrying the assault troops of 1 /4 
and 2/4. With LVT(A)s in the lead, the assault waves headed 
for the beach. Nine LCI gunboats followed closely, bombard- 
ing the beach to the front and flanks with rockets and 40mm 
fire. Carrier aircraft dived to bomb and strafe beach defenses, 
while, farther to seaward, fire support ships sent heavy caliber 
salvos crashing shoreward. 

In spite of the heavy bombardment, the Japanese were still 
full of fight. As the LVTs crawled onto the reef, artillery and 
heavy automatic weapons opened up from the beach. Particu- 
larly intense fire came from Bangi and Gaan Points. The first 
wave ground ashore at 0832 and was followed at five-minute 
intervals by subsequent waves. As soon as LVTs were unloaded, 
they returned to the outer edge of the reef to transfer troops of 
later waves from LC VPs. ( See Map 2 2 . ) 

Well-organized beach defenses, consisting of concrete pill- 
boxes built into coral outcroppings, an elaborate trench system, 
concealed machine-gun emplacements, and tank traps impeded 
the progress of the 4th Marines. On the left, Messer's 2d Bat- 
talion encountered unexpected resistance from a low mound 
within 100 yards of the shore. Japanese dug in on the reverse 
slope resisted stubbornly, but by noon the position had been taken 

24 Amphibious craft and vehicles of World War II were commonly known by 
abbreviations made up of the initials of the words making up their titles. 
Some of the more common were: LVT — landing vehicle, tracked; LVT(A) — 
armored LVT; LCI(G) — landing craft infantry converted to a gunboat; 
LCVP — landing craft vehicle, personnel. 


519667—60 19 


and the Marines pushed on across the open fields toward Mt. 

On the regimental right the ist Battalion landed with two 
companies in assault. First Lieutenant Frank A. Kemp's Com- 
pany A on the right ran into stiff resistance from enemy pillboxes 
near the beach but quickly silenced the opposition and moved 
inland. On the left, ist Lieutenant Thad N. Dodd's Company 
B met only token resistance. Both companies reached their 
initial objectives at a distance varying between iooo and 2000 
yards from the beach by 1030. 

First Lieutenant Lawrence S. Banger's Company C landed in 
the third wave and swung right to attack Hill 40 on the extreme 
right of the regimental zone. Deadly fire from Japanese machine 
guns dug in on this height hit the advancing Marines, halting the 
attack. Major Green ordered up two tanks, and with their sup- 
port Hill 40 was quickly seized by early afternoon. Company C 
was then relieved to rejoin its battalion by Company K, which, 
with the remainder of the 3d Battalion, had landed in regimental 

At 1345, Lieutenant Colonel Shapley ordered a resumption of 
the attack to seize an objective line which included the peak of 
Mt. Alifan. Only scattered resistance met the three battalions 
as they jumped off, and by 1730 the regiment had reached the 
slopes of the mountain when orders came to hold up and dig in. 
Casualties for the day totaled 67 killed and 195 wounded. 25 

The regimental position for the night was anchored on the 
left by a Company B roadblock on Harmon Road from which 
the Marines could see men of the 2 2d Marines across a deep 
gully. From the roadblock the 4th Marines' line bent back 
around the lower slopes of Mt. Alifan to reach the beach at 
Bangi Point. 

This line was too long to be solidly manned, but strong points 

25 Casualty figures from PersAccountingSec, HQMC, Final WW II casualty 
tabulation, dtd i2Dec52 (HistBr, HQMC). 


were located along it so as to cover the gaps with fire. In re- 
sponse to orders from General Shepherd, all hands made ready 
for an expected Japanese counterattack. Harmon Road, leading 
from the village of Agat into the interior, was the most critical 
area. To block an enemy tank thrust down this favorable 
avenue into the center of the Marine position, five tanks of the 
4th Marines tank company were parked in a hollow just off 
the road. Elsewhere the line was strengthened by the Recon- 
naissance Platoon and an engineer detachment. Company G 
was held in reserve near the regimental CP. 

Shortly before midnight Japanese began probing all along the 
Marine front. At 0100 a platoon of Company K was hit hard 
and driven off Hill 40. A counterattack recaptured the hill, but 
the Marines were driven off again. Reinforced by two squads, 
the platoon fought its way back on Hill 40, this time to stay. 
Company K was hit again a couple of hours later, and, though 
most of the enemy were thrown back, a few infiltrated all the 
way back to the artillery positions. 

A more serious attack hit the Company B roadblock on 
Harmon Road at about 0230, when four tanks leading truck- 
mounted guns and infantry attempted to break through to Agat. 
Private First Class Bruno Oribiletti knocked out the first two 
tanks with his bazooka, and the Marine tanks which had been 
stationed off the road earlier in the night took care of the rest. 
Deprived of their armor, the enemy infantry withdrew behind 
Mt. Alifan. 

Another enemy attack hit Company A in the left-center of 
the regimental front. Under cover of mortar and machine-gun 
fire, shouting Japanese, led by an officer waving a flag on a 
bamboo pole, charged the Marine lines. Swinging samurai 
swords and tossing grenades, some of the enemy soldiers broke 
through and raced all the way to the artillery positions within 
400 yards of the beach before being stopped by the gunners. 
The next morning 200 enemy dead were counted in this sector. 


Elsewhere in the brigade zone, the Japanese hit the 2 2d 
Marines and the 305th Infantry. All attacks had been repulsed 
by dawn, and the Marines and soldiers quickly restored their 
lines. For the Japanese, the night's attacks had been extremely 
costly. Not only had they failed to push the invading Ameri- 
cans into the sea, but in the attempt the 1st and 2d Battalions, 
38th Infantry, which were the main defensive units in the sector, 
had been destroyed as a fighting force. 

On 22 July General Shepherd ordered renewed attacks to 
complete seizure of the beachhead. The 4th Marines' mission 
was to seize Mt. Alifan and then extend along the ridge to the 
south to the vicinity of Mt. Taene. At 0900, the 1st and 3d 
Battalions jumped off in the attack, encountering resistance 
from Japanese dug in on the reverse slope of little rounded heights 
constituting the foothills of Mt. Alifan. Using demolition 
charges and hand grenades, the Marines made short work of 
the enemy positions. Once past this belt of fortifications, ter- 
rain and vegetation became the principal obstacles to advance. 
The trails led up near vertical cliffs, and a thorny undergrowth 
clung to the slopes. Large entwined vines caught on packs 
and equipment as the Marines struggled upward. Dropping 
excess gear, the men pushed on. Lieutenant William A. Kerr's 
2d Platoon of Company G finally reached the summit, where 
it discovered no evidence of the Japanese. As the peak did 
not lend itself to defense, Kerr led his platoon back to the base 
of the cliffs. 

While this platoon was reconnoitering Mt. Alifan, the main 
body of assault troops extended along the ridges to the south. 
By nightfall they occupied a line from Mt. Alifan to the coast 
at Magpo Point — 1st Battalion on the left, 3d Battalion on the 
right, and 2d Battalion in reserve. Having completed seizure 
of the brigade beachhead in their zone the 4th Marines held up 
and dug in. 

To the north, the 305th Infantry and the 2 2d Marines con- 


tinued the attack on 23 and 24 July to complete seizure of the 
beachhead in their zones. The soldiers, in the brigade center, 
completed their part of the job against little opposition by eve- 
ning of the 23d. But the 22d Marines, after a relatively easy 
advance during the morning, encountered stiffening resistance 
in the afternoon when the regiment attempted to swing across 
the neck of Orote Peninsula. Heavy fighting continued the rest 
of the day and throughout the 24th as the Marines battled 
forward. So stubborn was enemy opposition that 2/4 had to 
be thrown in to plug a gap between 2/22 and 3/22. 

By nightfall of 24 July, however, the Marines had pushed 
back the Japanese and had sealed off the peninsula. The 
Southern Landing Force beachhead was then firmly established, 
and the effective enemy troops remaining in Southern Guam 
were bottled up on Orote. 


Preparation for seizure of this enemy stronghold had begun 
on 22 July when Geiger ordered the remainder of the 77th In- 
fantry Division to take over defense of the beachhead, releasing 
Shepherd's brigade for the assault on Orote. Relief of the 4th 
Marines by the 306th Infantry Regiment began on the after- 
noon of the 24th and was completed the next morning. 

On the evening of the 24th, Geiger issued Shepherd a warn- 
ing order calling for the attack on Orote to begin the next day. 
But the Marines of the 2 2d Regiment were exhausted after 
four days of continuous fighting, and the 4th Marines, having 
been relieved late, were not in attack positions. Shepherd there- 
fore requested and was granted a delay of the attack from the 
25th to the 26th. 

The extra day provided little relief for the 2 2d Marines. Its 
1 st and 3d Battalions, attacking to shorten and straighten the 
jump-off line across Orote Peninsula, were hard hit by Japanese 


artillery, machine guns, and tanks. The objective, a nearly 
straight line across the narrow neck of the peninsula from Agat 
Bay to Apra Harbor, was achieved on schedule, but losses in 
1/22 were so heavy that 1/4 was brought up in relief. 

Major Green deployed Companies B and G and a platoon of 
Company A for defense of the battalion sector which was on the 
left flank of the brigade line. The Marines dug in and prepared 
defenses against a possible enemy counterattack. ( See Map 23. ) 

It was well they did. The Japanese commander on Orote, 
Commander Asaichi Tamai, IJN, was preparing to break out 
of the trap and join the main body of defenders to the north. 
Bottled up in the eight square miles were about 2,500 enemy 
troops, including the 54th Naval Guard Force, remnants of the 
38th Infantry, two antiaircraft companies, about 600 men from 
aviation squadrons, and a few naval laborers. Early in the 
afternoon an attempt to evacuate a part of this force by barge 
across Apra Harbor had been smashed by American air and 
artillery. With the back door slammed shut, Tamai gathered 
his remaining forces for a desperate effort to burst through the 
Marine lines. 

Rain, which had been falling intermittentiy all day, became 
more frequent after dark, helping to cover Japanese attack 
preparations. Marines in the front lines could hear screams, 
shouts, laughter, and the breaking of bottles, as the enemy 
soldiers sought alcoholic fortification for the coming assault. 

About midnight, flag-waving, sword-swinging officers led 
enemy troops from the cover of a mangrove swamp opposite the 
22d Marines. Clutching pitchforks, sticks, and pieces of broken 
bottles as well as their regular weapons, the sake-CTa.zt& attackers 
rushed the Marine line. A hail of fire from artillery, mortars, 
machine guns, and rifles beat back the enemy, but successive 
waves kept coming, only to be caught in the deadly cross fire. 
Not until dawn did the attack finally peter out. 

Lieutenant William A. Kerr's platoon from Company A, on 



the right flank of the 4th Marines and the only regimental unit 
engaged, had a turkey shoot with the Japanese as targets. Kerr's 
Marines, by enfilade fire, killed an estimated 250 of the Japanese 
assaulting the lines of the 2 2d Marines. 

On 26 July, the 4th Marines jumped off as scheduled to seize 
Orote Peninsula. Attacking in a column of battalions, the 1st 
in the lead and the 3d mopping up behind, the regiment made 
rapid progress against little or no opposition. 

The speed of forward movement soon opened a gap between 
the regiment and the 2 2d Marines, held up on the right by 
Japanese artillery fire. To protect the exposed right flank, 
Shapley requested permission to take over part of the 22d 
Marines' zone and to continue the attack to the vicinity of the 
old Marine rifle range, some 1,400 yards ahead. General Shep- 
herd acceded to this request and shifted the regimental boundary 
to the Agat-Sumay Road. 

Moving ahead in its zone west of the road, the regiment made 
steady progress until about 1700, when Company G ran up 
against a pillbox-studded position along a low ridge to its front. 
The Marines were hard hit by enemy fire including 75mm, and, 
after losing 8 killed and 18 wounded, pulled back about 700 
yards. 26 

Following the temporary withdrawal, the 4th Marines dug in 
for the night after an advance during the day of about 1,400 
yards. From the left flank resting on Agat Bay the front line 
ran straight across the peninsula for about 700 yards, then dipped 
back around a marsh to join the 2 2d Marines at Road 
Junction 15. 

After a heavy air and artillery preparation, the regiment 
jumped off on the 27th with the 1st and 3d Battalions abreast. 
Major Hoyler's 3/4, which had moved into line on the right 
next to the road, was stopped in its tracks by withering fire from 

26 1/4 WarD, 3oMay-9Sep44 (Unit Hist Rept File, HistBr, HQMC), here- 
after 1/4 WarD. 


the camouflaged, mutually supporting Japanese positions en- 
countered by 1/4 at dusk the previous day. Medium tanks of 
the regimental tank company rumbled forward to fire at point- 
blank range, smashing the enemy dugouts to rubble. Captain 
William Stewart and his Company L than moved forward onto 
the ridge, using white phosphorous grenades and BARs to mop 
up the smashed enemy positions. 27 

On the left, Company I moved up through the thick brush, 
encountering only scattered resistance and sniper fire. By 0900 
the battalion was on top of the ridge ready to move forward. 
Ahead was a coconut grove on ground sloping up to a second and 
higher ridge some 500 yards away. Once again, Company L on 
the right flank bore the brunt of the fighting against Japanese in 
a second line of emplacements. Tanks could not get forward 
owing to congestion on the road. Fighting in the coconut grove 
was bitter and progress was slow, but by 1530 enemy resistance 
in the grove had been silenced. 

Breaking clear of the coconut trees, Hoyler's men came under 
machine-gun fire from Japanese dug in on the next ridge. These 
positions, well-constructed concrete emplacements, were the last 
defenses before Orote airfield. By 1 700, Companies I and L were 
within 250 yards of the crest, and at this point the advance was 
halted. The 1st Battalion, which had encountered relatively little 
resistance was on line to the left, with the 2 2d Marines up even on 
the right after a day of hard fighting. 

General Shepherd's orders for the attack of 28 July readjusted 
regimental sectors to assign the old Marine Barracks and the town 
of Sumay to the 22d Marines, while the rifle range and airfield 
became the objectives for the attack of the 4th Marines. An 
extremely heavy air, naval gunfire, and artillery preparation was 
delivered to blast the Japanese from their defenses in front of the 
airfield but was only partially successful. 

"Maj Anthony Walker, "Advance on Orote Peninsula," Marine Corps 
Gazette, v. 29, no. 2 (Feb45), p. 8. 


Attacking with three battalions abreast, the regiment made 
rapid progress at first. Advancing Marines overran shattered 
enemy emplacements holding as many as i o to 15 dead Japanese. 
Shortly before noon, this easy advance slowed in the face of heavy 
automatic weapons fire from enemy dug in and concealed by 
dense underbrush. 

Progress was slowest in the center in the zone of 2/4. This 
battalion was unsupported by tanks because Major Messer had 
reported the terrain unsuitable for armor. But when his battalion 
was stopped by the fire of the dug-in Japanese, Messer requested 
tank support. The 2d Platoon of the 4th Marines' Tank Com- 
pany moved over from the 3d Battalion zone, on the right, but 
the tankers could not fire without endangering the 1st Battalion, 
which had advanced on the left. 

Early in the afternoon General Shepherd went forward to re- 
connoiter his front lines. Finding the 4th Marines' attack stalled, 
he obtained armored reinforcements from the 77 th Division, con- 
sisting of a platoon of light tanks and a platoon of tank destroyers. 
Shepherd then ordered Shapley to employ all available armor to 
spearhead the infantry in an effort to break through the Japanese 

At 1530 the attack jumped off all along the regimental front. 
The tanks smashed the defensive line, which by later count was 
found to include approximately 250 pillboxes and emplacements. 
Infantrymen following close behind the armor moved rapidly 
forward and by dusk were within 1 50 yards of the airfield. 

During the day the 2 2d Marines had advanced to the outskirts 
of Sumay against light resistance, recapturing the wreckage of the 
Marine barracks surrendered to the Japanese three years before. 

Enemy resistance on Orote had been crushed on 28 July, and 
the tank-led Marines of the 4th Regiment jumped off on the 29th 
after a prolonged air, naval gunfire, and artillery preparation to 
encounter only light resistance. The advance was rapid, and 
by 1400 the front lines were 150 yards beyond the airfield. At 


this point the 4th Marines took over the entire front, relieving the 
2 2d Marines for mopping up duties. At 1600 Colonel Shapley 
dispatched a strong tank-infantry patrol to reconnoiter to the tip 
of the peninsula. Only two Japanese soldiers were encountered 
during the reconnaissance. General Shepherd then declared 
Orote Peninsula secured. Mopping up continued the next day. 
Extensive patrolling by the 4th Marines discovered Japanese 
holed up in caves in a cliff along the shore 1,000 yards west of 
Sumay. The cave mouths could not be reached from the land 
side, but an LCI gunboat moved in and blasted them shut with 
40mm fire. 

The capture of Orote Peninsula secured a valuable airfield 
and freed Apra Harbor for use as a naval anchorage. For its 
part in the four days of heavy fighting on the peninsula, the 4th 
Marines shared a Navy Unit Commendation with the remainder 
of the 1 st Provisional Marine Brigade. But the victory was not 
without a price. Seventy-two Marines, including Lieutenant 
Colonel Samuel D. Puller, the regimental executive officer, were 
killed in action, and 355 wounded. 28 


By 30 July the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and the 77th 
Infantry Division had completed the seizure of the southern 
beachhead on Guam. To the north, the 3d Marine Division had 
achieved a comparable success. After landing on 2 1 July on the 
Asan Beaches, Marines of the 3d fought their way inland against 
bitter resistance from the main body of Lieutenant General Taka- 
shina's defenders. Unable to beat back the Marine attackers, 
the Japanese commander attempted to crush the American beach- 
head at a single stroke by all-out counterattack. His effort failed. 
An assault on the night of 25-26 July was no more successful 
against the 3d Marine Division than the similar effort by the 

28 PersAccountingSec, HQMG, tabulation of i2Dec52 (HistBr, HQMC). 


Japanese that same night against the ist Provisional Marine 
Brigade to the south. 

Unable to push the Americans into the sea, Takashina with- 
drew the remnants of his forces into mountainous jungle-clad 
northern Guam. An initial enemy position was established in 
the vicinity of the village of Dededo and along the southwest 
slopes of Mount Barrigada; a second defense line was set up just 
below the village of Ipapao; and a final stand was to be made on 
Mount Santa Rosa near the northeast coast. 

General Geiger was aware of the Japanese withdrawal route 
and planned accordingly. Patrols from the 77 th Division had 
already scouted southern Guam without locating major enemy 
units, and captured documents and prisoners of war indicated 
that the Japanese were retreating to the north. On the basis 
of this information, Geiger ordered the 3d Marine and 77th 
Infantry Divisions to cut the island in two, then swing north to 
locate and destroy the enemy. General Shepherd's ist Provisional 
Brigade was to take over the southern beachhead from the 77th, 
to protect the force from attack from the south, and to continue 
patrolling to make sure that no Japanese remained in southern 


On 3 1 July the 4th Marines moved from Orote back to posi- 
tions south of Mt. Alifan to carry out the new mission. By 
brigade order, southern Guam was divided into two regimental 
patrol areas along the line Gaan Point — Port Ajayan. Both the 
4th and 22d Marines were ordered to send out reinforced platoon- 
size patrols prepared to operate in the jungled mountains for at 
least two days. 

The next day Companies A and F began patrol activities in 
the regimental zone north and east of the Gaan Point — Port 
Ajayan line. The Company A patrol, covering the part of the 


area north of the Togcha River, was uneventful except for a 
skirmish at the east coast town of Marajan on 3 August in which 
six Japanese were killed. The Company F patrol went to 
Agfayan Point, near the southern tip of the island, without 
making any contact with the enemy. 

The negative patrol results facilitated the next employment of 
the 4th Marines as force reserve. A warning order from corps 
on 1 August had alerted General Shepherd to be ready to make 
an RGT available for this duty, and the following day an order 
followed directing the 4th Marines to move north on 3 August 
on the new mission. 

At daylight on the 3d, the regiment began the move to its new 
assembly area at Toto on northern Guam, leaving the two patrol- 
ling companies behind. While this move was in progress, Geiger 
ordered the northward movement of the rest of the brigade, leav- 
ing a small garrison force consisting of 1/22, the 9th Defense 
Battalion, and the Army's 7th AAA (Automatic Weapons) Bat- 
talion to continue the patrol mission. By evening of 4 August 
this movement had been completed. 


After only three days in reserve the 4th Marines was again 
thrown into the line on the corps left flank in what was to be the 
final drive of the Guam campaign. The 3d and 77th Divisions 
had, by 6 August, broken through the outer lines of defense and 
bottled up the remaining organized Japanese units on and near 
Mount Santa Rosa. In a drive to smash this final bastion and 
to sweep up stragglers and isolated pockets of resistance, Geiger 
planned to use all his major combat units. To the 77th Infantry 
Division fell the task of assaulting Mount Santa Rosa; the 3d 
Division was to drive north in the center of the island; and the 
1 st Provisional Brigade was to attack north along the west coast. 

General Shepherd received the corps operations plan describ- 


ing the new mission on 5 August. According to the plan, the 
brigade was to pass through the 3d Marines and attack north 
along the west coast of Guam, then clear the enemy from the 
northern part of the island by vigorous patrolling. The Recon- 
naissance Platoon, 4th Marines, reconnoitered assigned assembly 
areas near the village of Dededo on 5 August, and the next day 
the brigade moved north, ready to attack on order. The corps 
order calling for attack at 0730 on 7 August reached General 
Shepherd in late afternoon of the 6th. He designated the 4th 
Marines to make the assault along an improved road in the 
center of the sector. 

The 4th Marines attacked on schedule on 7 August with two 
battalions abreast — 1st on the left and 3d on the right. After 
passing through 1/3 and 2/3, the two 4th Marines' battalions 
advanced rapidly without opposition. 29 By 10 15 they had reached 
the initial objective and, at General Shepherd's order, pushed 
ahead, making a total advance during the day of about 5,500 
yards. (See Map 24.) 

A new scheme of attack was planned for 8 August. Because 
of the widening of the island at its northern tip, General Shepherd 
ordered the 2 2d Marines to take over on the left of the brigade 
zone. The impenetrable jungle in his sector and the lack of 
enemy opposition prompted Shapley to direct a change in tactics. 
Instead of a sweep forward on a broad front, the 4th Marines' 
commander ordered an advance in column along the two avail- 
able roads. 

Resuming the attack at 0730 on 8 August, the 4th Marines 
moved rapidly forward against sporadic resistance. From Road 
Junction 460 on the regimental right boundary, 3/4 and 2/4 
moved northeast along a road to Road Junction 462. Reaching 
their objective by the end of the day, they set up defensive perim- 
eters for the night a few hundred yards beyond the road junc- 

^IIIAC liaison officer msgs to IIIAC, 0825 and 10 15, 7Aug44, in App 2 
( 1 st ProvMarBrig Jnl) to 1st ProvMarBrig SAR. 



tion. The ist Battalion, after relief by the 2 2d Marines, moved 
east along the front to Road Junction 460 to take the northwest 
road fork to Road Junction 470. No Japanese were encountered 
and by noon the battalion had reached its objective, having 
marched diagonally across the regimental sector to its northwest 
boundary. 30 

Continuing the attack on 9 August, 4th Marines patrols 
reached the north coast and combed the regimental zone, en- 
countering only small scattered groups of Japanese who were 
quickly overcome. At 1800 General Shepherd was able to an- 
nounce that all organized resistance in the brigade zone had 
ceased, but he ordered aggressive patrolling the next day to de- 
stroy isolated enemy troops. Absence of enemy opposition 
elsewhere on the island permitted General Geiger to declare 
Guam secured on the evening of 10 August. 

During the 2 1 days of combat on Guam between 2 1 July and 
10 August, 190 Marines of the 4th Regiment lost their lives in 
combat with the enemy. Another 724 were wounded in action, 
and 4 were listed as missing. 31 

Although the island had been declared secured, vigorous pa- 
trolling to mop up enemy stragglers continued. The 4th Marines 
operated in their previously assigned zone of action until 2 1 Au- 
gust when the regiment took over all patrolling in the brigade 
zone, relieving the 2 2d Marines for return to Guadalcanal. On 
the 27th, 3/4 assumed the patrol mission, and the rest of the 
regiment prepared to leave the island, sailing for Guadalcanal 
on 28 August. The next day, 3/4 was relieved of all patrol 
duties by the 21st Marines, and, on the 30th, the battalion and 
remaining regimental units departed for Guadalcanal. 

30 1/4 WarD. 

31 PersAccountingSec, PersDept, HQMC, tabulation of i2Dec52 (HistBr, 

USMC Photo 86626 

Guam — Sheltering themselves from the tropic sun and rain, Marines on the 
deck of an LST move towards another war-swept island beach, below, where 
there was little shelter but a man's rifle and courage. 

USMC Photo 88203 

U.S. Navy Photo 239019 

Assault on Mt. Alifan — Above, mortar crew men spare their eardrums as a 
round leaves the tube. Below, Marines move up to front-line positions in the 

USMC Photo 87239 

USMC Photo 93428 

Action on Guam — Above, tank-supported infantry attack Japanese positions 
on Orote Peninsula. Below, a patrol mops up isolated enemy survivors after 
the island was declared secured. 

USMC Photo 116436 

USMC Photo 91380 

A battle leader of the 4th Marines — LtCol Alan Shapley, who led the regi- 
ment on Guam and Okinawa, briefs his officers for the attack on the Orote 

Okinawa — Above, assault troops in LVTs start shoreward under cover of 
naval gunfire. Below, the first wounded are evacuated from the beach, but 
few casualties occurred there. 

USMC Photo 123455 

USMC Photo 117248 

Rapid advance — Above, Marines cross the island 12 days ahead of schedule. 
Below, Company I patrols through the village of Ishikawa on the east coast. 

USMC Photo 117251 

USMC Photo 127805 

On Motobu Peninsula — Above, rocky hills like these were the natural ally of 
the Japanese, who employed them for cave warfare. Below, Marines move up 
to a hut, where eight Japanese were killed. 

USMC Photo 119093 

USMC Photo 122488 

Advance to the south — Above, the rain-soaked command post of 1/4 on Sugar 
Loaf. Below, rifle squad of Company L probes for Japanese in drive upon 

USMC Photo 122300 

Oroku— Above, Company B gets a break at Naha Airport before moving into 
front lines, just yards away. Below, Marines move up amid wreckage of 
Japanese planes. 

USMC Photo 124032 

USMC Photo 124251 

USMC Photo 120308 

Above, left, men of 1/4 advance under fire near village of Gushi on Oroku; 
right, a wounded Marine bids Godspeed to a patrol. Below, moving up to the 
Kiyamu-Gusuku Ridge, the last battleground of WWII. 

USMC Photo 128782 

USMC Photo 134461 

Landing in Japan — Above, Japanese officials surrender the Tateyama Naval 
Air Station to Maj W. L. Crawford. Below, color guard welcomes liberated 
Marines of the "old 4th." 

USMC Photo 133810 

USMC Photo 133811 

Occupation activity — Above, Marines of the "new 4th" pass in review before 
the "old 4th" at Yokosuka Naval Base. Below, a patrol, observed by curious 
inhabitants, sets out to take over military installations. 

USMC Photo A407859 

USMC Photo A181892 

Postwar Japan — Above, the regiment marches up Nara's Sanjyo Street. Below, 
Col F. A. Ramsey and Maj L. E. Fribourg greet Japanese before Softball game 
between regimental HQ officers and Nara city fathers. 

USMC Photo Al 78752 

U3MC Photo A181893 

Above, officers and enlisted men of 3/4 are honored at sea by Chinese Nation- 
alists during the Inchon-Formosa repatriation, January 1954. Below, the regi- 
ment's new home, the Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe. 

USMC Photo A25238 

- ""„•.■ - " " ! - * ■< -'- 

USMC Photo A150518 

Kaneohe — Above, the Shah of Iran troops the line, followed by LtGen V. E. 
Megee, CG, FMFPac, and BriGen A. R. Kier, CG, ist MarBrig. Below, air- 
ground team in action — a landing on Mokapu Peninsula, Oahu. 

USMC Photo A406157 





It was particularly fitting that the 4th Marines, one of the 
isolated units captured by the Japanese early in the war, took 
part in the reconquest of Guam — the first American territory 
recaptured from the Japanese. 

Even more important than the recovery of a lost island pos- 
session was the effect of U.S. control of Guam and the other 
Marianas in shortening the war. From the newly-won bases, 
American ships and planes could effectively cut off the trickle 
of supplies reaching the bypassed enemy garrisons in the South 
and Central Pacific. Repair and supply installations on the 
islands helped speed up attacks against the Japanese inner de- 
fenses, and hundreds of B-29 heavy bombers soon flew from 
Marianas fields to batter Japan itself. It was from a field on 
Tinian that two B-29S rose in August 1945 to carry atomic 
death and destruction to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

519667—60 21 



As Marines of the 4th Regiment moved toward Okinawa 
beaches on the morning of 1 April 1945 — to one of the most 
ominous landings of the Pacific war, a few may have speculated 
when, for them, the battle of Okinawa really started. 1 

Maybe it was on 8 September 1944 when the 4th Marines 
joined the newly activated 6th Marine Division, the successor 
to the 1 st Provisional Brigade. 

The change took place while the regiment was at sea, en route 
from Guam to a brief pause on Guadalcanal. On 9 September, 
Lieutenant Colonel Alan Shapley, 2 with the 1st and 2d Bat- 
talions and other elements of the reinforced regiment, disem- 
barked from the Army transport, Pennant. Other ships the 
same month lifted the rest of the regiment. 

1 Unless otherwise noted, this chapter is based on the following : Maj 
Charles S. Nichols, Jr., and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Okinawa: Victory in the 
Pacific (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1955), hereafter Nichols & 
Shaw, Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific; Roy E. Appleman, et al., Okinawa: 
The Last Battle — The War in the Pacific — U.S. Army in World War II 
(Washington: HistDiv, DA, 1948), hereafter Appleman, Okinawa: The Last 
Battle; Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious 
War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951); 6th MarDiv SAR, 
Okinawa Operation, Phases I & II, dtd 3oApr45, and Phase III, dtd 
3oJun45, hereafter 6th MarDiv SAR, I & II, and 6th MarDiv SAR, III, 
respectively; Annexes A (4th Mar) to 6th MarDiv SAR, I & II and 6th 
MarDiv SAR, III, hereafter 4th Mar SAR, I & II, and 4th Mar SAR, III, 
respectively. Unless otherwise cited, all official records are in Okinawa Area- 
Op File, HistBr, HQMC. 

2 Shapley was promoted to Colonel in November 1944. 



By 1 1 September all unit designations had been revised, and 
the ist Provisional Marine Brigade lost its identity to the 6th 
Marine Division. Aligned with the 4th and the 2 2d Marines, 
as the division's third infantry regiment, was the new 29th Ma- 
rines, activated at Camp Lejeune in May. The 15th Ma- 
rines (artillery) was formed at Guadalcanal in October from 
the pack howitzer battalions attached to the 4th, 2 2d, and 29th 
Regiments. Division Special Troops, such as the engineer and 
motor transport battalions, were drawn from the reinforcing 
units of each regiment and were each appropriately numbered 
the 6th. The staff was practically that of the brigade. 
General Shepherd continued in command, with a second star 
added. 3 


A summer of strategic uncertainty was ending. The months 
had seen a reassessment of the Allied position in the Pacific and 
a weighing of future moves. 

President Roosevelt had met at Pearl Harbor in July with 
Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, 
and General MacArthur, commanding the Southwest Pacific 
Area. Expressing the Navy's preference, Nimitz suggested that 
Formosa be the next target — bypassing the Philippines — a view 
opposed by MacArthur. There were several arguments against 
selecting Formosa first. Chief among them was the longing 
of everyone to end the war, by stepping up the drive against 
Japan itself. Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner, Jr., com- 
mander of the Tenth Army, slated for the proposed Formosa 
campaign, labeled CAUSEWAY, was less than ardent about 
that operation. When requested by Nimitz to express his frank 
opinion, he said that he considered a Formosa landing imprac- 
ticable, citing troop and supply shortages. What he said added 

3 4th Mar MRolls, iAug-3iOct44. 


weight to MacArthur's view that Formosa could be neutralized 
once Luzon was seized. 

Swayed by such arguments and as anxious as anyone to end 
the costly war, Admiral Nimitz and Fleet Admiral King, Com- 
mander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, both previous advocates of For- 
mosa, turned to favor Okinawa instead. Invasion of Luzon, 
Iwo Jima, and the Ryukyus — mainly Okinawa — would precede 
any Formosa campaign. On 3 October 1944 a directive went 
out to American forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas, informing 
them of prospective invasion of the Ryukyus, and, on 9 October, 
Admiral Nimitz issued the warning order, inserting Okinawa 
before Formosa. 

Capture of Okinawa would place the Allies just 350 miles 
from the Japanese home islands, far closer than they would be 
on Formosa. The size of Okinawa, though much less than 
Formosa, would permit the desired naval and air bases, besides 
providing elbow room for a staging area. The island is 60 
miles long and measures 485 square miles. Shaped like a lizard 
with a horny back, Okinawa was quite different from the other 
islands taken by Marines. It was much larger, it was rocky 
and hilly, and it was not tropical. In September 1 944, months 
before Marines would see the island, B-29S of the 21st Bomber 
Command began the photographic reconnaissance, what 
amounted to the first step of Operation ICEBERG. 

First real planning for Okinawa dwelt on 1 March as target 
date, but by 31 December 1944, when Admiral Nimitz issued 
the operation plan, 1 April had been seen to be more suitable, 
considering both weather and logistics. Capture of Iwo Jima 
and control over much of Luzon were expected by that time. 
The new date fell on Easter Sunday, and it was designated 
LOVE-Day, L-Day, rather than the usual D-Day. 

Admiral Nimitz topped the command pyramid for the gi- 
gantic operation, while Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Fifth 
Fleet Commander, received over-all leadership of ICEBERG. 


Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Commander of Amphibious 
Forces, Pacific Fleet, would head the Joint Expeditionary Force 
(Task Force 51). Part of Task Force 5 1 was the Expeditionary 
Troops (Task Force 56), namely, the Tenth Army, commanded 
by General Buckner. To this task force the 4th Marines was 

The Marine III Amphibious Corps (IIIAC), commanded by 
Major General Geiger, would serve as the landing force of the 
Northern Attack Force. The XXIV Corps (Army), under 
Major General John R. Hodge, would comprise the landing 
force of the Southern Attack Force. The IIIAC consisted of 
the 1st Marine Division, commanded by Major General Pedro 
A. del Valle, and the 6th Marine Division. The 2d Marine 
Division, under Major General Thomas E. Watson, was joined 
to the operation as a demonstration force. In the XXIV Corps 
were the 77th, 7th, and 96th Divisions. The 27th Division was 
in floating reserve under Buckner's control, while the 81st re- 
mained in New Caledonia as area reserve, directly under Admiral 
Nimitz. 4 

The 6th Marine Division preparations for Operation ICE- 
BERG did not wait upon the crystallizing of strategy. The 4th 
Marines entered upon a strenuous training program on 1 Octo- 
ber, and, as previously, the regiment emphasized small-unit 
training, concentrating upon the fire-team, squad, platoon, and 

Each regiment was assigned a section of the Tassafaronga 
area of Guadalcanal, where typical Japanese defenses were 
duplicated. Practice in street fighting was included because 
of numerous villages and towns on Okinawa, and to combat 
Japanese cave defenses in the hills of the island the flame 
thrower-demolition teams were schooled to precise efficiency. 

*Com FifthFlt, OPlan, No. 1-45, dtd 3jan45; GTF-51, GenAR on 
Okinawa Gunto Operation, i7Feb-i7May45, dtd 23J11I45, hereafter CTF-51 


The open terrain of Okinawa, as well as its ridges, was taken 
into account by tank-infantry teams. No detail was overlooked. 
Extensive ship-to-shore practice was held, and the training was 
concluded with an eight-day maneuver, climaxed on 6 March 
by a dress rehearsal of the Okinawa landings. 


On 1 1— 1 2 March, LSTs carrying part of the assault troops 
of the 4th Marines left Guadalcanal for the staging rendezvous 
at Ulithi Atoll in the Western Carolines. Colonel Shapley 
boarded the Mclntyre, the assault transport (APA) which was 
to serve as command post for the 4th Marines' landing at Oki- 
nawa. The rest of the 4th Marines departed on 15 March in 
APAs which anchored on the 21st at Ulithi. En route to the 
staging area, all troops were briefed on every phase of the forth- 
coming Operation ICEBERG. 5 They were warned of the poison- 
ous snakes, the Asiatic diseases, and the insects to expect on 
Okinawa — the "things besides bullets that make war hell." 6 

At Ulithi the men could comprehend the magnitude of the 
Okinawa assault plans. Gathering there were more than 1,200 
ships of all types, 350 more than at the first North African land- 
ings. There were, in fact, more large vessels there than served 
at Normandy. The Army's XXIV Corps, as well as Marines, 
utilized the vast staging area of the Ulithi Atoll. 

The strength of the forces assembled for the attack suggested 
the resistance to be expected. Including the Tactical Air Force 
and all Army and Marine ground elements, more than 182,000 
troops were loaded for the initial assault. The IIIAC totaled 

5 4th Mar MRolls, i-3oSep44 and i-3iMar45; 6th MarDiv OpO (Trng), 
No. 14-45, dtd 22Feb45; 6th MarDiv WarD, i~3iMar45, dtd 2Aug45; 6th 
MarDiv OPlan No. 1-45, dtd ioFeb45; Annex D (15th Mar) to 6th MarDiv 
SAR, I & II. 

6 The Washington Daily News, igApr45. 


63,052, of which the 6th Marine Division accounted for 24,356. 
The 4th Marines numbered 147 officers and 3,128 enlisted men. 


In the few days at Ulithi supplies received a final check. As- 
sault troops of the 4th Marines were assembled on six LSTs, and 
they shoved off for Okinawa on 25 March, due for a rather slow 
and crowded journey. Two days later the rest of the regiment 
sailed in four assault transports — the Mclntyre, Adair, Noble, 
and Gage — and the assault cargo ship Morning Light. By the 
evening of 27 March all forces of the giant armada were again 
at sea. The beaches of Okinawa waited 1,200 miles across the 
water, about 1 00 hours to go. 

The eternal detachment of the sea invited some men to forget 
what lay before them. The commanders and staff were per- 
mitted no such luxury. The short time remaining was devoted 
to a review of plans. 

Intelligence had concluded that the beaches would be lightly 
defended, that the enemy would concentrate inland, particularly 
in the southern part of the island, using mobile reserves else- 
where. There existed, however, a disturbing degree of uncertainty 
on enemy troop dispositions and defenses. Most of the intelli- 
gence had been necessarily gained from aerial photographs, but 
such reconnaissance had been limited by the flying distance to 
Okinawa — negotiable only by B-29S and carrier air, by the size 
of the island, and especially by persistent cloudy weather. In 
fact, an accurate map, drawn from aerial photographs, could 
not be finished and issued until after the Okinawa landing. 

Tenth Army tactics called for landing on the Hagushi beaches 
south of Zampa Misaki (Point) on the west coast of the island. 
These beaches especially suited three strategic objectives : ( 1 ) 
to seize desired airfields ; ( 2 ) to gain good unloading room ; and 
(3) to split the enemy forces, north and south. These advan- 


tages outweighed the difficulties presented to a landing. Coral 
reefs, impossible for LCMs 7 even at high tide, formed a fringe 
some 450 yards from the narrow sandy shore line opening upon 
a hilly plain. 

The beachhead was to extend seven miles, with the Bishi Gawa 
(River) dividing Marines and Army troops. North of the village 
of Hagushi by the Bishi Gawa, the III Amphibious Corps would 
land its two divisions, the 1st and the 6th. South of the river, the 
XXIV Corps would land the 96th and the 7th Divisions. Ma- 
rines would push across the island to the east coast, then move 
up into the Ishikawa Isthmus to isolate northern Okinawa, while 
Army troops could freely turn southward without worry from 
their rear. Occupation of southern Okinawa, the most populated 
area, had been designated the first phase. (See Map 25.) 

In the zone of action of the 6th Division, the 4th Marines (less 
2/4 in division reserve) was assigned to secure some 600 yards 
of beach on the right flank while the 2 2d Marines landed on the 
left — the Red and Green Beaches, respectively. The 29th Ma- 
rines would be held in corps reserve. Yontan Airfield, the 6th 
Division's first objective — in fact, the "prime initial objective" 
of the Tenth Army — lay 1,200 yards inland, just ahead of the 
4th Marines. 8 

As the invasion armada moved through foreboding weather 
on the last days of March, the naval and air bombardment by 
Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy's Amphibious Support Force 
rocked the gray sky over Okinawa. On 24 March, even before 
the invasion force sailed, mine sweepers and underwater demoli- 
tion teams had begun to clear the well-seeded waters off the 
Hagushi beaches. Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Fast Carrier 
Force and a British carrier force stood guard against any Japa- 

7 Landing craft, medium, used primarily for tanks and other mechanized 

8 U.S. PacFlt & POA Joint Staff Study, ICEBERG Operation, 250^44; 
Annex A to IIIAC OPlan, No. 1-45, dtd iFeb45; CTF-51 Rept; 4th Mar 
MRolls 3 iMar-3oApr45. 


MAP 25 

O 5 10 20 



nese attempt to reinforce Okinawa, already a fortress with more 
than 100,000 troops, 9 while Radio Tokyo warned the Japanese 
people that the Empire itself depended upon holding Okinawa. 
Japanese suicide pilots, the kamikaze (divine wind), more nu- 
merous than ever before, and men in suicide boats, bearing 
explosive charges, stood ready to expend themselves in tactics 
of desperation, which would cost our Navy so tragically. 10 

Prospects were somber. Ernie Pyle, the popular newspaper 
correspondent, writing as the ships waited in the East China Sea 
on that rainy 31 March, could find little to detract from "the 
awful image of tomorrow," except that "we are carrying 
marines .... They are a rough, unshaven, competent bunch 
of Americans. I am landing with them. I feel I am in good 
hands. 5 ' 11 


Bright moonlight forecast a clear day as at 0406 Admiral 
Turner signalled the familiar "land the landing force, 55 looking 
to H-Hour at 0830. On Transport Group Able (TG 53.1) 
Commodore Herbert B. Knowles relayed the order to the 6th 
Marine Division he was carrying. At 05 1 5, APAs started putting 
boats over the side. By 0630, all LSTs were in position, ready 
to launch tractors. 

In the East China Sea, Kipling's "dawn like thunder 55 became 
more truth than poetry when at 0530, 50 minutes before sunrise, 

9 Documentary evidence of enemy strength on Okinawa (basically the 
Thirty-second Army, under LtGen Mitsuru Ushijima) was lacking at the 
time. Figures had to be based on aerial photographs and standard Japanese 
tables of organization. Estimates varied from 55,000 in January 1945 to 
65,000 by the latter part of March. 

General Shepherd recalls that the final estimate of enemy strength while 
the attack force was at sea stood at 82,000. Gen. Shepherd ltr to ACofS, 
G-3, dtd i8Jan55 (Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMC). 

10 6th MarDiv OPlan, No. 1-45, ioFeb45; CTF-51 Rept. 
a The Washington Daily News, 3Apr45. 


the first pre-landing gunfire issued from i o battleships, 9 cruisers, 
23 destroyers, and 177 gunboats, obscuring some response from 
shore artillery and mortars. The rocket gunboats moved up to 
the very edge of the reefs. 

At 45 minutes before H-Hour, carrier aircraft dropping na- 
palm swept across the beaches with a broom of flame as Marines 
of the 1 st Armored Amphibian Battalion maneuvered their 
LVT(A)s into line to form the first wave. A still surf favored 
the landings, to be made at last in untropical air — less than 75 
degrees. 12 

Organized as RCT-4, under Colonel Shapley, with the 2d 
Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Reynolds H. Hayden) in division 
reserve, was the reinforced 4th Regiment. 13 

From the line of departure, 4,000 yards offshore, the armored 
amphibians started forward at 0800 behind LCI gunboats, their 
escort as far as the reefs. The LVT(A)s' guns were running 
interference in a grim game for Colonel Shapley, former All- 

12 Annex B to 6th MarDiv AdPlan, No. 1-45, dtd 8Feb45; Annex A to 
IIIAC OPlan, No. 1-45, dtd iFeb45; 4th Mar MRolls, i~3iMar45; CTF- 
51 Rept. 

13 6th MarDiv OPlan, No. 1-45, dtd ioFeb45, listed the following: 

4th Marines (less 2d Bn (less E Co) ) 

Co A, 6th Engineer Bn (less 2d Plat) 

Co A, 6th Pioneer Bn (less 2d Plat) 

Co A, 6th Motor Transport Bn (less 2d Plat) 

Co A, 6th Medical Bn (less one collecting section) 

Det, 26th and 33d Replacement Drafts 

1st Plat, MP Co (less dets) 

1st Plat, Ordnance Co (less dets) 

1 st Plat, Service and Supply Co (less PX sec and dets) 

Det, 58th Naval Construction Bn 

Det, 1 ith Special Naval Construction Bn 

Det, 6th Amphibious Truck Co. 

istBand Sec (less dets) 

1st Shore Fire Control Party, 6th JASCO (less dets) 

1st Air Ground Liaison Party, 6th JASCO (less dets) 

1st Shore Party Communication Team, 6th JASCO (less dets) 

1st Sec, 3d Plat, 1st Bomb Disposal Co 


American at the Naval Academy. As LVTs carrying the 3d 
Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Bruno A. Hochmuth) approached 
Red Beach 1 and those of the 1st Battalion (Major Bernard W. 
Green) came up to Red Beaches 2 and 3, support fire was moved 
inland. The smoke and dust lifted upon beaches which appeared 
deserted. (See Map 26.) 

But now, prepared for the worst yet, the 4th Marines en- 
countered the incredible twist. The beaches were deserted. 
There were not even mines. Assault waves landed at 0837 
"against practically no opposition," reported Colonel Shapley. 
"Several mortar rounds falling in the vicinity of the beaches and 
small-arms fire from several scattered enemy stragglers were all 
that met the assault waves." 14 Only three casualties occurred 
in the 4th Regiment's ranks. No LVT was lost to enemy action. 

The Marines could walk in standing up. Yet "the ridiculous 
ease of the assault landing fooled no savvy Marine," wrote a 
Marine combat correspondent. 15 The moment was merely seized 
in happy relief, whatever was due. Marines, some of whom 
would never leave Okinawa, called cheerfully to each other, 
"Happy Easter!" 

As 1/4 and 3/4 moved rapidly inland, they were greeted by 
mere token resistance, mainly from Japanese huddled around 
light machine guns in cave emplacements. A few empty caves 
were found, stocked with ammunition. Sometimes a cave would 
contain bewildered civilians. 

Yontan Airfield was reached by 1030, way ahead of schedule. 
Three days had been assigned to this objective, expected to be 
gained at a heavy price, but the runways and revetments were 
found abandoned. Marines could advance across the ghost field 
standing up, although there was scattered sniper fire from nearby. 
In what certainly appeared as a tactical blunder, the Japanese 

4th MarSAR,I&II. 

"Tales from Okinawa," Leatherneck, v. XXVIII, no. 9 (Sep45), p. 26. 



were allowing a prize airfield to be taken almost unopposed. 
By nightfall of i April, the 4th and 2 2d Marines were well east 
of the airfield, dug in along rugged and woody high ground, 
while the 29th Marines, still in corps reserve, moved up to take 
over temporarily the responsibility for the Yontan area. 

Back at the beaches the high tide, which had favored the 
infantry and tank landings, receded about noon, uncovering the 
rough floor of the reef which slowed the landing of reserves and 
supplies. Because of the unexpected progress inland, 2/4, in 
division reserve, was put ashore at noon and reverted to regi- 
mental control. The battalion moved up to the right of the 
22d Marines. By 1530 the 15th Marines (Colonel Robert B. 
Luckey) was entirely ashore, with 1/15, under Major Robert H. 
Armstrong, already in direct support of the 4th Marines. The 
shore party, landed on call, set up for business under the same 
easy going. The regimental headquarters and the Weapons 
Company also found their landing more like a maneuver than 
like war. 

The same lack of definite resistance encountered by the 4th 
Marines was reported by other Marine units crossing the island 
and, in fact, along the entire seven-mile front of the Tenth Army. 
Such a windfall enabled a stepping-up of the whole landing 
schedule; by evening of 1 April more than 60,000 troops of the 
Tenth Army were ashore on Okinawa. 

Postwar evidence proved what on that odd L-Day could be 
only a guess: that the Japanese were taking a strategic gamble 
on the most precious soil yet invaded by their enemy. They had 
decided in early 1945 to avoid the high cost of defending the 
beaches against a Marine amphibious assault, in hope of success 
against an enemy well ashore. The Kamikaze Corps was 
expected to destroy the U.S. Fleet offshore. 

Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, who commanded the 
enemy defenses, had received intelligence in February 1945 that 
Okinawa would be attacked with ovemhelming force. He 


planned the defense of Okinawa from a realistic viewpoint. He 
concluded that, because of U.S. naval and air strength, he could 
not hope for reinforcement by water. In light of what he knew 
could be brought to bear against him, both at the beaches and 
inland, he looked upon a strategy of offense as impractical and 
favored a war of attrition — selecting for his principal stand the 
populated southern section of Okinawa, where lay all the air- 
fields, the capital city, the best ports, and most of his supplies. 16 


In their 1,200-yard dash to Yontan Airfield, Marines had 
passed the scenery almost too quickly to see it. But just over 
the beach they noticed the curious ancestral tombs, where, they 
had been informed, a quite live Japanese could lurk. The vaults 
were ornate stone affairs, whose interiors were kept brightly 
whitewashed. Japanese troops found them handy for storage 
or as bomb shelters. 

While his ancestors slept in elegant dignity, a poor Okinawan 
and especially his wife labored on a small well-kept farm, usually 
working a plot of sugar cane, the chief export of the Ryukyus. 
Just inland from the beach, Marines first saw these bewildered 
and docile natives. They are an under-sized people, a mixture 
of Japanese, Mongolian, Malayan, and Ainu, the latter the 
original strain. Marines dubbed them "Okies" and won, by 
kindness and often by treatment of their physical ills, the good- 
will of a people taught by the Japanese to fear the Americans. 

A considerable number of the Okinawans had been conscripted 
into the Japanese Army, most of them unwillingly. The Japa- 
nese regarded them as quite inferior, a foreign population under 
the Emperor's rule since 1879. 

16 Dr. Philip A. Growl memo to MajGen A. C. Smith, USA, 60ct54 
(Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMC) ; LtCol Thomas E. Williams, 
"Jap Tactics on Okinawa," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 10 (Oct45), 
p. 43. 


Two military government detachments had been joined to 
the 6th Marine Division. Okinawa contained some 435,000 
civilians. It presented, therefore, the first sizable military govern- 
ment problem of the Pacific war. As early as the evening of 1 
April, wandering Okinawans began to enter Marine lines and 
were taken into custody at the village of Toya, set aside as a 
civilian compound. A few objected to being photographed, for 
they felt that the process removed a person's soul. 

Not so superstitious but just as shell-shocked were the numerous 
lost goats which, by the end of the first day, Marines had adopted 
as pets. The expected snakes had evidently taken cover under 
the bombardment. They never became a problem. "No snake 
with brains," said a Navy doctor, "is going to stay above ground 
and take a chance on catching a mortar shell or a grenade." 
Only two cases of many expected snake bites were reported in 
the division the entire first month, and both men recovered. But 
mosquitoes and fleas were indifferent to shell-fire, though cold 
nights discouraged mosquitoes. 17 

Yet life on Okinawa was surprisingly tolerable. The temperate 
climate was invigorating to tropics-weary Marines, who saw 
resemblance to the Middle West or to the South in Okinawa's 
landscape. "Most of the boys say they would like Okinawa," 
wrote a correspondent, "if it weren't at war with us, and if the 
people weren't so dirty. . . . The worst crosses to bear are the 
mosquitoes, fleas and the sight of the pathetic people." 18 


The 4th Marines resumed the attack towards the east coast 
at 0730 on 2 April. There was little resistance until midday. 
Then, upon moving down a draw, the 2d Platoon of Company L, 

17 "Tales from Okinawa," op. cit., p. 26. Sgt Harold Heifer, "The Oki- 
nawan," Leatherneck, v. XXVIII, no. 7 (Jul45),p. 38. 

18 The Washington Daily News, gApr45. 

519667—60 22 


3/4, was suddenly pinned down by fire from mutually supporting 
cave emplacements on each side of the ravine. Twelve wounded 
Marines, including Captain Nelson C. Dale, Jr., the company 
commander, were trapped in the draw and could not be removed 
for four hours. 

Reduction of the strong point had to be gained finally by a 
charge, which was led by 1st Lieutenant Marvin D. Perskie, 
executive officer of Company L, taking over for its wounded 
commander. One platoon entered the mouth of the draw, while 
another came down one side of the two noses which formed the 

On the same day the 1st Battalion found itself obliged to reduce 
a similar strong point. Concealed automatic weapons, command- 
ing all approaches, exacted a toll of Marines and cost the life 
of 1st Lieutenant Thad N. Dodds, commander of Company B. 
With the aid of a platoon of tanks the position was destroyed. 
When the 4th Marines halted at 1830 they were still far ahead 
of schedule. The two battalions had encountered the ambush, 
Okinawa style, and had made the enemy pay. 

The third day of the advance saw mostly spasmodic light re- 
sistance, enabling the 4th Marines to cover some 3,500 yards 
over rocky terrain and claim the Yontan hill mass, the highest 
ridge line fencing the Ishikawa Isthmus. Again, it was the 
landscape which was the chief obstacle. Roads were few, a 
fact which delayed supply, and tanks supporting the advance 
had to operate on narrow trails along the scrubby ridge tops. 
In some of the ravines cultivated to rice the ground was marshy. 
There were plenty of caves met through the day, but most of 
them were vacant. The sparse resistance produced a toll of 
but 60 Japanese casualties. Four prisoners were taken. The 
day's statistics included also 72 civilians interned. By orders 
of the day, 1/4 was brought back to regimental reserve. 

The end of that day saw the 4th Marines only 3,000 yards 
from the east coast of Okinawa. During the night an airborne 


attack warning was received, but no incident occurred. 19 This 
night, like those previous, was marked only by scattered fire and 
feeble infiltration efforts. 

There was still no Japanese front line. Enemy forces seemed 
unorganized, fighting indifferently in small numbers, from caves 
and dugouts. They often tried to escape, adding to their 
casualties, which already, by a 4th Marines' count, had mounted 
to some 300 Japanese in the regiment's zone of action. 

On 4 April the regiment jumped off and advanced rapidly. 
No resistance was encountered, although the area was honey- 
combed with caves, connected by an intricate system of tunnels. 
Flat country, thickly strewn with rice paddies, appeared as the 
advancing troops approached the eastern shore, and, at 1145, 
the 4th Marines reached the coast of Chimu Wan (Bay), 12 
days ahead of schedule. 

Elsewhere along the front the advance was equally rapid. 
To the left of the 4th Marines, 3/22 reached the shore at the 
town of Ishikawa. The 1st Marine Division, to the south, closed 
the east coast during the afternoon and took up defensive posi- 
tions. Meanwhile, on the Hagushi beaches, unloading could be 
speeded up; the situation even permitted night unloading under 


A new mission for the 4th Marines began the next morning, 
5 April, when Company F, reinforced by a platoon of tanks 
and four self-propelled 105mm howitzers, patrolled north up 
the east coast of the Ishikawa Isthmus. This was preliminary 

19 The Japanese made only one known attempt to land airborne troops on 
Okinawa. This occurred at Yontan Airfield on the night of 24 May when 
five Japanese two-engine bombers ("Sally's") raided the field. Four were 
shot down, but the fifth landed and eight Japanese soldiers emerged, with 
grenades and incendiaries. They destroyed 7 planes and damaged 26. 


to operations of the 4th Marines and its parent 6th Division to 
seize all of northern Okinawa. 

Originally scheduled for the second phase, to follow the cap- 
ture of southern Okinawa, the seizure of the north had been 
moved ahead by General Buckner on 3 April. Thus the IIIAG 
received instructions to strike the enemy above the Ishikawa 
Isthmus while the XXIV Corps wheeled south. General Geiger 
designated the 6th Marine Division for the northward drive and 
held the 1st Marine Division to occupy the area between the 
Ishikawa Isthmus and the XXIV Corps zone. 

Several reasons dictated the change of plans. It would fore- 
stall a strengthening of northern defenses and impede the or- 
ganization of Okinawan guerrillas in that area. There also 
existed the possibility of counterlandings on northern Okinawa, 
which a quick seizure could prevent. Radio Tokyo kept bol- 
stering Japanese troop morale by promising a counterlanding 
force, but the relief never arrived. 

After the unquiet night of 5 April when infiltrating Japanese 
threw grenades into the regimental command post killing four 
men and wounding six others, the 4th Marines started up the 
east coast road, advancing in a column of battalions, 2/4, 3/4, 
and 1/4, with a platoon of tanks behind the leading battalion. 
By early afternoon most of the 2d Battalion had moved off the 
road in small patrols, and the 3d Battalion passed through to 
take the lead, following a plan of "leapfrogging" battalions. 
The day's patrolling verified the fact that several hundred 
Japanese had already fled north in face of the Marine advance. 
An organized Japanese stand was expected. 

In their retreat up the Ishikawa Isthmus, the Japanese had 
destroyed most of the bridges and hastily mined the roads. To 
remove such mines, to clear road blocks, and to build bypasses 
around demolished bridges, a platoon of Company A, 6th Engi- 
neer Battalion, was put well forward in support of the 4th Ma- 
rines assault battalion. The remainder of the company followed 


close behind, repairing or replacing bridges and widening the 
narrow road where possible to allow two-way traffic. "The en- 
emy made small use of land mines," and had sown no mine fields 
"in the proper sense of the word." 20 The 6th Tank Battalion 
reported only "a few poorly disguised mine fields," 21 which, with 
a number of blown bridges, comprised the only antitank defense 
at that time. No tank was then lost to enemy action. 

A seven-mile advance the first day, 6 April, brought the 4th 
Marines to the village of Hochiya by 1600. A few enemy strag- 
glers turned up. Three bridges were found bombed out by our 
air attacks. Civilians wandering south were met on the road, 
and, of these, a few men of military age were sent to the rear for 
questioning. The rest could go their way, to be rounded up later 
by civil affairs personnel. With nightfall the regiment assembled 
off the main road, in the order of 3/4, 1/4, and 2/4, the pattern 
of advance for the next morning. The motorized Weapons 
Company had been left behind until bridges were repaired. 

At 0700 on 7 April, the 4th Marines resumed their advance 
up the east coast road, in a column of battalions, as before, and 
still with negligible opposition, chiefly from terrain and blown 
bridges. After the hard battles of the Pacific war, the easy going 
of the advance inspired a few exuberant Marines to break into 
song, such as that reported by a correspondent: 

Oh, don't you worry, Mother, your son is safe out here. 
No Japs on Okinawa, no sake, wine or beer . . . , 22 

The pace of the Marine advance was rapid on both coasts, 
but supply became a constant problem. Existing roads were 
narrow, and only boats and *4-ton trucks could be used for supply 
of the battalions. A main supply dump had been set up at Yon- 
tan and one at Ishikawa. 

A halt to the 4th Marines' advance up the east road was called 

20 Annex F (6th EngBn) to 6th MarDiv SAR, I & II. 

21 Annex E (6th TkBn) to 6th MarDiv SAR, I & II. 

22 "Tales from Okinawa," op. cit. 3 p. 26. 


at the town of Ora on the evening of 7 April, with all of the 
Ishikawa Isthmus in the regimental zone by then secured. Most 
of the men were footsore after days of patrolling in the rugged 
hills of the interior, and all, except those on patrol duty, wel- 
comed the next few days of rest and the first hot rations — supple- 
menting the individual cold rations used previously. 

Elsewhere across the 6th Division front progress had been 
equally rapid. On the west coast, the 29th Marines reached 
the town of Nago, at the base of the Motobu Peninsula on 7 April. 
A spearhead then sealed off the peninsula by driving farther north 
to Taira. On Motobu the 6th Division was due to meet its first 
serious organized opposition. Intelligence confirmed that the 
enemy had chosen to stand his ground in that mountainous re- 
gion. The 29th Marines was, therefore, assigned to move into 
the peninsula, probing for enemy strength, with the 2 2d Marines 
deployed across the island, covering behind them. 

The 4th Marines resumed the northward advance on 10 April, 
when Company K set out to patrol along the east coast road. In 
7 days it patrolled 28 miles up the coast, supplied all the while by 
LVTs from the regimental sendee area. No enemy force larger 
than eight men was encountered. On 13 April, the remainder 
of 3/4 was ordered to Kawada to join Company K, but most 
prophetic of future action was the departure on the same day of 
the rest of the regiment for the west coast, to positions at the base 
of the Motobu Peninsula. 


The reason for the hum- to the west coast was to reinforce 
the 29th Marines, which had encountered heavy enemy resistance 
in southwest Motobu. A company of 3/29 had been ambushed 
on 12 April and badly mauled. 

Colonel Takehiko Udo held the territory' with some 1,500 
Army troops of the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, and some 


Okinawan service units 23 — the so-called Udo Force. The 
colonel defied capture of his mountain fortress, which approxi- 
mated six by eight miles, about the same area as Saipan. The 
Motobu heights, ranging to 1,500 feet, well favored observation 
and defense, and with a larger force the enemy could have asked 
an even greater price. The terrain challenged invading infan- 
try, not to say equipment. Supply had to be hand-carried where 
jeeps and trailers could not go. 

It was the fringe of the Japanese stronghold that the 29th 
Marines had inadvertently entered and, although they did not 
know it then, it was here that Colonel Udo himself was sitting 
pretty in elaborate cave headquarters, commanding the defense 
of Motobu from Mount Yaetake. This mountain, rising to 1,500 
feet, resembled a medieval castle where the windows were caves 
and the surrounding moat was of mines, not water. 

Colonel Udo's strategy was to tie down and wear out Ameri- 
can man power, detaining it from proceeding south. He had 
expected the attacks would come from the Toguchi area near 
the west coast of Motobu, but, with his central position, direction 
made little difference. Entrenched behind machine guns, 
mortars, and artillery, he could well feel able to throw back 
assaults, like a hill keeps water from climbing. The caves on 
Motobu, indeed on the entire island, were comparable to those 
on Iwo, as centers of resistance. They were, however, more 
numerous on Okinawa and were more elaborately planned. 


Colonel Shapley and his 4th Marines received the mission to 
reduce the very center of Japanese resistance — Mount Yaetake. 

23 These were members of a local militia, or home guard largely draftees, 
on Okinawa, known as the Boeitai. They numbered around 20,000 and were 
used by the Japanese mostly as labor and service troops. They were not the 
same as the Okinawan conscripts and reservists who were absorbed into the 
regular Japanese Army. 


As reinforcements for this task, the 3d Battalion of the 29th 
Marines was attached to Shapley's command and took up a 
position near Toguchi, where it could press the enemy from the 
west. Shapley's 3d Battalion still remained in division reserve 
on the east coast. To the other two battalions of the 29th 
General Shepherd had assigned the job of barring Japanese 
escape northward, by seizing the high hills above the Itomi- 
Manna Road, and then exerting pressure on Yaetake from a 
northeast direction. Behind the 4th Marines, patrolling ele- 
ments of the 2 2d Regiment would forestall any Japanese threats 
to the rear. Thus the 4th Marines was free on 14 April to 
make a start on their hard assignment to capture Yaetake over 
terrain where tank support would be practically impossible. ( See 
Map 27.) 

The initial step toward the stronghold involved seizure of a 
700-foot ridge about 1,200 yards inland from the southwest coast 
of Motobu, the first of the escort of hills surrounding Mount 
Yaetake proper and dominating the coastal road. It was just 
behind the ridge that the company of the 29th Marines had been 
ambushed, and now the scrubby crag unloosed intermittent 
machine-gun fire like quills of a cornered porcupine. 

A situation which occurred here "was unique," said a regi- 
mental report, for the 4th Marines "was driving toward the 
remaining two battalions of the 29th, who were working toward 
Yaetake from the Itomi area at the central part of the peninsula, 
about four miles away, thus making careful coordination of 
artillery, naval gunfire and air support a strict necessity." 24 Yet 
a heavy bombardment was skillfully laid. 

With 3/29 on the left — moved up from the vicinity of To- 
guchi — and 2/4 on the right, the attack to seize the ridge jumped 
off at 0830 on 14 April. An unexpectedly poor defense was 
presented by the enemy, who merely harassed the attack with 
scattered machine-gun, mortar, and light artillery fire. The 

24 4 th Mar SAR, I & II. 


ridge fell by 1 1 15. In the meantime, 1/4 had been brought up 
the coastal road from regimental reserve and moved to the right 
rear of 2/4 to protect the right flank. At 1 100 Colonel Shapley 
ordered that the 1st Battalion send one company to seize a ridge 
about 1,000 yards to the right front of 2/4 and to contact 2/4 
at that point. 

Major Green assigned Company C, under the command of 1st 
Lieutenant James G. Washburn to the task. Washburn's men 
ran into machine-gun and mortar fire, and Company A ( Captain 
Clinton B. Eastment) was shortly committed on the left of 
Company C. The ridge was taken, and 1st Lieutenant Charles 
E. Jones' Company B moved up on the ridge while A and C 
pushed on to secure the regiment's flank. Below 1/4's position, 
2/4 and 3/29 moved into low ground. Awaiting their advance 
were nests of machine gunners, well under cover of the tangled 
rocky terrain. 

"It was like fighting a phantom enemy," said one officer. 25 
The Japanese would permit a number of Marines to pass, so 
that they could fire at selected individuals. An entire platoon 
of Marines passed one point on a trail successfully, the enemy 
reserving their fire for the company commander and several other 
officers. Major Green was killed in the afternoon of 14 April by 
a similar trick. The Japanese waited silently for more than a half 
hour to select their prey. In the thick vegetation of the slopes 
and ravines they would strike and then slip away, gone before 
Marines could cut through to them. The enemy's employment 
of small mobile fire teams on the approaches to Yaetake illus- 
trated their adaptation to mountain defense. They made use of 
personal camouflage everywhere on Okinawa, sometimes paint- 
ing their faces green and wrapping themselves with leaves. 26 

25 Maj Orville V. Bergren, "School Solutions on Motobu," Marine Corps 
Gazette, v. 29, no. 12 (Dec45), p. 3. 

26 istLt Alan Shilin, "To Yontan and Beyond," Marine Corps Gazette, 
v. 29, no. 7 (Jul45),pp. 16-19. 


A Marine would get more tired of the Japanese he could not 
see than of those he could, and the men of 2/4 and 3/29 were 
glad to dig in on the regimental objective at 1630 on 14 April 
after a trying advance. With the bringing up of 1/4 to the right, 
there were now three battalions on the line. Meanwhile, 3/4 
had moved from the east coast near Awa, to become division 
reserve on Motobu. The regimental Weapons Company was 
organized as a rifle company, since terrain precluded use of their 
heavy weapons. 

The morning of 1 5 April boded a hard day. Across the ground 
yet intervening before Mount Yaetake lay a ridge dominated by 
two highly-fortified hills: one (Hill 200) ahead of the 1st and 
2d Battalions — dominating the entire right flank, the other (Hill 
210 — named Green Hill for the fallen 1/4 commander) block- 
ing the advance of 3/29 on the left. Green Hill had been 
pounded for two days by naval gunfire and artillery, and by air 
strikes using 500-pound bombs and napalm flame bombs to burn 
off camouflage. Yet "every time it was thought reduced," said 
the regimental report, "the Japs would pop out of their caves 
again" 27 with their machine guns, mortars, and one mountain 
gun which they dragged out at intervals. 

Hill 200 had likewise absorbed intensive air attacks and pin- 
point bombardment by the battleship Colorado, but still the 
Japanese popped out from the recesses of their caves, deafened 
but otherwise untouched. Such attacks upon the caves, however 
accurate, could not be as conclusive as what General Buckner 
termed the "blowtorch and corkscrew method," the flame 
thrower being the blowtorch and demolitions the corkscrew. 

In the bitter contest on 15 April for the final ridge before 
Yaetake it was tough going. Company G of 2/4 encountered 
particularly heavy enemy fire, suffering 65 casualties, including 
three company commanders. Its Captain Archie B. Norford was 
killed in action. 

27 4th Mar SAR,I&II. 


Advancing upon Hill 200, the 2d Battalion started the attack 
with three companies abreast — E, F, and G (less one platoon of 
Company E in battalion reserve). Heavy fire, encountered at 
once, continued unabating, forcing Lieutenant Colonel Hayden 
to commit the meager reserve. 

Company G pushed three-fourths of the way up a hill just to 
the right of Hill 200, then withdrew to a more practical defense 
position tied in to Company F. The vigorous advance by Com- 
pany G against utmost resistance served the assault by Companies 
E and F which took Hill 200 before the end of the day. The 
action of Company G also aided the advance of 1/4 on the right, 
where Companies A and C secured a key hill mass southwest of 

When the attack ceased at 1630 the two battalions of the 4th 
Marines were on their objective, while 3/29 had fought just short 
of reducing Hill 210. The men were tired. Many Japanese had 
been cleared out of camouflaged emplacements, and a number 
of caves were sealed. The enemy had lost not only 1,120 counted 
dead but also much equipment — including 3 heavy mortars, 27 
light mortars, 14 machine guns, 1 75mm field piece, and 1 6-inch 

On the morning of 16 iVpril, as Mount Yaetake itself became 
the immediate objective of the 4th Marines, the 3d Battalion 
reverted from division to regimental control, making the 4th Ma- 
rines temporarily, a four-battalion regiment. Green Hill fell to 
3/29 by noon, clearing the path for the climactic assault of Mount 
Yaetake. The 1st and 3d Battalions faced north, the regimental 
Weapons Company patrolling to their rear. With 3/29 and 2/4 
both now on high ground looking east, they were ordered to re- 
main in position, to give fire support to 1/4 and 3/4 advancing 
north against Mount Yaetake. On the right, 1/22 was moving 
up from the rear but was delayed by terrain. The other units of 
the 29th Marines, moving southwest from the vicinity of Itomi, 


had not yet arrived in a position from which they could protect 
the 4th Regiment's right flank. 

Intelligence of enemy whereabouts indicated, however, that 
the temporary breaks in the Marine line were not serious. Colo- 
nel Shapley decided, therefore, to press the decisive attack against 
Mount Yaetake, whose peak lay in the zone of the 1st Battalion, 
now under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Beans, 
formerly regimental executive officer. He filled in here until 
relieved on 1 May by Lieutenant Colonel George B. Bell. 28 

To the left, Company A of 1/4, led by Captain Eastment, 
moved frontally up the steep south nose of Yaetake. Company 
C on the right, under 1st Lieutenant William H. Carlson, 29 who 
had just that day assumed command, started up a draw to reach 
the main ridge. Progress was slowed more by the terrain than by 
the scattered small-arms fire. 

When Marines gained the crest, however, they were suddenly 
met by unrestrained fire which had been withheld until they were 
close. Grenade launchers and hand grenades added to the resist- 
ance, the intensity of which forced a slight withdrawal to a ledge 
until 60mm mortars could be employed and hand grenades 
lobbed to the reverse side of the crest. 

In this close violent combat the 2d Battalion on the left fur- 
nished very effective supporting fire. From Hill 200, overlook- 
ing the reverse slope, they laid down a barrage of mortar and 
machine-gun fire and picked off a column of reinforcements 
moving along the ridge. Added to the mortar fire of the 1st Bat- 
talion, such support kept the enemy pinned down, permitting 
Companies A and C to seize the crest to stay. 

The foothold, gained by 1730, remained precarious, however. 
Taking the hill had cost the two companies over 50 casualties and 

28 Shilin, "To Yontan and Beyond," op. ext., pp. 16-19; 4th Mar MRolls, 

29 Lt Carlson took over for Lt Washburn, wounded in action on 15 April. 
Lt Carlson himself was later twice wounded, on 23 and 27 May, and was 
killed in action on 5 June. 


most of their ammunition. Moreover, the enemy seemed to be 
rallying what strength they had left for a counterattack. But 
the continued artillery fire of the 1 5th Marines and the 2d Bat- 
talion's supporting fire stopped the Japanese long enough for 
Marines to haul ammunition up the hill. Every available officer 
and man turned to the urgent mission of saving their comrades 
and the hill so courageously taken. That hill "looked like Pike's 
Peak," said one officer, 30 as he remembered the "tired sweaty 
men" carrying ammunition and water up on their backs. 

Just an hour after Marines had seized the crest the expected 
counterattack developed — a desperate charge by 75 Japanese, 
who were almost totally destroyed. In the repulse of the charge, 
2/4 again provided a model example of supporting fire. Mount 
Yaetake was now securely in the hands of the 4th Marines, but 
the long line of stretcher-bearers indicated the victory had not 
been cheap. 

Corporal Richard E. Bush of Company C, 1/4, had symbolized 
the courage of every Marine. Severely wounded while leading 
the first squad up the draw to Mount Yaetake, he was evacuated 
to a nearby aid station. There, when an enemy grenade fell 
among the wounded men, he quickly drew it to his body to save 
them. He was most fittingly awarded the Medal of Honor. His 
unhesitating sacrifice caused additional wounds in his stomach 
and face and the loss of three fingers. 

On the morning of 1 7 April the attack was delayed until noon 
due to supply problems. Orders to the 4th and the 29th Ma- 
rines were to seize high ground overlooking the Toguchi-Itomi 
east- west road. The advance, once resumed, quickly built up 
momentum, and the day ended with both regiments on the 

Progress was a breeze, after the previous hard fighting, and 
the day yielded much evidence that, by taking Mount Yaetake, 
the Marines had really broken the back of Japanese defenses. 

30 Bergren, "School Solutions on Motobu," op. cit., p. 6. 


A captured map showed that Yaetake contained the only or- 
ganized defense zone on Motobu. Caves, material, and enemy 
dead were abandoned in the collapse of resistance. 

With the 6th Marine Division's capture of Motobu about 
complete, 3/29 was detached on 18 April from the 4th Marines, 
where it had served so well, and reverted to its parent regiment 
then at Itomi. The 4th Regiment remained in position that 
day, with 1/4 and 3/4 patrolling ahead while 2/4 combed the 
area of the previous day's rapid advance. Mopping up was 
especially imperative on Okinawa with its cleverly concealed 

Next morning the 4th Marines resumed the advance, with 
the 29th Marines on the right. The immediate objective was 
the high ground to the northeast, on which possible enemy con- 
centrations were suspected. But except for a pocket of 35 
Japanese, cleaned out by 2/4, there were no signs of organized 
resistance over the entire 3,000 yards advanced by the 4th 
Regiment during the day. 

The high ground seized on 19 April was the only remaining 
hill mass between the Toguchi-Itomi Road and the north coast 
of Motobu. 31 "The enemy had apparently failed to occupy the 
previously prepared position in strength," said a division report, 
"although a considerable number of dead Japanese were found, 
presumably killed by artillery and naval gunfire." 32 

Some occupants of the position may have escaped. Division 
intelligence judged that several hundred Japanese had fled 
Motobu into northern Okinawa, as the Udo Force degenerated 
into a collection of fleeing stragglers. Udo himself had slipped 
out of his cave headquarters at Mount Yaetake, it was learned, 
to organize more guerrillas, nettlesome like the fleas on Okinawa. 

81 4th Mar MRolls, i-3oApr45; MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., "The 
Battle for Motobu Peninsula," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 8 (Aug45), 
pp. 8-1 1. Bergren, "School Solutions on Motobu," op. cit., p. 6. 

32 6th MarDiv SAR, I & II. 



By the afternoon of 20 April both the 4th and the 29th 
Marines were at the north coast of Motobu, having encountered 
no organized resistance since 16 April. In fact, on 20 April 
the 4th Marines bagged only three hapless stragglers. The next 
day, however, patrols of the 1st Battalion, 2 2d Marines, mopping 
up just south of the Motobu Peninsula, came upon a group of 
about 200 Japanese soldiers who had escaped from Motobu. 
This group, still in a fighting mood and strongly entrenched, 
was destroyed by 3/4. 

The roving 2 2d Marines had reached Hedo Misaki, the 
northernmost tip of the island, on 13 April. This, added to 
the capture of Motobu, rounded out the securing of northern 
Okinawa. On 21 April General Shepherd reported that the 
assignment was accomplished. General Vandegrift, Comman- 
dant of the Marine Corps, attended the flag-raising ceremony 
on 22 April at the division headquarters in Nago, officially 
signifying victory in northern Okinawa. 

On 23 April the 4th Marines started movement to assigned 
bivouac areas. The 3d Battalion moved to Kawada on the 
northeast coast of the island, and 2/ 4 moved to Ora on the east 
coast, 18 miles south of 3/4. Regimental headquarters, the 1st 
Battalion, and the Weapons Company located in the vicinity 
of Genke, five miles above the juncture of Motobu on the west 

The Marines could look back on a campaign which had 
started easily and ended ruggedly. Supply and evacuation de- 
veloped into extreme problems on Motobu's rough terrain. 
Rations, ammunition, and water had to be hand-carried over 
rocks and through brush much of the way from forward dumps 
to the front lines. 

Terrain was the rock-ribbed ally of the Japanese on northern 
Okinawa, but they suffered, nevertheless, a shattering casualty 


toll. Enemy losses had mounted to more than 2,500 counted 
dead. The cost of the campaign to the 6th Marine Division 
had been 236 killed, 1,061 wounded, and 7 missing in action. 
Of that number the 4th Marines had lost 91 killed, 365 wounded, 
and 4 missing in action. In 20 days the division had seized 436 
square miles of enemy territory. 

Elsewhere on Okinawa, meanwhile, Army troops were ex- 
periencing higher casualties and continued problems as they 
met the central Japanese defenses to the south. There lay 
the next assignment of the 4th Marines on Okinawa. 


When the XXIV Corps had turned south after the 1 April 
landings, it moved toward the powerful Naha-Shuri-Yonabaru 
line, drawn across the island — a chain forged of coral, water, and 
steel, fencing off the main part of Okinawa. Below the line the 
enemy was prepared to resist at the beaches any second landing. 

At the center of the defenses lay the town of Shuri, head- 
quarters of the Thirty-second Army of General Ushijima, a soft- 
spoken competent man, an experienced infantry commander. 
Knowing well that American success on Okinawa would break 
down the doors to Japan itself he steeled his troops to the defense. 
4 'Do your utmost," they were told. "The victory of the century 
lies in this battle." 33 

The strength of the Shuri line became apparent to American 
commanders early in April when advancing Army troops ran 
into bitter resistance from enemy outpost positions. In an effort 
to smash through the Japanese fortifications, XXIV Corps pre- 
pared an all-out assault for the 19th. Concentrated artillery 
fire, beyond any yet seen in the Pacific war, preceded the Army's 
general attack. But deep in their caves the enemy survived to 
repel the attack. The grand effort failed. There was no break- 

33 Quoted in Appleman, Okinawa: The Last Battle, pp. 103-104. 
519667—60 23 


through, and the size of the Tenth Army's job in southern 
Okinawa emerged from the blueprint of gunsmoke. The cas- 
ualties of 19 April emphasized the depressing fact that many 
more were due in a grinding struggle for the rest of this island. 
To get through the deep wide complex of hill and ridge defenses 
seemed a job comparable to hacking a way through a jungle of 
steel foliage. 

To forestall the protracted campaign which loomed in southern 
Okinawa, General Buckner considered amphibious landings 
below Shuri. But Tenth Army staff officers regarded them in- 
advisable. It was their belief that, in view of the shortage of 
shipping, such landings could not be well supplied, and, moreover, 
could not be properly supported by artillery. They felt that the 
beaches were unsuitable and the terrain preponderantly favorable 
to a strong Japanese defense. Persuaded by the staff studies, 
General Buckner decided against new landings. In this decision, 
Admiral Nimitz concurred. 34 

It was planned, therefore, to bring the Marines into the line 
above Shuri, moving them by land. In a conference on 28 April 
at General Buckner's headquarters the immediate redeployment 
of the 1 st and 6th Marine Divisions in southern Okinawa was 
discussed. It was decided to attach the 1st Marine Division 
to the XXIV Corps on 30 April, relieving the Army's reserve 
27th Division, which had joined the corps' attack on 19 April. 
The 27th would assume the mopping up duty of the 6th Marine 
Division in northern Okinawa, enabling that division to fight 
alongside the 1st. Upon such a re-shuffling and the employment 
of Marines, hopes were placed for renewing the attack with 
decisive vigor. 

34 In a press interview, Admiral Nimitz declared that "new landings would 
have had to be made over very unsatisfactory beaches against an alerted 
enemy defense. They would have involved heavy casualties and would have 
created unacceptable supply problems." — Washington Evening Star, I7jun45. 



On 2 May the 6th Marine Division started its southward 
move, as engineers and service troops shoved off by truck. Two 
days later the 4th Regiment left by truck convoy for an assigned 
area near Deragawa, 34 miles to the south and about 10 miles 
north of the front line on the west, there to bivouac as division 
reserve. 35 

By evening of 6 May all major elements of the division had 
reached the assembly areas around Chibana. A week of heavy 
rain began on the 7th, forecasting that, wherever the 4th Marines 
went next, it would be muddy going. 

Orders received by General Shepherd on 6 May committed 
the division to the right of the II I AC front, and, two days later, 
the 2 2d Marines were moved to high ground north of the Asa 
Kawa (River) to relieve the 7th Marines of the 1st Division. 
(See Map 28.) 

This relief set in motion the first mission of the 6th Marine 
Division in southern Okinawa: "To seize Naha and the line of 
the Kokuba River in its zone of action, to assist the 1st Marine 
Division by fire and maneuver, and to protect the Corps right 
(west) flank." 36 The mission would start with a crossing of the 
Asa Kawa. The push became termed the Battle for Naha, but 
the assignment encompassed far more than seizure of the capital. 
It was part of the Tenth Army's drive to break the Shuri line. 


Two hills, like posts holding a chain, had to be whittled away 
before the central strong point of Shuri could be taken. One was 
Conical Hill, facing the 96th Division, the other was Sugar Loaf, 

35 Upon movement to southern Okinawa the task organization of the 4th 
Mar (Reinf) was as follows: 4th Mar, Co A 6th MedBn, Det Co A 6th 
MTBn, 1st Plat OrdCo, 1st Plat S&S Co (less PX Sec), and Det 6th JASCO. 

36 6th MarDiv SAR, III. 



confronting the 6th Marine Division. Sugar Loaf (so nicknamed 
for its shape ) was the spearhead of a triangle, based on two sup- 
porting strongholds: Half Moon Hill — actually a cluster of 
ridges — and the Horseshoe depression, both hardly less fortified 
than Sugar Loaf. Together, dominating the approaches to the 
Shuri Hill mass from the west, they formed a web of cave and 
tunnel defenses of immense strength. Sugar Loaf fell to troops 
of the 2 2d and 29th Marines on 18 May after five days of bitter 

Seizure of this key enemy position, though significant, still left 
stubborn resistance on Half Moon Hill and the Horseshoe. Here 
the 4th Marines were to see their first action in southern Okinawa, 
when they relieved the 29th Marines on 1 9 May. As 2/4 and 3/ 4 
moved up they had to practically fight their way into the lines, 
while the 29th fought its way out. Concealment was impossible, 
and the 4th Marines suffered over 70 casualties, mostly from 
mortar and artillery fire, before the relief could be completed at 

In the re- alignment, the 5th Marines was on the left, opposite 
Shuri defenses — in particular the perilous Wana Draw. On the 
right was the 2 2d Marines, with a static front line along the lower 
reaches of the Asato Gawa (River). The position of 3/4 wove 
across the top of Sugar Loaf, Companies K and L relieving 2/29. 
Caves on the north slope had all been blasted shut, but the enemy 
on the reverse slope was still energetically employing grenade 
launchers. Registered on top of the hill, this fire made the Ma- 
rine position barely tenable. Around Sugar Loaf wrecked tanks 
and LVTs spoke of the bitter struggle waged in the area and still 
not ended. 37 

37 The Japanese used horned chemical antitank mines in the Sugar Loaf 
Hill area, and mine fields were covered by small-arms and antitank fire. 
The 47mm antitank guns were usually situated in pairs, covering likely tank 
approaches to the Japanese strong points. Fire was usually withheld until 
tanks were within 300 yards or less when penetration was possible on a 
medium tank. 


Apart from Sugar Loaf, the 29th Marines 5 front was taken 
over by Companies E and F of 2/4. Company E had just moved 
into a precarious advance foothold on Half Moon Hill when the 
Japanese counterattacked, supported by mortar fire. The assault 
was broken up after a two-hour fire fight, with 65 enemy killed, 
but Captain Leonard W. Alford was ordered to withdraw the 
left flank of Company E about a hundred yards to make physical 
contact with Company F and to tighten the line for defense 
through the night hours of ceaseless Japanese fire. 

On the morning of 20 May, the division's movement toward 
the Asato Gawa, which curved through part of Naha, was still 
held up by resistance in the Sugar Loaf area. As Companies K 
and L of 3/4 moved out at 0800 from their positions on Sugar 
Loaf they both met immediate fire from small arms, automatic 
weapons, mortars, and artillery. 

Numerous caves were blasted out by the "blowtorch and 
corkscrew" method in Company K's sector during the morn- 
ing, and early that afternoon Company I joined the line to pre- 
serve contact. Because of the still grim struggle in the Sugar 
Loaf area, Company B (regimental reserve) was briefed for 
possible support of the beleaguered 3d Battalion. The com- 
pany's opportunity occurred that night when the Japanese staged 
a large counterattack against 3/4. At 2130, Company K 
caught the brunt of the assault by an estimated battalion, pref- 
aced by a 50mm mortar barrage and covered by smoke. Before 
the hand-to-hand fighting which developed, support ships helped 
outline the enemy approach with star shells, permitting detec- 
tion at 800 yards. By midnight the attack was broken up. 

This was the last Japanese attempt to repossess Sugar Loaf. 
But Half Moon and the Horseshoe resisted complete possession 
by the Marines, a fact due less to Japanese strength in those 
areas than to enemy fire delivered from outside the division zone 
of action, from the Shuri line to the east. 

In an effort to outflank the enemy, General Shepherd redi- 


rected his division's effort, to side slip to the west of the trouble- 
some strong point and push on to the Asato Gawa. 

Nevertheless, the Shuri defense complex appeared to be 
everywhere, and casualties continued from the monotony of 
seemingly endless ridges. Underfoot, the mud from prolonged 
rain gripped the advance. But General Shepherd's maneuver 
bypassed the worst fire, and the ist and 3d Battalions now 
pressed on to the Asato, to complete the envelopment of the west- 
ern anchor, while the 2d Battalion strove to end the argument 
on Half Moon and the Horseshoe. 


Patrols across the Asato on the night of 22-23 May reported 
that a crossing was feasible without initial tank support, which 
the everlasting mud prevented. So, on the morning of 23 May, 
assault waves of the 4th Marines, the forefront of two battalions, 
began wading the 150-foot-wide Asato under cover of smoke. 

A correspondent described the scene as the crossing progressed 
and the rains deepened the river: "Leathernecks leaped the 
four-foot river embankment by two's and three's and waded over 
the muddy bottom in water that boiled with enemy fire. A 
lot of them didn't make it." 38 In the chest-high water and on 
the slippery underfooting, it required up to 12 stretcher-bearers 
to remove a wounded man. 

By 1 1 00 the harassed assault companies of both battalions 
were across the river. The rest of the regiment crossed during 
the afternoon, while assault troops advanced against hard re- 
sistance around the low clay hills west of the village of Machisi 
outside Naha. Engineers were able to get two foot-bridges across 
the Asato by midnight, but the heat of enemy artillery fire delayed 
bringing up a Bailey bridge. 

38 "Tales from Okinawa," op. cit. } p. 27. 



A Japanese newspaper took note of the approaching Marines : 
"The Sixth Marine Division is a fresh unit. Among the badly- 
mauled enemy it is a tiger's cub and their morale is high." 39 

Prior to landing on Okinawa, Marines had pleasantly an- 
ticipated Naha, the island's capital, as a kind of Paris of the 
Pacific, scuttlebutt crediting it even with streetcars. But now 
Naha was a ruined city, a charred shell of itself, battered by 
artillery and air bombardment. 

The advance upon Naha moved through soaking wetness and 
ceaseless gunfire. On 24 May, 3/4 was relieved by 2/4, which 
joined the action after a crossing of the Asato, leaving the 
division's left flank in the hands of 3/22. 

As the 4th Marines fought into the outskirts of Naha, the 
Division Reconnaissance Company crossed the Asato near its 
mouth and patrolled into downtown Naha. Their probing 
was reinforced when General Buckner ordered patrolling stepped 
up along the entire Tenth Army fine, aimed at checking indica- 
tions of a wholesale enemy withdrawal. The 4th Marines 
probed east of the 20-yard-wide canal which cut across Naha 
from the Asato to the Kokuba Estuary. Some lingering civilians 
reported that lately they had seen only scattered Japanese 
patrols, and what they said proved correct. Naha, with a peace- 
time population of 65,000, had lost value to the Marines except 
as a point on the route southward. 

Colonel Shapley's men, having fought through ten hard days 
to Naha, were placed in division reserve. The 29th Marines 
moved in to relieve them on the morning of 28 May. The 
4th Regiment left by motor and marching for the beach areas 
vacated by the 29th Regiment north of Machinato Airfield, 
there to gain rest and replacements. The 4th Marines were 
tired but could be proud. They had helped to crack the western 
end of the main Japanese defense line in southern Okinawa. 

39 Quoted by Shilin, "6th MarDiv in Southern Okinawa," op. ext., p. 23. 


The ten days of advance against incessant fire had depleted 
the 4th Regiment of men and endurance. Almost 18 inches of 
rain had kept progress a miserable slogging. W eather — and the 
closeness of the fighting — often prevented air support. Weap- 
ons, like everything else, felt the omnipresence of rain. More- 
over, General Buckner's reconnaissance seemed to show that the 
Japanese had no plans to quit, any more than did the rain. 

In the preceding ten days, especially after the Asato crossing, 
supply had become most arduous. Mud joined up with the Jap- 
anese to strain the efforts of engineers and vehicles. On such 
days the LVT was a godsend for supply and evacuation, as the 
only type of vehicle which could consistently ride the sea of mud 
to the front lines. 40 

Momentarily out of the lines, the 4th Marines now had time 
to learn what was happening elsewhere on the Tenth Army 
front — and to hear what was left to be done on Okinawa across 
the six miles to the southern tip. 

Two of the three successive enemy defense lines had been 
broken through by Marines and Army troops. First had been 
the line based on Kakazu Ridge, lying two miles before the 
main defense ring: the Naha-Shuri-Yonabaru. By the end of 
May the latter fine had collapsed. Capture of Sugar Loaf by 
the 6th Marine Division had decisively unhinged it on the west, 
while seizure of Conical Hill, above Yonabaru Airfield, by the 
7th and 96th Army Divisions had destroyed the eastern anchor. 
In the center, pressure by the 1st Marine Division and the Army's 
77th had hastened evacuation of battered ancient Shuri castle, 
Japanese headquarters, where men of the 1st Marines raised the 
Stars and Stripes. 

Remnants of the Thirty-Second Army had retired to the third 
and final defense line to the south — Itoman to Gushichan — 
strung along the backbone of the Yuza Dake (hill mass) and 

40 "Drive on Naha," Leatherneck, v. XXVIII, no. 8 (Aug45), pp. 15-17. 


Yaeju Dake. As early as 22 May, General Ushijima had begun 
a silent orderly retreat to the last wall. 


In addition to the third defense line, there remained a strong- 
hold of Japanese resistance on the Oroku Peninsula, across the 
Kokuba Estuary from Naha and the site of Naha Airfield, biggest 
on Okinawa. It was against Oroku that the 4th Marines were 
to see their next action, and this time in Marine style: the 
amphibious landing. (See Map 29.) 

On Oroku they would meet Rear Admiral Minoru Ota's 
Okinawa Base Force, composed of naval and army troops, chiefly 
the former, and numbering far above the original 1,200 to 1,500 
men estimated by intelligence. It was not then known that, 
before the Marine landing, a number of additional naval troops 
had been brought into the peninsula, along with Okinawan 
conscripts. Ota's regular naval force was known to number 
around 10,000 men, and its elements on Oroku, proving well 
over half of the unit, had been hastily reorganized into a ground 
combat force to defend the peninsula. 

The admiral was expecting a land approach at the base of 
the peninsula, being evidently forgetful of the Marine Corps 
specialty, and he concentrated defenses on the ridge line there. 
Still, from whatever direction the Marines came they would en- 
counter hard going on Oroku. This two-by-three-mile peninsula, 
flat only at the airfield, shared the irregular terrain of Okinawa. 
Its ridges and hills were lower — seldom above 200 feet — but 
they contained the usual camouflaged cave emplacements, hiding 
automatic weapons, of which the enemy possessed an incredible 
number on Oroku. This was partly because the Japanese had 
stripped the wrecked planes on Naha Airfield of their machine 
guns and 20mm cannon and adapted them for ground use. The 
enemy also had many grenade launchers and 81 mm mortars, 



which some of the converted naval troops used rather 

General Shepherd, assigned on short notice to take Oroku, 
weighed the suitable approaches. Reconnaissance by division 
scouts showed the beaches suitable for LVTs. Defenses just in- 
land were reported light, favorable to getting ashore. A draw- 
back was the lack of sufficient amphibious vehicles. Only 70 
LVTs were available, and many of these were the worse for 
wear. General Shepherd decided, therefore, to land only one 
regiment, the 4th Marines, in the assault. According to the 
operation plan, the 29th Marines would follow as LVTs became 
available. The 2 2d Marines, in corps reserve, was to keep the 
door closed at the base of the peninsula. 

It was 1 June when the 4th Marines received their warning 
order, projecting the landing on Oroku three days later. Colo- 
nel Shapley designated the 1st and 2d Battalions to make the 
assault. The 3d Battalion would land a few hours later in reg- 
imental reserve. The 91st Chemical Mortar Company (USA) 
and the 5th Provisional Rocket Detachment were attached to 
the regiment to support the attack, while 1/15 was designated 
to furnish artillery support. 

The chosen Nishikoku beaches, Red 1 and Red 2, measured 
about 800 yards wide, protected by a rough coral shelf extending 
some 200 yards. These were the only available beaches; a sea- 
wall surrounded the rest of the peninsula. 

Logistic preparations for the landing were fretted by unre- 
mitting rain. So impassable were the muddy roads that supplies 
had to be brought up by water. Nevertheless, by 3 June, the 4th 
Marines were ready. Battalion commanders received the land- 
ing orders. K-Day would be 4 June, with H-Hour set at 0545. 

LVT(A)s to lead the assault were readied by the 3d Armored 
Amphibian Battalion (Provisional). The 6th Tank Battalion 
had installed fording equipment on tanks to be used for the land- 
ing, and 1 1 of these would move to the beaches in the 5 LCTs as- 


signed to the battalion. The mission of landing the 4th Marines 
on Oroku went to the Amphibian Tractor Group of the 6th Divi- 
sion, made up of the 4th and 9th Amphibian Tractor Battalions. 

For two days the guns of a battleship, two heavy cruisers, and 
a destroyer pounded the Oroku landing area. Planes raked the 
beaches with napalm and rocket strikes. On the morning of 4 
June the naval support was stepped up and was joined by the 
fire of 15 artillery battalions in a half-hour preparation which 
seemed to shake the peninsula from its hinges. 

The line of departure for K-Day was fixed 1,200 yards north 
of the beaches. As 1/4 was bivouacked farthest north, near 
Machinato Airfield, it was the first to start on the morning of 
K-Day. By 0300 all its equipment was loaded, and personnel 
began to embark in the LVTs. At 0400 the battalion moved out 
for an almost two-hour boat ride. 

When 2/4 was sighted at its embarkation area the two units 
continued abreast. From then to the beaches a number of LVTs 
began to rebel after the weeks of abuse from mud and gunfire. 
Nine of the amphibian tractors failed to land on schedule. 

Delay was not serious this time, however. When the first wave 
of Marines hit the beach at 0558 it met only scattered machine- 
gun fire and bursts from a 20mm gun. Aside from such enemy 
positions covering the landing, there was virtually no opposition 
on the beaches, and a 1,200-yard foothold could be quickly 

Unlike the Hagushi beaches, the sands were thickly mined, 41 
and, despite the vigilance of removal teams, one tank was disabled 
by an undetected mine. By 0650, however, 24 tanks, along with 
4 105mm self-propelled assault guns (M-7's) of the regimental 
Weapons Company, were well ashore and moving inland to sup- 
port the attack. The movement of armor was confined to the 
roads, however, due to ten days of rain. 

41 All of Oroku proved to be well-mined, especially likely tank approaches, 
such as roads and bridges. 


Logistic support across the Kokuba Estuary was simplified by 
seizure of Ono Yama, a small island. This job went to the Divi- 
sion Reconnaissance Company, riding vehicles of the Army's 
708th Amphibious Tank Battalion. The assault was made on 
K-Day against some resistance. Engineers then replaced a dam- 
aged bridge from Naha to the island and another thence across 
to Oroku. 

A unique wire communication with the assault troops on Oroku 
was established soon after the landing. The Division Signal 
Company working on rubber boats strung a four-trunk cable 
across Naha harbor, using the mast of a sunken ship. 42 

Five-hundred yards inland, assault troops met fire from grenade 
launchers as well as intense machine-gun fire. A strategy of in- 
land rather than beach defense had again been adopted by the 
enemy — but this time more from error than design. The first 
small hills rising beyond the flat shore ground were not defended. 
Marines found tunnels, however, with firing ports on all sides — 
prophetic of tunnels with tenants farther inland. 

Lieutenant Colonel Hochmuth's 3d Battalion was landed at 
0850, the advance then proceeding with three battalions on the 
line. As the operations unfolded according to plan, the 2d and 
3d Battalions, 29th Marines, were put ashore in the afternoon 
to relieve 2/4 in the 2o,th's designated zone of action. The bat- 
talion then went into regimental reserve as the attack for the day 
halted at 1700. By that hour the lines were 1,500 yards from 
the shore and included part of Naha Airfield, but mines and after- 
noon rain had slowed the movement of supporting weapons. In 
the first days on Oroku supply was carried out entirely by LVTs. 

Renewal of the attack at 0730 on 5 June produced sharp 
resistance as Marines moved into the more hilly terrain where 
caves bristled with machine guns, grenade launchers, and a few 

42 In addition to the basic sources already cited, this section is based upon 
Annexes E (6th TkBn), H (1st Armored AmphBn), I (4th AmphTracBn ) , 
D ( 15th Mar), and B (22d Mar) to 6th MarDiv SAR, III. 


heavy mortars. Something new had been added by the Japanese, 
namely, an 8-inch rocket, which Marines nicknamed "Whistlin' 
Willie," whose bark proved worse than its bite. The "whistlin" 
was followed by a terrific concussion, but accuracy was poor and 
there was little fragmentation. 

As the Japanese reception committee increased, so close was 
the enemy that Marines digging in for the night could hear the 
detonation of grenade launchers when they were fired. A satchel 
charge was thrown into 1/4's sick bay but fortunately failed to 

The day had been a tiring one for both men and vehicles. In- 
sufficient and overworked LVTs labored through the mud on 
their tasks of supply and evacuation. Tanks sank into the mud 
on roads treacherous with craters and mines. Nevertheless, by 
nightfall three-fourths of Naha Airfield was under Marine con- 
trol, specifically 3/4's. This airfield, once the best on Okinawa, 
now presented a sad state of neglect — swampy and overgrown 
with grass. Bombing and strafing had converted several planes 
into useless wreckage, adding to the scene of decay. Yet the en- 
emy had the field well covered with fire, and they exacted a price 
for the dilapidated place, which by 6 June fully belonged to the 

That same third day on Oroku saw 1/4 stopped short by a 
hail of fire from a dominating hill — "Little Sugar Loaf," the Ma- 
rines named it. Tanks and howitzers, stalled in the perpetual 
mud, could not be brought to bear until dozers, after contending 
with mines, could clear the way. Until such direct fire support 
from tanks and M-7's, attempts upon the hill were hopeless and 

By 1530, covered by Company C, the tanks were moveable; 
however, by the time the high ground could be seized it would be 
dark, so the battalion fell back to the line occupied that morning. 
Company A's assault platoon, which had been pinned down for 


six hours south of Little Sugar Loaf, was pulled out under cover 
of smoke. 

The ist Battalion had laid the groundwork, but actual reduc- 
tion of Little Sugar Loaf was turned over to the 2d Battalion as 
1/4 went into regimental reserve the next morning, 7 June. By 
now, tanks, M-7's, and 37mm guns could all be applied on Lit- 
tle Sugar Loaf, which was captured at 1 100 by Company G, in 
a flanking movement from the west. In taking an adjoining 
hill, Marines of Company E, 2/4, adopted the unusual tactic of 
moving through an enemy tunnel instead of advancing down the 
fire-swept reverse slope. A fire team was sent through first, fol- 
lowed by a section of machine guns. This maneuver was repeat- 
ed on subsequent occasions. 

Machine-gun fire seemed to come from everywhere. More- 
over, 3/ 4 received fire from Senaga Shima, a small rocky island 
some thousand yards off the coast. But this was silenced by air 
and naval gunfire — so thoroughly, in fact, that when the island 
was seized on 14 June by the Division Reconnaissance Company 
all the Japanese there were dead. 

After the third day on Oroku, sun, the only force able to con- 
quer mud, started to dry the land, and when it now untrapped 
the wheels of war General Shepherd moved swiftly to wrap up 
the Oroku operation. Action could now be resolved into encircle- 
ment of enemy strength, by compressing it against the waters 
of the Kokuba Estuary near Tomigusuki at the southeastern tip 
of the peninsula. To this end General Shepherd deployed his 
three infantry regiments — the 4th and the 29th driving east and 
northeast, and the 2 2d attacking northwest. 

It was not quite the original plan, but tactics, like philosophy, 
adapt to facts. As first mapped out, the 4th and the 29th Marines 
were to drive southeast to the base of the peninsula. The 29th 
Marines, however, pushing against the left, had become stalled 
by extreme resistance before the town of Oroku. The result was 
that the 4th Regiment swung wide around Oroku and drove 


northeast toward the center of Japanese resistance. The 2 2d Ma- 
rines crossed the Kokuba Gawa, and General Shepherd's new 
encirclement plan welded a shrinking ring around Admiral Ota. 

On 9 June, the 4th Marines seized a key position beyond 
Chiwa, while patrols cleaned out that town and established 
contact with the 2 2d Marines to the east, thus sealing off escape 
from the peninsula. Both guns and flame thrower tanks, known 
as "Zippos" (after a popular cigarette lighter), suffered 
considerably from mines and antitank weapons. 

The next day of concerted pressure brought the 4th Marines 
farther northeastward and the 2 2d Marines toward Tomigusuki, 
while the 29th Marines moved through the town of Oroku. 
The division advance could not be rapid, in view of resistance, 
but it was steady. Brigadier General William T. Clement, as- 
sistant division commander and a veteran of the Philippines, 
said the Oroku Peninsula was "fifty times as strong as 
Corregidor." 43 

By the night of 1 o June, enemy territory had been so reduced 
that local counterattacks exploded along the entire perimeter. 
The next morning General Shepherd renewed the drive, employ- 
ing most of his infantry battalions, supported by tanks. General 
Buckner's humanitarian message to Ushijima to surrender, stop- 
ping useless bloodshed, had been ignored, and the battle was 
to continue. 

Increasingly desperate enemy resistance met the division at- 
tacks on 1 1 June, but substantial gains were recorded. The 
2 2d Marines captured the town of Tomigusuki and Hill 53, 
which overlooked both the Kokuba Estuary and the Oroku 
Peninsula to the northwest where the 29th Marines were pushing 
against a powerful system of mutually supporting hill defenses. 

Direction of the 4th Marines' attack from the southwest lay 
between Hill 58 and Tomigusuki, leading into a pocket covered 

43 Quoted by istLt Shilin, "6th MarDiv in Southern Okinawa," op. cit., 
P- 55- 

519667—60 24 


by mutually supporting machine guns and 20mm antiaircraft 
cannon. Tanks encountered mine fields here, well-covered by 
automatic weapons. 

On the nth the 1st and 2d Battalions remained in position 
while 3/4 passed through 1/4. From its vantage point on high 
ground to the left, the 2d Battalion could support the attack of 
both the 29th Marines and 3/4 by the fire of its own weapons 
and regimental M-7's. The 1st Battalion likewise covered the 
attack of 3/4 with small-arms and 60mm fire. 

The day's experience of Company I, 3/4 illustrated the pattern 
of resistance. Hardly had the men moved out than they ran into 
a rain of fire from a low red clay hill, a strongly fortified em- 
bankment — proving to be "almost another Sugar Loaf," said 
the battalion report. The approaches were so seeded with mines 
that, though engineers worked under constant fire to remove 
them, two tanks were knocked out. 

By the afternoon of 1 1 June, Marines had combed the Jap- 
anese off the surface of the hill, but the underground still 
swarmed with them, and sniper fire had already cost Company I 
35 casualties. Capture of the hill had to be left to the next day. 
When the attack was then resumed, Company I advanced fron- 
tally, while Company K, coming through the 2 2d Marines' zone 
of action, attacked from the right. At 1030, Company L was 
committed between the two assault companies and soon found 
itself involved in grenade warfare with Japanese in a maze of 
trench works, known as spider traps. 

Capture of the hill occurred at noon, and, from then on, 
Marines could plug along toward the estuary, cleaning up the 
evaporating resistance and sealing caves. By the evening of 
12 June the Marine front lines were just 500 yards from the 
Kokuba Estuary. Those Japanese who were now left on Oroku 
stood practically at the water's edge, with no ships waiting to 
rescue them. 

The next day, 13 June, as the enemy were forced into the 


open on the flat rice-paddy land along the estuary, most of them 
lost their will to fight, although some still fanatically resisted. 
"The battle soon turned into a rout. Japs jumped out of their 
holes, threw down their weapons and ran. Some surrendered. 
Many of them committed suicide by blowing themselves up with 
grenades." 44 Admiral Ota committed hara-kiri, along with his 
staff, in his cave headquarters near Tomigusuki. 

On 1 3 June, General Shepherd could report the end of organ- 
ized resistance on the Oroku Peninsula. It had been a hard 
struggle. In ten days the enemy had lost an estimated 5,000 
men killed and nearly 200 as prisoners. Of this number the 4th 
Marines accounted for 2,923 Japanese killed or captured, but 
themselves suffered 89 killed and 5 1 1 wounded, part of the Ma- 
rine toll of 1,608 killed and wounded. 

The reinforced 4th Marines had captured more than 75 per 
cent of the Oroku Peninsula. Now the men went into assembly 
areas. They had well earned a Presidential Unit Citation, 45 re- 
ceived for the regiment's heroic assault of the Oroku Peninsula. 

The Oroku landing was a model example of what General 
Shepherd called "the professional character which Marines pos- 
sess with respect to landing operations." 46 Other landings in 
Marine Corps history were bigger, but perhaps none was prepared 
more quickly, or conducted more successfully under harassing 
problems. A division was readied for a complex amphibious op- 
eration in approximately 36 hours. Embarkation took place 
under darkness, the approach was made without adequate aids 
to navigation, and there was no opportunity for rehearsal or even 
a detailed briefing. Just the same, the landing was effected as 

44 4th Mar SAR, III. 

45 This award was later changed to include the entire 6th Marine Division, 
for the assault and capture of Okinawa. 

46 Gen Lemuel G. Shepherd, Jr., memo to Hd, HistBr, HQMC, dtd 2Mar55 
( Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMG ) . 



The whole Okinawa campaign was just a week from the end, 
but the 4th Marines did not know that when they again picked 
up their gear to move south. On Ara Saki (Gape), the south- 
ern end of Okinawa, the Japanese were staging their last fight. 
In those final square yards of Okinawa, General Buckner was 
mortally wounded on 18 June when a fragment of jagged coral, 
kicked up by enemy artillery fire, tore into his chest. Death was 
dealt to the Tenth Army commander not by a Japanese shell 
itself but by the rocky earth of Okinawa, which had so consistently 
served the Japanese. Leadership of the Tenth Army devolved 
upon General Geiger as senior troop commander, while the cam- 
paign approached conclusion. 

The eastern part of the enemy defense line, the Yaeju Dake, 
had been penetrated by Army troops. But the western section, 
the Yuza Dake and the adjoining Kunishi Ridge, still resisted the 
Army's 96th Division and the 1st Marine Division. 

As the 6th Division prepared to align itself with the 1st, the 
2 2d Marines led the column of regiments south, shoving off on 
17 June. The 4th Marines moved into an assembly area north 
of Mezado Ridge on 19 June. Meanwhile, the 1st Division, on 
the left, shortened its lines to give the 6th elbow room. 

Ahead of the 4th Marines stood their final ridge on this island, 
their last hills of World War II, the Kiyamu-Gusuku mass. As 
Colonel Shapley's battalions reached the foot of it on 20 June 
they were met by fire from caves and crevices of the steep incline. 
(See Map 30.) 

Because the north slope was particularly steep, the weight of 
attack was moved around to the reverse side. There, too, how- 
ever, the deep fissures and large boulders lent cover to a last-ditch 
defense. Opposed by machine guns and mortars, Marines 
climbed the ridge, to lay claim to it on the morning of 2 1 June. 

At 1027 of that day General Shepherd could report the end of 


organized resistance in the division zone of action. Japanese or- 
ganizations, as such, no longer existed. 47 

When the enemy's hold on Okinawa slipped from their trig- 
ger fingers, the mood to surrender overtook many of the Em- 
peror's most stubborn soldiers. More than 700 officers and 
men gave up the fight in its last hours. 48 Thus does war often 
end suddenly in a kind of collapse, like an overwhelming 
weariness with the boredom and carnage. 


On 22 June, General Geiger took official note of the end on 
Okinawa during a flag-raising ceremony at Tenth Army Head- 
quarters. General Ushijima met defeat in the most noble manner 
he knew. True to the ancient warrior code, he and his chief of 
staff, General Cho, made to their Emperor the supreme apology. 
General Cho's last words blamed the defeat on "the material 
strength of the enemy." 49 It had counted, but there was much 
more, for battles are won by human spirit as well as by equipment. 

On 26 June the 4th Marines started for its assigned rest and 
rehabilitation area on the Oroku Peninsula. There, on ground 
where they had lost many buddies, the men awaited shipment 
off Okinawa. On 8 July the regiment sailed for Guam, leaving 
to memory and history its most costly campaign. Five hundred 
officers and men of the 4th Marines had paid with their lives for 
the victory on Okinawa. More than 2,400 others bore wounds 
from the battlefield. 50 

47 Annex B (22d Mar) to 6th MarDiv SAR, III. 

48 Few officers surrendered. In one group of 400 prisoners, who surren- 
dered en masse, only one was an officer — a warrant officer — and he was "filled 
with misgivings about his conduct." 6th MarDiv SAR, III. 

49 Quoted in Appleman, Okinawa: The Last Battle, p. 470. 
60 See Appendix H, Casualties. 


Occupation of Japan and China 


On Guam the 4th Marines began making ready for what was 
expected to be the toughest operation of the war — the invasion 
of Japan. 1 They moved into a newly constructed tent camp on 
high ground overlooking Pago Bay. Under the command of 
Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Beans, who had relieved Colonel 
Shapley on 4 July, the regiment was slated to begin training and 
preparing for invasion of the enemy homeland. But Japanese 
peace overtures caused a swift revision of plans, so quickly, in 
fact, that the day after the 14 August surrender the 4th Marines 
was on board ship, leaving for occupation duty on Japanese 
soil. 2 

The surrender of Japan had followed the explosion of two 
atomic bombs over her soil. Dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 

1 Unless otherwise noted, the section on the occupation of Japan is based 
upon the following: TG-31.3 AR, Initial Occupation of Yokosuka Naval 
Base Area, Japan, dtd 7Sep45; and TF-31 AR Occupation and Securing of 
the Yokosuka Naval Base and Airfield, dtd 8Sep45 (both in the Japan 
Area-Op File, HistBr, HQMC); 4th Mar WarD, n-i3Aug to 3iDec45; 
6th MarDiv WarD, 1 Jul-3 iOct45 ; and IIIAC WarD, iAug45~28Feb46 (all 
in Unit Hist-Rept File, HistBr, HQMC) ; Maj James M. Jefferson, Col Louis 
Metzger, Col Orville V. Bergren, and BriGen Fred D. Beans interviews by 
HistBr, HQMC, dtd i2-i4-i9jan59 and i3Mar59, respectively (all in 
Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMC); and Bevan G. Cass, ed., 
History of the Sixth Marine Division (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 

2 4th Mar MRolls, iJuly~3iAug45. 



and upon Nagasaki three days later, the nuclear weapons has- 
tened a decision which had long been in the making. They 
provided a terrifying illustration of what was meant by the alter- 
native to unconditional surrender, stated by the Potsdam ulti- 
matum of 26 July, namely, "utter devastation of the Japanese 
homeland." Russia's declaration of war on 9 August merely 
added another despair to Japan's hopeless prospect. Surrender 
upon the Allied terms was the only "path of reason," as explained 
at Potsdam, and Japan took it. 3 


On 10 August, Washington received word of Japan's consent 
to the Potsdam terms, "with the understanding," said the mes- 
sage, that Emperor Hirohito could stay. The Allies saw no 
necessity or wisdom for denying a request so based upon Japan's 
historic fabric, but a proviso was made — that the Emperor's au- 
thority must become subject to the Allied Supreme Commander, 
a task which devolved upon General MacArthur. On 1 4 August, 
President Truman received Japan's final acceptance. 4 

But Japan's message of 10 August was plain enough writing 
on the wall. On that day, therefore, Admiral Nimitz dispatched 
a message to the IIIAC, advising that he wanted a regimental 
combat team for immediate occupation duty. In turn, General 
Shepherd was directed to furnish the team, which would be the 
first foreign troops ever to occupy Japan's own soil. There was 
a certain Tightness to the fact that the 4th Marines received the 
honor. Memories of Corregidor gave it a deep meaning. 

But the regiment due for this honor was short both of men 
and equipment. In the 4th Marines which suddenly found itself 
off for Japan, half of the men were new to the regiment — re- 

3 Robert J. C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1954), pp. 231-232, 243-244. 
* See Butow, op. ext., Appendix. 


placements hurriedly assembled. Most of the weapons stowed 
on board were still as received from the Field Depot — cased and 
heavily cosmolined. Men had been marched directly from the 
transient center to the ships, with the result that numerous stow- 
aways turned up after several days at sea. 5 The mounting out, 
under Lieutenant Colonel Beans, had followed the Marine Corps 
tradition of making ready fast, but this time it was for a happier 
assignment than perhaps ever before. 

Reinforced, and with its attached units, the 4th Marines sailed 
for Japan as the major element of Task Group Able, activated on 
1 1 August, under the command of Brigadier General William T. 
Clement, assistant commander of the 6th Marine Division. He 
and a hastily organized staff left Guam on 13 August in the 
Ozark, a vehicle landing ship ( LS V ) . They reported to Admiral 
Halsey on board the battleship Missouri on 1 8 August at the sea 
rendezvous of the Third Fleet, some 350 miles southeast of Tokyo. 
The Third Fleet had been designated to furnish the Tokyo Bay 
Occupation Force. Most of the troops and supplies of Task 
Group Able were by then well under way, loaded on board five 
troop transports, a cargo ship, an LST, and a dock landing ship. 6 

On 19 August the convoy closed the Third Fleet, where Task 
Group Able was to become the nucleus of the newly created Task 

5 Col Wilson E. Hunt ltr to CMC, dtd i8Mar59 (Monograph & Comment 
File, HistBr, HQMC). 

6 Lieutenant Colonel Beans' 4th Marines (Reinforced) stood as follows: 
4th Marines; 1st Battalion, 15th Marines; Company C, 6th Tank Battalion; 
Tank Maintenance Section, 6th Service Battalion; Company A, 6th Engineer 
Battalion; Company A, 6th Medical Battalion; Company A, 6th Pioneer 
Battalion; Truck Company, 6th Motor Transport Battalion; 1st Platoon, 
Ordnance Company; Service Platoon, 6th Service Battalion; Supply Platoon, 
6th Service Battalion; Band Section; Shore Party Communications Team, 
6th Joint Assault Signal Company (JASCO) ; Shore Fire Control Party, 6th 
JASCO ; and Air Ground Liaison Team, 6th JASCO. Attached to General 
Clement's command were Company A, 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion and 
Company D, 6th Medical Battalion, a provisional headquarters detachment, 
and a platoon of the 6th Military Police Company. 4th Mar MRolls, 1-31 
Aug45; 6th MarDiv OPlan, No. 106-45, dtd i3Aug45 (Japan Area-Op File, 
HistBr, HQMC). 


Force 31 — the Yokosuka Occupation Force, commanded by Rear 
Admiral Oscar C. Badger. News of particular interest was the 
fact that while General Clement was at sea his command had 
grown like Topsy. He learned by dispatch from Admiral Halsey 
that he commanded a Fleet Landing Force (Task Group 31.3), 
almost of division strength. The main element (and the spear- 
head of the landings) was still RCT-4, then numbering 5,863 of- 
ficers and men. But added to General Clement's Task Group 
Able was a Third Fleet Marine Landing Force, which consisted 
of three battalions organized from seagoing Marines of 32 com- 
batant ships — the largest number, 107, provided by the battleship 
Wisconsin. They totaled 1,829 officers and men and were trans- 
ferred at sea into two transports. 

The second addition was a Third Fleet Naval Landing Force 
of two battalions, totaling 850 bluejackets, also transferred at sea, 
and five provisional battalions organized aboard eight of the 
ships of the Third Fleet. As it turned out, it was not necessary 
to land these reserve units. A British Landing Force of 450 men, 
including 250 Royal Marines, from 5 British ships also came un- 
der General Clement's command. He ended up with a landing 
force, all told, of more than 1 1,000 men. 

The mass transfer of Marines and bluejackets and supplies to 
transports while at sea was a unique operation, but a necessary 
one, to provide for their organization as tactical units. It was 
a sight to remember in a war marked by American ingenuity. 
Men were moved, by the thousands, from one ship to another 
by breeches buoy, swinging precariously across on a rope stretched 
between two vessels. Commanders also used this mode of transit 
to attend conferences on other ships. 

Neither the Marines of the fleet nor the bluejackets were bal- 
anced tactical units or combat-ready for land operations. More- 
over, they were short of equipment, particularly communication 
gear, and had to be provided essential supplies from the stocks 
of the 4th Marines. They were, in a sense, token forces, enabling 


the Navy — like the British — to share the final landing of the war. 
Their over-all commander, General Clement, established his 
command post along with the 4th Marines' headquarters, in the 
troop transport Grimes. Admiral Badger shifted his flag from 
the battleship Iowa to the cruiser San Diego, a name early 
associated with the 4th Marines. 7 


General Clement's command took its place in the vast Third 
Fleet which was cruising off Tokyo Bay. Assignments had been 
spelled out. The Third Fleet, with impressive carrier air cover, 
would occupy Tokyo Bay and adjacent coastal waters, support- 
ing the landings. Task Force 31 was assigned to occupy and 
secure the great Yokosuka Naval Base, commanded by Vice Ad- 
miral Michitura Totsuka. It lay some 30 miles south of the 
capital, on Miura Peninsula, which shelters Tokyo Bay on the 
west. A wartime beehive, the base had built and supplied much 
of Japan's navy, most of which could be enfolded within its 
capacious harbor. The base adjoined Yokosuka, a city then 
about the size of San Diego. The Army's nth Airborne and 
27th Infantry Divisions were to seize Yokohama and Tokyo, 
respectively. ( See Map 3 1 . ) 

The 4th Marines was scheduled to land in assault. Prior to 
the main landings, Major Edgar F. Carney's 2d Battalion was 
to execute a dawn landing. It would secure Futtsu Cape, across 
the Uraga Strait — entrance to Tokyo Bay — and seven miles from 
the naval base. On the cape the Marines would make certain 
that the Japanese had rendered powerless those coast defense 
guns and mortars which stood at the door of Tokyo Bay. The 
Marines would also seize a small fort just off the point of the 

7 6th MarDiv OpO, No. 106-45, dtd i3Aug45; CTF-31 msg to TF-31, 
dtd 5Sep45; and Third Fit OPlan, No. 10-45, dtd J 9 A ug45 (both in Japan 
Area-Op File, HistBr, HQMG) ; 4th Mar MRolls, i-3iAug45. 



cape. British Marines were assigned two harbor islets containing 
stores and ammunition. The Marines of 2/4, their mission 
accomplished, would reembark in landing craft as regimental 
reserve, ready to land on order. To 1/4 (Lieutenant Colonel 
George B. Bell) went the task of seizing the naval airfield and to 
3/4 (Major Wilson E. Hunt) the responsibility for taking over 
the navy yard. These two battalions would land simultaneously, 
set up defense perimeters, patrol the peninsula, and disarm 
Japanese military personnel. 

Duties of the Third Fleet Marine and Naval Landing Forces 
were to be chiefly of a reinforcement nature. The seagoing 
Marines would relieve elements of RCT-4 in occupation of the 
airfield while bluejackets were to move into the navy yard, once 
the 4th Marines had secured it and moved on to the perimeter. 
If the assault landings should encounter resistance, both these 
elements were available to support the 4th Marines. 

Originally, it had been planned that the Marines land on the 
southwest coast of the peninsula and then drive five miles over- 
land on two good roads to the naval base. Ships, under this 
plan, would unload supplies and equipment at the Yokosuka 
docks and beaches once the assault troops had secured the 

A thrust into Tokyo Bay, the world's most thoroughly mined 
area with its ring of coastal defenses, was a redoubtable prospect. 
However, this direct approach was settled upon, for it would put 
the Marines right on their objective — the naval base. Moreover, 
the roads across the peninsula went through numerous tunnels, 
perfect setups for ambushes. The Japanese themselves were to 
remove the risks of the adopted plan by demilitarizing Tokyo 
Bay beforehand. 8 

Although the Japanese had never known a foreign occupation, 

8 Third Fit OPlan, No. 1-45, dtd 2oAug45; TF-31 OPlan, No. 1-45, dtd 
2oAug45; and TG-31.3 OPlan, No. 1-45, dtd 2oAug45 (all in Japan 
Area-Op File, HistBr, HQMC). 


there were signs they would cooperate. Emperor Hirohito, who 
had opposed the war in 1 94 1 , urged the Japanese people by radio 
on 15 August to yield to "the dictate of time and fate." In the 
Cabinet debates before surrender the Emperor courageously op- 
posed the diehards. "The time has come," he said, "when we 
must bear the unbearable." The Emperor's opinion, the most he 
could legally express, was endorsed by the Cabinet. It was there- 
upon handed down as an imperial decision, officially binding and 
compelling upon a people who revered the Emperor as divine. 
The new prime minister, a cousin of the Emperor, was decidedly 
conciliatory, and the first American talks with Japanese officers 
prior to the Yokosuka landings proved very friendly. 9 

Peaceful occupation was desired. And in pursuance of that 
policy, Marines and bluejackets were advised that it would no 
longer be correct to call a Japanese a "bastard." Marine vet- 
erans, however, were understandably wary. "We expect to be 
greeted by some Nips," said a battalion commander at a briefing. 
"Friendly ones, we've been told." 10 

On Monday, 27 August, ships of the Third Fleet anchored in 
Sagami Bay, just south of Tokyo Bay. A party of 22 Japanese 
sailed out in a destroyer and boarded the Missouri to receive oc- 
cupation orders, issued by Rear Admiral Robert B. Carney, Ad- 
miral Halsey's Chief of Staff. Tokyo Bay, still a trap of mines, 
some of which were controlled from the shore, was to be cleared 
completely by the Japanese aided by American mine sweepers. 
The forbidding coastal and AA defenses were to be disarmed and 
marked by white flags, visible four miles at sea. Thorough de- 
militarization was emphasized. The Yokosuka Naval Base was 
to be evacuated of all personnel except necessary maintenance 
crews, who would wear white armbands. Officers and guides 

9 Masuo Kato, The Lost War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1946), 
pp. 246-247, 225-227; Butow, op. cit., pp. 1, 176, 232 and Appendices. 

10 Sgts Duane Decker and Joseph Purcell, "Crazy Beachhead," Leatherneck, 
v. XXVIII, no. 12 (Dec45), pp. 38-39. 


were to meet the landing forces. The next day Vice Admiral 
Totsuka and his staff boarded the San Diego. They came bear- 
ing records, charts, and agreeable answers to demands. They 
bowed, and they bent over backward to cooperate. 

At night the Third Fleet ships were illuminated, for the first 
time since Pearl Harbor, and the colorful ships' flags waved 
against the brightness of snow-shrouded Mount Fuji in the back- 
ground. On the shore were the village lights of people grateful 
that the war was over. It was a scene which was stirring and 
unforgettable to men who had fought so long to get here. They 
could relax, more completely than ever before, at their precious 
wartime recreation — the movies, shown topside. 


The favorable climate of the talks which had been held with 
the Japanese overlapped into blue skies on 30 August, set as 
L-Day. At 0315 transports of Task Force 31, with escorts and 
guided by Japanese pilots and navigation lights, started moving 
from Sagami Bay, rounding the 20-mile Miura Peninsula, and 
negotiating the 2 -mile width of Uraga Strait into Tokyo Bay. 
The first group lifted 2/4, the second the bulk of the landing 
forces, and the third the British Landing Force of Marines and 
naval ratings. Carriers did not enter Tokyo Bay, but their air- 
craft covered the landings. 

At 0558, men of the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines went ashore on 
Futtsu Cape. They preceded, by some ten minutes, the first 
Army troops to land on Japan's home soil — the nth Airborne, 
at Atsugi Airfield, some eight miles west of Yokohama. 

True to the Japanese promise, the guns of Futtsu Cape stood 
silent, like relics of a forgotten war. White flags marked all the 
battery positions. There, as on the Miura Peninsula, white flags 
covered the landscape, like wash hung out to dry. 

The landing on Futtsu Cape interrupted a few clam diggers 


apparently unconcerned at the decline of the Empire. Two 
waiting Japanese officers, with their interpreter, met the Marines 
at the cape's tunneled and vaulted main fort, next to empty beach 
bunkers and pillboxes. The place, like all Tokyo Bay, would 
have been hell to wartime invaders. 

Today the local commander performed a smart salute of com- 
pliance when ist Lieutenant George B. Lamberson, of Company 
G, ordered the Japanese garrison marched away. They left their 
weapons stacked in neat rows. Marines made certain that 17 
guns and mortars were really incapacitated, while a detail climbed 
a weather station tower to unfurl the American flag. In Fort 
No. 1, at the tip of the cape, other Marines found four 150mm 
guns, more ammunition, and a few more Japanese, likewise will- 
ing to surrender. By 0845 Major Carney's Marines had wrapped 
up their mission and were reembarking in landing craft to become 
the reserve battalion. 11 The way was now clear for the main 

The 1 st and 3d Battalions, 4th Marines, which went ashore at 
0930, met no resistance. Moving rapidly upon the navy yard 
and the airfield, they found a few Japanese around, each wear- 
ing the required white armband of the caretaker crew left behind. 
Most of the other Japanese were already on their way home. 
The only "shooting" on shore was done by Japanese press pho- 
tographers, who collected next to the U.S. Navy camera men 
who were filming the landing. An English-speaking Japanese 
Army colonel in uniform reported to Lieutenant Colonel Beans 
as liaison officer, and to each unit commander a Japanese officer 
of comparable rank reported for orders. 

In front of each building which contained supplies stood an 
unarmed Japanese guard with a key and bearing a methodical 
inventory, in Japanese. The exclamation of one Marine, looking 

11 4th Mar MRolls, dtd i-3iAug45; Decker & Purcell, "Crazy Beachhead," 
op. cit., pp. 39-40, 80; The New York Times, 2 7~28Aug45, 2Sep45; Wash- 
ington Evening Star, 3oAug45. 


into a building, formed a brief translation of all the detailed 
inventories: "Christ, there's a lot of gear in here !" But gasoline, 
a basic of 20th century warfare, was scarce. On the airfield a 
Japanese captain turned over 108 planes, 90 per cent of them 
yet operational. The guns, everywhere at Yokosuka, had been 
decommissioned, as ordered. 

If the well-equipped naval base was a kind of mirage of Japan's 
true strength after the years of war, there lay in the harbor more 
tangible evidence of the Empire's collapsed war power. The 
damaged battleship Nagato, a remnant of Japan's broken navy, 
was boarded by Marines for the receipt of its surrender. 

The speed of the 4th Marines' landing permitted General 
Clement to move his command post ashore from the Grimes and 
to the Japanese naval headquarters building, where at 1018 the 
American flag was raised. It was the same flag unfurled by the 
6th Marine Division on Okinawa after the northern campaign 
and, before then, on Guam by the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. 

It required no prodding from General Clement to bring Vice 
Admiral Totsuka down to the dock before noon to meet Admiral 
Badger and Admiral Carney, who had been designated to receive 
surrender of the naval base. Greeting the Americans on the pier, 
between lines of Marines, short and stocky Totsuka handed over 
a plain white envelope, enclosing his formal surrender of the 
base. A few Russian officers were spectators of the proceedings. 

By afternoon, the 2d Battalion and regimental supporting units 
were ashore. The relief of 1/4, whose assault mission was over, 
was begun by the Third Fleet Marine Landing Force, which 
next day took over the security of the airfield. This enabled 
the 1 st Battalion to join 2/4 at setting up a perimeter defense 
around the naval base and beginning patrol of the peninsula. 
In the navy yard, the 3d Battalion was similarily relieved by blue- 
jackets of the Naval Landing Force, who took over the interior 
guard. The British Landing Force occupied the area between 
the navy yard and the airfield. Their sector had little tactical 

519667—60 25 


significance, but it was found to be well-stocked with many 
"goodies" including spirits, to the dismay of the other landing 
troops. Among the various findings on the base were medical 
supplies and hospital cots donated by America at the time of the 
great Japanese earthquake in 1923. 

The day after L-Day the Eighth Army requested that a com- 
pany of 4th Marines reconnoiter Tateyama Naval Air Station, 
across Uraga Strait, preliminary to the landing of the 112th 
RCT there on 3 September. Major Wallace L. Crawford, regi- 
mental intelligence officer, took Company L over to make a recon- 
naissance in force. He was met by a Japanese surrender party. 
The Marines remained at Tateyama until the 112th took over. 

General Clement witnessed the signing of the surrender on 
board the Missouri on 2 September, and so a nation which, cen- 
turies ago, had proudly rejected all foreigners, received occupa- 
tion troops, with a grace hardly precedented in the history of 
war. 12 


The shadow of war's inhumanity still lay, however, on the thin 
faces of some 150 Marines liberated from Japanese prison camps. 
Hardly were the landings over before men of the regiment went 
out to reclaim their own. A few of the old 4th were already free 
and they got themselves to the 4th Marines' area. 

The number was but a fraction of nearly 1,500 captured, of 
whom only about 1,000 survived to come home. The extreme 
hardships of life in the Japanese prison camps caused around 250 
deaths. An additional 175 lost their lives in prison ships un- 
knowingly bombed or torpedoed by Allied forces. 13 

""Third Fit MarLdgFor Rec of Events," dtd 6Sep45; and "Third Fit 
NavLdg For, AR," dtd 5Sep45 (both in Japan Area-Op File, HistBr, 

13 Statistics from PersAccountingSec, HQMC. Their figures are the best 
available. Owing to capture, records became lost or incomplete. 


Now, at the naval base, in the happy reunion, tears were felt 
even if they did not appear. Men exchanged recollections over 
beer and food at the former Japanese NCO Club. The former 
prisoners were issued new clothing, which they could well use, but 
a particularly poignant moment to them was the receiving of new 
Marine Corps emblems, their cherished identification. The men 
of the Old 4th reviewed the New 4th as it staged a formal guard 
mount in their honor. They looked with pride at its new colors, 
replacing those burned by Colonel Howard at Corregidor; and 
they were interested in the new weapons introduced since 1942. 
Some of them wanted to reenlist on the spot so they could serve 
in their old regiment, but policy was against it. Soon all the 
former prisoners were en route home by the fastest means avail- 
able. The occasion had caught, as perhaps seldom before, the 
deep sentiment and attachment of the Marines for each other and 
their Corps. 14 

Meanwhile, the take-over at Yokosuka progressed so well that 
between 4 and 6 September all landing forces of the Third Fleet, 
except Task Group Able, were re-embarked in transports for re- 
turn to their parent ships. On 8 September, Task Force 31 
ceased its brief existence. Two weeks later, on the 21st, Task 
Group Able was likewise disbanded. General Clement rejoined 
the 6th Marine Division at Guam. The 4th Marines continued 
to be administratively attached to the division but went under 
operational control of the Eighth Army, which received directives 
from General MacArthur at Tokyo, the supreme commander of 
the occupation forces. 


Command at Yokosuka was vested in the Commander, Fleet 
Shore Activities, but security was left to the 4th Marines. Perim- 

14 Sgt Harry Polete, "Post of the Corps — Yokosuka/' Leatherneck, v. XXX, 
no. 8 (Aug47), p. 5. 


eter defense, interior guard, and the disarming of the Japanese 
formed the mission of the regiment. The ist Battalion stayed on 
the airfield, the 2d occupied the main naval station, and the 3d 
took over the British sector which included the Torpedo School. 
Regimental headquarters was set up in the former Naval Music 
School, where the Japanese had left a grand piano and stacks of 
sheet music. Marines enjoyed the piano but sent the unfamiliar 
music to the Marine Band at Washington. 

The men settled into evacuated Japanese barracks, which they 
cleaned up. The buildings then presented only the risk of knock- 
ing one's head against the heavy iron rods which the Japanese 
used to sling their hammocks navy style, when they bunked 300 
men to a squad room. Marines removed the rods, the only ele- 
ments that blocked their advance at Yokosuka, and put 40 men 
into the same room. The Japanese Government furnished cooks, 
mess boys, and housekeeping help, so combat Marines found a 
new ease of life, strange but welcome. 

Outside the barracks the whirring wartime machinery of the 
naval base was at a standstill. The small-arms and ammunition 
factory looked hit by a depression. Japanese mechanics at the 
midget submarine assembly plant had dropped their tools and 
gone home. Technicians, who here developed the Baka bomb, 
manned by a suicidal pilot, had quit the devil's laboratory. Ma- 
rines found a number of Japanese suicide boats, upon which they 
ventured to sail. But the boats cracked like egg shells if they 
struck even a small piece of wood, leaving the Marines in the 

The steep hills surrounding the base contained underground 
shops of various kinds and storage centers, carved into a tunnel 
defense system. Caves were found stocked full of food, drink, 
and other supplies at this major logistical base for the Imperial 

Patrols were sent out daily into the countryside during the first 
weeks of occupation. This system avoided the use of small de- 


tachments scattered among the native population, a method apt 
to brew trouble. 

Throughout the peninsula, small units of Japanese waited to 
surrender their arms and ammunition, which they neatly stacked 
and marked for easy collection. The Japanese on the base fur- 
nished the Marines with English-speaking guides and provided 
maps pinpointing the location of installations. Some of these 
were so cleverly camouflaged that without this assistance one 
could have searched for them for weeks without success. There 
was no effort to conceal supplies or withhold information. Many 
documents, however, had already been destroyed by the Japanese, 
on orders from above. 

Marines came upon some weapons that the Japanese had not 
begun to use in the Pacific, such as twin-mounted 8cm and 1 6cm 
guns. There was no apparent shortage of military equipment, 
although some of the guns had obviously been dismounted from 
battered Japanese combatant ships for emplacement ashore. 

In contrast to Yokohama and Tokyo, the entire Yokosuka area 
was remarkably intact, having been spared by U.S. bombers. On 
the southwest coast of the peninsula lay six drydocks, four ship- 
building ways, and a major naval repair base. Landing ships, 
crude copies of American LSTs, were anchored there. Apart 
from the military installations, the landscape of the peninsula was 
rice-paddy countryside and beach resorts. In mid-October, all of 
the demilitarized peninsula, except the naval base and the town 
of Yokosuka, was taken over by the Eighth Army. 

Yokosuka, which fringed the base, was a navy town, like San 
Diego. And, like "Dago" of World War II, it became a liberty 
town, patrolled by Marine MPs reporting to their provost marshal 
at Yokosuka. The concept of the occupation prescribed that 
law enforcement over the Japanese people be left, wherever pos- 
sible, to their own police, who were permitted to retain sidearms. 
Only crimes against the U.S. forces or regulations were made 
punishable by the occupation authorities. The 4th Marines MP 


Company was responsible for enforcement, but the Marines were 
not charged with military government. Crimes were negligible, 
although petty theft was something of a nuisance. Offenders, 
though sentenced by a military court, served time in a Japanese 

There were no serious incidents with the civilians, but black 
market troubles soon arose. Some Americans attempted to 
smuggle PX supplies, such as cigarettes, out to the civilian market 
where they brought a high price. This practice was curbed by 
having a sentry on the gates "shake down" the men when they 
went out on liberty. Men were allowed to take only two packs 
of cigarettes with them. 

Duty, as well as liberty, had unique angles. One responsibility 
of the 4th Marines was to keep an eye on Uraga, port of entry 
for Japanese ships repatriating former enemy soldiers and ci- 
vilians from Pacific areas and the Asiatic mainland. Beginning 
in October, almost every day saw ships arriving from points like 
Yap and Truk and the remotest Pacific islands where Japan had 
extended her sway. American officials were concerned that some 
of the returning Japanese soldiers might create trouble, but they 
did not. 

Occupation life and duty, with its varied aspects, was not new 
to the Marine Corps, but to most of the Marines of World War II 
it was certainly a change. Yet a remarkable adjustment took 
place. Hard combat veterans, only recently off Okinawa, left 
the bitter past ungrudgingly behind and substituted sympathy for 
enmity. The behavior of the 4th Marines was markedly excel- 
lent, whether on duty or liberty. It was the replacement, not the 
veteran, who, after a few beers, would occasionally feel an urge 
to "slug a Jap." 

A training order stated that "emphasis on the traditional Ma- 
rine Corps' characteristics" of discipline and appearance "will 
resume their pre-war status." 15 The traits served well toward 

15 6th MarDiv TrngO No. 32-45, i7Aug45 (Unit Hist-Rept File, HistBr, 


success of the occupation. Marines understood that "regardless 
of the fine plans, elaborate directives, or foreign policy, it is the 
man in the ranks and the small unit's officers who are the final 
executors of the occupation policy." 16 


To the Japanese people, occupation was a welcome relief from 
war. They had known no real peace since the beginning of the 
conflict with China in the early 1930's. Their feelings regarding 
the Marines — apart from curiosity — were often hard to fathom. 
Where shown, it was usually by a child, a merchant, or a woman. 
Fraternization was originally forbidden by the American high 
command, but after the first week, when liberty began, human 
nature made the rule difficult to enforce — and it was not. In 
everyone's joy, both American and Japanese, that the war was 
over, kindness and friendship rushed into the void created by 

Japanese youngsters responded to Marines who gave them 
candy ("ka-shee") and who were soon teaching them to sing a 
few notes of the Marine Corps hymn. As the days went by, Jap- 
anese girls captivated a number of Americans, eventually marry- 
ing them, but others, like Madame Butterfly, loved in vain. A 
few eager young Marines were disappointed to find that the 
fabled geisha girls, as a class, were traditionally devoted to sing- 
ing and dancing — and that quite prim. Perhaps the Japanese 
most glad to see the Marines was the merchant, who knew well 
that the American abroad is a confirmed shopper and souvenir 
collector. In Japan he was a pushover for silk prints, brocades, 
cloisonne, and lacquer ware, or whatever had a native flavor. 

When he returned stateside, a Marine was permitted to take 
home as a souvenir either a samurai sword or a rifle. But the 

16 Maj J. A. Donovan, "The Occupation Marine," Marine Corps Gazette, 
v. 30, no. 4 (Apr46),p. 19. 


Eighth Army issued an order that any sword over a century old 
was to be considered a family heirloom and be exempt from the 
order requiring surrender of all arms to the occupation forces. 

Marines saw both the old beauty and the new sadness of Japan. 
Bombed factories stood near ancient temples. Poverty dwelt 
under bright plum blossoms. There was bitterness, but it was 
less against the Americans than toward the Japanese war leaders, 
the Emperor excepted, who had led the people into a hopeless 
exhausting struggle. Marines, also, were inclined to blame for- 
mer Premier Tojo and the others — not the people themselves, 
whose culture was a pleasant surprise. A nation so old as Japan, 
however, did show to Marines some curious contrasts of East 
and West. When men went on liberty they saw, along city streets, 
more women wearing slacks than kimonos. 

At first, few Japanese of either sex would stop on a street to 
talk. Language was the barrier, usually, for wartime propaganda 
had never entirely spoiled Japanese goodwill toward America. 
Only a very small number of the people were ever fearful of the 
invaders. A few natives did rush their daughters and other 
treasures into hiding, but even they soon became reassured, first 
by the Japanese press, which took care to refute rumors, and 
then by the occupation itself. They saw truckloads of American 
foodstuffs arrive at Yokosuka for local relief, and blankets to 
warm the poor. 17 


As the weeks went by, the regiment dwindled in numbers. It 
began to feel the pinch of the hurried postwar demobilization. 

17 Kato, op. tit., pp. 227, 248, 251-252; "The Face of Japan," Leatherneck, 
v. XXX, no. 7 (J11I47), p. 14; "Notes on Nippon," Leatherneck, v. XXIX, 
no. 3 (Mar46), pp. 47-48; Sgts Duane Decker and Joseph Purcell, "Train to 
Tokyo," Leatherneck (Pacific edition), v. 3, no. 11 (iDec45), p. 4; News- 
week, v. XXVI, no. 13 (24Sep45), pp. 44-46. MajGen Charles A. Wil- 
loughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur, ig^i-ig^i (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954), p. 304. 


During November the 4th Marines lost some 1,500 officers and 
men, detached to the United States for separation. 

On 3 and 4 December the 1st Battalion sailed for San Fran- 
cisco to be disbanded, and on New Year's Day it was followed 
by the Headquarters and Service Company, the Weapons Com- 
pany, and the 2d Battalion. This left in Japan only the 3d 
Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Hochmuth, with about 800 
Marines, and a token regimental headquarters. A week later, 
Lieutenant Colonel Beans took his token group and the regi- 
mental records to Tsingtao to rejoin the 6th Marine Division. 
The 4th Marines were back in China, whence they had left on the 
eve of America's involvement in World War II. 

At the end of January 1946, Lieutenant Colonel Beans was 
detached to the United States, leaving the regimental adjutant, 
2d Lieutenant Paul W. Stone, in charge of Headquarters, 4th 
Marines, at Tsingtao. The unit then consisted of only nine of- 
ficers and nine men. The 4th Marines' last tie to Japan was 
broken on 15 February 1946 when the 3d Battalion was reor- 
ganized and designated the 2d Separate Guard Battalion (Pro- 
visional), Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. 18 


When the 4th Marines, or what was left of it, reached Tsingtao 
they were joining 47,000 Marines in China. 19 On 30 September 

18 3d Bn, 4th Mar WarD, 1-31^1146, dtd iFeb46; and 2d Sep GrdBn 
(Prov), FMFPac, WarD, 1 Feb- 14JU1146 (both in Unit Hist-Rept File, HistBr, 
HQMC) ; 4th Mar MRolls, i~3iDec45, 1 Jan-28Feb46. 

19 Unless otherwise noted, this section on China is based upon the follow- 
ing: U.S. Dept. of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, 
1949); Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1953) ; 4th Mar WarD, ijun-3ijul46; IIIAG WarD, iMar-ioJun46; 
6th MarDivWarD, iSep-3oNov45 ; and 3d MarBrig WarD, iApr-ioJun46 
(all in Unit Hist-Rept File, HistBr, HQMC) ; Maj Bruce A. Rushlow and 
Maj Palmer H. Rixey interviews by HistBr, HQMC, 9 and I2jan59, respec- 
tively (both in Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMC); and Cass, 
op. cit. 


1945, troops of the 1st Marine Division had landed at Tientsin, 
beginning a IIIAG occupation of key points in North China. On 
1 1 October, the 6th Marine Division (less RCT-4) had followed 
at Tsingtao, to occupy that port and Tsang-kou Airfield, 1 2 miles 
inland, where Marine aircraft were to base. General Shepherd 
had received surrender of Japan's $th Independent Mixed Bri- 
gade at Tsingtao on 25 October. 

The 6th Marine Division, like the 1st, was to help the Nation- 
alists send thousands of Japanese back home, writing the end to 
decades of Japanese design upon the mainland. Marines were 
to ensure the peaceful and orderly repatriating of both soldiers 
and civilians. The Communists, who were then seeking control 
of China, were to be kept from entangling the process. 

Officially, Uncle Sam was sitting on the fence in the middle 
of a Chinese civil war — "intervention is inappropriate," said 
President Truman 20 — but it was a lopsided posture, it was like 
trying to straddle the Great Wall; for American sympathy lay 
with the recognized Central Government of Chiang Kai-shek, 
and he had received our financial and military aid. Still, the 
United States took the position of a friendly neutral interested 
only in seeing a democratic government in China, where both 
the Nationalists and Communists could coexist. But the Na- 
tionalists would not accept the Communists as political bed fel- 
lows, and the Communists resented America's obvious leaning 
toward Chiang. A fateful impasse existed. 

This, then, was the strife-torn land where the 4th Marines 
undertook its next mission. On 8 March 1946, the token 
Headquarters, 4th Marines, then down to four officers and five 
men was redesignated 4th Marines. A Headquarters and Serv- 
ice Company was activated, and other units came from other 
regiments of the division. The Weapons Company, 2 2d Marines, 

The New York Times, i6Dec45. 


was redesignated Weapons Company, 4th Marines. The 2d Bat- 
talion of the 29th Regiment became 1/4; the 2d Battalion of the 
22d was changed to 2/4; and the 3d Battalion of the 22d turned 
into 3/4. 

Colonel William J. Whaling, former commanding officer of the 
29th Marines, became regimental commander, serving until 26 
March when he was relieved by Colonel John D. Blanchard from 
the 2 2d Marines. By the end of the month the 4th Regiment 
stood at a strength of 97 officers and 3,151 men. Shantung 
University housed the command post, and many of the men were 
quartered in former Japanese schools. 21 


The 4th Marines found Tsingtao much smaller than Shanghai, 
the old China home of the regiment. Yet, like Shanghai, the 
city was modern — in an Oriental sense, cosmopolitan, and used 
to the foreigner. Much of the architecture was European. A 
few Americans — missionaries and businessmen — were still there, 
but there had always been more British and Germans, and some 
White Russians and Koreans. The port's prewar population of 
around 600,000 had recently been swelled by the influx of Chi- 
nese from the interior, seeking refuge from Communism. 

Between 1897 and 19 14 Germany had leased Tsingtao. The 
Kaiser based his Asiatic Fleet in Kiaochow Bay, while German 
businessmen built up on the Shantung Peninsula a small economic 
empire. The Germans, therefore, had a backlog of experience 
at Tsingtao. Their local knowledge and linguistic ability were 
often helpful to the Marines. 

But the German day of power at Tsingtao had long been over. 
In World War I Japan seized the Shantung Peninsula to exploit 
it herself. In 1922, under international pressure, she relaxed her 

21 4th Mar MRolls, i-3iMar46. 


grip, but she came back in 1937, more determined than ever 
to stay. 22 

By March 1946, when the 4th Marines came to Tsingtao, most 
of the Japanese had been shipped home. A number of Germans 
had also left. To the population of Tsingtao the novelty of 
seeing Marines had begun to wear off, and fewer persons lined 
the streets to cheer a parade. Yet, to everyone at Tsingtao, it 
was still reassuring to have the Marines there. To the Japanese 
it meant getting home, spared from ill-treatment by vengeful 
Chinese. To other people at Tsingtao, the fact was plain that 
only the presence of the Marines kept Tsingtao from becoming 
a battleground between Nationalists and Communists. 

No Communist soldiers ventured into Tsingtao while the 4th 
Regiment was there, although, outside the city, they outnumbered 
the Nationalists, whom they kept huddled at Tsingtao and along 
the 125-mile railroad to the provincial capital at Tsinan. The 
Communists were then biding their time while carrying on guer- 
rilla warfare and sabotage; but if they should attempt to take 
Tsingtao, the 4th Marines had defense plans ready. Marines 
were alerted to occupy selected positions across the neck of the 
Shantung Peninsula, barring the land routes to Tsingtao. They 
patrolled the outskirts of the city and scouted in jeeps beyond it. 
But few actual defenses were constructed, and these were mostly 
wire. At Tsang-kou Arifield a rifle company supported by tanks 
was maintained, billeted in Quonset huts. 

Marines were under orders to avoid, wherever possible, any 
friction with the Communists. No clashes occurred. But Ma- 
rines who went out on hunting parties, loaded merely for ducks 
and other birds, were eyed suspiciously by Communists. After 
an incident near Tientsin in November 1945, when a Marine out 
hunting was killed by a Chinese, Major General Keller E. Rockey, 

22 Harold M. Vinacke, A History of the Far East in Modern Times (New 
York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1947), pp. 364-365. 


the IIIAG commander, had forbidden Marines to go out into the 
country, except as members of an armed party. 23 

The Navy was much in evidence at Tsingtao when the 4th 
Marines got there. In late 1945 Admiral Charles Maynard 
Cooke, Jr., had moved the home base of the Seventh Fleet from 
Shanghai to Tsingtao, thereby creating a security responsibility 
which fell to the Marines. 

Both the Navy and Marines obtained quarters in the vacated 
homes of Japanese and Germans who left Tsingtao. The Edge- 
water (nicknamed "Bilgewater" ) Hotel was one of the principal 
officers' billets and became also a center of social life. A Marine 
officers' club was set up there. 

Navy dependents began to arrive at Tsingtao in the summer 
of 1946 and Marine dependents in October. The second baby 
born in Tsingtao to American parents after the occupation began 
was the daughter of a Marine Corps officer. 24 


The windup of repatriation occupied the 4th Marines during 
their first few months at Tsingtao. Some of them served as 
guards on the LSTs, which, because of lack of Japanese ship- 
ping, were often used to transport repatriates. In April the 4th 
Marines supervised the departure of 5,233 Japanese military and 
1 2,9 1 2 civilians through Tsingtao. In May, 4,000 Japanese left. 
But in June the number dwindled to 1,220 civilians, and July's 
quota came to only 4 1 1 civilians and 1 7 military. 25 

23 IIIAG G-2 Periodic Rept, dtd 3N0V45 (Unit Hist-Rept File, HistBr, 
HQMG) ; Annex A to 6th MarDiv OPlan, No. 108-45, dtd i8Sep45, and 
6th MarDiv G-2 Study of the Theater of Operations, Shantung Province, 
n.d. (both in China Area-Op File, HistBr, HQMG) ; Maj Robert A. Ghurley, 
"The North China Operation," pt II, Marine Corps Gazette, v. 31, no. 11 
(N0V47), p. 19; istLt Alan Shilin, "Occupation at Tsingtao," Marine Corps 
Gazette , v. 30, no. 1 (Jan46), pp. 31-36. 

24 Col William N. McGill ltr to CMC, dtd 6Apr59 (Monograph & Com- 
ment File, HistBr, HQMG ) . 

25 Gapt Edwin Klein, "Back to Japan," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 30, no. 3 
(Mar46), pp. 18-19. 


So repatriation drew to a close, but security duty at Tsingtao, 
as the Seventh Fleet base, continued to engage the 4th Marines. 
As at Yokosuka, law enforcement over the natives was left to lo- 
cal authorities, unless Marines were involved. Theft was ram- 
pant, however, and American property was repeatedly pilfered by 
petty thieves and organized gangs. Several Chinese attempting to 
steal U.S. supplies in the warehouse area were shot by Marine 
sentries. In one instance, a Marine was found in a sentry box 
shot through the back by an unknown assailant. 26 

A training program served to keep up the military proficiency 
of the 4th Marines, who consisted more and more of replace- 
ments. Schools for specialists and NCOs were organized. Drills 
and athletics were conducted on the Tsingtao race course and 
range firing was begun. The surrounding countryside was used 
for tactical problems and long hikes. 

Sport contests between units were a favorite recreation, and 
the beaches were excellent for swimming. The gym at Shantung 
University saw the Seventh Fleet basketball finals. Baseball, 
volleyball, and touch football were also popular. On Thanksgiv- 
ing Day a "rice bowl" game was played in Tsingtao stadium. 

The Red Cross, USO, and unit enlisted men's clubs helped to 
distract men from the town's honky-tonk entertainment. Shop- 
ping was a favorite pastime. Some Chinese merchants still had 
old beaten-up U.S. greenbacks which they had apparently been 
hanging onto since 1 94 1 . 

At the barracks — indeed, to all Americans then in Tsingtao — 
the radio was a source of pleasure. Marines had fixed up and 
put into operation a radio station, which was also especially valued 
as a means for alerting dependents in case of emergency. There 
seemed always the chance of one, particularly as postwar reduc- 
tions continued to cut down Marine strength. 

26 Col Joseph P. Sayers ltr to CMC, dtd 6Aprsg (Monograph & Comment 
File, HistBr, HQMC). 



Of unending concern to the 4th Marines were the successive 
realignments due to postwar demobilizing of the Marine Corps. 
By the spring of 1946 the 6th Marine Division was so reduced 
in strength that on 1 April it could be readily transformed into 
the 3d Marine Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to consist 
only of the 4th Marines and three supporting battalions — head- 
quarters, service, and artillery. But the brigade was extremely 
short-lived. On 10 June it, too, was deactivated in a shake-up 
which also ended the IIIAC, now reorganized as the 1st Marine 
Division, Reinforced. By the end of June 1946, the Marine 
Corps had dropped from its war's end strength of nearly 475,000 
to 155,000. It was rapidly shrinking to the planned postwar 
level of 108,000. 

In the sweeping change, the 1st Marine Division in Tientsin, 
and the Marines in Tsingtao were joined to form Marine Forces, 
China, commanded by Major General Rockey, hitherto the 
IIIAC commander. The 4th Marines, Reinforced, became the 
principal element of the task group, Marine Forces, Tsingtao, 
under General Clement. Other elements included an artillery 
battalion (3/12), a tank company, a service battalion, a medical 
battalion, a signal company, Marine Observation Squadron-6 
(VMO-6), and a naval construction battalion. Colonel 
Blanchard continued to command the regiment until the end of 
June 1946. 

Execution of U.S. policy in China was ever having to adapt 
to postwar readjustment. Even the China Theater itself was 
deactivated on 1 May 1946, and operational control of Marine 
forces in China passed to the Commander, Seventh Fleet. 27 

27 4th Mar MRolls, iMar-3iAug46; CMC, Report . . . to the Secretary 
of the Navy ig46 (Washington, 1946). 



In the States there was a popular clamor to bring the boys 
back home. Even before the end of 1945, U.S. Congressmen 
had been insisting that the Marines be returned home. "In God's 
name," declared one Congressman, ear to the ground, "let's get 
our beloved Marines out of China!" 28 

President Truman had explained on 15 December 1945 that 
"the United States has been assisting and will continue to assist 
the National Government of China in effecting the disarmament 
and evacuation of Japanese troops in the liberated areas. The 
United States Marines are in North China for that purpose." 29 

By the middle of 1946 that purpose had been practically ac- 
complished, certainly at Tsingtao. Moreover, the regiment faced 
even further reduction through separations. It was decided, 
therefore, to withdraw all the 4th Marines except Colonel Sam- 
uel B. Griffith's 3d Battalion, which was left at Tsingtao as an 
outfit of about a thousand regulars ; only seven remaining officers 
and two enlisted men were reservists. 

On 3 September 1 946 the H&S Company, the Weapons Com- 
pany, 1/4 and 2/4 sailed in the troop transport Breckinridge. It 
was the voyage home for most of the men who, after docking 
at Norfolk on the 30th, were returned to civilian life. The regi- 
ment which joined the 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune 
could hardly be called that, although, on paper, the battalions 
and companies were retained. By the end of October the 4th 
Marines at Lejeune numbered only 9 officers and 35 men, com- 
manded by Lieutenant Colonel Wesley McC. Piatt, who had 
taken over the regiment on 2 1 October. 30 

28 Washington Evening Star, ioDec45. 

29 The New York Times, i6Dec45. 

30 4th Mar MRolls, iSep-3iOct46 



Beginning in May 1947 the 1st Battalion was built up by an 
influx of recruits so that by the end of August it had reached a 
strength of 821, but the 2d Battalion continued to be a paper 
unit. In September and October the restored 1st Battalion took 
part in amphibious maneuvers at Little Creek, Virginia. 

At Tsingtao the 3d Battalion had ceased to be a part of the 4th 
Marines, when, on 1 October 1947, it was redesignated the 3d 
Marines, part of the newly formed Fleet Marine Force, Western 
Pacific (FMFWesPac). 31 

On 18 November 1947 all other elements of the regiment were 
disbanded except the 1st Battalion. That unit was redesignated 
the 4th Marines and continued as a part of the 2d Marine Divi- 
sion at Camp Lejeune. Commanded by a colonel, it included 
three rifle companies and a headquarters and service company. 
The H&S Company, besides its headquarters section, contained 
communication, service, antitank, and mortar platoons. Medical, 
dental, and chaplain sections also indicated the regimental type 
of self-sufficiency which marked this particular battalion 
organization. 32 

Substitution of such a reinforced battalion, with a regimental 
designation, for the conventional infantry regiment resulted from 
the adoption of the "J" Series Table of Organization in April 
1947. This was the Marine Corps' answer to the problem of 
maintaining, with a strength of only 100,000 "a flexible, mobile, 
essentially amphibious organization capable of easy regrouping 
for specific missions, ready to tackle various limited scale opera- 
tions on short notice." 33 It was suggested partly by the highly 
developed battalion landing teams of World War II; partly by 

31 4th Mar MRolls, iMay-i8Nov47 ; CMC, Report . . . to the Secretary of 
the Navy, 1948 (Washington, 1948). 

32 4th Mar MRolls, 18-30N0V47; 2d MarDiv Station List, Camp Lejeune, 
dtd 3 iDec47 (Unit Hist-Rept File, HistBr, HQMC ) . 

33 "The New FMF," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 31, no. 5 (May47), p. 10. 

519667—60 26 


the prospect of atomic warfare, which would require wide disper- 
sion and decentralization; and, finally, by the fact that the over- 
all peacetime strength of the Marine Corps favored smaller 

The BLT (Battalion Landing Team) 4th Marines was formed, 
in the main, by consoHdating the remnants of the old 1st Bat- 
talion, 4th Marines, and 2d Battalion, 8th Marines. This "con- 
solidation" and redesignation took effect on 19 November 1947. 
The first commanding officer under the new Table of Organiza- 
tion was Colonel Frank M. Reinecke. A period of intensive field 
training was soon instituted, culminating in a Fleet Landing 
Exercise (FLEX) on Vieques, Puerto Rico, in early 1948. The 
4th Marines assaulted and captured "Red Beach" and the area 
inland. 34 


In September 1948, reinforced by detachments from other ele- 
ments in the division, the battalion joined the newly designated 
Sixth Task Fleet in the Mediterranean for a period of training, 
involving several full-scale landing exercises. Most of the bat- 
talion boarded the carrier Franklin D. Roosevelt and three cruis- 
ers, including the Albany, which flew the flag of Vice Admiral 
Forrest P. Sherman, new commander of the Sixth Task Fleet. 
Equipment and supplies were carried in the cargo ship Montague. 

Marines were no strangers to the Mediterranean; since the 
war with Tripoli under President Jefferson they had served there 
intermittently. But now the 4th Marines became the instrument 
for carrying out a new mission of the Marine Corps, that of 
showing America's interest in the freedom of nations bordering 
the Mediterranean. In 1947, civil war in Greece, between the 

34 Ibid., pp. 10-14; "New Developments," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 31, 
no. 8 (Aug47), pp. 55-57; BriGen Frank M. Reinecke Itr to Hd, HistBr, 
HQMC, 4Mar59 (Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMG). 


recognized government and Communist guerrillas, had taken an 
ominous turn, foreboding Communist encroachment upon the en- 
tire Mediterranean area. President Truman asked Congress for 
military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, initiating a 
definite U.S. policy of assisting independent countries to resist 
Communist aggression. 

In keeping with that policy, the Marine Corps instituted a plan 
of maintaining a battalion landing team, including tanks and ar- 
tillery, afloat in the Mediterranean. The troops were drawn 
from the 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, and the units 
were rotated about every five or six months. 35 

In January 1948 the President had sent 1,000 Marines from 
the 2d Division, ostensibly "to augment the shipboard training 
of Marines" and to restore the normal shipboard complements 
of Marines with the Sixth Task Fleet. 36 But they went combat- 
equipped, supplied with tanks and flame throwers. "The Navy's 
little army, the Marines," said a news commentator, "is capable 
of making a landing to show clearly that our warnings are 
serious." 37 

Admiral Sherman indicated that the men would "round out 
the Marine forces of the fleet and improve the capabilities of 
the force to meet minor emergencies." 38 The Sixth Task Fleet 
now had the capability of projecting naval power ashore in the 
Mediterranean as that ancient sea assumed a new importance 
to the United States. 

35 4th Mar MRolls, i~3oSep48; Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History 
of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1958, rev. 
ed.), pp. 797-799; LtCol Charles L. Banks, "To the Shores of Tripoli," 
Marine Corps Gazette, v. 34, no. 8 (Aug5o), pp. 30-33; The New York 
Times, 3-4-6 Jan48 and 9N0V48; Stephen G. Xydis, "The Genesis of the 
Sixth Fleet," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 84, no. 8 (Aug58), 
pp. 41-50. 

39 The New York Times, 3jan48. 

37 Walter Lippmann, quoted in Newsweek, v. XXXI, no. 4 (26Jan48), 
p. 28. 

38 The New York Times, 23jan48. 



When the 4th Marines came back from the "Med" cruise, 
in January 1949, the BLT joined the 2d Provisional Marine 
Regiment, a unit which had formed at Lejeune on 1 November 
1948, under the command of Colonel Reinecke. But, though 
part of a new provisional regiment, the 4th Marines kept its 
name, as well as its battalion form. 

The name, 4th Marines, disappeared on 17 October 1949 
when the unit was redesignated the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. 39 
Thus the 4th Marines left the rolls of the Corps, but only for a 
short time. A few years later the regiment was again summoned 
to duty. 

4th Mar MRolls, 1 -31 Jan and 1 -31 Oct 49. 


Force in Readiness- 
Mid Century Model 

The 4th Marines was reactivated at Camp Pendleton, Cali- 
fornia, on 2 September 1952. 1 Not quite five years had passed 
since the regiment had been removed from the active list in wide- 
spread national demobilization, but the hopes of Americans for 
a peaceful future had not been realized. Even in 1947 signs of 
Communist determination for world dominance were becoming 
apparent. Since then the iron curtain had slammed down across 
Central Europe, and, on 25 June 1950, Communist expansive 
pressure had erupted into invasion and war in Korea. 

President Truman immediately announced that the United 
States would join the United Nations in defending the Republic 
of Korea against the Communist North Korean People's Re- 
public. A hastily organized 1st Provisional Marine Brigade 
joined other UN forces in keeping a toe hold at the tip of the 
Korean peninsula around the port of Pusan. Later the Marines 
of the brigade rejoined the 1st Marine Division to spearhead a 
landing behind the enemy lines at Inchon. The enemy, his back 
broken by the outflanking maneuver, was pushed north almost 
to the Yalu River before the intervention of the Chinese Com- 
munists in late November surprised and overwhelmed the UN 

^MFPac HistD, i~3oSep52. Unless otherwise noted, all official docu- 
ments cited in this chapter are in Unit Hist-Rept File, HistBr, HQMC. 



troops and forced a general pull-back well below the 38th parallel 
dividing North and South Korea. It was then that the 1st 
Marine Division made its epic break-out to the sea. 

Reorganized UN forces slowly fought their way north, reach- 
ing the 38th parallel again by the spring of 1951. After the 
Communists failed in two massive counterattacks, truce talks 
started and the front became stalemated. This was still the situ- 
ation in Korea when the 4th Marines was reactivated in 
September 1952. 

The military build-up stimulated by the Korean War created 
the opportunity to reactivate the 4th Marines. With more Ma- 
rines available the Marine Corps was able to build up a force 
more nearly adequate for force-in-readiness missions in a tense 
world, where fighting might break out at widely scattered points 
at any moment. In spite of the advent of "massive retaliatory 
power" in the form of strategic air forces armed with nuclear 
weapons, Marine leaders had always believed that ready ground 
forces with adequate tactical air support were essential to national 
security. The Korean War vindicated this Marine judgment and 
also convinced the Congress, which, in 1953, passed a law re- 
quiring the Marine Corps to "be so organized as to include not 
less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such 
other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be or- 
ganic therein." 2 It was as part of the 3d Marine Division that 
the 4th Marines was reactivated. 


At Camp Pendleton Colonel Robert O. Bowen, the regimental 
commander, put all hands to work on a vigorous training pro- 
gram. But it was to be nearly a year before the 4th Marines and 
its parent 3d Division would be declared combat ready. In con- 

2 U.S. Code, Title io } Chap 503, Sect 5013. 


trast, the 4th Provisional Regiment of 191 1 and the 4th Regiment 
of 19 14 assembled at the gangplank and embarked for expedi- 
tionary duty without any unit training at all. 

This difference in training requirements points up the differ- 
ence between forces in readiness of the early and mid-twentieth 
century. Early in the century Major General Commandant 
Barnett could, without qualms, activate and ship out a regiment 
on the same day. He knew that the intended action did not in- 
volve the vital interests of great powers and that the potential 
enemy consisted only of poorly led, trained, and equipped Latin 
American revolutionaries. 

General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commandant of the Ma- 
rine Corps in 1952, knew that his Marines would face a tough, 
disciplined, well-equipped and well-led Communist enemy almost 
anywhere in the world. And the theaters of operations, though 
most likely in small and remote countries, would involve a head-on 
collision between the Communist Bloc and the Free World. 

It was a situation calling for the most thorough and realistic 
training possible for the 4th Marines. Originally consisting only 
of the 1 st Battalion, a Headquarters and Service Company, and 
a 4.2-inch Mortar Company, the regiment made such rapid 
progress in training by 1 October that it was able to play the role 
of defenders against the rest of the 3d Division, consisting of the 
3d, 9th, and 1 2th Marines, in an amphibious exercise at Camp 
Pendleton. The regiment attempted to duplicate Chinese and 
North Korean tactics of night counterattack. These efforts were 
so successful that the 3d and 9th Marines were caught in their 
sleeping bags on several occasions and thrown off objectives 
seized during the day. 3 

The 2d Battalion was activated on 29 October and the 3d on 
28 November. Training continued, and during the first two 

8 Furgurson, "The 4th Marines," pp. 196-197; FMFPac HistD, i-3oSep 
52; Col Franklin B. Nihart ltr to CMC, dtd 27Mar59 (Monograph & Com- 
ment File, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter Nihart letter. 


weeks of December the regiment maneuvered across the vast 
desert artillery ranges of Twentynine Palms. Constant exercises 
in the field contributed greatly to combat readiness. 4 

On 7 November, the 4th Marines, along with the other 3d 
Division units, received its colors at a memorable review. Major 
General Samuel Howard, who had commanded the regiment in 
China and on Corregidor, presented the colors to Colonel Bowen. 
For the Marines of the new 4th it was a reminder of the history 
and traditions of the regiment and a challenge to carry them on. 5 

An additional mission was assigned the 4th Marines on 5 
January when the Commandant directed the Commanding Gen- 
eral, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, to test the feasibility of in- 
creasing the infantry component of a Marine division by modi- 
fying the regiment to include three battalions of four rifle 
companies each, or four battalions of three rifle companies each. 
To examine the practicality of both these organizations, Company 
K was added to the 3d Battalion and a new 4th Battalion with 
three rifle companies was organized. 6 

This quadrangular organization was the first major change 
proposed from the combat-tested regimental setup perfected in 
World War II. Only minor differences existed between the 4th 
Marines of Guam and Okinawa and the strength and organiza- 
tion authorized for the regiment in the fall of 1952. Total 
authorized strength of the World War II regiment was 3,218 
officers and men, and of the 1952 regiment 3,901. Accounting 
for the strength difference was the addition of units of greatly 
increased firepower. At regimental level an antitank company, 
consisting of a platoon each of medium tanks and 75mm recoil- 
less rifles, and a company of 4. 2 -inch mortars replaced the former 
weapons company. The battalions regained the weapons com- 

1 Nihart letter. 

5 Col Robert O. Bowen ltr to CMC, dtd 3Mar59 (Monograph & Comment 
File, HistBr, HQMC) , hereafter Bowen letter. 
9 Bowen letter. 


panies taken away in the latter part of World War II and added 
antitank platoons to them. 7 

The culmination of training for the 4th Marines and for the 
whole 3d Marine Division came in the spring of 1953. Between 
20 April and 10 May the Marines engaged in PACPHIBEX-II, 
a full-scale division amphibious exercise. 8 Embarking in APAs 
lying off Camp Del Mar, a landing craft base adjacent to Camp 
Pendleton, the regiment moved to San Diego for a rehearsal 
landing on the Silver Strand at Coronado Island. On 1 May 
the Attack Force sortied from San Diego Harbor en route for 
the objective area at Camp Pendleton. Landing in LVTs on 
5 May, the 4th Marines advanced inland for the next four days 
to seize the Force Beachhead Line. 

An outstanding feature of PACPHIBEX-II was the inclusion 
of the most modern weapons and tactics. Both the attacking 
3d Marine Division and the defenders employed atomic bombs 
(simulated, of course) , and the assault landing included a vertical 
envelopment by a force set down behind enemy lines by heli- 
copter. This latest amphibious tactic had been pioneered by the 
Marine Corps as early as 1947 in order to eliminate the lucrative 
nuclear weapon target presented by the concentration of a mas- 
sive amphibious attack force of the World War II type. By 
lifting assault troops in helicopters from widely dispersed shipping 
to points inland to the rear of enemy beach defenses, no single 
nuclear weapon could destroy all or most of the attack force 
either afloat or ashore. 

In PACPHIBEX-II the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, constituted 
the helicopter assault force. The 4th Marines, while they were 
not helicopter lifted, gained valuable experience in the new tactics 
through problems involving the coordination of LVT and 
helicopter-landed forces. 

7 USMC T/O's, F-io, dtd 27Mar44, and K-1099, dtd 3iMay4g. 
8 CG 3d MarDiv PACPHIBEX-II rept, dtd 15J11I53; and 3d MarDiv 
OpO 2-53 (PACPHIBEX), dtd 23Mar5 3 . 


The regiment operated with four battalions during this exer- 
cise and covered a very wide front. In spite of this dispersal, 
Colonel Bowen was able to exercise effective control of his com- 
mand. Even when a simulated nuclear weapon knocked out the 
regimental command post, control procedures were so well con- 
ceived that Lieutenant Colonel Brooke Nihart, the ist Battalion 
commander, was able to take over from his position on the right 
flank. 9 

Upon completion of PACPHIBEX-II Major General Robert 
H. Pepper, commanding the 3d Marine Division, reported that 
the training objectives had been achieved in a superior manner. 
With the success of this amphibious exercise, an eight-months' 
cycle of rigorous training for the 4th Marines came to an end. 
The regiment and its parent division were now rated as combat 
ready. This status was achieved none too soon, for on 17 July 
the 3d Marine Division was alerted for movement to the Far 


These orders, which arrived at FMFPac Headquarters without 
warning, were the result of enemy successes in Korea. After two 
years of negotiations, just when an armistice appeared imminent, 
the Communists suddenly attacked and punched out gains all 
along the line. The United Nations Command committed all 
reserves available in Korea and recalled a regimental combat team 
of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division from Japan, leaving the Far 
East theater with very few uncommitted reserves. It was to bol- 
ster the UN forces that the 3d Division was scheduled by the JCS 
for movement to the Far East. 10 

The alert of 17 July carried neither mission nor destination, 

9 Nihart letter. 

10 FMFPac Special Rept, "Deployment of the 3d MarDiv and Air Units 
to the Far East Command — Summer 1953," dtd 2gMar54. 


but the possibility of combat assignment in Korea called for se- 
curity measures to conceal preparations for departure. 11 Com- 
manders and staff officers, dressed in civilian clothes, met in their 
homes on Sunday, 19 July, so that there would be no unusual 
activity at division headquarters. Tentative plans and orders 
were drawn up to cover assignment either to Korea or Japan. 
They were put into effect on the 23d when orders arrived from 
Marine Corps Headquarters to mount out. But there was still 
no mission or destination more specific than reporting to the Far 
East Command. 

For the 4th Marines, and the rest of the 3d Division, replace- 
ment of personnel ineligible for overseas service was the most 
serious problem to be solved before departure. By order of the 
Commandant, no Marines, except for a few specialists in short 
supply, who had already served in Korea could return to the Far 
East without waiving in writing their Korea veteran status. 
There were, in addition, a number of Marines who, because of 
pending action on hardship discharges and medical surveys, were 
to be left behind. All in all, these two groups amounted to nearly 
50 per cent of division strength. 

Separation of ineligibles began shortly after receipt of the or- 
ders to begin movement to the Far East and was completed by 29 
July. Replacements began pouring into Camp Pendleton on the 
30th, and, by 5 August, division units had been built back up to 
authorized strength. For the 4th Marines, the necessity to dis- 
band the quadrangular test units — Company K and the 4th Bat- 
talion — created additional administrative problems. Property 
had to be inventoried and personnel transferred. 12 

Word of the destination came on 30 July. Three days before, 
an armistice had finally been signed. Under its terms, reinforce- 
ments to Korea were forbidden, so the division was routed to 

n 3d MarDiv, Type G Rept, "Deployment of 3d MarDiv to the Far East," 
dtd 2gAug53. 
u Bowen letter. 


Japan. On i August a division operation order was issued call- 
ing for combat loading of one RGT and administrative loading 
of all other division units. 

The 4th Marines, designated for administrative loading, 
mounted out in two echelons. On 4 August the first echelon be- 
gan loading. By the 8th all were on board the transports General 
Black, and General Brewster, and had sailed for the Far East. 
The second echelon sailed on board the General Howze on the 

During the voyage to the Far East, Colonel Bowen revived the 
famous motto of the regiment, "Hold High the Torch," which 
had been originated by Colonel Shapley in 1944 and used until 
1947 when the 4th Marines was disbanded. 13 


The 4th Marines landed at the southern Honshu port of Kobe 
on 24 August 1953. Boarding trains late that afternoon, the 
Marines headed inland for Nara which was to be their home 
station in Japan. 14 It was late at night when the train pulled 
into the Nara station. A march of about two miles through the 
dark streets of the city brought the Marines to Camp Nara, new 
home of the regiment. 15 This camp had been constructed by 
the U.S. Army originally for the 25th Division. When the in- 
fantrymen pulled out for Korea, their camp became a rest and 

13 Bowen letter; MajGen Alan Shapley, interview by HistBr, HQMG, dtd 
7Apr59 (Monograph and Comment File, HistBr, HQMG). 

14 Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on 3d MarDiv and 4th Mar 
GmD's, July 1954-January 1955; and Furgurson, "The 4th Marines," pp. 

15 LtCol George M. Dawes memo to Head HistBr, HQMC, n.d., hereafter 
Dawes memo; and LtCol James T. Kisgen memo to Head HistBr, HQMG, 
dtd 27May59, hereafter Kisgen memo (both in Monograph & Comment File, 
HistBr, HQMG). 


rehabilitation center for men returning from the war. The camp, 
which was administered by the Army's Southwestern Command, 
was made up of five separate areas. Three of them were prac- 
tically contiguous, but the other two were on the opposite side of 
the city, nearly 30 minutes away. 

Camp Nara was close to good liberty, with Kyoto, Osaka, 
and Kobe less than an hour away by the efficient Japanese inter- 
urban railways. Nara itself is one of the chief tourist attractions 
of Japan. An ancient cultural center, the city contains the 
tombs of the emperors of ancient Japan, the park of the Emperor's 
sacred deer, and some of the largest and most beautiful Buddhist 
temples in the country. 

Liberty was not granted at first. This was a precautionary 
measure taken by Colonel Bowen after a warning on the day of 
arrival from Brigadier General Homer L. Litzenberg, Assistant 
Commander of the 3d Marine Division, that Communists were 
planning to create incidents between the Marines and the local 
residents. Shortly after arriving at Nara a meeting between Ma- 
rine and Army officers and Japanese officials and business men 
was arranged to discuss mutual problems. Colonel Bowen was 
told at this meeting that, because the local citizens had known 
Marines only as enemy combat troops, he should not flood the 
city with Marines on liberty until the Japanese had become ac- 
customed to them. 

When the local press complimented the regiment on its orderly 
conduct during its march from the railroad station to the camp, 
Bowen decided to run small liberty parties during daylight hours. 
Joint patrols of Marine and Army MPs and Japanese police 
were organized to keep order, but there was little for them to do. 
Liberty parties caused little or no trouble, and, before long, the 
restrictions were removed. The Marines quickly made friends 
among the townspeople, and, by the end of the first month at 
Nara, Marines were playing baseball against local Japanese 


teams. Of particular satisfaction to the Marines were the op- 
portunities to join in the life of Nara by contributing to churches, 
civic groups, and local charities. 16 

In Japan, the 4th Marines, along with its parent division, was 
charged with two general missions. First was local defense. As 
the Japanese, by terms of the World War II peace treaty, were 
allowed to maintain only very modest defense forces, the U.S. 
occupation forces assumed the major responsibility for defending 
the country. The 4th Marines, as a unit of the Provisional Corps, 
Japan, shared responsibility for defense of southern Honshu. 
Made up of the 3d Marine Division, the Army's 387th Airborne 
RCT, and the 2d Amphibious Support Command, the corps was 
headed by the commanding general of the 3d Marine Division. 

To be instantly ready for emergency operations in the Far East 
was the other major mission of the 4th Marines in Japan. In 
Korea an uneasy armed truce existed; in Indochina aggressive 
local Communist forces, supplied and encouraged by the Chinese, 
were threatening to overthrow the French regime; and elsewhere 
around the rim of free Asia, Communist diplomatic and psycho- 
logical offensives might erupt into open warfare at any moment. 
If armed intervention were called for in any of these cases, the 
4th Marines, along with other Marine forces, had specific missions 
to perform. 

To maintain readiness for these missions required constant 
training. Japan was far from ideal as a training site. Dense pop- 
ulation and rugged terrain combined severely to limit maneuver 
room. Most land not occupied or cultivated was nearly vertical, 
leaving only the slopes of Mt. Fuji for exercises of a full regiment. 
Employed before World War II by the Japanese Army, the Fuji 
area, because of its isolation from populated areas, freedom from 
administrative routine of garrison life, and facilities for artillery 

19 Bow en letter; Kisgen memo; and Col John C. Miller, Jr., Itr to Col 
Charles W. Harrison, dtd 3oMar59 (Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, 
HQMC), hereafter Miller letter. 


and tank-supported problems of the whole regiment, was an excel- 
lent maneuver ground. 17 

Two smaller areas were also available to the 4th Marines — 
Aebano, 60 miles from Nara, where battalion problems could 
be conducted, and Uji, between Nara and Kyoto, suitable for 
company-size problems. Amphibious maneuver areas were even 
more limited. There were only two beaches available. At Nagai 
in the Yokosuka area, reconnaissance company and limited shore 
party exercises could be held. Chigasaki could accommodate a 
regimental landing on the beach but lacked maneuver room in- 
land. As a result, most amphibious training came to be con- 
ducted at Okinawa or Iwo Jima. (See Map 32.) 

Almost constant shuttling between Camp Nara and the various 
training areas was the inevitable result of this setup. The moving 
began in November 1953 when Colonel John C. Miller, Jr., who 
had relieved Bowen on 3 October, led the 4th Marines to Fuji 
for a month of intensive training at every level from fire team to 
regiment. Following the maneuvers at Fuji was a regimental 
landing exercise at Chigasaki, then back to Nara for a period of 
garrison routine. 


The 4th Marines' only direct participation in the Korean con- 
flict came in January and February 1954. Although an armistice 
agreement had been in effect since the preceding July, the strug- 
gle between the Communist and the Free World forces continued 
on the political and psychological fronts. Chief among the points 
at issue was the fate of prisoners of war held by both sides — some 
22,000 North Koreans and Chinese and 359 UN personnel — who 
did not wish to return home. 

Under the terms of the armistice agreement, 120 days were 
devoted to "explanations," under neutral supervision, by repre- 

17 Kisgen memo. 



sentatives of both sides in an attempt to persuade their country- 
men to return. In most cases, the "explanations" failed, and the 
UN Command decided to turn their prisoners over to the South 
Korean and Chinese Nationalist governments, respectively. 18 

The U.S. Navy agreed to furnish 16 LSTs to carry the 14,500 
soon to be liberated Chinese to Formosa. To insure their safe 
delivery, Marine guards were to be stationed in each ship. The 
3d Battalion, 4th Marines, was designated for the job and arrived 
at Inchon on 19 January. Tragedy struck when 3/4 was trans- 
ferring from the transport to the LSTs. A loaded landing craft 
capsized and drowned 2 7 Marines and two Navy hospital corps- 
men in the icy waters of the harbor. 

On 22 January, the Chinese prisoners were released and loaded 
on board for the voyage to Formosa. Accompanying the prison- 
ers were Chinese Nationalist officers who, according to a directive 
from the UN Command, were to take charge of their countrymen. 
The Marine mission was accordingly modified to providing gen- 
eral security for the ships. The LSTs reached Formosa on the 
fifth day out, unloaded the Chinese passengers, and sailed imme- 
diately for Japan. 

After an absence of about three weeks, 3/4 was back at Nara. 
Marines of the battalion had played a part, though a small one, 
in one of the important victories of the Cold War. They had 
escorted to freedom former Reds who, given the opportunity, had 
chosen not to return to Communist rule. 19 


Amphibious training moved into high gear in February and 
March when the regiment sailed to I wo Jima to participate in 
a division landing exercise. The 2d Battalion sailed first, on 22 

18 Carl Berger, The Korea Knot (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1957), PP- I73-I75- 

19 MSgt Robert E. Heinecke, "Operation Comeback," Leatherneck, v. 37, 
no. 4 (Apr54),p. 44. 

519667—60 27 


February, to construct defenses on the island in preparation for 
its role as aggressors. In March the remainder of the regiment 
left Kobe for Iwo Jima where it was assigned at first as division 
reserve. After the initial landing, the regiment went ashore and 
maneuvered as an assault element for the last five days of the 

Back at Nara, training continued with companies and bat- 
talions shuttling back and forth between the base camp and Uji 
and Aebano. At the end of May the regiment moved back to the 
Fuji area for a month of concentrated exercises at all levels. 

On 8 June, at North Camp Fuji, the first reproduction of the 
4th Marines' crest was delivered to the regiment. Adoption of 
this insignia had been originated the previous fall by Colonel 
Miller, whose purpose was to stimulate the intangible qualities 
of esprit de corps and unit loyalty through a tangible symbol — a 
military practice as old as war itself. A contest among the mem- 
bers of the regiment produced the design, composed of a yellow 
shield with a red cross and border, crossed officer and NCO 
swords, a blue scroll below the shield bearing the words "Fourth 
Marines," and an eagle with wings outspread above the shield. 
This design included the Marine Corps colors of scarlet and gold ; 
the national red, white, and blue; the crossed swords represent- 
ing the close relationship between officers and enlisted men; and 
the spread eagle, symbolizing the regiment's tradition of 
readiness. 20 

The following summer saw the regiment engaged in another 
major amphibious exercise under the leadership of Colonel Fred- 
erick A. Ramsey, the commanding officer since 7 April 1954. 
From 30 July to 1 1 August the 4th Marines, along with the 
Army's 187th Airborne RCT, carried out landings on Okinawa. 
Leaving Kobe on the 30th, the naval attack force steamed south 

20 Col John C. Miller ltr to Col Charles W. Harrison, dtd 24Mar5g; and 
LtCol George M. Dawes interview by HistBr, HQMC, dtd isMarsg (both 
in Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMC). 


under simulated combat conditions to put the Marine and Army 
regiments ashore in an assault landing on 6 August. Three days 
of maneuvers ashore ended on the 9th when an emergency call 
came for the transport shipping to shift refugees from northern 
to southern Indochina — an aftermath of the truce ending the 
civil war in that country. The troops hastily loaded back aboard 
for a high speed return voyage to Japan. On 1 1 August the 
Marines debarked at Kobe and returned by truck to Camp Nara. 
Colonel Wood B. Kyle took command of the regiment on the 

During September and October the 4th Marines was back at 
Fuji for another round of training exercises. The advance eche- 
lon arrived at the mountain training area in the midst of typhoon 
"Marie." North Camp Fuji's tent city was completely flattened 
by the heavy winds, and the Marines huddled together, wet and 
miserable, in the few tents they were able to erect. Long hours 
of hard work barely made the camp habitable in time before the 
main body of the regiment arrived. 21 

This was the last training period on Fuji for the 4th Marines. 
On 2 January 1955 the regiment was alerted for imminent trans- 
fer to the Hawaiian Islands. Part of President Eisenhower's 
strategy of disengagement, the withdrawal of the 4th Marines 
was one step in a general redeployment. This included also the 
recall of the 1st Marine Division and certain Army units from 
the Far East to strategic reserve positions in Hawaii and the 
continental United States. 22 

On 20 December 1954, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson 
had announced the imminent withdrawal of the 1st Marine Di- 
vision from Korea, and on the 23d General Shepherd sent Lieu- 
tenant General Robert H. Pepper, then Commanding General, 

21 Kisgen memo. 

22 "Budget Message of the President," in The Budget of the United States 
Government for the Year Ending June 30, 1956 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1956). 


FMFPac, detailed instructions for the move, including orders for 
transferring an RCT of the 3d Marine Division to Hawaii. Ma- 
jor General James P. Risely, now commanding the division, des- 
ignated the 4th Marines for the move. 

Preliminary planning conferences between regimental and di- 
vision staffs regarding embarkation of the 4th Marines took place 
on 3 and 5 January, and, on the 6th, FMFPac issued an opera- 
tion plan for the redeployment of an RCT built around the 4th 
Marines. On the 8th the 3d Division issued its operation plan for 
the move and activated RCT-4. Reinforcing units included the 
3d Battalion, 12th Marines (artillery); Company C, 3d Motor 
Transport Battalion; Company E, 3d Medical Battalion; Com- 
pany B, 3d Shore Party Battalion; and detachments of the 3d 
Service Regiment and Division Headquarters Battalion. 

Detailed planning for outloading RCT-4 began at once, and, 
with receipt on 18 January of the division directive to execute 
redeployment plans, movement of supplies and equipment to 
Kobe began. Loading of shipping began on the 2 2d. By the 
25th all hands and gear were on board, and the convoy sortied 
for Hawaii. 

Embarkation was complicated by arrival of about 1,900 re- 
placements, needed to bring the regiment up to strength after the 
transfer of "short-timers" and non-effectives. The vast majority 
of the new men were privates and privates first class who, under 
existing Marine Corps policy, had not been classified according 
to their specialized skills. There was not enough time to perform 
a complete individual classification on each man, so blocks of re- 
placements were assigned arbitrarily to units and the necessary 
classification performed on board ship during the voyage to 
Hawaii. 23 

^LtCol William R. Ourand, Jr., ltr to CMC, dtd 7May59 (Monograph & 
Comment File, HistBr, HQMC ) . 



Hula girls and Hawaiian music greeted the 4th Marines on 4 
February when the ships carrying the regiment docked at Pearl 
Harbor. Boarding trucks the Marines motored through Hono- 
lulu and over the Pali, the famous pass where the Hawaiian na- 
tional hero, King Kamehameha I, is alleged to have disposed of 
his enemies, to their new post on the windward side of Oahu. 
The Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, new home of the 
4th Marines, is one of the most beautiful and comfortable posts in 
the Corps. Modern barracks set among lawns and well-kept 
shrubbery provide a standard of life as good as any in the Marine 
Corps. 24 

At this post the 4th Marines assumed a new mission as the 
ground element of the 1st Provisional Marine Air-Ground Task 
Force. Under the command of Brigadier General Edward C. 
Dyer, this composite force also included Colonel Robert John- 
son's Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 13. The 4th Marines and 
the reinforcing units making up RCT-4 were attached to the Air- 
Ground Task Force only for operational control. They con- 
tinued under the administrative control of the 3d Marine Divi- 
sion, until 1 o July when this latter function was transferred to the 
Air-Ground Task Force. 

This change in status resulted from the Commandant's decision 
to assign the 4th Marines permanently to Kaneohe rather than to 
rotate it with other regiments of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific — a 
plan which had to be abandoned because of a shortage of ship- 
ping. For the members of the 4th Marines, one important result 
of this "home porting" was that families were officially author- 
ized to join the regiment overseas for the first time since December 
1940. 25 

24 Unless otherwise cited, this section is based on 4th Mar HistD, ijan- 

25 CMC msg to CinCPac, dtd 7^55, End 12, App I, FMFPac HistD, 


An air-ground task force had first been proposed by the 
FMFPac staff in a study completed in October 1950. The 
Inchon-Seoul campaign had just ended, and total defeat of the 
North Korean Communists seemed imminent. Early with- 
drawal of the Marines appeared likely. General Shepherd, then 
FMFPac commanding general, was rightly concerned with main- 
taining a ready force capable of dealing with future emergencies 
in the Far East. Pointing out the continuing instability in the 
Orient, his staff anticipated situations "which [might] demand 
the immediate dispatch of a balanced amphibious force-in-readi- 
ness to preserve or protect United States interests in the Pacific 
Area. Operations of such a force," the report continued, "may 
extend all the way from peaceful occupation and installation of 
defenses to the short-notice conduct of a full-scale amphibious as- 
sault, including close air support." 26 

If this emergency force were to achieve the desired perfection 
in tactical teamwork, the FMFPac staff officers felt, a single 
commander over both air and ground elements was needed. A 
precedent existed for such a balanced force in the 1st Provisional 
Marine Brigade sent to Korea in July 1950 — a unit which in- 
cluded an RGT and a Marine Air Group. 

Close coordination between air and ground elements had al- 
ways been a fundamental Marine Corps principle, and over the 
years a remarkably efficient system of close air support for ground 
troops had been developed. But never before the activation of 
the 1 st Provisional Brigade in 1950 had the intimacy between air 
and ground elements extended so far as to place both under a sin- 
gle commander. It was this newly battle-proven concept which 
General Shepherd wished to perpetuate and perfect. 

The following month General Shepherd recommended to Ad- 
miral Arthur W. Radford, the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, 

29 Hq FMFPac Staff Study: "The Establishment of a Balanced FMF Air- 
Ground Force in the WestPac," dtd igOctso, Encl J, App II, FMFPac 
HistD, i-3iOct50. 


that the proposed air-ground task force be stationed at the Ma- 
rine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay. Favoring this selection, in 
Shepherd's opinion, were the advantages of central location of 
Hawaii in the Pacific Fleet operating area and good port facilities 
which would permit speedy assembly of shipping and embarka- 
tion of the landing force. These advantages outweighed, in Shep- 
herd's mind, the disadvantage of long steaming distance to 
potential trouble areas. The climate favored all-year training, 
liberty conditions were good, and Kaneohe could be expanded to 
house an RGT and MAG at minimum cost. Also, forces could 
easily be rotated between Hawaii and California if necessary. 
Finally, and most important to Shepherd, locating the force at 
Kaneohe would keep it in the Pacific Fleet operating area and 
therefore under naval control. 27 

Not until 26 months later were troops available for assignment 
to the proposed air-ground unit. On 16 January 1953, the 1st 
Provisional Marine Air-Ground Task Force was activated at 
Kaneohe. But continued troop shortages permitted the assign- 
ment of only a battalion-size ground element. Effective organiza- 
tion was delayed until the arrival of RCT-4 in February 1955. 28 

Training of the Air-Ground Task Force to work effectively as 
a team was General Dyer's major responsibility. But before this 
job could be started, RCT-4 na< ^ to regain a state of combat 
readiness. In Japan the 4th Marines had been a highly trained 
and efficient combat unit, but replacement of large numbers of 
experienced Marines by relatively unskilled personnel had greatly 
reduced the combat readiness of the regiment. Attachment of 
supporting units undergoing similar changes aggravated the 

Colonel Kyle lost no time in beginning the rebuilding task. 
On 9 February, only five days after arrival, units of the regiment 

* GG FMFPac ltr to CinCPac, 14N0V50, End 5, App II, FMFPac HistD, 
28 FMFPac HistD, 1-31^1153. 


began basic individual instruction, looking forward to an in- 
tensive training program scheduled to begin on i March. The 
first month of this program was devoted to individual training, 
small unit tactics, and requalification firing. By the beginning 
of April the regiment was ready for field exercises and air-ground 
training, including air lift and close air support. 

Kaneohe, so ideal in many respects, lacked facilities for more 
than non-firing small unit problems. To conduct battalion 
maneuvers or firing exercises of any kind the regiment had to 
move off the base. Ever since the arrival of RCT-4 in Hawaii 
the regimental staff had been busy lining up suitable training 
areas, pressing into service facilities all over the island. 

Bellows Air Force Base, 13 miles away, was the closest. The 
approximately 1,300 acres of this disused airfield were used for 
non-firing small unit problems, landing exercises, and air support 
and helicopter air lift problems. At Waikane, a 15-mile drive 
from the main gate, .30 and .50 caliber machine guns, 60 and 
81mm mortars, and 75mm recoilless rifles could be fired. The 
Kahuku area also provided firing ranges for all these weapons, 
and, in addition, space for battalion exercises and close air sup- 
port problems. To fire 105mm howitzers or 4.2-inch mortars it 
was necessary to make a 70-mile trip to Makua or Schofield cen- 
tral range, both Army training areas. Exercise of the entire RGT 
at once required a move off the island. (See Map 33.) 

Intensive training utilizing these training facilities got under 
way during April and continued from then on at an intensive 
pace. In keeping with its role as the ground component of an 
air-ground task force, RCT-4 placed particular emphasis on train- 
ing with MAG- 1 3. To the maximum extent possible, fighter 
aircraft flew close air support as part of ground unit problems. 
And training in troop and supply movement by helicopter and 
fixed-wing aircraft was given continuing attention. Guerrilla 
operations, mountain warfare, and night operations were also 
stressed throughout training. 


By the winter of 1956, training of both ground and air ele- 
ments of the 1 st Provisional Marine Air-Ground Task Force had 
progressed to the stage where a full-scale Task Force landing 
exercise was practical. Accordingly, General Dyer, in February, 
announced Operation MAUKA, to be held between 7 and 13 
April. 29 The purpose of the exercise was to gain experience in 
operating on a task force level, and to test the latest atomic-age 
tactics in amphibious operations. Employing helicopters and 
simulated atomic weapons, as well as conventional air, sea, and 
ground forces, the Task Force was to seize and defend a beach- 
head enclosing an airstrip on the island of Kauai, about 75 miles 
northwest of Oahu. 

At 0800 on 7 April, 2/4 and 3/4 landed on the Black and 
Blue Beaches respectively, under the critical eye of Colonel James 
M. Masters, Sr., the regimental commander. A part of the 2d 
Battalion was put down on the airstrip by helicopters. These 
men were soon joined by their LVT-landed comrades who, sup- 
ported by close air strikes and naval gunfire, quickly overcame 
aggressor defenses. 

Aggressors concealed on the high volcanic cliffs overlooking 
the beaches harassed 3/4 with simulated mortar and small-arms 
fire until aircraft of MAG- 13 delivered an "atomic" strike on 
the cliff positions. After a helicopter-borne radiation team had 
checked the blast area for radiation, other helicopters lifted two 
platoons of Company G to seize enemy positions knocked out 
by the blast. The airstrip secured, MAG- 13 fighters landed to 
base there and continue close air support of the ground troops. 
Four-engined transports of VMR-152 and -352 began air lifting 
supplies, delivering 260,000 pounds during a 17-hour period. 

Under cover of simulated atomic weapons the 2d and 3d Bat- 
talions jumped off to clear the enemy from his remaining cliff 
positions. An Aggressor atomic bomb exploded over 3/4, "an- 

The Windward Marine (Kaneohe), ioFeband i3Apr56. 


nihilating" two companies. All available personnel and vehicles 
were pressed into service, evacuating 300 casualties to Company 
E, 3d Medical Battalion in a two-hour period. To replace the 
shattered assault battalion, 1/4 was helicopter lifted from reserve 
to attack positions and completed the seizure of enemy emplace- 
ments on the cliffs. 

This ended Operation MAUKA. General Dyer gave a "hearty 
well done" to all members of his command, while the Aggressor 
commander remarked that "the 4th Marines appear well trained, 
particularly on the small unit level . . . 30 

On 1 May 1956, the Air-Ground Task Force was redesignated 
the 1 st Marine Brigade. No organizational changes accompanied 
the switch in title, the main purpose of which was to perpetuate 
the honors and traditions of the 1st Brigade, dating back to the 
Philippine insurrection and including service in Haiti, World War 
II, and Korea. 31 

In June, Brigadier General George R. E. Shell relieved General 
Dyer as commander of the 1st Brigade. Soon after his arrival 
the new commanding general ordered the reinforcing units of 
RCT-4 placed directly under brigade command. The purpose 
of this change was to relieve the Commanding Officer, 4th Ma- 
rines, of the burden of administering the attached units of the 
regiment and to simplify the command and administration of the 
entire brigade. Carried out in stages, the reorganization was com- 
pleted by September 1956. RCT-4 was tnen dissolved and the 
4th Marines became a regular infantry regiment for the first time 
since January 1955. 32 

Because of the demands of the atomic age for unit separation, 
a program of independent battalion landing team exercises oc- 

30 The Windward Marine, i3Apr56. 

31 The Windward Marine, 2 7Apr56. 

^LtGol James G. Juett memo to CMC, dtd i6Mar59, hereafter Juett 
memo; and LtCol John A. Lindsay ltr to CMC, dtd 4Mar59, hereafter 
Lindsay letter (both in Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMC). 


cupied the summer of 1956. Each battalion, reinforced to BLT 
strength, conducted an amphibious landing on Kauai. All phases 
of each program, including planning, naval coordination, em- 
barkation, landing, passing of control ashore, and operations 
against the aggressors ashore, were carried out entirely at bat- 
talion landing team level. Tactical withdrawal after three days 
ashore concluded the first phase of this training. The second 
phase consisted of battalion landing team firing exercises in the 
Pohakuloa area of the island of Hawaii. Air strikes and artillery 
fires, as well as the firing of all infantry weapons, characterized 
this part of the training. Tactical helicopter lifts were also con- 
ducted. Colonel Bryghte D. Godbold, the regimental com- 
mander since 9 June, and his staff observed, graded, and de- 
livered a critique of the performance of each battalion landing 
team. 33 

A full brigade air-transported attack on Kaneohe Bay followed 
the battalion landing team exercises. On 26 September, the 
brigade moved by air from Hilo, on the island of Hawaii, to land 
and seize Kaneohe Air Station and surrounding area. Follow- 
ing an atomic weapon drop by MAG— 13, designed to clear the 
area of enemy resistance yet leave the field usable by friendly 
planes, 3/4 began landing in fixed-wing aircraft. By nightfall, the 
battalion had occupied defensive positions around the field. On 
the two following days, 1/4, 2/4, and the remainder of the 
brigade landed and expanded the air head. Altogether, about 
6,000 troops, together with their supplies, had been transported 
by air over a distance of more than 100 miles and landed in 
tactical sequence. 34 

Training of the 1st Marine Brigade continued at an intensive 
level. Continuous individual and small unit training were com- 
bined with major exercises to maintain a high state of combat 
readiness. In Operation TRADEWINDS, held on Kauai dur- 

33 Juett memo; and Lindsay letter. 
3i Juett memo. 


ing August 1957, the brigade continued to develop the am- 
phibious techniques of the atomic age. This exercise included 
an amphibious assault followed by three days of maneuvers 
ashore. Of particular importance was the landing in assault of a 
full BLT by helicopters from the specially converted carrier 
Thetis Bay. Other techniques tested included a system for pump- 
ing fuel ashore in bulk through a floating pipeline, mass casualty 
evacuation after atomic attack, and communications under con- 
ditions of wide dispersal. 35 

Ability to embark rapidly in ships or aircraft with all equip- 
ment necessary for combat in any climatic zone is also of great im- 
portance to a mobile striking force. Beginning in October 1956, 
special measures designed to achieve the utmost in embarkation 
readiness were taken by the 4th Marines. With the encourage- 
ment of Colonel Godbold, Major Franklin J. Harte and his 1st 
Battalion drew up a list of supplies and equipment needed to 
maintain the battalion for 30 days in a temperate, tropical, or 
arctic climate. A further breakdown indicated the items required 
for immediate combat and those necessary only for garrison serv- 
ice in each of the climatic zones. Based on this data, complete 
embarkation tables were prepared to cover movement by air or 
surface transportation to any of the three climatic zones. 36 

Colonel Godbold was so impressed by this system that he di- 
rected its application to the entire regiment. In addition to the 
preparation of embarkation tables, the regimental commander 
took an additional step by ordering the physical separation of the 
supplies and equipment. Completion of these measures made 
possible embarkation of the 4th Marines, ready to fight, in a mat- 
ter of hours. 

In addition to maintaining a high state of combat readiness, 
the 4th Marines carried on the regimental tradition for military 

35 1 st MarBrig Type E Rept, Brig AGLEX 58A (TRADE WINDS), dtd 

38 CO 1/4, Type C, Special Rept: Embarkation Preparation, dtd i8Jun57. 


smartness and perfection in drill. Ever since its service at the San 
Diego and San Francisco expositions of 19 15 the regiment had 
enjoyed a reputation for "spit and polish" as well as combat readi- 
ness. At Kaneohe, located as it is at the "crossroads of the Pa- 
cific," inspections by high ranking military officers and civilian 
officials of the Department of Defense were so frequent as to be- 
come routine. Praise of the regiment as outstanding was com- 
mon. The highest commendation came from senior Marine 
officers who, having served in the regiment during its palmy days 
in Shanghai, declared the new 4th to be superior to the old China 
Marines in military drill and appearance. Adding to the color 
of these ceremonies was the regimental drum and bugle corps 
which played the regiment past many distinguished visitors to the 
strains of a special version of "Battle Hymn of the Republic," 
adopted as the regimental marching song. 37 

The regiment was also outstanding in esprit de corps, as evi- 
denced by its reenlistments. For the five-month period from 
June through September 1956, the 4th Marines attained a re- 
enlistment rate approximately 65 per cent above the Marine 
Corps average. The Commandant of the Marine Corps was so 
impressed with the results that he directed the regimental com- 
mander, Colonel Godbold, to report in detail on the method 
which had been used in the 4th Marines to achieve this high score. 
This report was subsequently published to all commanding of- 
ficers in the Marine Corps. 38 

During the same period, the brig and hospital lists were of 
moderate proportions. Unauthorized absence was never a prob- 
lem and disease was practically non-existent. As one battalion 
commander put it, "In every endeavor, in the field or in the gar- 
rison, the 4th Marines was never satisfied with a 'well-done. 5 The 

37 Juett memo; Miller letter; and LtCol Alex H. Sawyer ltr to CMC, dtd 
3Mar59 (Monograph & Comment File, HistBr, HQMG), hereafter Sawyer 

38 MarCorpsO 1 133.10, dtd 27N0V56; and Encl (1) thereto: GO 4th Mar 
ltr to CMC, dtd 5N0V56 (HistBr, HQMG) . 


4th was a 'second to none' outfit capable of competing in any 
league and winning the pennant." 39 

On 27 November 1957, the 4th Marines honored a fallen for- 
mer comrade and commanding officer. At impressive ceremo- 
nies, the regimental parade ground was named Piatt Field in 
honor of Colonel Wesley McC. Piatt, who died on 27 September 
1 95 1 of wounds received in action in Korea. Colonel Piatt had 
served in the 4th Marines as a second lieutenant at Shanghai from 
February 1938 to July 1940, and from 21 October 1946 to 10 
July 1947 he was the regimental commander at Camp Lejeune. 
Culminating the ceremony, Colonel George A. Roll, commanding 
officer of the 4th Marines and a classmate of Colonel Piatt's, 
accepted for the regiment a bronze memorial plaque from the 1st 
Marine Brigade commander, Brigadier General Avery R. Kier. 40 


Nearly half a century has passed since the 4th Marines was first 
organized in 191 1. All but five of the regiment's 38 active years 
have been spent abroad — engaged in a World War, fighting a 
limited engagement in the Caribbean, protecting U.S. interests 
in China, or standing ready in Japan or Hawaii for action in the 
Pacific area. Missions have varied, and the regiment has ad- 
justed to the changing conditions of operational employment. 
But readiness for varying assignments has been constant; the 4th 
Marines has undertaken its widely differing tasks swiftly and 

Today, the 4th and its brother Marine regiments are as neces- 
sary to national security as ever. The struggle between the Free 
and Communist Worlds continues — by economic, political, and 
propaganda methods today, but possibly by armed conflict to- 

89 Sawyer letter. 

40 The Windward Marine, 29N0V57; 4th Mar MRolls, iFeb38~3 1 J11I40, 


morrow. In this troubled world, the preservation of freedom 
calls for military force in being. It must be ready for employ- 
ment if necessary, but, in any event, its very existence is a constant 
reminder to the Communists to treat the vital interests of the 
United States with respect. 

Mass-destruction weapons, employed under the doctrine of 
massive retaliation, are not suited to all types of military actions. 
They are essential to deter all-out attack but are vastly over-de- 
structive for use in limited actions around the perimeter of the 
Free World. "An H-bomb cannot project our national policy 
ashore in foreign lands . . . nor bring about constructive 
changes in the political arrangements of an area vital to our na- 
tional security," as General Randolph McC. Pate, the Com- 
mandant of the Marine Corps, put it. "The man on the ground 
with a rifle and the warship in the harbor are tangible symbols of 
the power of the United States of America. But the threat of 
nuclear attack ... is impossible to see with the naked eye. It 
is like the electric chair; not like the policeman on the corner." 41 

Hard-hitting, mobile amphibious forces — ground and air — are 
needed to deal with limited aggression. In Korea, Taiwan, and 
Lebanon, the Marine ground soldier and fighter pilot bore the 
brunt of the action, while the long range bomber and missile re- 
mained on the runway and launching pad. 

The 4th Marines, as part of the 1st Marine Brigade, is a vital 
element of ready force. True to the traditions of its Corps, the 
4th Marines stands today, as it has for nearly half a century, 
ready to do its part as a component of the nation's force in 

41 Statement of Gen Randolph McC. Pate, House of Representatives Com- 
mittee on Armed Services, Hearings on Sundry Legislation Affecting the 
Naval and Military Establishments, 85th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 
1957), P- 185. 


Glossary of Abbreviations and 
Technical Terms 


Antiaircraft Artillprv 

1 XXI 1-J.CIXJ. VI CA.X. i> X XL till vl y 




Assistant Chief of Staff 


Administr?) ti vp 

X lUllliillJLl CL LJ. V 




Air-Ground Exercise 


U.S. Naval Attache 


Amphibian Tractor 






Assault Transport 




Action Report 




Army War College 


Asiatic Fleet 








Battalion Landing Team 








Coast Artillery 


Commanding General 


Commander in Chief 


Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet 

519667—60 28 389 

390 HOLD 



Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet 


Commandant of the Marine Corps 


Command Diary 


Commanding Officer 






Commander Advance Force 


Commander Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet 


Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet 


Commander, South Pacific 


Commander Task Force 


Department of the Army 










Died of Wounds 




Executive Officer 




Far East Command 


Field Order 


I Marine Amphibious Corps 


1 st Battalion, 4th Marines 




Fleet Marine Officer 


Fleet Marine Force 


Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 


Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific 




Intelligence Officer or Section, Division or Above 



Gen Corr 

General Correspondence 


General Headquarters 










Historical Branch 




Historical Section 


Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps 

H&S Go 

Headquarters and Service Company 


III Amphibious Corps 


Imperial Japanese Navy 






Joint Army-Navy 


Joint Assault Signal Company 


Joint Chiefs of Staff 


Marine Aircraft Group 




Marine Corps 


Department of the Pacific, U.S. Marine Corps 




Missing in Action 


Main Line of Resistance 


Military Police 


Muster Roll 




Motor Transport 


National Archives 




Noncommissioned Officer 


Naval Gunfire 


Naval History Division 


Office of the Chief of Military History 




Officer in Charge 


Operation Order 


Operation (s) 


Operation Plan 




Pacific Fleet 


Pacific Amphibious Exercise 


"Catalina" Patrol Bomber Aircraft, made by 






392 HOLD 



Pacific Ocean Area 


Prisoner of War 



PT Boat 

Motor Torpedo Boat 


Post Exchange 




Regimental Personnel Officer 


Regimental Intelligence Officer 










Special Action Report 


Secret and Confidential 


Security Force 


Secretary or Section 






Service and Supply 




The Adjutant General 


Table of Equipment 


Task Force 


Task Group 




Table of Organization 






Task Unit 


United Nations 


U.S. Army Forces in the Far East 


U.S. Forces in the Philippines 


V Amphibious Corps 


Marine Fighter Squadron 


Marine Observation Squadron 


War Diary 


War Department 


Wounded in Action 


W estern Mail Guard 



WWII World War II 

Zero Japanese Mitsubishi Single-engined Fighter Air- 




io Mar 191 1 Colonel Charles A. Doyen activates a provisional 
regiment at Mare Island. Regiment sails for 
San Diego. 

12 Mar 191 1 Provisional regiment arrives at San Diego and 
goes into camp on North Island. 

20 Apr 191 1 Regiment is designated 4th Provisional Regi- 


24 Jun 191 1 4th Provisional Regiment is disbanded at North 


9 Apr 1 9 14 Mexican authorities at Tampico seize a ration 

party from USS Dolphin. 
16 Apr 1 9 14 Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton reactivates 4th 
Regiment at Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, Puget 

U.S. forces land and occupy Vera Cruz, Mexico. 

21 Apr 1 9 14 4th Regiment assembles at San Francisco. 

22 Apr 1 9 14 4th Regiment sails from San Francisco for west 

coast of Mexico. 
27 Apr 1 9 14 4th Regiment arrives off coast of Mexico. 

25 Jun 1 9 14 U.S. agrees to withdraw forces from Mexico. 

2 Jul 1 9 14 First elements of the 4th Regiment depart from 

Mexican waters. 

10 Jul 1 9 14 4th Regiment encamps on North Island, San 


12 Dec 1 9 14 Regimental Headquarters and the 2d Battalion 

go into camp at the Panama-California Exposi- 
tion in San Diego. 


16 Feb 1915 

17 Jun 1915 

30 Jun 1915 
26 Nov 1915 

3 Feb 1916 

18 Feb 1916 
14 Apr 1916 

5 May 1916 

4 Jun 1916 

21 Jun 1916 

26 Jun 1916 

27 Jun 1916 
3 Jul 1916 

6 Jul 19 16 

31 Jul 1916 

29 Nov 1 9 16 
29-30 Nov 1 9 16 
10 Jan 1917 


1 st Battalion establishes model camp at Panama- 
Pacific Exposition in San Francisco. 
Regimental Headquarters and the 2d Battalion, 
less one company, sail again from San Diego for 
the west coast of Mexico. 

Units of 4th Regiment arrive back in San Diego. 
4th Regiment, less two companies, departs for 
third time for the west coast of Mexico. 
4th Regiment, less the 1st Battalion which pro- 
ceeded on to San Francisco, debarks at San 

1 st Battalion arrives in San Diego. 
Juan Isidro Jimenez, the elected president of the 
Dominican Republic, is overthrown by revolu- 
tionaries under Desiderio Arias. 
The first Marines land in the Dominican 

4th Regiment is ordered to the Dominican 

4th Regiment lands at Monte Cristi. 

4th Regiment, reinforced, begins march inland 

to Santiago. 

4th Regiment defeats Dominican rebels at Las 

4th Regiment defeats Dominican rebels at 
Guayacanas, thereby ending organized resist- 

4th Regiment, reinforced, enters Santiago. 
4th Regiment completes occupation of key 
towns in the northern part of the Dominican 

U.S. establishes military government in the 
Dominican Republic. 

4th Regiment crushes an attempted revolt at 
San Francisco de Macoris. 

Marines begin anti-bandit operations in the 
eastern part of the Dominican Republic. 


1 6 Jan-2 Feb 191 7 4th Regiment detachments reinforce the 3d 
Marine Regiment in anti-bandit operations. 

31 Jul 1 9 18- 4th Regiment detachments again reinforce the 
25 Feb 19 1 9 3d Regiment in anti-bandit operations. 

24 Dec 1920 President Wilson announces decision to with- 
draw U.S. forces from the Dominican Republic. 

24 Sep 1922 4th Regiment completes concentration at San- 

tiago and Puerto Plata. 
21 Oct 1922 Provisional government takes office. The 4th 

Regiment surrenders police powers. 
12 Jul 1924 An elected Dominican government is installed. 

6 Aug 1924 4th Regiment departs for San Diego. 

25 Aug 1924 4th Regiment arrives in San Diego. 

10 Apr- 4th Regiment participates in a landing exercise 

8 May 1925 in the Hawaiian Islands. 
18 Oct 1 926- 4th Regiment guards the mails in western U.S. 

18 Feb 1927 

10 Jan 1927 American Minister in China recommends that 

reinforcements be sent to Shanghai. 

28 Jan 1927 4th Regiment, less the 2d Battalion, is ordered 

to Shanghai. 

24 Feb 1927 4th Regiment arrives in Shanghai. 

21 Mar 1927 Fighting breaks out in native section of Shanghai 
when Communists revolt against the local war- 
lord; the 4th Regiment lands in the Interna- 
tional Settlement and takes up security duties. 

27 Mar 1927 Chinese Nationalist troops enter native section 
of Shanghai. 

12 Apr 1927 Chiang Kai-shek purges the Communists and 

takes undisputed control of Chinese city. 

2 May 1927 6th Marine Regiment, less the 3d Battalion, and 

3d Brigade Troops arrive in Shanghai. 

4 May 1927 2d Battalion, 4th Regiment, 3d Battalion, 6th 

Regiment, and reinforcing units arrive in the 

16 May 1927 Emergency at Shanghai is declared at an end. 


2 Jun 1927 The 6th Regiment (minus) departs Shanghai 

for Tientsin. 

4 Jun 1927 2d Battalion, 4th Regiment, and 3d Battalion, 

6th Regiment, depart Philippines for Tientsin. 

4 Oct 1927 2d Battalion, 4th Regiment redesignated 1st 

Battalion, 1 2th Regiment. 

4 Jun 1928 Chiang Kai-shek's forces occupy Peiping with- 

out harming foreign lives or property. 

23 Jan 1929 3d Brigade (minus 4th Regiment) completes 

withdrawal from China. 

13 Feb 1930 4th Regiment redesignated the 4th Marines. 

18 Sep 1 93 1 Japanese invade Manchuria. 

28 Jan 1932 Japanese attack Chinese in Shanghai; 4th Ma- 

rines man defenses along Soochow Creek as a 
state of emergency is declared in the Interna- 
tional Settlement. 

2 Mar 1932 Chinese retreat from Shanghai. 

3 Mar 1932 Fighting stops between Chinese and Japanese. 

5 May 1932 Chinese and Japanese accept a settlement 

worked out by a special committee of the 
League of Nations. 

13 Jun 1932 State of emergency in the International Settle- 

ment is terminated; 4th Marines return to 

7 Jul x 937 Japanese invade North China. 

13 Aug 1937 Fighting breaks out between Chinese and Japa- 
nese at Shanghai; 4th Marines again man Soo- 
chow Creek. 

19 Sep 1937 Headquarters, 2d Marine Brigade, Brigade 

Troops, and the 6th Marines, arrive at Shanghai 
from San Diego. 

9 Nov 1937 A successful Japanese flanking maneuver forces 

a general Chinese withdrawal from Shanghai. 

17 Feb 1938 All Marines, except the 4th Regiment, are with- 

drawn from Shanghai. 


5 Jul 1940 Export Control Act is invoked against Japan 

to prohibit exportation of strategic materials 
and equipment. 

27 Jul 1940 Japan, Germany, and Italy sign a mutual de- 

fense treaty — the Tripartite Pact. 

Nov 1 940 Asiatic Fleet, except for the Yangtze River gun- 

boats, withdraws from China waters to the 

23 Jul 1 94 1 Japanese complete the seizure of Indochina, 

26 Jul 1 94 1 U.S. government freezes Japanese assets in the 

U.S., resulting in stoppage of oil shipments. 
Jul 1 94 1 Admiral Thomas C. Hart recommends with- 

drawal of 4th Marines to the Philippines. 

10 Nov 1 94 1 U.S. government decides to evacuate 4th Ma- 

rines from Shanghai. 

27 & 28 Nov 4th Marines sails for the Philippines. 

30 Nov & 1 4th Marines arrives at Olongapo, Philippine 

Dec 1 94 1 Islands. 

7 Dec 1 94 1 Japanese attack Pearl Harbor. 

8 Dec 1941 U.S. declares war on Japan. 

22 Dec 1 94 1 4th Marines placed under operational control 


26-29 Dec 1 94 1 4th Marines arrives at Corregidor to take over 
beach defense. 

23-29 Jan 1942 Japanese landing attempt at Longoskawayan 
Point turned back. 

9 Apr 1942 Bataan falls. 

5 May 1942 Japanese make assault landing on Corregidor. 

6 May 1942 Corregidor falls; the survivors of the 4th Ma- 

rines become prisoners of war; the regiment 
ceases to exist. 

1 Feb 1944 4th Marine Regiment is reactivated on Guadal- 


19 Mar 1944 4th Marines lands unopposed on Emirau. 

11 Apr 1944 4th Marines returns to Guadalcanal. 


19 Apr 1944 4th Marines is attached to the 1st Provisional 

Marine Brigade — mission, the recapture of 

3 1 May 1 944 4th Marines sails for Guam. 

21 Jul 1944 4th Marines makes assault landing on Guam. 

22 Jul 1944 Japanese counterattack repulsed. 

24 Jul 1944 Southern Landing Force beachhead secured. 

26 Jul 1944 Attack on Orote Peninsula begins. 
29 Jul 1944 Orote Peninsula secured. 

7 Aug 1944 Final drive to conquer Guam begins. 

10 Aug 1944 Organized resistance on Guam declared at an 

27 Aug 1944 4th Marines leaves Guam. 

8 Sep 1944 4th Marines assigned to the 6th Marine Division. 
11, 12, 15 4th Marines leave Guadalcanal for Okinawa. 

Mar 1945 

1 Apr 1945 4th Marines lands on Okinawa. 

4 Apr 1945 4 tn Marines reaches east coast of Okinawa. 

14 Apr 1945 4th Marines attacks Motobu Peninsula. 

16 Apr 1945 4th Marines seizes Mount Yaetake, stronghold 
of Japanese defense on Motobu. 

20 Apr 1945 Organized resistance ends on Motobu Peninsula. 

21 Apr 1945 Organized resistance ends in northern Okinawa. 
13 May 1945 4th Marines enters the lines on the southern 


28 May 1945 4th Marines relieved after helping turn the west- 

ern end of the Shuri line and capturing Naha. 
4 Jun 1945 4th Marines attacks Oroku Peninsula. 

13 Jun 1945 Organized resistance ends on Oroku Peninsula. 

20 Jun 1945 4th Marines joins in reducing the last Japanese 

defenses on Okinawa. 

21 Jun 1945 Organized resistance on Okinawa ends. 

8 Jul 1945 4 tn Marines sails from Okinawa for Guam. 

6 Aug 1945 Atomic bomb is dropped on Hiroshima. 

14 Aug 1945 Japan surrenders. 


15 Aug 1945 4th Marines leaves Guam for the occupation of 

30 Aug 1945 4th Marines lands at Yokosuka. 

2 Sep 1945 Japan surrenders formally on board USS Mis- 

souri in Tokyo Bay. 
3&4Dec 1945 1st Battalion, 4th Marines sails for San Diego. 

29 Dec 1945 1 st Battalion, 4th Marines is disbanded at San 


1 Jan 1946 Regt H&S Company, Weapons Company, and 

the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, sail for San 

17 Jan 1946 A token headquarters, 4th Marines, joins the 

6th Marine Division in Tsingtao, China. 

31 Jan 1946 2d Battalion and H&S Company, 4th Marines, 

are disbanded at San Diego. 

15 Feb 1946 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, at Yokosuka is re- 

designated 2d Separate Guard Battalion. 

8 Mar 1946 4th Marines is built back up by transfers from 

other units of the 6th Division at Tsingtao. 

3 Sep 1946 4th Marines (less the 3d Battalion) sails for the 


30 Sep 1946 4th Marines ( — ) arrives at Camp Lejeune, 

joins the 2d Marine Division. 

1 Oct 1947 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, is disbanded. 

18 Nov 1947 All remaining regimental units except the 1st 

Battalion (redesignated the 4th Marines under 
"J" T/O) are disbanded. 
13 Sep 1948 4th Marines joins the Sixth Fleet in the Medi- 


24 Jan 1949 4th Marines returns to Camp Lejeune. 
17 Oct 1949 4th Marines is disbanded. 

25 Jun 1950 North Koreans invade south Korea. 

2 Sep 1952 4th Marines is reactivated at Camp Pendleton 

as part of the 3d Marine Division. 
23 Jul 1953 4 tn Marines, along with the 3d Marine Division, 

is ordered to prepare for movement to the Far 


27 Jul 1953 Korean armistice is signed at Panmunjom. 

24 Aug 1953 4th Marines arrives in Japan. 

25 Jan 1955 4th Marines sails from Japan for Hawaii. 

29 Jan 1955 Operational control of RCT-4 passes to CG, 1st 

Provisional Marine Air-Ground Task Force. 

4 Feb 1955 4th Marines arrives in Hawaii. 

1 May 1956 1 st Provisional Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

redesignated 1st Marine Brigade. 


Regimental Honors 


Presidential Unit Citation, with one bronze star signifying second 
award. 1 

1. Guadalcanal, 7 Aug-9 Dec 1942 (1st and 2d Raider 
Battalions, as part of the 1st Marine Division) . 

2. Okinawa, 1 Apr-21 Jun 1945 (as part of the 6th Marine 
Division) . 

Army Distinguished Unit Citation, with one bronze oak leaf 
cluster signifying second award. 2 

1. Philippines, 14 Mar-9 Apr 1942. 

2. Philippines, 7 Dec 194 1-6 May 1942. 

Navy Unit Commendation. 

Guam, 21 Jul- 10 Aug 1944 (as part of the 1st Provisional 
Marine Brigade). 


Expeditionary Streamer — Navy and Marine Corps, with one 
bronze star signifying second award. 

1. Dominican Republic, 5 Dec 19 16-5 Apr 191 7; 12 Nov 
1 9 18-6 Aug 1924. 

2. China, 7 Jun-4 Oct 1927 (2d Battalion, 4th Marines at 
Tientsin) ; 22 Oct 1927-28 Feb 1930, 1 Jan 1933-6 Jul 1937 

1 Unless otherwise noted, this appendix is based on BuPers, NavDept, U.S. 
Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual (Washington, 1953). 

s TAG, USWD, AR 220-315, dtd nApr52; USWD GO's 21 and 22, dtd 
3oApr42 (closing date auth WD GO 46 of 1948). 



Dominican Campaign Streamer. 

Dominican Republic, 21 Jun-4 Dec 19 16. 

World War I Victory Streamer, with one bronze star signifying 
the West Indies Clasp. 

Dominican Republic, 6 Apr 191 7-1 iNov 19 18. 

Yangtze Service Streamer. 

Shanghai, 24 Feb-21 Oct 1927; 1 Mar 1930-31 Dec 1932. 

China Service Streamer, with one bronze star signifying second 

1. Shanghai, 7 Jul 1937-7 Se P !939- 

2. Tsingtao, 17 Jan 1 946-1 Oct 1947. 

American Defense Streamer, with one bronze star signifying award 
of "Base" service clasp for service on shore outside the continental 
limits of the U.S. 

Shanghai, 8 Dec 1939-28 Nov 1941; and Philippines, 1-7 
Dec 1941. 

Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Streamer, with two silver and one bronze 
stars signifying operations as follows : 

1. Philippine Islands Operation, 8 Dec 194 1-6 May 1942. 

2. Midway, 4-6 Jun 1942 (2d Raider Bn) . 

3. MakinRaid, 17-18 Aug 1942 (2d Raider Bn) . 

4. Guadalcanal-Tulagi Landing, 7-9 Aug 1942 (1st Raider 

5. Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal, 10 Aug-17 Dec 
1942 ( 1 st and 2d Raider Bns) . 

6. New Georgia-Rendova-Vangunu, 5 Jul-29 Aug *943 ( Ist 
Raider Bn) . 

7. Occupation and Defense of Cape Torokina (Bougain- 
ville) , 1 Nov-14 Dec 1943 (2d Raider Regt (Prov) ) . 

8. Consolidation of the Solomon Islands: 

Northern Solomons (Bougainville), 15 Dec 1943-12 Jan 
1944 (2d Raider Regt (Prov) ) ; and Southern Solomons (the 
Russell Islands), 21 Feb-20 Mar 1943 (3d Raider Bn). 

9. Admiralty Island Landings (Emirau), 20 Mar-12 Apr 

10. Capture and Occupation of Guam, 21 Jul- 15 Aug 1944. 

11. Assault and Occupation of Okinawa Gunto, 1 Apr~3C 
Jun 1945. 


World War II Victory Streamer. 

7 Dec 1 94 1-6 May 1942; and 1 Feb 1944-31 Dec 1946. 

Navy Occupation Streamer, with Asia and Europe Clasps. 

1. Japan, 2 Sep 1945-14 Feb I 94 6 - 

2. Mediterranean, 23 Sep-28Dec 1948. 

National Defense Service Streamer. 
2 Sep 1952-27 Jul 1954. 

Korean Service Streamer. 

Japan, 23 Aug 1953-27 J ul J 954- 
U nited Nations Service Streamer. 

Japan, 23 Aug 1953-27 Jul 1954. 

Philippine Defense Streamer (Commonwealth of the Philippines), 
with one bronze star signifying combat against the enemy on Philip- 
pine territory. 

7 Dec 1941-6 May 1942. 


Regimental Citations and Commendations 


4 February 1943. 

Cited in the Name of 
The President of the United States 


Under command of 
Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, U.S.M.C. 


"The officers and enlisted men of the First Marine Division, Rein- 
forced, on August 7 to 9, 1942, demonstrated outstanding gallantry 
and determination in successfully executing forced landing assaults 
against a number of strongly defended Japanese positions on Tulagi, 
Gavutu, Tanambogo, Florida and Guadalcanal, British Solomon 
Islands, completely routing all the enemy forces and seizing a most 
valuable base and airfield within the enemy zone of operations in 
the South Pacific Ocean. From the above period until 9 December, 
1942, this Reinforced Division not only held their important stra- 
tegic positions despite determined and repeated Japanese naval, air 
and land attacks, but by a series of offensive operations against 
strong enemy resistance drove the Japanese from the proximity of 
the airfield and inflicted great losses on them by land and air attacks. 
The courage and determination displayed in these operations were 
of an inspiring order." 

Frank Knox, 
Secretary of the Navy. 

519667—60 29 405 



The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting 


consisting of: The Sixth Marine Division; First Marine 
War Dog Platoon; Fifth Provisional Rocket Detachment; 
Third Platoon, First Bomb Disposal Company; Marine 
Observation Squadron Six; Sixth Joint Assault Signal 
Company; First Armored Amphibian Battalion; Fourth 
Amphibian Tractor Battalion; Ninth Amphibian Tractor 
Battalion; First Section, Second Platoon, First Bomb 
Disposal Company; 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion, 
U.S. Army; Third Armored Amphibian Battalion (less 
4 platoons) ; 91st Chemical Mortar Company (Separate), 
U.S. Army; First Platoon, Company B, 713th Armored 
Flame-Thrower Battalion, U.S. Army, 

for service as set forth in the following 


"For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese 
forces during the assault and capture of Okinawa, April 1 to June 
21, 1945. Seizing Yontan Airfield in its initial operation, the 
SIXTH Marine Division, Reinforced, smashed through organized 
resistance to capture Ishikawa Isthmus, the town of Nago and 
heavily fortified Motobu Peninsula in 1 3 days. Later committed to 
the southern front, units of the Division withstood overwhelming 
artillery and mortar barrages, repulsed furious counterattacks and 
staunchly pushed over the rocky terrain to reduce almost impregnable 
defenses and capture Sugar Loaf Hill. Turning southeast, they 
took the capital city of Naha and executed surprise shore-to-shore 
landings on Oroku Peninsula, securing the area with its prized Naha 
Airfield and Harbor after nine days of fierce fighting. Reentering 
the lines in the south, SIXTH Division Marines sought out enemy 
forces entrenched in a series of rocky ridges extending to the southern 
tip of the island, advancing relentlessly and rendering decisive sup- 
port until the last remnants of enemy opposition were exterminated 
and the island secured. By their valor and tenacity, the officers 


and men of the SIXTH Marine Division, Reinforced, contributed 
materially to the conquest of Okinawa, and their gallantry in over- 
coming a fanatic enemy in the face of extraordinary danger and 
difficulty adds new luster to Marine Corps history, and to the tradi- 
tions of the United States Naval Service." 

James Forrestal, 
Secretary of the Navy 

(For the President) . 

General Orders ) WAR DEPARTMENT, 

No. 21 I Washington, ^pn7 30, 1Q42 

Citation of units in the United States Forces in the Philippines. — 
As authorized by Executive Order 9075 (sec. II, Bull. 11, W.D., 
1942), a citation in the name of the President of the United States, 
as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction, is awarded 
to the following-named units. The citation reads as follows: 

The Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays and Naval and 
Marine Corps units serving therein, United States Forces in the 
Philippines, are cited for outstanding performance of duty in action, 
during the period from March 14 to April 9, 1942, inclusive. 

Although subjected repeatedly to intense and prolonged artillery 
bombardment by concealed hostile batteries in Cavite Province and 
to heavy enemy aerial attacks, during the period above-mentioned, 
and despite numerous casualties and extensive damage inflicted on 
defensive installations and utilities, the morale, ingenuity, and com- 
bat efficiency of the entire command have remained at the high 
standard which has impressed fighting men the world over. 

On March 15, approximately 1,000 240-mm projectiles were fired 
at Forts Frank and Drum, and large numbers of lesser caliber pro- 
jectiles struck Forts Hughes and Mills. Again on March 20, over 
400 240-mm shells were fired at Fort Frank and a lesser number at 
Fort Drum, while enemy air echelons made a total of 50 attacks 
on Fort Mills with heavy aerial bombs. 

During the entire period all units maintained their armament at 
a high degree of efficiency, while seaward defense elements executed 
effective counter battery action. Antiaircraft batteries firing at ex- 
treme ranges exacted a heavy toll of hostile attacking planes, and 


Naval and Marine units from exposed stations assured the defense 
of the beaches and approaches to the fortified islands. By unceasing 
labor and regardless of enemy activity, essential utilities were restored 
and the striking power of the command maintained unimpaired. 

As a result of their splendid combined efforts, ruggedness, and 
devotion to duty the various units and services comprising the 
Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays frustrated a major 
hostile attempt to reduce the efficiency of the fortified islands. 

Units included in above citation : 59th Coast Artillery, 60th Coast 
Artillery (AA), 91st Coast Artillery (PS), 92d Coast Artillery (PS), 
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Harbor Defenses of Ma- 
nila and Subic Bays, Medical Detachment, Ordnance Detachment, 
Quartermaster Detachments (American and Philippine Scouts), 
Finance Detachment, 1st Coast Artillery (PA) (less 2d Battalion), 
Company A, 803d Engineer Battalion (Aviation) (Separate), de- 
tachments DS Army Mine Planter Harrison (American and Philip- 
pine Scouts), 4th U.S. Marines, U.S. Navy Inshore Patrol, Manila 
Bay area, Naval Force District Headquarters Fort Mills, Naval 
Forces Mariveles Area Philippine Islands, Battery D, 2d Coast Artil- 
lery (PA), 1st Platoon Battery F, 2d Coast Artillery (AA), (PA), 
2d Platoon Battery F, 2d Coast Artillery ( AA) , (PA) . 

(A.G. 201.54 (4-12-42)) 

By Order of the Secretary of War : 

G. C. Marshall, 
Official: Chief of Staff. 

J. A. Ulio, 
Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 

General Orders I WAR DEPARTMENT 

No. 22 Washington, A pril 30, ig^2 

Citation of units of both military and naval forces of the United 
States and Philippine Governments. — As authorized by Executive 
Order 9075 (sec. II, Bull. 11, W.D., 1942), a citation in the name 
of the President of the United States as public evidence of de- 
served honor and distinction, is awarded to all units of both military 


and naval forces of the United States and Philippine Governments 
engaged in the defense of the Philippines since December 7, 1941 
to 10 May 1942. 

(A.G. 210.54 (4-12-42).) 

(Closing date auth. by W.D.G.O. #46 of 1948) 

By Order of the Secretary of War : 

G. C. Marshall, 
Official: Chief of Staff. 

J. A. Ulio, 
Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 


The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the 


for service as follows : 

"For outstanding heroism in action against enemy Jap- 
anese forces during the invasion of Guam, Marianas 
Islands, from July 21 to August 10, 1944. Functioning 
as a combat unit for the first time, the First Provisional 
Marine Brigade forced a landing against strong hostile 
defenses and well camouflaged positions, steadily ad- 
vancing inland under the relentless fury of the enemy's 
heavy artillery, mortar and small arms fire to secure a firm 
beachhead by nightfall. Executing a difficult turning 
movement to the north, this daring and courageous unit 
fought its way ahead yard by yard through mangrove 
swamps, dense jungles and over cliffs and, although ter- 
rifically reduced in strength under the enemy's fanatical 
counterattacks, hunted the Japanese in caves, pillboxes and 
foxholes and exterminated them. By their individual acts 
of gallantry and their indomitable fighting teamwork 
throughout this bitter and costly struggle, the men of the 


First Provisional Marine Brigade aided immeasurably in 
the restoration of Guam to our sovereignty." 

James Forrestal, 
Secretary of the Navy. 

All personnel serving in the First Provisional Marine Brigade, 
comprised of: Headquarters Company; Brigade Signal Company; 
Brigade Military Police Company, 4th Marines, Reinforced; 2 2d 
Marines, Reinforced; Naval Construction Battalion Maintenance 
Unit 515; and 4th Platoon, 2d Marine Ammunition Company, 
during the above mentioned period are hereby authorized to wear 


Medal of Honor Citations 

WINANS, Roswell 
i st Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps 
G.O. Navy Department, No. 244 
October 30, 19 16 

"For extraordinary heroism in the line of his profession and for 
eminent and conspicuous courage in the presence of the enemy 
at the action at GUAYACANES, Dominican Republic, July 3, 

GLOWIN, Joseph Anthony 
Corporal, U.S. Marine Corps 
G.O. Navy Department, No. 244 
October 30, 19 16 

"For extraordinary heroism in the line of his profession and for 
eminent and conspicuous courage in the presence of the enemy 
at the action at GUAYACANES, Dominican Republic, July 3, 

WILLIAMS, Ernest Calvin 
1st Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps 
G.O. Navy Department, No. 289 
April 27, 19 1 7 

"For extraordinary heroism in the line of his profession in the 
face of the enemy at SAN FRANCISCO de MACORIS, Domini- 
can Republic, November 29, 19 16." 



The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting 

for service as set forth in the following 


"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life 
above and beyond the call of duty as a Squad Leader serving 
with the First Battalion, Fourth Marines, Sixth Marine Division, 
in action against enemy Japanese forces during the final assault 
against Mt. Yaetake on Okinawa, Ryukyu Islands, 16 April 1945. 
Rallying his men forward with indomitable determination, Cor- 
poral Bush boldly defied the slashing fury of concentrated Japa- 
nese artillery fire pouring down from the gun-studded mountain 
fortress to lead his squad up the face of the rocky precipice, sweep 
over the ridge and drive the defending troops from their deeply 
entrenched position. With his unit, the first to break through to 
the inner defense of Mt. Yaetake, he fought relentlessly in the 
forefront of the action until seriously wounded and evacuated with 
others under protecting rocks. Although prostrate under medical 
treatment when a Japanese hand grenade landed in the midst of 
the group, Corporal Bush, alert and courageous in extremity as in 
battle, unhesitatingly pulled the deadly missile to himself and ab- 
sorbed the shattering violence of the exploding charge in his own 
body, thereby saving his fellow Marines from severe injury or 
death despite the certain peril to his own life. By his valiant 
leadership and aggressive tactics in the face of savage opposition, 
Corporal Bush contributed materially to the success of the sus- 
tained drive toward the conquest of this fiercely defended outpost 
of the Japanese Empire and his constant concern for the welfare 
of his men, his resolute spirit of self-sacrifice and his unwavering 
devotion to duty throughout the bitter conflict enhance and sus- 
tain the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service." 

Harry S. Truman. 


Command List 1 


Col Charles A. Doyen 

. . . . 10 Mar- 

-23 Jun 


Col Joseph H. Pendleton 

.... 1 6 Apr 

-11 Dec 


Maj Arthur T. Marix 


-31 Dec 


Col Theodore P. Kane 

1 Jan- 

- 4 May 


LtCol John H. Russell 

5 Ma r 

- 2 Nov 


LtCol Arthur T. Marix 

3 Nov- 

-20 Dec 


Col William N. McKelvy 

. . . . 21 Dec 

J 9i7- 

-17 Apr 


Col Dion Williams 

1 8 Apr 


-14 May 


Col Charles H. Lyman 

. . . . 15 May 192 1- 

- 9 May 


LtCol Robert Y. Rhea 

-22 Jul 


Col Alexander S. Williams 

23 Jul 


- 7 Mar 


LtCol Ellis B. Miller 

8 Mar- 

-27 Jun 


Col Charles S. Hill 

.... 28 Jun 


- 4 Sep 


LtCol Fred D. Kilgore 

5 Sep- 

- 6 Oct 


Col Henry C. Davis 

7 Oct 

1927-26 Sep 


LtCol Fred D. Kilgore 

.... 27 Sep 


•13 J an 


Col Charles H. Lyman 

14 Jan 


-20 Nov 


Col Richard S. Hooker 

. , 21 Nov 


23 Dec 


LtCol Emile P. Moses 

. . . . 24 Dec 


-12 Mar 


Col Fred D. Kilgore 

3 Mar- 

- 6 May 


LtCol Emile P. Moses 

7 May- 

-10 Jul 


Col John C. Beaumont . 

.... 11 Jul 


- 6 May 


Col Charles F. B. Price 

7 May 

I93 6 - 

-23 Oct 


Col Joseph C. Fegan 

24 Oct 


- 3 Dec 


1 Unless otherwise noted, this Appendix is based on 4th Mar MRolls and 
Unit Diaries. Gaps in chronology result from nonexistence of the unit or a 
vacant command position in the existing unit. 



LtCol Charles I. Murray 4 Dec 1939- 2 Jan 1940 

Col DeWitt Peck 3 Jan 1940-13 May 1941 

Col Samuel L. Howard 2 14 May 1941- 6 May 1942 

LtCol Alan Shapley 1 Feb 1944- 3 Jul 1945 

(promoted to colonel on 16 Nov 

LtCol Fred D. Beans 4 Jul-30 Dec 1945 

Col William J. Whaling 8-25 Mar 1946 

Col John D. Blanchard 26 Mar-30 Jun 1946 

BriGen William T. Clement 1 Jul-24 Aug 1946 

LtCol Robert L. Denig 1-20 Oct 1946 

LtCol Wesley McC. Piatt 21 Oct 1946-10 Jul 1947 

Col Robert B. Luckey n Jul-i 1 Nov 1947 

LtCol Frank M. Reinecke 12 Nov 1947-28 Oct 1948 

(promoted to colonel on 29 Feb 

LtCol Donald J. Decker 29 Oct 1948- 8 May 1949 

Maj Donald E. Asbury gMay-igJun 1949 

LtCol John F. Dunlap 20 Jun-i 7 Oct 1949 

Col Robert O. Bowen 2 Sep 1952- 2 Oct 1953 

Col John C. Miller, Jr 3 Oct 1953- 6 Apr 1954 

Col Frederick A. Ramsey 7 Apr-21 Aug 1954 

LtCol Richard L. Boll 22 Aug-23 Sep 1954 

Col Wood B. Kyle 24 Sep 1954- 5 Jun 1955 

LtCol John E. Decher, Jr 6-22 Jun 1955 

Col Robert E. Hill 23 Jun-18 Aug 1955 

Col James M. Masters, Sr 19 Aug 1955- 8 Jun 1956 

Col Bryghte D. Godbold 9 Jun 1956-24 Aug 1957 

Col George A. Roll 25 Aug 1957- 2 May 1958 


Capt John N. Wright 21 Apr-11 Jun 191 1 

Maj John T. Myers 21 Apr 1914- 5 Jun 1916 

2 After 28 Feb 1942 no muster rolls reached Headquarters USMG from the 
Philippines. Names of commanders after that date until the surrender of Cor- 
regidor on 6 May 1942 are from LtCol. Frank O. Hough, Major Verle E. Lud- 
wig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal — History of U.S. Marine 
Corps Operations in World War II, v. I (Washington: HistBr, HQMC, 1957), 
PP- 3 8 7~3 88 - 



Capt Arthur T. Marix 6Jun 1 916-31 July 191 7 

(promoted to major on 23 Aug 

MVn William FT Prifrhptf" 

1 Aug 


- Tul 


1 y j.o 

fnrnmof^f] to lifMitpnant rolnnpl 

nn Aiip* inrRl 

LtCol Henrv C Davis 

1 4 Jul 


-27 Oct 



(promoted to colonel on 2 Aug 

IQl8 > ) 

Cant Tpssp H Filiate 

28 Oct 


- Tan 

T O T O. 

1 y 1 y 

M!aj John B Sebree 

r 5 J an " 

~20 Sep 

T O T Q 

x y x y 

22 Sep- 

-t t T\Tr»\7 

i 9 i y 

Capt Rafael Griffin 

12 Nov 


-15 Mar 

T 020 

Maj Chandler Campbell 


-22 M^ar 

I Q20 

M!aj Harold L Parsons 

29 Mar 

I Q20- 

-TO AllO" 

T Q.2 T 
1 y^ i 

M^aj James T Reid 

1 Aug 


-OQ Tul 

I Q2°. 

Maj Franklin B Garrett 

24 Jul 


-on Tun 

T Q2/1 

Maj Adolph B Miller 

1 Sep- 

-14 Dec 


1 y zz t 

LtCol Giles Bishop Jr 

15 Dec 


-or Tan 

t 02 c; 

LtCol Ellis B. Miller 


-28 Feb 

I Q2 ^ 

1 y^ 4 j 

Maj Gerald A Johnson 

1 Mar- 

- 1 Mav 

I Q2 ^ 

1 y^o 

Maj Edward M Reno 

9 May 


-to Tun 

1 026 

"Mai Beniamin A Mneller 


4 Jun- 

- ^ Tul 

T 09fS 

1 y zu 

Maj Edward M Reno 

6 Jul 


-26 Jan 

1 y^ / 

A/fai T'hporlnrp A Sppot* 

1 Feb 


_ 3 1 Dec 

T no *7 

M!aj Harold L Parsons 

1 Jan 


- 2 Tun 

I Q°.0 

1 yj^ 

M^aj George H Osterhout Jr 

3 Jun 


-22 Dec 

1 yj^ 

M^aj John L Doxey 

23 Dec 


-00 Tul 

1 yoo 

LtCol Edward W Sturdevant 

24 Jul 

r 933" 

-26 Aug 

T OQ/1 
1 yj'4r 

M!aj Selden B Kennedy 

27 Aug 


-on Anr 
Or 1 1 v r' A 

I 02 ^ 

1 yjo 

(promoted to lieutenant colonel 

on 25 Oct 1934) 

LtCol Edwin W. McClellan 

1 May- 

- 8Jun 


Maj Archibald Young 

9 Jun- 

" 4 Jul 


Capt William McN. Marshall 


-3 1 Jul 


Maj Franklin T. Steele . 

1 Aug- 

-14 Oct 


LtCol Lowry B. Stephenson 

15 Oct 


-14 Dec 


LtCol Harold C. Pierce 

15 Dec 


-21 Mar 


Maj Blythe G. Jones 

22 Mar- 

-19 Apr 


LtCol William H. Rupertus 

20 Apr 


"3 1 J an 

i93 8 


T tCnl Harold C! Piprrp 

t Fph- 
1 rcu 

20 Oct 

t nofi 

r 93o 


T AflP 

J 93° 

■12 Sep 

r 939 

T tCol Eiicrpne F CI Cnllipr 

T O 



"i 2 Jun 

T 94 T 

A/Tai Slamnpl W Frppnu 

13 Jun- 

-13 Aug 

x 94 r 

T tCnl Curtis T Rpprhpr 

■ • *4 



u ividy 


LtCol Charles L Banks 

1 Feb- 

-TO A/Tmr 

t n /i a 


Mai "Bernard W Grppn fKTA^ 

lvxcxj uci uai u vv . vji ecu ^rvirv y . . . 

o r\ 

May 1 944- 

-15 Apr 

T n /< C 

r 945 

T tCol Fred D Bp^ns 

.on A tit* 

30 i\pr 

T C\ A c 


LtCol Oenrp-e R Bell 

1 K^fay - 

-on iXTrwr 

T C\ A C 


T — 


"i 7 Dec 

r 945 

Pt(!ol Tncpnn P S^T/prc 

-00 Tnl 
22 JUl 

T O /< f"» 

1 94° 

T tCnl Warrpn P Rakpr 

00 Tnl— 

- *7 A no - 


LtCol Waltpr FT Stpohpns 

O Aug 

-0 c Ort 

T .tCol Frpdprirk Rplton 

i Apr- 

-on inn 

1 947 

21 Jun- 

- 2 Sep 

r 947 

T tCol WpsIpv MrC Pl^tt 

3 Sep- 

1 4 -»-^ c)v 

T 947 

LtCol Franklin B Nihart 




I O ivj-dy 

1 9oo 

T .' Tqitipc A A/1 nn a rt\r Ir 


9 May- 

-t n Tnl 

LtCol Chp^tpr T Chri«:tpn<;on 

20 Jul- 

- fi Ort 

A/Tqi Tcimpc F \/Tr > iI1 a n a Vi a n 

7 Oct- 

-to lSJo^r 
1U 1M vJV 


LtCol Loni<? IV Ca^pv 




-28 Sep 

T O r /j 

LtCol William R. Ourand, Jr 

•• 29 



- 3 Au g 

r 955 

Maj John A . Lindsay 

• • 4 


r 955- 

- 4 Oct 


Maj Franklin J. Harte 

• • 5 



- 3 Se P 


LtCol Ernest L. Medford, Jr 

• • 5 



- 3 Sep 



Capt' William W. Low 

21 Apr- 

-1 1 Jun 


Maj William N. McKelvy 

21 Apr 1914- 

-1 7 Feb 


Maj Melville J. Shaw 

20 Feb- 

- 5 De c 


Capt Robert B. Farquharson 

7 Dec 1 91 6- 

-29 Jan 

i9 J 7 

Maj William H. Pritchett 

3 x J an - 

- 7 Mar 


Capt Charles F. Williams 

14 May- 

- 1 Jul 


Maj William H. Pritchett 


-31 Jul 

I 9 I 7 

Maj Ellis B. Miller 

7 A ug- 

-18 Sep 


Capt Robert B. Farquharson 

4° ct I 9 I 7" 

- 2 Aug 


(promoted to major on 2£ 

1 Nov 191 7) 

Maj Gerald A. Johnson 

1 Sep- 

-14 Dec 


Maj Adolph B. Miller 

15 Dec 1924- 

-19 Jun 





-22 Feb 


... 23 



- 1 Mar 


2 Mar- 

-19 Apr 


20 Apr- 

-13 Jun 


\/f oi X? r ]t,-o A /T /z»-r^ 

14 Jun- 

5 Jul 


jD i o tt"> l r~i A /-i/~M 1 /-iv* 


- ft Anrr 
O AUg 


1 0*1-1 + 1 Vi /-"if*/"* A Nppav 

12 Aug- 

■27 Oct 


T tPnl Fllie "R TV/Till--=>T* 

19 Feb- 

- 3 M^ar 


|\ /\ «-» i (h r\ T iro \ f\ \< /-y 


-3 1 Mar 


1 Apr- 

3 Uct 


iviaj .L-yie ri. iviiiier 

T ft 

... 10 



- 6 Mar 

J 934 

A/foi Tnlion "\A7i 1 l/'-'iO'v- 

7 Mar- 

oft TV^> 

20 uec 

J 934 

T tPrJ TnVin R QpKrpp 

... 29 



-30 Oct 

J 93^ 

iviaj xvaymonQ jviiapp 

31 Oct- 

- 2 Nov 

J 93 6 

• • • 3 



3 1 J an 

T /-.oft 

J 93 y 

T tPnl -PliTVrm R f dtPO 



T *1 TV /To X T 

1 7 iviay 

T 939 

T -fOz-vl T? /^l-i/^r-Y- A/T A/Tnntami^ 

Ma Y *939" 

25 Jun 



5 Jun- 

10 JUI 


1 OT"\"f- 1 mine W V^i 1 1 1 pr 


_r\ r\ An pr 

20 ^vug 


T tPrJ Fi/~»t-i alr-l Piir-tic- 

... 27 



-14 Apr 

I 94 I 

... 15 



- iviay 


1 Feb- 

-20 Nov 

J 944 

T tP-ol T) f±\7Trt /ol c FT Hciurlpn 



-op Ayf 

20 iviay 

x 945 

Maj Edgar F. Carney, Jr 

... 27 

Ma Y r 945~ 

-30 Jan 


T T ^ f~~^ T 1, ^ ^ 

8 Mar- 

-12 Apr 


\ /| *-v i T j-^-flT \-J llTTQratroot 


-2 1 Apr 


T tPnl Tnhn F Wphpr 

22 Apr- 

" 5 Aug 


T +C*r~A T7^It»7,'t-, -P 1 -P- ™^ K,-. 1 ,-1 


-15 Aug 


1 +f o, 1 I rt £i(~\r\ f^\Y*f^ Ih Wf±&TY\ o "ft 

16 Aug- 

-to C^lnf 


T tPnl TiV/=»rl <=>T'i/^L' Ti /•"•>! f-r\r-i 

... 19 



-10 Jul 

T 947 

11 Jul- 

- i Sep 

T r\ A *7 

I 947 

T ~tl .r~\t ( Z-r\Yr\ s~\y*i F 1— T^n/*iT % i/^l^o 

2 Sep- 

1 y i\ uv 

r 947 

T tPnl Clmrcrf* P R 

... 30 



-T T Tnl 

J 953 

T O 



-23 Jan 

J 954 

LtCol George P Wolf Jr 


-TO Till 

Maj George W. McHenry 

1 1- 

-12 Tul 

u Jt 

LtCol James T. Kisgen 

... 13 


J 954- 

■ 7 Jan 


LtCol Frank H. Vogel, Jr 


- 7 Jun 


Maj Paul M. Moriarty 

8 Jun- 

-26 Jul 


Maj Arthur W. Zimmerman . . . . 



J 955- 

-21 Mar 



LtCol Alex H. Sawyer 

22 Mar- 

-16 Jul 

J 956 

LtCol Quintm A. Bradley 

17 Jul 


- 1 Jun 


Maj Leo V. R. Gross 


-13 Jun 


LtCol Foster C. Lahue 

t a Tun 

Tfic , 7- 

1 yj/ 

-15 Aug 



Maj Lowry B. Stephenson 

1 (Jet 

- 1 Jan 


Gapt Norman G. Bates 

1 1 Jan- 

1- Tul 


^promoted to major on 3 iviar 


1 Jan- 

-26 Mar 


f^^Y-it T (±~Q P Miint 

1 Apr- 

- 2 Aug 


3 Au §~ 

-10 Oct 


Maj James L. Underhill 

I i (Jet 


- 7 Sep 


iviaj r\aoipn jj. iviiiier 



13 Dec 

J 929 

1 4 Dec 

i9 2 9~ 

-2 1 Feb 

I nrnmntpn f"f~> lifMitf^'nc} nt col /~>t~i 
l Ul UllJUlCU. IU 11C LI L CvJlvJllCl 

on 1 Nov 1930) 

22 Feb- 

-24 Sep 

J 93 r 

(promoted to major on 4 Au §^ 

r 930 

25 Sep 

-30 Sep 


(promoted to lieutenant colonel 

on 30 Jun 1932) 

i (Jet 

l 933~ 

5 Mar 

x 934 


-i uec 

J 934 

JLtvjOl jonn r\ Auams 

1 Jan- 

- 6 May 


Maj Ira J. Irwin 

i reb- 

16 Apr 


1 7 Apr- 

10 Oct 

J 944 

1 1- 

-10 (JCt 


Maj Anthony Walker 

1 7 (Jct- 

_ TA _ _ 

- 3 Dec 


4 Dec 


x 945 

_ T "I 

-30 Dec 

r 945 

.LtL<ol rSruno A. riocnmutn 

3 1 Dec 

r 945~ 

■15 Feb 


ijtL^oi waiter ri. otepnens 


" 5 Au g 


6 Aug 


30 /\pr 

r 947 

Col Jaime Sabater 

1 May- 

1 Oct 


LtCol Kirby B. Vick 

28 Nov 


■ 6 Jan 


LtCol James A. Moriarty, Jr 

7 Jan- 

■17 May 




T H Tt 1 1 

... 17 Jul 

I 953~ 



x 954 

2 5 




x 954 

\ fx oi \ A / rvp r"^ 1 — 1 ^iTTrncnn 

t Ort- 


1\ U V 


LtCol Richard L. Boll 

6 Nov 




r 955 

LtCol James G. Juett 

. . . 13 Apr 





LtCol Ernest P. Freeman, Jr . . 

21 Jun 

r 956- 




LtCol Milton A. Hull 

... 5 May 






Maj Francis H. Williams 9 Apr- 6 May 1942 

LtCol Roy D. Miller 5 Jan- 3 Apr 1953 

Maj Frederick Simpson 4Apr-25jun 1953 

LtCol William R. Bonner 26 Jun-23 Jul 1953 

Maj John D. Fair 24-29 Jul 1953 


Maj Julian P. Willcox 1 Apr- 7 Oct 1927 


Maj Max Schaeffer 19 Feb- 6 May 1942 


Regimental Strength 1 





31 Mar 


^1 1 

Month of first organization. 

31 May 




Prior to disbandment, 24 Jun 191 1. 

30 Apr 



1, 006 

Month of reactivation. 

30 Jun 



1 19 

30 Jun 




30 Jun 




30 Jun 




30 Jun 




30 Jun 




30 Jun 




30 Jun 




30 Jun 




30 Jun 




30 Jun 




30 Sep 




Month of reactivation. 

30 Jun 




30 Jun 




9 Nov 




Mail Guard service. 3 

28 Feb 




Beginning of China duty. 

30 Jun 




30 Jun 



1, 012 

30 Jun 




30 Jun 



i> 15° 

30 Jun 



i> *59 

29 Feb 




Crisis of China duty. 

30 Jun 




1 Unless otherwise noted, all statistics are from 4th Mar MRolls and Unit 

2 Includes warrant officers. 

3 CG Western Mail Guard, msg to MarCorps, dtd 9N0V26 (1645-80, Central 
Files, HQMC). 




Officers 2 

30 Jun 



!> 778 

30 Jun 

J 934 



30 Jun 




30 Jun 




30 Jun 




30 Sep 



J > 239 

Crisis of China duty. 

30 Jun 



1, o76 

30 Jun 




30 Jun 



1, 010 

30 Jun 

1 941 



30 Nov 

1 941 


6 75 

End of China duty. 

1 May 



4 3> 671 

Last strength figure from Corregidor. 

21 Jul 



4> 581 

W-Day, Guam. 

1 Apr 


r 47 

3, 128 

L-Day, Okinawa. 

30 Aug 



5 3, 264 

L-Day, Japan. 

31 Mar 



3, i4 6 

Month of reorganization in China. 

31 Oct 




Postwar demobilization. 

30 Jun 



r 43 

30 Nov 



!j 034 

Reorganization of 4th Marines as 

battalion landing team. 

30 Jun 



9 r 5 

30 Jun 

J 949 



30 Sep 


5 1 


Eve of redesignation as 1st Battalion, 

6th Marines, 17 Oct 1949. 

30 Sep 




Month of reactivation. 

30 Jun 



4, 691 

30 Jun 



3, o6 9 

30 Jun 



3, 380 

30 Jun 



3, 202 

30 Jun 



3, 081 

4 These figures are the total personnel of all services in the regiment on 1 
May 1942. Marine strength was the largest: 72 — 1,368. Others were Army, 
83 — 532; Navy, 37 — 804; and Philippine personnel, 28 — 967. 4th Mar Rec of 
Events, iMay42 (Philippines Area-Op File, HistBr, HQMC). 

5 6th MarDiv OpO, No. 106-45, dtd I 3^ u g45 (Japan Area- Op File, HistBr, 

519667—60 30 


4th Regimental Casualties 1 




























Santiago Opn, 

26 Jun-6 Jul 







San Francisco 

de Ntacoris, 

29 Nov 1 9 1 6 



Sanchez, 30 

Nov 191 6. . . . 




15 ° ct x 937 












2, 052 


1 1 

I 5 I 










iApr-22 Jun 







2, 334 





2, 9 6 5 

1 Unless otherwise noted, these figures are from Pers AccountingSec, HQMC, 
Final WW II Tabulation, dtd 26Aug52. 

2 The key to the abbreviations used at the head of the columns in this table is 
as follows: O, Officers; Enl, Enlisted Men; KIA, Killed in Action; WIA. Wound- 
ed in Action; MIAPD, Missing in Action, Presumed Dead; POW Prisoner of 
War; CF, Combat Fatigue. 

3 Figures are from 1975-70/2, Central Files, HQMC. 

4 Figures are from 4th Mar R-2 Rept, dtd 150^37 (Mar Corps Units in China, 
1927-1938 File, HistBr, HQMC). 




This volume is based primarily on official records. Inasmuch as footnote 
references to primary sources have been bibliographical in nature, giving 
precise file designations and locations for each document cited, it is not 
considered necessary to repeat this detailed information here. This note 
on primary sources will be confined, therefore, to a listing of general 
groups of records consulted. Except for those items noted as being in the 
National Archives, all unpublished documents may be obtained from the 
office under which they are listed. 

U.S. Marine Corps. Commandant. Reports. . . . In Annual Reports of 
the Navy Department for the Fiscal Years ign-iQ32. Washington: Navy 
Department, 19 12-1933. 

Reports to the Secretary of the Navy, 1946-1948. Washington, 

1 946-1 948. 

Headquarters. Marine Corps Manual. Washington, 1926. 

General Correspondence Files, 1904-1911 (National Archives). 

Central Files, 19 12-1957. In addition to correspondence, includes 

operational reports of the 4th Marine Regiment and 2d Marine Brigade 
in Santo Domingo, and annual reports of the 4th Marine Regiment 
in China. 

■ Personnel Department, Unit Diary Section. Contains 4th Marine 

Regiment Muster Rolls, March-June 191 1, April 1914-February 1942, 
February 1944-October 1949; and 4th Marine Regiment Unit Diaries, 
September 1952-December 1957. 

■ Personnel Accounting Section. Contains Final Casualty Tabulation, 

World War II, dated 26 August 1952. 

• Historical Archives. The following file groups; 

Area-Operations File. Contains operational records of the Philippines, 
Emirau, Guam, and Okinawa operations; and the occupations of Japan 
and North China. 

Marine Corps Units in China, 192 7-1 938 File. 

Monograph and Comment File. Contains interviews and comments 
on circulated drafts by veterans of the 4th Marine Regiment. 



Plans and Policies Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Exercise 
File. Contains reports of the Joint Army-Navy Exercise, 1925. 

Santo Domingo File. Contains miscellaneous records of the 2d Marine 
Brigade and 4th Marine Regiment. 

Subject File. Contains miscellaneous records of Marines in China and 
of Marine Barracks, San Diego. 

Unit Historical Report File. Contains war diaries, command diaries, 
and historical diaries of Marine units. 

War Plans Section, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Miscellaneous 
File. Contains radio messages from Marine and Navy commanders in 

U.S. Navy. The Landing Force and Small Arms Instructions, United States 

Navy. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 19 12. 
Chief of Naval Operations. Files of the Military Government in 

Santo Domingo; reports of the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet 

(Records Group 38, National Archives) . 
Naval History Division. World War II Action Reports File. Con- 
tains operational reports of naval units in the Philippines. 
U.S. Congress. "An Act for the establishing and organizing a Marine 

Corps." In United States Statutes at Large, i78g-iygg, v. I. Boston: 

Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1845. 
Senate. Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and 

Santo Domingo, 2 vols. 67th Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions. Washington, 


U.S. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 

United States, igi§-ig4i. Washington, 1924-1943. 
U.S. President. Budget Message. ... In The Budget of the United States 

Government for the Year Ending June 30, /056. Washington, 1956. 

Books and Periodicals 

Hallett Abend. My Life in China. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Com- 
pany, 1943. 

Annual Fourth Marines, /055. Shanghai: Mercury Press, n.d. 

Roy E. Appleman, et al. Okinawa: The Last Battle — The War in the 

Pacific — United States Army in World War II. Washington: Historical 

Division, Department of the Army, 1948. 
Thomas A. Bailey. A Diplomatic History of the American People. New 

York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1947. 
Hanson W. Baldwin, "The Fourth Marines at Corregidor," Parts I-IV. 

Marine Corps Gazette, v. 30, nos. 11-12 (November-December 1946) 

and v. 31, nos. 1-2 (January-February 1947). 
LtCol Charles L. Banks, USMC. "To the Shores of Tripoli." Marine 

Corps Gazette, v. 34, no. 8 (August 1950). 
Samuel F. Bemis. A Diplomatic History of the United States. New York: 

Henry Holt and Co., 1942. 


Carl Berger. The Korea Knot. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1957. 

Maj Orville V. Bergren, USMC. "School Solutions on Motobu." Marine 

Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 12 (December 1945). 
George Bruce. Shanghai's Undeclared War. Shanghai: Mercury Press, 


Robert J. C. Butow. Japan's Decision to Surrender. Stanford: Stanford 

University Press, 1954. 
Wilfred H. Calcott. The Caribbean Policy of the United States, i8go-ig20. 

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942. 
Capt Evans F. Carlson, USMC. "The Fessenden Fifes." Leatherneck, 

v. 1 1, no. 2 (February 1928). 
SgtMaj Thomas F. Carney, USMC. "Famous U.S. Marine Corps Regiment 

Makes San Diego Home." The Marines' Magazine, v. I, no. 5 (May 


Bevan G. Cass, ed. History of the Sixth Marine Division. Washington: 

Infantry Journal Press, 1948. 
Chinese Ministry of Information. China Handbook, 1 937-1 943. New York: 

The Macmillan Company, 1943. 
Maj Robert A. Churley, USMC. "The North China Operation," pt. 2. 

Marine Corps Gazette, v. 31, no. 1 1 (November 1946). 
Philip A. Crowl. Campaign in the Marianas — The War in the Pacific — 

United States Army in World War II. Washington: Office of the Chief 

of Military History, Department of the Army, i960. 
Sgts Duane Decker and Joseph Purcell, USMC. "Train to Tokyo." 

Leatherneck (Pacific edition), v. 3, no. 11 (1 December 1945). 
■ "Crazy Beachhead." Leatherneck, v. XXVIII, no. 12 (December 


Maj J. A. Donovan, USMC. "The Occupation Marine." Marine Corps 

Gazette, v. 30, no. 4 (April 1946). 
"Drive on Naha." Leatherneck, v. XXVIII, no. 8 (August 1945). 
Foster Rhea Dulles. China and America, the Story of their Relations Since 

1784. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946. 
Editorial. Marine Corps Gazette, v. XII, no. 1 (March 1927). 
Herbert Feis. The China Tangle. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 


Fourth Marines Annual, 1 931-1932. Shanghai: Mercury Press, n.d. 

A. Whitney Griswold. The Far Eastern Policy of the United States. New 

York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938. 
FAdm William F. Halsey, USN, and LCdr J. Bryan, III, USN. Admiral 

Halsey's Story. New York: Whittlesey House, 1947. 
Maj Samuel M. Harrington, USMC. "The Strategy and Tactics of Small 

Wars." Marine Corps Gazette, v. VI, no. 4 (December 192 1 ) . 
Sgt Harold Heifer, USMC. "The Okinawan." Leatherneck, v. XXVIII, 

no. 7 (July 1945). 

LtCol Frank O. Hough, USMC, Maj Verle E. Ludwig, USMC, and Henry 
I. Shaw, Jr. Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal — History of U.S. Marine 


Corps Operations in World War II, v. I. Washington : Historical Branch, 
G-3 Division, Headuarters, USMC, 1958. 

Harold N. Isaacs. The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1954. 

Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl. The U.S. Marines and Amphibious 
War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. 

Melvin M. Johnson, Jr., and Charles T. Haven. Automatic Weapons of the 
World. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1945. 

Masuo Kato. The Lost War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1946. 

Carl Kelsey. The American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political Science, 1922. 

Capt Edwin Klein, USMC. "Back to Japan." Marine Corps Gazette, 
v. 30, no. 3 (March 1946). 

Col John A. Lejeune, USMC. "The Mobile Defense of an Advance Base." 
Marine Corps Gazette, v. I, no. 1 (March 19 16). 

F. F. Liu. A Military History of Modern China. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1956. 

Maj O. R. Lodge, USMC. The Recapture of Guam. Washington: Histori- 
cal Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, USMC, 1954. 

"Marine Corps Mail Guards Carry Improved Machine Gun." Leatherneck, 
v. 9, no. 15 (December 1926). 

"Marines Stage Final Practice for Oahu Maneuver." Leatherneck, v. 8, 
no. 17 (25 April 1925). 

"Marines to Guard the Mails." Leatherneck, v. 9, no. 15 (December 1926). 

Clyde H. Metcalf. A History of the United States Marine Corps. New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939. 

LtCol Charles J. Miller, USMC. "Diplomatic Spurs, Our Experiences in 
Santo Domingo." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 19, nos. 1, 2, and 3 (Febru- 
ary, May, and August 1935). 

Samuel Eliot Morison. History of United States Naval Operations in World 
War II — v. Ill, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942; v. VI, 
Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier; and v. VIII, New Guinea and the Mari- 
anas. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1954, 1950, and 1953. 

Louis Morton. The Fall of the Philippines — The War in the Pacific — United 
States Army in World War II. Washington: Office of the Chief of 
Military History, Department of the Army, 1953. 

Dana G. Munro. The Latin American Republics. New York: Appleton- 
Century-Crofts, 1950. 

The United States and the Caribbean Area. Boston: World Peace 

Foundation, 1934. 

"New Developments." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 31, no. 8 (August 1947). 
Maj Charles S. Nichols, Jr., USMC, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr. Okinawa: 

Victory in the Pacific. Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, 

Headquarters, USMC, 1955. 
"No 'Constructive' War." Leatherneck, v. 8, no. 21 (23 May 1925). 
Charles Noble. "Sitting on the Lid." Harper's Weekly, v. IV, no. 2844 

(24 June 191 1 ). 


LCdr T. C. Parker, USN. "The Epic of Corregidor-Bataan, December 24, 

1941-May 4, 1942." United States Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 69, 

no. 1 (January 1943). 
Sgt Harry Polete, USMG. "Posts of the Corps — Yokosuka." Leatherneck, 

v. XXX, no. 8 (August 1947). 
"Professional Notes — Mail Guard." Marine Corps Gazette, v. XII, no. 1 

(March 1927). 

MSgt Robert E. Reinecke, USMC. "Operation Comeback." Leatherneck, 

v. 37, no. 4 (April 1954). 
Maj John N. Rentz, USMC. Bougainville and the Northern Solomons. 

Washington: Historical Section, Division of Information, Headquarters, 

USMC, 1948. 

Otto Schoenrich. Santo Domingo, a Country with a Future. New York: 

The Macmillan Company, 19 18. 
"Shanghai." Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1944, v. 20, pp. 455-458. 
MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC. "The Battle for the Motobu 

Peninsula." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 8 (August 1945). 
istLt Alan Shilin, USMC. "Occupation at Tsingtao." Marine Corps 

Gazette, v. 30, no. 1 (January 1946). 
"6th MarDiv in Southern Okinawa." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, 

no. 9 (September 1945). 
■ "To Yontan and Beyond." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 7 

(July 1945). 

LtCol Baird Smith, British Army. "The Shanghai War." The Army 

Quarterly, v. XXIV, no. 2 (July 1932). 
Cdr H. E. Smith, USN. "I Saw the Morning Break." United States 

Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 72, no. 3 (March 1946). 
Henry L. Stimson. The Far Eastern Crisis. New York: Harper and 

Brothers, 1936. 

"Tales from Okinawa." Leatherneck, v. XXVIII, no. 9 (September 1945). 
" 'Tel It To the Marines' Opens." Leatherneck, v. 10, no. 1 (January 

"The Broadcast." Leatherneck, v. 8, no. 29 (18 July 1925). 

• Leatherneck, v. 8, no. 34 (22 August 1925). 

"The Face of Japan." Leatherneck, v. XXIX, no. 7 (July 1947). 

"The Mail Guard." Marine Corps Gazette, v. XI, no. 4 (December 1926). 

"The New FMF." Marine Corps Gazette, v. 31, no. 5 (May 1947). 

"This Glorious War." Leatherneck, v. 8, no. 21 (23 May 1925) . 

Kazumaro Uno. Corregidor: Isle of Delusion. Shanghai: Press Bureau, 
Imperial Japanese Army, China, 1942. 

U.S. Department of State. United States Relations with China. Washing- 
ton, 1949. 

U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters. Division of Operations & Training. 
"Protection of American Interests." Marine Corps Gazette, v. XII, no. 3 
(September 1927). 

Harold M. Vinacke. A History of the Far East in Modern Times. New 
York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1947. 


Gen Jonathan C. Wainwright, USA. General Wainwright's Story. Robert 
Considine, ed. Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1946. 

Maj Anthony Walker, USMC. "Advance on Orote Peninsula." Marine 
Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 2 (February 1945). 

Sumner Welles. Naboth's Vineyard, 2 vols. New York: Parson and Clark, 
Ltd., 1928. 

"What the Marines Are Doing, A Monthly Summary of Activities." The 

Marines' Magazine, v. I, no. 2 (January 19 16) . 
"Where Are the Mail Bandits Now?" Editorial, Leatherneck, v. 10, no. 1 

(January 1927) . 

BriGen Dion Williams, USMC. "Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force." 

Marine Corps Gazette, v. X, no. 2 (September 1925). 
The Naval Advance Base. Washington: Government Printing Office, 


LtCol Thomas E. Williams, USMC. "Jap Tactics on Okinawa." Marine 

Corps Gazette, v. 29, no. 10 (October 1945). 
Maj Gen Charles A. Willoughby, USA, and John Chamberlain. Mac Arthur, 

1941-1951. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954. 
Roswell Winans. "Campaigning in Santo Domingo." Recruiters' Bulletin, 

v. 3, no. 5 ( March 19 1 7 ) . 
H. G. W. Woodhead, ed. The China Year Book, 1928. Tientsin: Tientsin 

Press, n.d. 

The China Year Book, 1932. Shanghai: The North China Daily 

News and Herald, n.d. 
Stephen G. Xydis. "The Genesis of the Sixth Fleet." United States Naval 

Institute Proceedings, v. 84, no. 8 (August 1958). 


Army and Navy Journal, v. XLVIII, nos. 28 (11 March 191 1) and 29 
(18 March 191 1 ) ; v. XLVIII, no. 41 (10 June 191 1 ) ; v. LII, no. 44 (3 
July 1915). 

Chicago Evening Post, 25 June 1925. 

Los Angeles Times, 26 August 1924. 

Newsweek, v. XXXI, no. 4 (26 January 1948). 

The New York Times, 15, 18 February 1938; 13, 14 August 1938; 14 
September 1939; 9, 11, 12 July 1940; 27, 28 August 1945; 16 December 
1945; 3, 4, 6, 23 January 1948. 

The North China Daily Herald, 26 March 1927. 

The San Diego Union, 27 March 191 1; 7, 14 July 19 14; 8 November 19 14, 
3, 4 January 19 16. 

San Francisco Chronicle, 8, 11 March 191 1; 17, 18, 21, 22 April 19 14; 

23 April-3 July 19 14; 26 November 19 15; 30 June 1925; 1, 2 July 1925; 

15, 17, 22, 23, 24, 29 October 1926. 
Walla Walla (4th Regt newspaper) , Shanghai, 1928-1941. 
The Washington Daily News, 3, 9, 18 April 1945. 


Washington Evening Star, 17 June 1945, 30 August 1945, 10 December 

The Windward Marine (Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii), 
10 February 1956, 13 April 1956. 

Unpublished Material 

Elmore A. Champie. "Brief History of the Marine Corps Base and Recruit 
Depot, San Diego, California — Marine Corps Historical Reference Series, 
No. 9." MS, dtd 1959 (Historical Branch, Headquarters, USMC). 

2dLt Ernest B. Furgurson, Jr., USMC. "The 4th Marines: A History." 
MS, dtd 15 March 1955 (Historical Branch, Headquarters, USMC). 

"Motor Transportation in the United States Marine Corps." MS. No 
author, n.d. (Subject File, Historical Branch, Headquarters, USMC). 

Joel D. Thacker. "History of the 4th Marines (Preliminary)." MS, dtd 
February 1954 (Subject File, Historical Branch, Headquarters, USMC). 

"The Marine Raiders in World War II." MS. n.d. (Subject File, 

Historical Branch, Headquarters, USMC). 


"ABC Powers", 19 
Acapulco, 14, 16-18 
Adair, 284 

Adams, LtCol John P., 198 
Adelup Point, 254 
Aebano, 371, 374 
Agat, 256, 263 
Agat Bay, 266 268 
Agat Point, 254 
Agat-Sumay Road, 268 
Agfayan Point, 273 

B-29, 252, 277, 281, 284 

PBY, 199 

Zero, 199 
Albany, 358 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, 112, 114 
Alford, Gapt Leonard W., 314 
Alta Mira, 61 

American Company and Troop, 
Shanghai Volunteer Corps, 148 
Amphibian vehicles 

LVT, 260, 260*2, 289, 298, 313, 
317, 320-323, 365, 382 

LVT (A), 26on, 288, 320 
Anderson, LtCol Herman R., 207 
Annapolis, 25 
Appalachian, 259 
Apra Harbor, 254, 266, 271 
Ara Saki, 328 
Area "B", 172 
Argentina, 19 

Arias, Desiderio, 34-36, 43, 51, 63, 

Arizona, 112, 242 
Armstrong, Maj Robert H., 291 
Arnold, PhM Floyd, 175 
Arnold, Gen Henry H., 251 

Asa Kawa, 311 
Asan Beaches, 271 
Asan Point, 254 
Asato Gawa, 313-317 
Asheville, 131 
Asia, 190, 370 
Atlantic Ocean, 31 
Atsugi Airfield, 339 
Augusta, 172-174 

Ausmus, LtCol Delbert, USA, 206, 

Australia, 244, 251 
Avenue Edward VII, 172 
Avenue Foch, 139 
Awa, 303 
Ayuntiamento , 70 

Badger, RAdm Oscar C, 334, 335, 

Bagac, 201, 210 

Bailey bridge, 315 

Bain, Gapt James M., 88, 89 

Bakersfield, California, 114 

Balboa Park, 23, 27 

Banger, istLt Lawrence S., 262 

Bangi Point, 254, 260, 262 

Barber's Point, 107 

Barbero, 72 

Barker, Capt Frederick A., 54 
Barnett, Major General Comman- 
dant George C, 363 
Bataan, 195, 196, 198, 201, 202 204, 
206-210, 216, 220-222, 225- 
228, 230-233 
fall of, 227, 228 
hardships of, 227, 228 
start of Japanese drive upon, 221 
Battery Point, 231 



Beans, LtCol Fred D., 305, 331, 

333, 333^ 340, 349 
Bearss, Maj Hiram A. ("Hiking 

Hiram"), 58, 59, 61, 62 
LtCol, 84, 85, 87 
Beaumont, BriGen John C, 175 
Beecher, LtCol Curtis T., 199, 207, 


Belgian government, 30 
Bell, LtCol George B., 305, 337 
Bellingham, Washington, 114 
Bellows Air Force Base, 380 
Benton, Surgeon Frederick L., USN, 

Berkeley, California, 114 
Biaan Point, 214 

Biddle, Major General Commandant 

William P., 2, 1 1 
Bishi Gawa, 285 
Bismarcks Barrier, 244, 245, 251 
Blackburn, Capt John H., 133 
Blanchard, Col John D., 351, 355 
Blandy, RAdm William H. P., 285 
Bliss, BriGen Tasker H., USA, 6n 
BLT, 384, 385 
Boise, Idaho, 114 
Boone, Capt Ronald A., 171, 180 
Bordas, Jose, 33, 34 
Bougainville, 242, 245, 247 
Boulevard de Montigny, 72 
Bowen, Col Robert O., 362, 364, 366, 

368,369, 371 
Boxer Rebellion, 125, 126, 136 
Boxers, 1 2 5 
Brazil, 19 
Breckinridge, 356 

Bridget, Cdr Francis J., 208, 209, 

212, 214, 218 
Bristol, Adm Mark L., 143, 144 

Army commander, Shangai, 129 
government, 188 
Landing Force, 334, 339, 341 
Navy, 335 

Shangai Area Force, 168 
Bubbling Well Road, 180, 187, 193 

Buckner, LtGen Simon B., Jr., USA, 
280, 282, 296, 303, 310, 316, 
3*7, 325, 328 

Buffalo, 3, 4, 27 

Bulkeley, Lt John D., 210 

Buna, 245 

Bund, 131, 172, 178, 193 
Bush, Cpl Richard E., 306 
Butler, BriGen Smedley D., 112, 116, 

136-139, 142, 144, 146, 147 
Butte, Montana, 114 

Cabras Island, 254 

Caceres, Ramon, 33 

Caibobo Point, 210 

California, 23, 112, 379 

California, 4 

California City, 13 

Camino Real, 47, 51-53 

"Camp Carefree", 203, 208 

Camp Del Mar, 365 

Camp Howard, 20, 22, 23 

Camp Lejeune, 280, 356, 357, 359, 

360, 387 
Camp Nara, 368, 369, 371, 375 
Camp Pendleton, 361-363, 365, 367 
Camp Point, 224 
Camp Thomas, 5, 7 
Campaign Order No. 1, 90 
Campbell, Capt Chandler C, 47, 64 
Canopus, 208, 218 
Canton, 125 
Cape Esperance, 256 
Cape Gloucester, 245 
Cape Torokina, 245 
Caperton, RAdm William B., 35, 36, 

39, 43, 5i, 63, 65 
Caribbean Sea, 31, 387 
Carlson, istLt William H., 305, 30571 
Carney, Maj Edgar F., 335, 340 
Carney, RAdm Robert B., 338, 341 
Carolines, 251 

Carranza, Venustiano, 12, 24, 26, 27 
Carter Road, 131 
Castillo, 63 

INDEX 433 

Castle, Capt Noel O., 234, 236 
Casto, Passed Assistant Surgeon Dow 

H., USN, 45 

Dominican Republic 

4th Marines, 50, 52, 58, 71, 87 
Dominicans, 50, 71, 85, 91 

4th Marines 262, 268, 271, 276 
Japanese, 263, 266, 270, 273 

4th Marines, 289, 293, 294, 296, 

302, 303, 305, 309, 313, 

326, 327, 330 
6th Marine Division, 309 
Japanese, 294, 295, 304, 307, 

309 313, 327, 330 

4th Marines, 200, 204, 22 1, 228, 

233, 239, 240 
All U.S., 219 
Japanese, 218, 236 
POWs 4th Marines, 342 
Cavalry Point Beach, 224, 230, 234, 

Cavite, 173, 198, 203, 208, 220 
Cavite Naval Ammunition Depot, 

Central Bank of China, 1 9 1 
Central China, 126, 185 
Central Pacific, 251, 242, 277 

Allied offensive drive across, 251 
Chacha, 85 
Chahar, 166 

Chambers, Capt Robert, 226, 237 
Chang Tsung-ch'ang, 126, 134, 135 
Chapei, 123, 130, 134, 135, 152, 

156, 159, 162, 163, 167-169, 

174, 176 

Chaumont 119-121, 129, 133, 134, 

142, 161, 165, 175 
Cheney Ravine, 224 
Chiang Kai-shek, 125, 126, 135, 

139-144, 150, 169, 178, 191, 


Chibana, 3 1 1 

Chicago Evening Post, 1 10 
Shigasaki, 371 
Chile, 19 
Chimu Wan, 295 

China, 102-104, 116, 1 19-127, 135, 
136, 143-146, 148-153, 164, 
166, 167, 178, 190, 252, 347, 
350, 355, 356, 364, 387 
British in, 188 

economic boycott of Japan (1932), 

foreign interests, 121, 123, 124 
4th Marines 

arrive ( 1927) , 120 

danger from Japan, 148 

defenses, 139 

depart for (1927), 119 

land (1927), 134 

mission, 121, 127-129, 137, 138, 

144, 146 
sports program 147 
Marine policy re Communists, 353 
mission of the Marines ( 1 945- 

1947), 350, 356 
resents foreigners, 125, 126 
IIIAC begins occupation, 350 
U.S. interests, 123 
U.S. policy, 119, 127-129, 169, 
350, 355, 356 
China Marines, 388 
China Theater, 355 

Central Army (Nationalist), 167, 

Central Government (National- 
ist), 350, 373 
Civil war, 350 

88th Division (Nationalist), 168 
1st Division (Nationalist), 140 
government, 125, 169 
Nineteenth Route Army (Com- 
munist), 152, 156, 162 
Peace Preservation Corps, 167 
Puppet government, 178 
Revolution, 119, 125 


Chiwa, 325 

Chungking, 191 

Cibao, 37, 39, 59, 66 

Clark, Capt Golland L., Jr., 237, 240 

Clark Field, 220 

Clement, LtCol William T., 201, 
202; BriGen, 325, 33m, 333- 

335, 341-343,355 
Clements, PISgt Robert A., 2 15 
Cold War, 373 
Coldstream Guards, 146 
Collier, LtCol Eugene F., 187 
Collins, Cpl Raymond H., 215 
Colorado, 1 1 2 
Colorado, 25, 303 
Columbia Country Club, 145 
Communist General Labor Union, 


Communist Workers' Militia, 134, 

Communist World, 387 
Communists, 125, 126, 130, 135, 140, 
142, 144, 350-352, 359, 361, 
362,366, 369,370,373,388 
Chinese, 361 
North Korean, 376 
Russian, 125 
Congress, U.S., 14, 36 
Conolly, RAdm Richard L., 252, 253, 

258, 259 
Consuelo, 86, 87 

Cooke, Adm Charles M., Jr., 353 
Coolidge, President Calvin, no, 112, 

Cordillera Central, 37, 78 
Cordillera Septentrional, 37 
Coronado, California, 5 
Corregidor, 195, 201, 202, 204-207, 
216, 219-222, 224-228, 231- 
233, 236, 241, 332, 343, 364 
Bottomside, 206, 207 
Central Sector, 207, 221, 222 
defense of, 206 

deployment against Japanese land- 
ing (May 1942), 234 
East Sector, 207, 222, 224, 225, 
231, 234 

Corregidor — Continued 
final stand, 239 

Japanese landing imminent (May 
1942), 233, 236, 237 

Japanese landing plans (April 
1942), 231 

Japanese pre-landing bombard- 
ment (April-May 1942), 232, 

Japanese siege of, begins, 220 
Middleside, 204, 206, 207, 221, 

222, 231 
mythical Gibraltar, 205 
strengthening beach defenses, 221, 

222, 224-226 
surrender of (May 1942), 240 
Topside, 206, 221, 222, 231 
West Sector, 207, 221, 222, 224 

Corregidor Bay, 231 

Crall, Sgt John H., 57 

Crawford, Maj Wallace L., 342 

Cuba, 4, 9, 10, 31, 35 

Culebra, 10 

Curtis, LtCol Donald, 203 

Dale, Capt Nelson C, Jr., 294 
Dalness, Capt Harold E., USA, 238 
Dampier Strait 245 
Daniels, Secretary of Navy Josephus, 

Darrah, Cpl Clyde R., 88 
Davis, Col Henry, 146 
Davis, istLt Ralph E., 52, 54 
Dededo, 272, 274 

Del Valle, Maj Gen Pedro A., 64^ 


Denver, Colorado, 1 12-1 14 
Department of Defense, 386 
Deragawa, 3 1 1 
Diamond Head, 107 
Diaz, Porfirio, 1,2, n 
Diego, 89 

Dodd, istLt. Thad N. 262, 294 
Dolphin, 12 

Dominican Congress, 33-35, 67 
Dominican government, 30, 33, 34 

INDEX 435 

Dominican Republic, 29-31, 36, 37, 
76, 80, 83, 92, 96, 98 
banditry in, 83, 84 
crisis of 19 16, 35 
Eastern District, 78, 8ora, 92 
guerrillas, 82 
history of, 29, 30 

Marine anti-bandit operations, 

Marines withdrawn from, 96-98 
Northern District, 78-82, 84, 95, 

opposition to U.S., 93, 95 
president elected (1924), 97 
provisional government takes of- 
fice (1922), 97 
Senate Investigating Committee 

(1921), 79 
Southern District, 78, 84 
strategic importance, 31 
U.S. military government, 69, 
76-78, 93-95, 98 
Dominican Treaty of 1907,33 
Dos Rios, 91 

Doyen, Col Charles A., 2-7, 103 
Duncan, MajGen John, British 

Army, 129, 130, 133, 135, 138 
Dunlap Maj Robert H., 41, 49, 56; 

Col, 106 
Durham Light Infantry, 134 
Dyer, BriGen Edward C, 377, 379, 

382, 383 

Earthquake, 4th Marines emergency 
duty, Santa Barbara (1925), no 

East China Sea, 287 

Eastment, Capt Clinton B., 302, 305 

Edgewater ( "Bilgewater" ) Hotel, 

Edwards, Clement S., 14 
Eisenhower, President Dwight D., 

El Paso, Texas, 112, 114 
Elizabeth, New Jersey, 1 1 1 
Elomusad, 248 

Emirau, 244, 245, 247, 248, 250, 253, 

Beach Green, 248 
Beach Red, 248 

first combat mission of reactivated 
4th Marines (1944), 244 

Halsey's first order for seizure of 
(December 1943), 245 

Halsey's second order for seizure of 
(March 1944), 247 

key to the Bismarcks Barrier, 244 

Col Shapley commands assault 
troops, 248 

4th Marines land unopposed (20 
March 1944), 250 

4th Marines relieved, 250 

intelligence reports, 248 

landing plans, 248 

plans set aside because of pro- 
jected Kavieng assault, 245 

strength of landing force, 248 

substituted for Kavieng plan 
(March 1944), 247 
Engineer Point, 233 
Eniwetok, 4th Marines at, 259 
Esperanza, 58 
Europe, 184 

Evans, Maj Francis T., no 
Extraterritoriality, 121, 124 

Far East, 119, 127, 366-368, 370, 

375, 378 
U.S. policy, 151, 153 
Far East Command, 367 
Fegan, Col Joseph C, 183, 184, 186 
Feland, BriGen Logan, 106, 112 
Ferguson, QMClk Frank W., 237 
Fernandez, Senior, 16, 17 
Ferrell, MG Harold M., 236 
Ferrocarril Central Dominicano, 59 
Fessenden, Sterling, 148 
Fessenden Fifes, 148 
Field Order No. 2, 47 
Five-five-three Naval ratio, 150 
Fleming, Brigadier, 154, 160 
FORAGER, 252, 254, 256, 257, 265 


"Foreign devils", 125 

Formosa, 124, 149, 280, 281, 373 

Fort Drum, 207, 220, 222, 232 

Fort Frank, 220, 232 

Fort Hughes, 207, 220, 222, 236 

Fort Wint, 200 

Fortaleza San Francisco de Macoris, 

Fortaleza San Luis, 63, 69 
Fortson, Capt Eugene P., 59, 60 
France, 124, 150, 178, 179 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 358 
Frazee, Cpl George, 56 
Free World, 363, 371, 387, 388 
French Concession, 121, 123, 130, 

138, 139, 167, 172, 176, 178- 

180, 184, 191 
French government, 30 
Fresno, California, 114 
Fukabori, LtCol Yuki, 1 79-1 81 
Fuller, Major General Commandant 

Ben H., 163, 165 
Fulton, 199 

Futtsu Cape, 335, 339, 340 

Gaan Point, 260, 272 

Gaan Point — Port A jay an line, 272 

Gabral, Gen Maximo, 57 

Gage, 284 

Garden, Emilio, 95 

Garden Bridge, 193 

Gauss, Clarence, 129, 134, 168, 169, 

171, 174, 175 
Geary Point, 229 

Geiger, MajGen Roy S., 243, 247, 
252, 253, 259, 265, 272, 273, 
276, 282, 296, 328, 330 

General Black, 368 

General Brewster, 368 

General Howze, 368 

Genke, 308 

German Pacific island possessions, 

Germany, 30, 124, 186, 190, 351 
Gilberts, 241 

Gilmer, Capt William W., 16, 17 

Glassford, RAdm William A., 192 
Glowin, Cpl Joseph A., 56, 58 
Godbold, Col Bryghte D., 384-386 
Gona, 245 
Gonzales, Padre, 70 
Gordon, Col F. R. W., 172 
Gordon Road, 159 
Gordon's Riverside Cabaret, 200 
Government Ravine, 207, 229, 237 

Great Britain, 121, 124, 130, 150, 

178, 179 
Great Wall, 166 
Greece, 358, 359 

Green, Maj Bernard W., 257, 262, 

266, 289, 302 
Green Howards, 148 
Green River, Wyoming, 1 1 2 
Green society, 140 
Griffith, Col Samuel B., 356 
Grimes, 335, 341 
Grundels, Ens, USN, 209, 212 
Guadalcanal, 241, 243, 245, 247, 

250, 251, 256, 276, 279, 280, 

282, 283 

Guam, 9, 102, 131, 182, 250-254, 
256-259, 265, 271-274, 276, 
277, 279, 330, 331, 333, 341, 

343, 364 
assault of Orote Peninsula, 266, 

declared secured (10 August 

1944), 276 
description of, 254 
Expeditionary Troops Reserve, 258 
final drive, 274, 276 
4th Marines 

assigned to reconquest of, 251 

land, 260, 262 

leave for Guadalcanal, 276 

leave for Japan occupation 
duty, 331 

mission, 264 

ordered north, 273 

patrol in south, 273 

prepared for expected invasion 
of Japan, 331 

sail for, 257 

INDEX 437 

Guam — Continued 
Green Beach, 285 
Hill 40, 254, 262, 263 
Japanese defending force, 256 
Japanese withdraw to the north, 

Landing plans, 254 
Old Marine barracks, 269, 270 
Operation Plan No. 1, 254 
Orote Peninsula secured, 270 
Preliminary bombardment, 259 
Results of the reconquest, 277 
Rifle range attacked, 269 
Regimental CP, 263 
Road Junction 15, 268 
Road Junction 460, 274, 276 
Road Junction 462, 274 
Road Junction 470, 276 
Seizure of beachhead, 262-265 
Significance of 4th Marines vic- 
tory, 277 
W-Day (21 July 1944), 258, 260 
W-Day postponed by naval battle, 

White Beaches, 254 
Yellow Beaches, 256 
Guantanamo, 4, 10, 35 
Guardia Nacional Dominicana, 77. 

See also Policia Nacional. 
Guayacanas, Battle of, 53, 54, 56-58, 

Guaymas, 18, 25, 27 
Guayubin, 51 
Gulf of California, 27 
Gushichan, 3 1 7 

Hagushi, 284, 285 

beaches, 295, 321 
"Hail Sunny California", 4th 

Marines' marching song, 22 
Hainan Island, 190 
Haiphong Road, 159 
Haiti, 29, 31, 35, 37, 44, 383 
Halsey, Adm William F., 244, 245, 

247, 333, 334, 338 
Hancock, 29, 37, 39, 41 

519667—60 31 

Hangchow Bay, 176 
Hankow, 126, 141, 164 
Harada, MajGen, 180 
Harding, President Warren G., 1 1 1 
Harmon Road, 262, 263 
Harrington, istLt Samuel M., 72; 
Capt, 79 

Harris, istLt William F., 234, 237 
Hart, Adm Thomas C, 189-192, 196 

Harte, Maj Franklin J., 385 
Hato Mayor, 83, 85-87, 89 
Hauck, Capt Herman, USA, 239 
Hawaii, 9, 105, 106, 375, 376, 379, 
advantageous site for new air- 
ground task force, 379 
time difference from Philippines, 

Hawaiian National Guard, 107 
Hayakawa, Col Masoyoshi, 220 
Hayden, LtCol Reynolds H., 288, 

Helena, Montana, 114 
Helicopters, 365, 380, 382-385 
Henderson, 98, 101, 105, 106, no, 

136, 142, 192 
Henriquez y Carvajal, Dr. Federico, 

67, 93, 94 
Hedo Misaki, 308 
Heureaux, Ulises, 30, 33 
Hiatt, Pvt Milton O., 176 
Higuey, 83 

Hill, Col Charles S., 119, 121, 129, 

131, 134, 136-139, Hi 
Hilo, 384 

Hines, MajGen John L., USA, 109 
Hirohito, Emperor, 231, 330, 332, 

338, 348, 369 
Hiroshima, 277, 331 
Hispaniola, 31, 37 
Ho-Umetsu Agreement, 166 
Hochiya, 297 

Hochmuth, LtCol Bruno A., 289, 

322, 349 
Hodge, MajGen John R., 282 


Hogaboom, istLt William F., 208, 
209, 2i2, 214-217, 225, 226, 

Holcomb, LtGen Thomas (CMC), 

Holdredge, istLt Willard C, 208, 

209, 212, 214-216 
Homma, LtGen Masaharu, 209. 220, 

221, 226, 227, 232 

Hong Kong, 147 

Hongkew, 145, 153, 180 

Hongkew Creek, 131 

Hongkew Park, 162 

Honolulu, 105, 1 10, 377 

Honshu, 368, 370 

Hooker, Col Richard S., 160, 165 

Hooker Point, 232 

Hopei, 166 

Hotta, Lord, 149 

Houston, 161 

Howard, Col Samuel L., 192, 193, 
196, 198, 202, 203, 206, 207, 

222, 230, 237, 239, 240, 343; 
Ma j Gen, 364 

Howard, RAdm Thomas B., 20 
Hoyler, Maj Hamilton M., 257, 
268, 269 

Huerta, Victoriano, 12, 14, 18, 28 
Hughes, Capt John A. "Johnny the 

Hard", 74, 75 
Hull, Secretary of State Cordell, 190 
Hungjao Airfield, 167, 171 
Hunt, Maj Wilson E., 337 
Huntington, LtCol Robert W., 10 

ICEBERG, 280-285, 287 
Idaho, 112 
Idzumo, 171, 172 

"Imperial command", doctrine of, 

"In Flanders Fields" (poem), 243 
Inchon, 361, 373 
Inchon-Seoul campaign, 378 
Indochina, 190, 370, 375 
Infantry Point, 222, 230, 233, 234 

International Settlement, 119, 121, 
123, 124, 126-131, 133, 134, 
136-140, 144, 145, 148, 152- 
154, 156, 157, 162, 167, 169, 
172, 174, 176, 178, 179, 181, 
183-186, 188, 191, 193 
American Sector, 159, 160, 169, 
171, 172, 180-182, 184, 186, 

British Sector, 159, 160, 169, 184, 

Defense Committee, 153, 154, 160, 
188, 189 

Defense plans (1927), 128, 129, 

Eastern Area, 131, 133, 139, 146 
foreign forces, 136 
International Defense Agreement, 

International Defense Forces, 161 
International Defense Scheme, 

153, 156, 185 
Marine billets, 146 
Marine Sector, 162, 165, 171, 173, 

175, 176 
Municipal Police, 185 
Sector A, 153, 157 
Sector B, 153, 161, 181, 185, 188 
Sector C, 153, 157, 159, 160, 169, 

171, 174, 175, 179, 181-184, 


strength of foreign units, 130, 178 
Western Area, 131, 133, 139, 146, 
153, 185, 186, 188 

Iowa, 335 

Ipapao, 272 

Iron curtain, 361 

Ishikawa, 295, 297 

Ishikawa Isthmus, 285, 294-296, 

Italy, 30, 186 

Itoman, 317 

Itomi, 300, 304, 307 

Itomi-Manna Road, 300 

Iwo Jima, 281, 299, 371, 373, 374 

INDEX 439 

Jaibon, 53 
James Ravine, 224 
Japan, 124, 147-152, 167, 178, 189, 
190, 244, 251, 252, 277, 280, 

309, 331-333, 339, 346-349, 
351, 366-370, 373, 375, 379, 


attitude of Marines toward Jap- 
anese, 346 

Foreign Office, 156 

L-Day (30 August 1945), 339, 

Marines aid success of U.S. oc- 
cupation, 346 

4th Marines 

and the Japanese, 347, 348 
at Camp Nara (1953), 369 
carry out demilitarization, 345 
depart from, 349 
end of occupation, 349 
land at Kobe (24 August 1953), 

land at Yokosuka (30 August 

1945), 340, 34i 
missions (1953), 370 
movement to, 334 
oversee return of Japanese 

troops from overseas, 346 
participate in Nara community 

We (1953), 370 
reunion with the "old 4th", 343 
selected to make first landing. 


settle to occupation duty, 344 
signing of surrender, 342 
steps of conquest (1894-1941), 

surrender of, 331, 332 
2/4 lands at Futtsu Cape, 340 
U.S. landing plans (1945), 335, 

337, 338 
U.S. occupation policy, 345 
World War II peace treaty, 370 
Japanese Army, 163, 178, 179, 18 1, 
182, 184, 187, 292, 29971, 370 
Headquarters, Hongkew, 180 
Special Service Section, 183 

Japanese aggression in North China 
(1933-1935), 166, 167 

Japanese attitude toward occupation, 

Japanese Buddhist monks, attacks on, 

Japanese Cabinet, 338 
Japanese Consul, Shanghai, 152, 171 
Japanese consular service, 184 
Japanese forces in Central China, 

Japanese gendarmes, 187 
Japanese government, 150, 151, 179, 

Japanese Imperial Navy, 156, 163, 

178, 184, 344 
Japanese prime minister, 149 
Japanese puppet police, 185-186 
Japanese Units 

Thirty-Second Army, 28771, 309, 

4th Division, 230, 231 
5th Independent Mixed Bri- 
gade, 350 
44th Independent Mixed Bri- 
gade, 298 
Udo Force, 299, 307 
5th Air Group, 219, 220 
60th Bombardment Regiment 

(Air), 220 
62d Bombardment Regiment 

(Air), 220 
1st Heavy Artillery Regiment, 

38th Infantry Regiment, 256, 

6 1 st Infantry Regiment, 230, 

234, 236 
gth Tank Regiment, 256 
1st Battalion, 38th Infantry 

Regiment, 264 
2d Battalion, 38th Infantry 

Regiment, 264 
1st Battalion, 61st Infantry 

Regiment, 234, 236 


Japanese Units — Continued 
Army — Continued 

2d Battalion, 6ist Infantry 

Regiment, 236 
2d Battalion, 20th Infantry 

Regiment, 210 
3d Battalion, 20th Infantry 

Regiment, 210 
Hayakawa Detachment, 220 
Kondo Detachment, 220 
2d Independent Heavy Artillery 
Battery, 220 
Kamikaze Corps, 287, 291 

Combined Fleet, 258 
nth Air Fleet, 219 
Okinawa Base Force, 318 
Special Naval Landing Force, 
153, 154, 156, 159, 160, 
162, 167, 171, 174, 176, 

54th Naval Guard Force, 256, 

Jefferson, President Thomas, 358 
Jehol, 166 

Jenkins, istLt Robert F., 228 

Jessfield Park, 145 

Jimenez, Juan Isidro, 34, 35 

Johnson, Nelson, 169 

Johnson, Col Robert, 377 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 245, 

251, 252, 366 
Jones, istLt. Charles E., 302 
Jones, Capt Harry L., 88, 91 
Junta Consultiva, 94 
Jupiter, 13, 16, 18, 19 

Kahuku, 380 
Kakazu Ridge, 317 
Kamehameha I, King, 377 
Kane, Col Theodore P., 66, 69, 70, 
75, 78 

Kaneohe, 377, 379, 380, 386 
Kauai, 382, 384 
Kavieng, 245, 247, 248 
Kawada, 298, 308 

Kellogg, Secretary of State Frank B., 

Kemp, istLtFrank A., 262 
Kerr, istLt. William A., 264, 266, 

Kiaochow Bay, 351 

Kier, BriGen Avery R., 387 

Kilgore, LtCol Frederick D., 133, 134 

Kimura, MajGen Naoki, 210 

Kindley Field, 206 

King, 2dLt Charles A., 72, 75 

King, MajGen Edward P., Jr., 227 

King, Adm Ernest J., 247, 251; 

FAdm, 281 
King, Maj Stuart W., 207, 226, 227 
Kingston, 2d Lt Arthur, 72 
Kiyamu-Gusuku mass, 328 
Knapp, RAdm, Harry S., 69, 93 
Knowles, Como Herbert B., 287 
Knox, Sgt William R., 87 
Kobe, 368, 369, 374-37 6 
Koka, 1 10 

Kokuba Estuary, 316, 318, 322, 324- 

Kokuba Gawa, 311, 325 
Kondo, Maj Toshinoro, 220 
Korea, 149, 361, 362, 366-368, 370, 
375, 378,383, 387, 388 
Korean War begins (25 June 

1950), 361 
Korean War (1950-1953) hastens 
reactivation of 4th Marines, 

intervention of Chinese Commu- 
nists, 361, 362 

Marines involved in Korean War, 

North Korean People's Republic, 

Republic of Korea, 373 
signing of armistice, 367, 368 
38th Parallel, 362 
3/4 aids return of liberated Chi- 
nese POWs, 373 
UN Command, 366, 373 
UN Forces, 366 
Kunishi Ridge, 328 

INDEX 441 

Kuomintang, 135 
Kwajalein, 257 
Kwangchow Bay, 124, 125 
Kyle, Col Wood B., 375, 379 
Kyoto, 369, 371 

La Ceiba, 74 
La Cumbre, 62 
La Gina, 72, 75 
Lajas, 61 
La Loma, 88 

Lamberson, istLt George B., 340 
Landing craft 

LCI(G), 260, 26on, 271 

LGM, 285 

LGT, 320 

LGVP, 260, 26on 
Lane, LtCol Rufus H., 7 
Lang, Maj Harry G., 233 
Langley, 106-108 

Lansing, Secretary of State Robert, 

26,35,67, 94 
La Paja, 89, 90 
La Paz, 18, 19 
Lapiay Point, 212, 215, 216 
La Romana, 83 
Larsen, 2dLt Henry L., 44 
Las Trencheras, Battle of, 46-47, 49, 

50, 58 
Latin America, 94 

La Vega, 39, 65, 66, 72, 75, 81, 86, 

League of Nations, 151, 157, 163 

Leatherneck, 1 15 

Lexington, 109 

Lebanon, 388 

Lee, BriGen Harry, 92 

Lejeune, Major General Comman- 
dant John A., 96, 102, 103, 105, 
1 1 1 

Limay-Bagac Road, 201 
Limited military force, 1 
Lingayen Gulf, 200, 202 
Little Creek, Virginia, 357 
Litzenberg, BriGen Homer L., 369 
Liuho, 174 

Llanos, 60 

Lloyd, 2dLt Egbert T., 54 
Lockhart, Frank B., 192 
Longoskawayan Point, 2 1 0-2 1 9 
Los Angeles, California, 110, 113, 

114, 116 
Los Mochis, 25, 26 
Louisiana, 36, 41, 66 
Low, Capt William W., 5 
Luckey, Col Robert B., 291 
Lungwha Junction, 133, 135 
Luzon, 200, 202, 209, 225, 281 
Luzon Force, 227 
Lyman, Col Charles H., 92 

Mabatank, 209 

MacArthur, Gen Douglas, 198, 201, 
202, 208-210, 218, 226, 227, 
244, 245, 251, 280, 281, 332, 

MacMurray, John Van A., 1 19, 126- 

128, 141, 142, 144 
Machias, 86 

Machinato Airfield, 316, 321 
Machisi, 315 
Macoris, 83-85, 87 
Madero, Francisco, 1, 1 1 
Magpo Point, 264 
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 9 
Mail Guard, 1 1 1-1 13, 1 15, 1 16 
Makin Island, 241 
Makua, 380 

Malinta Hill, 205-207, 222, 230, 

Malinta Tunnel, 234 

Manchu dynasty, 125 

Manchukuo, 152, 167 

Manchuria, 148, 150-154, 156, 157, 

Manila, 165, 174, 196, 200, 202, 

Manila Bay, 196, 198, 201, 205, 206, 

Manning, istLt Alan S., 240 
Marajan, 273 

Marco Polo Bridge incident, 167 


Mare Island, California, i, 3, 6, 11- 

13, 18 
Marianas, 258, 277 

first plans for seizure of, 252 
significance to Japanese defense, 

Marine Barracks 
Gavite, 165 

Navy Yard, Mare Island, 3 
Navy Yard, Puget Sound, 2, 12 
Marine Corps, 1-4, 8-1 1, 19, 22, 23, 
43, 76, 101-103, 105, 115, 116, 
148, 164, 166, 182, 241, 308, 
318, 327, 333, 346, 353, 359, 
360, 365, 374, 376, 377, 386, 

air-ground task force conceived, 

amphibious doctrine, 106 
amphibious warfare, 109 
cadre system, 103, 104 
combat organization, 10, 11 
company designation, 10, 11, nn 
concepts of mission, 1, 8—10 
first permanent regiments (19 14), 
1 1 

marine band, 344 
organization, 364, 365 
postwar reduction (1924), 103 
postwar reduction (1947), 355, 

provision for 3 Divisions and 3 

Air Wings, 362 
Tables of Organization (1922), 


Tables of Organization ("J" 
Series, April 1947), 357, 358 
Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe 

Bay, 377, 379, 384 
Marine Corps Base, San Diego, 10 1 
Marine Corps Commandant, 364, 

367, 377, 386 
Marine Corps Headquarters, 2, 3, 7, 

10, 11, 1 in, 12, 109, 113, 367 
Marine Corps hymn, 347 
Marine Corps Schools, 106 
Marine raiders, 241 

Mariveles, 196, 199, 202-204, 207- 
210, 212, 216, 225, 227, 229 

Marix, Capt Arthur T., 47, 49, 51, 
52, 65; Maj, 66, 72, 74 

Markham Road Bridge, 136, 176 

Marshall Islands, 252, 258 

Marsman Building, 202 

Marvin, GySgt Milton C. "Slug", 
182, 183 

Maryland, 4 

Masters, Col James M., Sr., 382 

Mata Palacio, 91 

Matsui, Gen Iwane, 1 80 

Mauban, 209 

MAUKA, 382, 383 

Maunalua Bay, 107 

Mazatlan, 14, 16-18 

McBride, BriGen Allan C, 214 

McCrae, John, 243 

McCullough, Col Samuel, USA, 206 

McHugh, Maj James M., 184 

Mclntyre, 283, 284 

McKelvey, Maj William N., 20 

Mears, Passed Assistant Surgeon John 

B., USN, 45 
Medal of Honor, 58, 72, 173, 306 
Medhurst Road, 173, 175 
Mediterranean, 358 

assignment of 4th Marines BLT 
to, 360 

U.S. policy, 359 
Mee Foo XIV, 133 
Melhorn, Passed Assistant Surgeon 

Kent C, USN, 45 
Memphis, 36, 41, 66 
Mercurio, MGySgt John, 234 
Messer, Maj John S., 257, 260, 270 
Mexico, 4, 13, 19, 26 

crisis of 191 1, 1,2 

Revolution (1913-1915), 11, 24 

U.S. investments, 2 

U.S. relations (1914), 12, 14 
Mexico City, Mexico, 14, 16 
Mezado Ridge, 328 
Midway, 9 
Mikado, 149 
Military force in being, 1 

INDEX 443 

Miller, Capt Ellis B., 24 
Miller, Col John C, Jr., 371, 374 
Miller, Maj Lyle H., 165 
Mission Valley, 106 
Missouri, 333, 338, 342 
Mitscher, VAdm Marc A., 257, 285 
Miura, MajGen Saburo, 187-189 
Miura Peninsula, 335, 337, 339, 341, 

Moca, 39, 65, 97 
Molokai Island, 107 
Mona Passage, 3 1 
Monkey Point, 222, 236 
Montague, 358 
Montana, 1 1 2 

Monte Cristi, 36, 37, 39, 41-45, 5°> 

53, 54, 65, 97 
initial U.S. Marine landing, 36 
Monte Gristi-Santiago road, 43, 47, 

Moore, MajGen George F., USA, 

206, 222, 238, 239 
Moore, Capt. James T., 88, 89 
Moore, Capt. Paul C, USA, 238 
Morgan, Sgt. Albert J., 217 
Morning Light, 284 
Moron, 210 
Morrison Hill, 207 
Morrison Point, 231 
Motobu Peninsula, 298-300, 303, 

307, 308 
Mt. Alifan, 256, 263, 264, 272 
Mt. Barrigada, 272 
Mt. Fuji, 339, 370, 371, 374, 375 
Mt. Natib, 209 

Mt. Pucot, 212, 214-216, 218, 219 
Mt. Santa Rosa, 272, 273 
Mt. Taene, 264 

Mt. Yaetake, 299, 300, 302-307 
Munoz, Gen, 25 

Murai, Japanese Counsul General, 

Myers, Maj John Twiggs, 20, 23, 26, 

Nagai, 371 
Nagasaki, 277, 332 

Nagato, 341 
Nago, 298, 308 

Naha, 311, 314-316, 318, 322 
Naha Airfield, 318, 322, 323 
Naha-Shuri-Yonabaru line, 309, 317 
Naicklek Point, 212, 214 
Nanking, 76, 141, 166, 181, 185 
Nanking Road, 172, 179-181, 193 
Nantao, 123, 180 
Napoleon, 180 

Nara, 368, 369, 371, 373, 374 
National Government of China, 164, 
191, 356 

Nationalists, Chinese, 126-128, 133- 
136, 139-142, 150, 151, 178, 
350, 352 
Nationalist Chinese Army, 135 
Nationalist Chinese 1st Division, 135, 

Nationalist Chinese flag, 183 
Naval Academy, U.S., 242, 289 
Naval gunfire, 259, 269, 270, 321, 
324, 382 

Naval Training Station, Yerba Buena 

Island, 3 
Navarette, 42, 53, 58, 59, 62 
Navy Cross, 182 

Navy Department, 2, 10, 16, 17, 19, 

36, 136, 144, 184, 192 
Navy Unit Commendation, 271 
Nelson, Lord, 107 
Nevada, 1 1 2 

Neville, MajGen Wendell C., 106 
New, Postmaster General Harry S., 

in, 116 
New Britain, 245 
New Caledonia, 282 
New Georgia, 241 
New Guinea, 245, 251 
New Ireland, 245 
New Jersey, 36, 42, 66 
New London, Connecticut, 10 
New Mexico, 1 1 2 
New Orleans, 29 
Newport, Rhode Island, 10 
Niagara Falls, 19 
Nicaragua. 1 16 


Nihart, LtCol Brooke, 366 

Nimitz, Adm Chester W., 245, 247, 

251, 252, 280-282, 310, 310/1,, 


Nine-Power Treaty, 150 
Nishio, Gen Juzo, 186, 187 
Noble, BriGen Alfred H., 247, 250 
Noble, 284 

Norfolk, Virginia, 356 

Norford, Capt Archie B., 303 

Normandy, 283 

North African landings, 283 

North Camp Fuji, 374, 375 

North Channel, 228, 230 

North China, 141-143, 166, 188, 

350, 356 

Americans in, 141, 143 

U.S. policy, 141 
North Island, 4-6, 19, 20 
North Point, 234 
North Station, 135 
North Szechuan Road, 129, 157 
Nouel, Archbishop Adolfo, 33 

Oahu, 107, 108, 377, 382 
Oakland, California, 114 
Obregon, Gen Alvaro, 18 
Ogden, Utah, 1 14 
"Okies", 292 

Okinawa, 279, 281-285, 287, 28772, 
289, 291-294, 296, 297, 299, 
302, 307-311, 313, 3i6-3i8, 
323, 327, 328, 330, 341, 346, 

364, 371, 374 
Army troops, 309, 317, 328 
Battle for Naha, 311, 316 
Boeitai, 29971 

breaking the Shuri defenses, 313- 

capture of Naha, 316 
Conical Hill, 311,317 
description of, 292, 293, 328 
end of organized resistance, 330 
end of the campaign, 330 
estimated Japanese strength on 
Oroku Peninsula, 318 

Okinawa — Continued 

estimates of Japanese strength, 

final days, 328 
4th Marines 

advance to east coast, 294 
assault Mount Yaetake, 300, 

assigned to capture Mount Yae- 
take, 299 
capture Yontan Airfield, 291 
land, 289 

leave for Guam, 330 

move south, 3 1 1 

move to Motobu Peninsula, 298 

organization of RCT-4, 288/2 

push north on Ishikawa Isth- 
mus, 295, 296, 297 

reach east coast, 295 

secure Mount Yaetake, 306 
Green Beaches, 285 
Guerrillas, 296, 307 
H-Hour, 287, 288 
Half Moon, 313-315 
Hill 53, 325 
Hill 58, 325 
Hill 200, 303-305 
Hill 210 (Green Hill) 303, 304 
Horseshoe, 313-315 
Initial progress ashore, 291 
Ishikawa Isthmus secured, 298 

defenses in South, 309, 310, 313 

final defense line, 318 

stand expected on Motobu 
Peninsula, 298 

strategy, 291, 292 

strategy of Motobu Peninsula, 

L-Day, 281, 291 
lack of initial resistance, 289 
Little Sugar Loaf, 323, 324 
mop-up after Mount Yaetake, 307 
Motobu Peninsula secured, 307 
Northern Okinawa secured, 308 
Red Beaches, 285, 289 

INDEX 445 

Okinawa — Continued 

Sugar Loaf, 311, 313, 314, 317, 

U.S. strategy in South, 310 

Wana Draw, 313 
Okinawan conscripts, 3 1 8 
Olongapo, 141, 142, 146, 196, 199, 

200, 203 
Olongapo Naval Station, 196, 203 
Ono Yama, 322 
Opium War of 1842, 121 
Ora, 298, 308 
Oregon, 1 1 2 

Oribiletti, PFC Bruno, 263 
Orion, 210 

Oroku Peninsula, 321, 32 m, 325, 

326, 330 
capture of Little Sugar Loaf, 324 
capture of Naha Airfield, 323 
description of, 318 
end of Japanese resistance, 327 
4th Marines 

assigned to assault landing, 320 

land, 321 
H-Hour, 320 

Japanese defense, 318, 322, 323 
K-Day, 320-322 

Nishikoku beaches, Red 1 and 

Red 2, 320 
6th Marine Division assigned to 
capture, 320 
Orote Airfield, 269, 270 
Orote Peninsula, 254, 256, 259, 265, 

266, 268, 270-272 
Osaka, 369 

Osterhout, Maj. George H., 157 
Ota, RAdm Minoru, 318, 325, 327 
Otter, istLt Bethel B., USN., 238 
Ozark, 333 

Pacific Area, 378, 387 
Pacific defense 

British concern with, 190 

Dutch concern with, 190 

U.S. concern with, 190 
Pacific Ocean Areas, 280, 281 
519667—60 32 

Pacificador, 66 
Pago Bay, 331 

Pai Tsung-hsi, Gen, 135, 139 
Palace Hotel, Shanghai, 187 
Palaus, 251 
Pali, 377 
Panama, 9, 10 

Panama-California Exposition, 23, 

Panama Canal, 23 

strategic importance, 3 1 
Panama defense area, 33 
Panama- Pacific Exposition, 23, 27, 

Panay, 181 
Panther, 36 

Parker, Maj Gen George M., USA, 

Pasadena, California, 114 
Pate, Gen Randolph McC, (CMC), 

Peabody Stadium, no 

Pearl Harbor, 105, 144, 190, 199, 
242, 252, 253, 280, 339, 377 

Peck, Col DeWitt, 1 86-1 91 

Peiping, 142, 166, 167 

Peking, 125, 136, 150 

Peking-Tientsin railway, 125 

Pendleton, Col Joseph H. "Uncle 
Joe", 12, 14, 17, 19, 21-23, 28, 
39, 42, 43, 45-47, 53, 54, 5^, 
59, 63-67; MajGen. 101 

Pennant, 279 

Pennsylvania, 4 

Pepper, LtGen Robert H., 366, 375 
Perez, Dr. Juan B., 60, 63, 70-72 
Perez, Manuel, 75 
Perry Como Matthew C, 149 
Perskie, istLt Marvin D., 294 
Pescadores, 124 

Peshek, 2dLt Michael E., 216, 218 
Pew, Lt(jg) Leslie A., USN, 209, 

212, 215 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1 1 
Philippine Air Force, 225, 226 
Philippine 71st Division, 214 


Philippine campaign 

Battle of the Points begins, 210 

significance of, 195 
Philippine forces, 195, 196, 202, 208, 
210, 228 

Philippine National Army, 198, 202 
Philippine Scouts, 218, 219 
Philippine Sea, Battle of the, 258 
Philippines, 9, 10, 131, 141, 146, 161, 
192, 195, 196, 198, 201, 207, 
208, 244, 251, 258, 280, 325, 

Phoenix, Arizona, 1 1 4 
Pickup, Capt. Lewis H., 233, 236 
Pimental, 74 
Pittsburgh, 121 

Piatt, LtCol Wesley McC, 356; 

Col, 387 
Piatt Field, 387 
Plymouth, Vermont, 1 1 o 
Poe, Pvt John M., 90 
Pohakuloa, 384 

Policia Nacional Dominicana, 77, 96, 

Pond, RAdm Charles F., 65, 66 
Pootung, 123 
Port Ajayan, 272 
Port Arthur, 124 

Russians at , 125 
Portland, Oregon, 112, 114, 116 
Potsdam ultimatum, 332 
Powers, Maj William C, 157 
President Grant, 141 
President Harrison, 192, 193, 196 
President Jefferson, 174 
President Line, 1 93 
President Madison, 192, 195 
Presidential Unit Citation, 327 
Price, Col Charles F. B., 168, 169, 

171, 172, 174, 175, 180-183 
Pringamosa, 91 

Pritchett, Capt William H., 56, 57; 

Maj, 87 
PT Boat No. 34, 210 
Pu Yi, Henry, 152 
Pueblo, Colorado, 1 14 

Puerto Plata, 36, 37, 39, 42, 53, 58- 
62,65, 95,97 
initial U.S. Marine landing, 36 
Puerto Plata railroad, 64 
Puerto Rico, 9, 3 1 
Puget Sound, 3, 6, 1 1-13, 18 
Puller, LtCol Samuel D., 27 1 
Putnam, Capt Russell B., 43 
Pusan, 361 
Pyle, Ernie, 287 

Quantico, 105, 106, 112, 147 
Quebreda Honda, 6 1 
Quinauan Point, 210, 219 

Rabaul, 244, 245, 247 
Radford, Adm Arthur W., 378 
Radio Tokyo, 287, 296 
Ramsey, Col Frederick A., 374 
Ramsay Ravine, 224 
Range Road, 134 

Recruit depot, establishment of, 771 

Red Cross, 354 

Red society, 140 

Reid, 2dLt James T., 72 

Reifsnider, Como Lawrence F., 247 

Reinecke, Col Frank M., 358, 360 

Reno, Nevada, 1 14 

Rhode Island, 36, 42, 66 

Ridgely, Maj Reginald H., Jr., 193 

Rio Grande River, 7, 1 1 

Risely, Maj Gen James P., 376 

Riverside, California, 1 14 

Robinson, Capt Ray A., 139 

Robinson Road, 183 

Rochester, 203 

Rock Point, 231 

Rockey, MajGen Keller E., 352, 355 
Rockwell, RAdm Francis W., 196, 

Roll, Col George A., 387 
Romana Sugar Company, 86 
Ronin, 159, 160 

Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of 
Navy Franklin D., 19; 

INDEX 447 

Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 
189, 190, 227, 280— Continued 

Roosevelt, President Theodore, 30, 
3i, 33 

Rowbottom, Chief Trumpeter 

George V., 22 
Royal Marines, 334, 337 
Rupertus, LtCol William H., 1 73 
Russell, William H., 35, 36, 66 
Russia, 124, 149, 332 
Ryukyus, 281, 292 

Sabana de la Mar, 86, 88 
Sacramento, California, 1 14 
Sacramento, 36, 131, 171, 175 
Sagami Bay, 338, 339 
St. Mathias Group, 244, 245 
Saipan, 251, 252, 254, 258, 259, 299 
Salladay, Maj Jay McK., 85 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 113, 114, 116 
Samana Bay, 37, 65, 66, 86, 87 
Samana-Santiago railroad, 65 
Sambijima, Baron, 160 
Samoa, American, 9 
Samurai swords, 263 
San Bernardino, California, 1 14 
Sanchez, 37, 39, 65, 72, 74, 75, 79, 

San Diego, California, 2-5, 19, 22, 
23, 25-27, 29, 98, 101, 102, 105, 
106, no, in, 116, 119, 136, 

141, 335, 345 
San Diego, 26, 335, 339 
San Diego harbor, 4, 27, 365 
San Diego Union, 5 
"San Diego's Own", 19, 101 
San Francisco, California, 2, 3, 12- 

14, 20, 23, 26, 27, 106, 1 12-1 14, 

116, 349 
San Francisco Bay, 3, 13 
San Francisco de Macoris, 39, 65, 

70, 72, 74-76, 97 
San Jose, California, 114 
San Pedro de Macoris, 83, 85, 86 
Santa Barbara, California, 1 10 

Santiago, 37, 39, 41-43, 45, 50, 51, 
58, 59, 62, 63-66, 69, 70, 74, 

Marine occupation of, 63 
Santiago Operation 
intelligence, 43 
logistics, 43 

Marine task force organization, 41 
plans, 39,41 
purpose, 39 
Santo Domingo, 28, 29, 41, 65, 66, 

69, 70, 76, 92,95, 104, 113 
Santo Domingo City, 35, 37, 39, 41, 
43, 63, 66, 67, 95, 98 
landing of U.S. Marines, 35 
Saratoga, 109 
Sato, Col, 234, 236 
Savannah Ranch, 52 
Saywer, Sgt Leslie D., 2 1 7 
Schaeffer, Maj Max, 226, 237-239 
Schofield Barracks, 380 
Seattle, Washington, 3, 20, 1 13, 1 14 
Secor, Maj Theodore A., 119, 131 
Seibo, 83-85, 87, 89 
Senaga Shima, 324 
Service Command Area, 2 1 6 
Shanghai, 116, 119, 121, 123, 126, 
127, 129, 131, 133, 135, 136, 
138-148, 152, 153, 157, 163- 
165, 167, 169, 171, 175, 176, 
178, 181, 182, 184, 185, 187, 
188, 190, 191, 196, 253, 351, 
353, 387,388 
Americans at, 119, 121, 123, 127- 
129, 130, 138, 143, 147, 153, 
157, 168, 178, 189 
American Chamber of Commerce, 

Safety Committee, 138 
British at, 121, 123, 124, 128, 134, 
136, 153, 157, 161, 168, 178, 
186, 188, 189 
customs duties, 1 78 
declaration of emergency (January 

1932), 156, 157 
Dutch at, 130 

evacuation of Americans (1937), 


Shanghai — Continued 
foreigners at, 1 84, 1 85 
4th Marines at, 143, 148 

community participation, 1 64 
dependents leave (1940), 191 
defense sector, 157 
escape plan (1941), 191 
recommendations for with- 
drawal, 189 
withdrawn from (1941), 192, 

Yangtze River vessel duty, 164 
French at, 121, 123, 124, 128-130, 
138, 178 

International Defense Scheme, 

154, 157, 159, 160 
Italians at, 130, 136, 178, 185, 

186, 188 

Japanese at, 123, 128, 130, 136, 

153, 159 
Japanese atrocities, 1 59 
MLR (Main Line of Resistance), 

Portuguese at, 130 
Sino-Japanese fighting (1932), 

157, 162, 163 
Spanish at, 130 

state of emergency ended (June 
1932), 164 
Shanghai Defense Force, 135 
Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Rail- 
road, 130 
Shanghai Hotel, 184 
Shanghai Municipal Council, 121, 

129, 134, 146, 148, 156, 163, 

168, 183, 184, 193 
Shanghai Municipal Police, 135, 137, 

168, 179, 183, 184, 187, 191 
Shanghai Power Company, 171, 175 
Shanghai Race Course, 145, 147, 179 
Shanghai Rugby championship, 147 
Shanghai Special City Government 

Municipal Police, 185 
Shanghai Volunteer Corps, 130, 134, 

137, 145, 154, 157, 161, 168, 

172, 174, 185, 188 
Shanghai-Woosung Railway, 169 

Shantung, 124, 166 
Shantung Peninsula, 150, 351 
Shantung province, Germans in, 125 
Shantung University, 351, 354 
Shansi, 166 

Shapley, LtCol Alan, 242, 243, 247, 
248, 257, 262, 270, 271, 274, 
279; Col, 27971, 283, 289, 299, 
300, 302, 305, 316, 320, 328, 

331, 368 

Shaw, Maj Melville J., 47, 49, 54, 65 
Shell, BriGen George R. E., 383 
Shepherd, BriGen Lemuel C, Jr., 
253, 254, 263-265, 268-274, 
276, 287/1, 300, 308, 311, 314, 
315, 320, 324, 325, 327, 328, 

332, 35°; MajGen, 280; LtGen, 
378, 379; Gen, 363, 375 

Sherman, VAdm Forrest P., 358, 359 

Shibeyama, Baron, 154 

Shinn, Assistant Surgeon Herbert L., 

USN, 89, 90 

APAs, 287, 365 

LCI gunboats, 288 

LSTs, 257, 25771, 258, 260, 284, 

287, 333, 345, 353, 373 
LSVs, 333 

Mine sweepers, 285 
Shiozawa, RAdm, 153, 156, 162 
Shuri, 309-31 1, 313, 315 
Shuri castle, 3 1 7 
Shuri line, 309, 31 1, 314 
Shuri Hill mass, 313 
Silver Star Medal, 242 
Silver Strand, Coronado Island, 365 
Simpson, istLt Carter B., 212, 214, 

Sinaloa, 25 
Singapore Road, 1 59 
Sino-Japanese war, 119, 154, 167, 

Battle of Shanghai (1937), 167— 
169, 1 7 1-1 76 
Smith, istLt Holland M., 6, 6n, 47 ; 
LtGen, 252 

INDEX 449 

Smith, istLt Julian C, 46, 4.611, 57 
Snowden, RAdm Thomas R., 93, 94 
Solace, 58 
Solomons, 241, 245 
Soochow Creek, 130, 136, 156, 157, 
159-162, 167-169, 172-174, 
176, 181, 185, 189, 191, 193 
South China, 124 
South China Sea, 215 
South Dakota, 4, 13, 14, 1471, 16-19 
South Dock, 224 
South Harbor, 224 
South Manchuria Railway, 150 
South Pacific, 244, 245, 247, 277 

first allied offensive moves, 245 
South Pacific Area, 245 
Southeast Asia, 190 
Southern California, 22 
Southwest Pacific, 227, 244 

first Allied offensive move, 245 
Southwest Pacific Area, 280 
Southwest Pacific Forces, 245 
Soviet Russia, 1 39 
Spanish- American War, 9, 10 
Spanish government, 30 
Sparks, Fred, 44 

Spokane, Washington, 113, 114, 116 
Spruance, Adm Raymond A., 252, 

258, 281 
Spunt Cup, 147 

Standard Oil Company, Shanghai, 

120, 133 
Stewart, Capt William, 269 
Stimson, Secretary of State Henry 

151, 152 
Stockton, California, 114 
Stone, 2dLt Paul W., 349 
Stone Bridge, 1 76 
Subic Bay, 196, 200, 201 
Suiyuan, 166 
Sumay, 269—271 
Sun Yat-sen, 125 
Sunkiang, 176 

Sutherland, BriGen Richard K., 
USA, 201, 202 

Tacoma, Washington, 114 
Taft, President William Howard, 1, 

Taira, 298 
Taiwan, 388 

Takashina, LtGen Takeshi, 256, 271, 

Takeda, RAdm Moriji, 188 
Tamai, Cdr Asaichi, 266 
Tampico, 12 

Tandy, 2dLt Jack H., 89-91 

Task Force 31 (Yokosuka Occupa- 
tion Force), 334, 335, 339, 343 

Task Force 51 (Joint Expeditionary 
Force), 282 

Task Force 56 (Expeditionary 
Troops), 282 

Task Force 58, 257 

Task Group 31.3 (Fleet Landing 
Force), 334 

Task Group Able, 333 

Tassafaronga, 243, 248, 250, 256, 
257, 282 

Tateyama, 342 

Taylor, Chaplain Leroy N., 45 
Taylor, Adm Montgomery M., 160 
Telfer-smollett, Brigadier A. P. D., 

British Army, 168, 172 
"Tell It to the Marines", 1 15 
Thailand, 220 
Thetis Bay, 385 

Thomas, RAdm Chauncey, 5, 6 
Thorpe, LtCol George C, 86-91 
Thrasher, istLt Thomas E., 45, 52 
"Three Principles," 125 
Tientsin, 141-144, 147, 166, 350, 

352, 355 
Tinian, 251, 277 
Togcha River, 273 
Toguchi, 299, 300 
Toguchi-Itomi Road, 306, 307 
Tojo, Premier, 348 
Tokyo, 258, 333, 335, 343, 345 
Tokyo Bay, 335, 337~340 
Tomigusuki, 324, 325, 327 
Topolobampo, 25, 26 
Toto, 273 


Totsuka, VAdm Michitura, 335, 339, 

Toya, 293 

TRADE WINDS, 384, 385 
Training, 4th Marines, 6, 102 

Camp Pendleton (1952), 363, 364 
China, 133, 145, 164 
Fleet Landing Exercise (FLEX), 
Vieques, Puerto Rico (1948), 

Hawaii, 105-109, 380-385 
Iwo Jima landing exercise (1954), 

Japan (1954), 37°, 371, 374, 375 
Okinawa landing exercise (1954), 

PACPHIBEX-II (1953), 365, 

Tripartite Pact, 1 90 
Tripoli, 358 
Truk, 346 

Truman, President Harry S., 332, 
350, 361 

defines Marine mission in China, 

policy re Communist aggression, 

Tsang-kou Airfield, 350, 352 

Tsinan, 352 

Tsingtao, 124, 172, 357 
British at, 351 
Chinese at, 351,352 
description of, 35 1 
foreign powers at, 351 
4th Marines at, 349, 351-35^ 
General Shepherd receives sur- 
render (25 October 1945), 

Germans at, 125, 351, 352 
history of, 35 1 

Japan dominates (193 7-1945), 

35i, 352 
Koreans at, 351 
6th Marine Division lands, 350 
U.S. Navy at, 353 
White Russians at, 35 1 

Trinidad, 1 14 
Tri-Partite Pact, 190 
Tulagi Island, 241, 245 
Turkey, 359 

Turner, VAdm Richmond K., 252, 

254,282, 287 
2 1 Demands, 150 
29 Palms, 364 

Udo, Col Takehiko, 298, 299, 307 

Uji, 371,374 

Ulithi Atoll, 283, 284 

U nadilla, 3 

Union Nacional Dominicana, 94 
United Nations, 361 
UN troops, 361, 362 
United States, 8, 12, 14, 19, 25, 27, 
3i, 33-36, 39, 43, 59, 67, 81, 
94, 101, 123, 141, 150-152, 157, 
167, 178, 179, 189, 190, 349, 
350, 356, 361, 375, 378, 388 
steps short of war ( 1 94 1 ) , 190 
U.S. Army, 105, 107, 109, 201, 202, 
208, 228, 250, 335, 368, 375, 380 
U.S. Army Air Forces, 252 
U.S. Army Air Force Units 
3d Pursuit Squadron, 2 14 
2 1 st Bomber Command, 281 
U.S. Army engineers, 224 
U.S. Army units 

2d Amphibious Support Com- 
mand, 370 
Service Command, Bataan, 208 
Southwestern Command, 369 
Tokyo Bay Occupation Force, 333 
United States Army Forces in the 
Far East (USAFFE), 196, 
198, 200-202, 208, 209, 214, 
216, 218, 227 
United States Forces in the Philip- 
pines (USFIP), 227 

Eighth, 342, 343, 345, 348 
Tenth, 280, 282, 284, 285, 291, 
310, 311,316, 317, 330 

I, 208-210, 218 

II, 208-2 10 

INDEX 451 

U.S. Army units — Continued 
Corps — Continued 
XXIV, 282, 283, 285, 296, 309, 


nth Airborne, 335, 339 

7th Infantry, 282, 285, 317 

24th Infantry, 366 

25th Infantry, 368 

27th Infantry, 252, 258, 282, 

3io, 335 
32d Infantry, 245 
77th Infantry, 252, 259, 265, 

270-273, 282, 317 
8 1 st Infantry, 282 
96th Infantry, 282, 285, 311, 



187th Airborne, 370, 374 
1 1 2th, 342 
305th, 259 

59th Coast Artillery, 239 
88th Field Artillery (PS), 216, 

31st Infantry, 161 

45th Infantry (PS), 227 

147th Infantry, 250 

305th Infantry, 264 

306th Infantry, 265 

2/57 (PS), 218 

3/45 (PS), 218 

7th AAA (AW), 273 

708th Amphibious Tank, 322 
Batteries and Companies 

Battery Geary, 2 16, 2 1 7 

Denver Battery, 236-239 

Battery I, 60th Coast Artillery 
(AA), 207 

91st Chemical Mortar Company, 

301st Chemical Company, 214 
U. S. Marine units 

Advance Base Force, n, 19 

MAG-13, 377, 380, 382, 384 

U.S. Marine units — Continued 
VMO-6, 355 
VMR-352, 382 
Department of the Pacific, 1 1 2 
1 st Provisional Marine Air-Ground 
Task Force, 377, 379, 382, 

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 6n, 
349, 364, 366, 376-378 

Fleet Marine Force, Western 
Pacific, 357 

Mail Guards, Eastern, 1 12 

Mail Guards, Western, 112, 113 

Marine Corps Expeditionary Force 
(1925), 106 

Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, 
Asiatic Fleet, 136 

Marine Forces, China, formed of 
4th Marines (Tsingtao) and 
1st Marine Division (Tient- 
sin), 355 

Marine Forces, Tsingtao, 355 

Provisional Detachment, U.S. 
Naval Forces Operating 
Ashore in Santo Domingo, 41, 
42,45,59, 66 

Third Fleet Marine Landing Force, 

334, 337, 34i 

I Marine Amphibious Corps 
(IMAC), 243, 247 

III Amphibious Corps (IIIAC), 
252, 253, 256-259, 273, 
274, 282, 283, 285, 296, 
3n,332, 350,353,355 

V Amphibious Corps (VAC), 
6n, 252, 258 

Provisional Corps, Japan, 370 

1st, 241, 245, 282, 285, 295, 296, 
310, 311, 317, 328, 350, 
355, 361, 362, 375, 376 

2d, 282, 356-359 

3d, 182, 242, 247, 252, 254, 259, 
271-273, 362-370, 373, 
376, 377 


U.S. Marine units — Continued 
Divisions — Continued 

6th. 279, 280. 282. 284, 285, 
287, 293.. 296, 298,. 307- 
311, 313, 314, 3i6, 317, 
321, 327, 328, 333, 341, 

343, 349, 35° ; 355 
6 th Marine Division Special 
Troops, 280 

1^,383,384, 387.. 388 

1 st Provisional, 250—254, 256, 

258-260, 271-274, 279, 

280, 341. 361, 378 
2d, 66, 77, 82, 92,. 96-98, 175, 


3d : 136, 142, 143, 355 

RCT-4, 288, 334, 337, 350, 

376, 377, 379, 380, 383 

RCT-22, 256 
Artillery Regiments 

10th, 106, 136 

1 2th, 142, 144, 363 

15th, 280, 291, 306 
Infantry Regiments 

1st, 11, 317 

2d, 1 1, 360 

3d, 78, 84,. 86, 88.. 89, 92, 274, 

357, 363 
4th, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 
17-21, 24-27, 29, 36, 37, 
39.. 41, 44, 63, 65, 66, 69, 
76, 78-82, 84, 88, 89, 91, 
9 2 , 95-98, 101-106, 109- 
112, 115, 119, 121, 129, 

131, 133, 136-138, 140, 
142-148, 153, 156, 157, 
16 1 — 1 64, 166, 168, 169, 
171—1763 178, 179, 1 8 1— 
183, 185-193, 195, 196. 
198, 200—204, 2 °6, 207, 
217, 221, 222, 224-226, 
228, 240-243, 247, 250. 
253, 254, 256-258, 260, 
262, 264, 265, 268-274, 

U.S. Marine units — Continued 
Infantry Regiments — Continued 
4th — Continued 

276, 277, 279, 280, 282- 
285, 288, 289, 291, 293- 
300, 304-309, 3", 3i3, 
315-318, 320, 321, 324, 
325, 327, 328, 330-333, 
333". 334, 335, 337, 34*- 
346, 349-358, 360-371, 

374-377, 379, 383, 385- 


Band, 147, 148, 28872, 33371 
Concert orchestra, 148 
Crest (1954), 374 
Dance orchestra, 147 
Headquarters, 18, 21, 23, 25, 
26, 81, 119, 145, 159, 
169, 173, 187, 196, 203, 
204, 243, 291, 308, 335, 

344, 349, 350 
Hospital, 175, 192 
Intelligence officer, 171 
Marching song, 22, 386 
Motto: "Hold High the 

Torch," 243, 368 
Organization, 80—82, 103- 
105, in, 114, 115, 142, 
144, 148, 165, 166, 241, 
243, 248, 28871, 31 in, 
333^ 349, 350, 355, 358, 
360, 363, 364, 370, 377, 

Quartermaster, 193 

Strength, 95, 97, 102, 103, 
105, in, 113, 115, 119, 
161, 165, 166, 173, 1 70, 
196, 222, 228, 229, 284, 
333, 349, 35i, 356, 357 
5th, 147, 313 

6th, 136, 141, 142, 144, 175, 

7th, 3 1 1 
9th, 363 
15th, 78,92 

2ISt, 276 

INDEX 453 

U.S. Marine units — Continued 
Infantry Regiments — Continued 
22d, 253, 262, 264-266, 268- 
272, 274, 276, 280, 285., 
291, 298, 300, 308, 311, 
313, 320, 324-326, 328, 

29th, 280, 285, 291, 298-300, 
304, 306-308, 313, 314, 
316, 320,324-326 
Raider Regiments 
1 st, 241 
2d, 241, 242 
Service Regiments 
3d, 376 

Amphibian Tractor Battalions 

4th, 321 

9th, 321 
Armored Amphibian Battalions 

1st, 288 

3d (Provisional), 320 
Artillery Battalions 

1st Separate Marine Battalion, 

198, 202-204, 207 
1/10, 106, 141 

1/15, 291,320,33372 
3/12,355, 376 

Pack howitzer bn, 4th Mar, 253 
Defense Battalions 

9th, 273 

14th, 248 
Guard Battalions 

2d Separate (Provisional), 349 
Headquarters Battalions 

3d MarDiv, 376 
Infantry Battalions 

i/3, 274 

1/4, 5, 20, 23, 26, 27, 42, 45, 47, 
50-54, 57, 58, 81, 82, 104- 
106, 114, 119, 131, 139, 
146, 157, 173, 187, 193, 

199, 203, 204, 207, 222, 
225, 228, 229, 233, 234, 
237, 239, 243, 248, 257, 
260, 262, 264, 266, 268- 
270, 274, 276, 279, 289, 

U.S. Marine units — Continued 
Infantry Battalions — Continued 
1 / 4 — Continued 

294, 296, 297, 302-305, 

307, 308, 315, 320, 321, 

323, 324, 326, 337, 340, 
341, 344, 349, 356-358, 

363, 366, 383-385 
1/6, 360 

1/22, 265, 266, 273, 304, 308 
2/3, 274, 365 

2/4, 5, 20, 26, 42, 45, 47, 49, 54, 
65, 81, 104, 106, 1 10, 1 14, 
116, 120, 141, 142, 165, 
173, 174, 192, 199, 204, 
207, 222, 229, 240, 241, 
243, 248, 257, 260, 264, 
265, 270, 274, 279, 285, 
288, 291, 296, 297, 300, 
302-308, 313, 315, 316, 
320-322, 324, 326, 335, 
337, 339, 34i, 344, 349, 
356, 357, 363, 373, 382, 

2/8, 358 

2/22, 265, 351 


3/4, 104, 106, 119, 131, 136, 
139, 146, 156, 157, 166, 

207, 216, 222, 229, 240, 
241, 248, 257, 262, 264, 
268-270, 274, 276, 289, 
296-300, 303, 304, 307, 

308, 3i3-3!6, 320, 322- 

324, 326, 337, 340, 341, 
344, 349, 356, 357, 363, 

364, 373, 382, 384 
3/6, 136, 141 

3/22, 265, 295, 316, 351 
3/29, 300, 302-304, 307, 322 
4/4, 229, 230, 238, 364, 367 
Naval battalion, 4th Marines, 

208, 209, 216, 218, 219 
Provisional Battalion, 4th 

Marines, 106, 131, 142, 
144, 146 


U.S. Marine units — Continued 
Infantry Battalions — Continued 
Reserve Battalion, 4th Marines, 
Medical Battalions 
4th Marines, 253 
Raider Battalions 
1st, 241-243 
2d, 241-243 
4th, 241 
Service Battalions 

6th, 33372 
Tank Battalions 
6th, 297, 320 

Battery A, 4th Marines, 204, 
207-209, 214, 215, 225, 226 
Company A, 4th Marines, 5, 
98, 234, 237, 238, 262, 263, 
266, 272, 302, 304, 305, 

Company A, 4th Amphibian 
Tractor Battalion, 333/1 

Company A, 6th Engineer Bat- 
talion, 28872, 296, 33372 

Company A, 6th Medical Bat- 
talion, 28872, 33372 

Company A, 6th Motor Trans- 
port Battalion, 28872 

Company A, 6th Pioneer Bat- 
talion, 28872, 33371 

Company B, 4th Marines, 5, 98, 
173, 234, 262, 263, 266, 
294, 302,314 

Company B, 3d Shore Party Bat- 
talion, 376 

Battery C, 4th Marines, 204, 
207-209, 212, 214, 215, 

Company C, 4th Marines, 5, 98, 
166, 173, 226, 237, 262, 
263, 266, 268, 302, 304- 
306, 323 

Company C, 3d Motor Trans- 
port Battalion, 376 

Company C, 6th Tank Battalion, 

U.S. Marine units — Continued 
Companies — Continued 

Company D, 4th Marines, 5, 98, 

Company D, 6th Medical Bat- 
talion, 33372 
Company E, 4th Marines, 5, 

173, 175, 304,314,324 
Company E, 3d Medical Bat- 
talion, 376, 383 

Company F, 4th Marines, 203, 
204, 272, 273, 295, 304, 

Company G, 4th Marines, 166, 

174, 264, 303, 304, 324, 
340, 382 

Company H, 4th Marines, 182, 

203, 216 
Company I, 4th Marines, 269, 

Company K, 4th Marines, 262, 

263, 298, 313, 314, 326, 

364, 367 
Company L, 4th Marines, 269, 
293, 294, 313, 314, 326, 

Company P, 4th Marines, 226, 

237, 238 
Company Q, 4th Marines, 229, 


Company R, 4th Marines, 229, 

Company S, 4th Marines, 229, 


Company T, 4th Marines, 229, 

1st Company, 53 

1 st Bomb Disposal Company, 6th 

Marine Division, 28872 
2d Ammunition Company, 1st 

Provisional Marine Brigade, 


4th Company, 42, 60-62, 66, 80 
6th Company, 41, 42, 45, 53, 
66, 80 

6th Amphibious Truck Com- 
pany, 28872 

INDEX 455 

U.S. Marine units — Continued 
Companies — Continued 

6th Joint Assault Signal Com- 
pany (JASCO), 28871,33371 
6th Military Police Company, 

333^ 345 
8th Company, 29, 42, 47, 50, 

52-54, 81 
9th Company, 42, 59-62, 65, 

66, 80 

10th Company, 80, 82, 104, 105, 

1 14, 116, 165 
13th Company, 41, 42, 44, 45, 

47,51,54,56, 64,66 
19th Company, 120 
2 1 st Company, 120, 139 
2 2d Company, 120, 133 
24th Company, 62, 65, 66, 120 
25th Company, 13, 14, 18, 22- 

26, 41, 42, 65, 82, 88, 97, 

104, 105, 114, 139 
26th Company, 13, 18, 20, 23, 

25, 42, 47, 49, 52, 54, 58, 

81, 104 

27th Company, 13, 18, 20, 23, 
25, 26, 42, 45, 47, 49, 52, 
54, 56,57,8i, 104, 114 

28th Company, 18, 20, 21, 25, 
28, 42, 45, 47, 49, 52, 56, 

82, 95, 104, 105, 114, 173 
29th Company, 27, 42, 45, 54, 

57, 63, 81, 104, 116, 165 
31st Company, 13, 18, 20, 42, 
49, 52, 65, 70, 104, 105, 
112, 114, 116, 165 
32d Company, 13, 18, 20, 42, 49, 
52, 53, 58, 65, 72, 75, 82, 
87, 104, 105, 112, 114, 116, 

33d Company, 80, 82, 88, 89, 

91, 92, 97, 104 
34th Company, 13, 18, 20, 42, 

49> 53, 65, 72, 75, 81 
35th Company, 13, 18 
36th Company, 18 
45th Company, 66, 81 
47th Company, 66, 70, 81 

U.S. Marine units — Continued 
Companies — Continued 

48th Company, 72, 75, 80, 86- 

69th Company, 81, 82, 97 

88th Company, 1 3 1 

89th Company, 131 

90th Company, 1 3 1 

91st Company, 131 

4. 2 -inch Mortar Company, 4th 
Marines, 363 

Headquarters Company, 4th 
Marines, 81, 82, 104, 105, 
no, 114, 131, 136, 173, 
222, 225, 226, 233, 253 

Headquarters and Service Com- 
pany, 4th Marines, 349, 
350, 356, 357, 363 

Howitzer Company, 4th Ma- 
rines, 82, 97, 104 

Military Police Company, 6th 
Marine Division, 28872 

Military Police Company, 4th 
Marines, 253 

Motor Transport Company, 4th 
Marines, 173 

Ordnance Company, 6th Ma- 
rine Division, 288^, 33371 

Provisional Company, 4th Ma- 
rines, 105 

Reconnaissance Company, 6th 
Marine Division, 316, 322, 

Regimental Reserve Company, 
4th Marines, 226, 233 

Service Company, 4th Marines, 
82, 104, 119, 173, 204, 222, 

Service Company, 3d Marine 

Brigade, 136 
Service and Supply Company, 

6th Marine Division, 28871 
Signal Company, 1st Provisional 

Marine Brigade, 253 
Signal Company, 4th Marines, 



U.S. Marine units — Continued 
Companies — Continued 

Signal Company, 6th Marine 

Division, 322 
Supply Company, 4th Marines, 

Tank Company, 4th Marines, 
263, 269, 270 

Truck Company, 6th Motor 
Transport Battalion, 33372 

Weapons Company, 4th Ma- 
rines, 291, 297, 303, 304, 

5th Provisional Rocket Det., 320 

Louisiana Det., 42, 53 

Memphis Det., 42 

Mounted Det. 4th Marines, 42, 

New Jersey Det., 42, 62 
Olongapo Guard Det., 196 
Puerto Plata Det., 41, 42, 53 
Rhode Island Det., 42 
Field Depots 

5th Field Depot, 253 
Replacement Drafts 

26th Replacement Draft, 288/1 
33d Replacement Draft, 288/1 
Reconnaissance Platoon, 4th Ma- 
rines, 274 
U.S. Navy, 228, 250, 280, 287, 335, 
340, 353, 359,373 
Fleet Reserve, 225, 226 
U.S. Navy units 

Asiatic Fleet, 102, 121, 143-145, 
172, 189, 198, 199, 201, 202, 
208, 214, 215 
Asiatic Station, 161 
1 1 th Special Naval Construction 

Bn, 288/1 
Fifth Fleet, 252, 281 
53d Naval Construction Battalion, 

58th Naval Construction Bn, 288/1 
Naval Ammunition Depot, 214, 

Pacific Fleet, 2, 6, 26, 199, 379 

U.S. Navy units — Continued 
1 6th Naval District, 196 
Sixth Task Fleet, 358, 359 
Seventh Fleet, 353-355 
Third Fleet, 333~335, 33**, 339, 

Transport Group, III Amphibious 

Force, 247 
United States Fleet, 105, 190, 281, 


Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, 

III Amphibious Force, 247 

Third Fleet Naval Landing Force, 

334, 337, 34i 
Emirau Attack Group, 247 
Southern Attack Force, 260 
Cruiser Force, Atlantic Fleet, 35 
Cruiser Force, 65 
U.S. occupation forces, Japan, 370 
U.S. State Department, 2, 26, 27, 35, 
94, 126, 128, 129, 141, 144, 169, 
171, 192 
Uraga Strait, 335, 339, 342, 346 
Ushijima, LtGen Mitsuru, 287/1, 291, 

309, 318, 325, 330 
USO, 354 
Utah, 1 1 2 

Vaga, 199 

Valdes, Jose Bordas, 33 
Vallejo Junction, California, 3 
Vandegrift, Maj Alexander A., 120, 
131, 136, 137, 139; 
LtGen, 242, 308 
Vasquez, Horacio, 97, 98 
Vera Cruz, 14 

Versailles Peace Conference (19 19), 

Vicentico Evangelista, 85-87 
Victoria, Alfredo, 33 
Villa, Francisco, 12, 24 
Villaespesa, Francisco, 95 
Villistas, 25 
Vitiaz Strait, 245 

INDEX 457 

Wake Island, 9 
Waikane, 380 

Wainwright, Ma j Gen Jonathan M., 
209, 210, 216, 218, 227, 239, 

War Department, 227 
Washburn, istLt James G., 302, 30572 
Washington, State of, 112 
Washington Conference (1921- 

1922), 150 
Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, 


Watson, MajGen Thomas E., 282 

antiaircraft guns, 231 

BARs, 137, 199, 269 

bazooka, 263 

flame thrower tanks ("Zippos"), 


3-inch, 12, 14, 22, 24, 47, 56, 60, 

62, 206-208, 212, 225 
6-inch, 17 
14-inch, 232 
20mm, 318, 321, 326 
37mm, 225, 234, 243, 324 
47mm, 313/1 
60mm, 305, 326 

75 mm, 217, 224, 225, 231, 234, 

8cm, 345 
105mm, 220, 340 
105mm self-propelled assault 
(M-7s), 321, 323, 324, 326 
155mm, 220, 225, 232 
240mm, 226, 231 

2.95-inch mountain pack, 214, 

37mm, 173 
105mm, 380 
Japanese Baka bomb, 344 
Japanese 8-inch rocket ("Whistlin' 

Willie"), 323 
machine guns, 3, 21, 46, 47, 56- 
58, 60, 61, 206, 207, 209, 224, 
225, 380 

Weapons — Continued 

3-inch Stokes, 238 
4.2-inch, 364, 380 
12-inch, 216, 217 
50mm, 314 
60mm, 380 

81mm, 216, 217, 243, 318, 380 
pistols, 1 13 

rifles, 3, 21, 225, 364, 380 

riot type shotguns, 1 1 3 

star shells, 314 

submachine gun, 113, 137 

tanks, 239, 263, 266, 269, 270, 
294-297, 300, 313, 320, 321, 
323-326, 352, 359, 364 
Weitzel, istLt Harry W., 86, 87 
Well, istSgtNoble W., 234 
Welles, Sumner, 97 
West, 1 stSgt William, 86 
West Coast expeditionary forces, 10 1 
West Road, 214 
West Virginia, 4, 18, 19, 23 
Western Carolines, 283 
Western Pacific, 251 
Western Powers, 1 78, 1 79 
Whaling, Col William J., 351 
Whampoa Academy, 125 
Whangpoo River, 120, 123, 130, 143, 

168, 172, 174, 193 
White, 2dLt Thomas B., no 
"White labor movement", 140 
White Russians, 135 
Wilbur, Secretary of the Navy Curtis 
D., in 

Wilkinson, RAdm Theodore S., 245, 

Willcox, Maj Julian P., 131 
Williams, Col Alexander S., 102 
Williams, Capt Charles F., 53 
Williams, Adm Clarence S., 121, 

127-129, 134, 136, 137, 139, 

141, 143 

Williams, Maj Dion, 10; Col, 95, 96, 

Williams, istLt Ernest C, 70-72 


Williams, Capt Francis H. "Joe," 

203, 229, 238, 239 
Williston, North Dakota, 1 1 2 
Wilson, Secretary of Defense Charles 


Wilson, President Woodrow, 12, 14, 

23,34,67, 96 
Dominican policy of, 34, 35, 67 
W T inans, 1st Sgt Roswell, 57, 58; 

LtCol, 1 73 
Windward Passage, 3 1 
Winslow, RAdm Cameron McR., 26 
Wisconsin, 334 
Woosung, 120, 167, 174, 184 
World War I, 150, 243, 351 
World War II, 109, 149, 173, 182, 

186, 195, 25771, 26on, 328, 345, 

346, 349, 357, 364, 365, 383 
Wright, Capt John N., 5 
Wu, Mayor of Shanghai, 153, 156 
Wuchen Bridge, 1 76 
Wyoming, 1 1 2 
Wyoming, 107 

Yaeju Dake, 3 1 8, 328 
Yalu River, 361 

Yangtze Rapid Steamship Company, 

Yangtze River, 120, 131, 174, 178, 

Yangtze River Patrol, 145, 189, 192 

Yangtze River pirates, 1 64 

Yangtze Valley, 121, 124, 126, 141, 

144, 167, 176 
Yaque del Norte River, 37, 41, 47, 51 
Yaqui Indians, 25 
Yaqui Valley, 24 

Yarnell, Adm Harry E., 172, 174, 

175, 183, 189 
Yokohama, 335, 339, 345 
Yokosuka, 348, 354, 371 

Airfield, 337, 340, 341, 344 

British at, 341, 343 

Naval Base, 335, 337, 338, 340, 

U.S. Fleet Shore Activities, 343 
Yonabaru Airfield, 3 1 7 
Yontan Airfield, 285, 289, 291, 292, 

Yucatan Peninsula, 3 1 
Yui, Mayor O.K., 167 
Yuna River, 37 
Yu Ya Ching Road, 1 80 
Yuza Dake, 3 1 7, 328 

Zampa Misaki, 284 
Zapata, Emiliano, 14, 24 
Zapatistas, 17 
Zeilin, 257 






QUANTICOVA 22134-5107 

DEC 5 2005